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In a general combination of labourers to obtain higher wages, success Is 
Impossible^ because the capital out of which the Increased wages are to 
be drawn does not exist. In a partial combination no such Impossibility 
presents Itself, since the Increased wages secured for some merely 
absorbs a larger share of the capital, leaving less to be distributed 
among others.
William Ellis, Lessons on the Phenomena of 
Industrial Life and the Conditions of 
Industrial Success 1854
The doctrine hitherto taught by all or most economists (Including 
myself), which denied It to be possible that trade combinations can raise 
wages, or which limited their operation In that respect to the somewhat 
Q9.rller attainment of a rise which the competition of the market would 
have produced without them, — this doctrine Is deprived of Its scientific 
foundation, and must be thrown aside. The right and wrong of the 
Proceedings of Trades' Unions becomes a common guestlon of prudence and 
social duty, not one which Is peremptorily decided by unbending 
necessities of political economy,
John Stuart Mill, "Thornton on Labour and 
Its claims". Fortnightly Review, 1869
THE WAGES FUND DOCTRINE; A IiAKATOSIAN ANALYSIS 
ABSTRACT
For almost a century the wages fund doctrine existed as an important 
part of Classical economic thought. It formed the theoretical basis of 
the Classical analysis of the labour market, and was employed by 
political economists and popularizers of political economy when 
discussing the role of trades unions, the impact of machinery, the effect 
of the Poor Laws and other policy issues.
This thesis applies the ideas of Imre Lakatos to the history of the 
wages fund doctrine in order to analyze and appraise its development and 
decline. The theoretical framework employed is based on Lakatos' 
methodology of scientific research programmes and the methodology of 
historiographical research programmes. Various elements of this framework 
are then applied to the history of the wages fund doctrine. It is argued 
that the hard core of the wages fund research programme emerged gradually 
in the work of the early Classical writers and was fully formed by the 
1820s. A major counterexample to the programme — the 'monster' of money 
wages — is analyzed using the concepts developed by Lakatos in his Proofs 
and Refutations [1976].
It is argued that the programme made theoretical progress at the hands 
of Ricardo, Senior and Mill but that this progress halted in the 1850s. 
The 1860s saw a major debate concerning the wages fund doctrine prompted 
the events of that decade, and this debate is analyzed in detail using 
the tools and concepts of the Lakatosian framework. The thesis rationally 
reconstructs the wages fund doctrine and the recantataion debate as 
'scientific' and provides evidence that the methodology of 
historiographical research programmes continues to make theoretical 
progress.
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I.* Introduction 1
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: THE WAGES FUND DOCTRINE, MILL'S RECANTATION AND 
THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT
In 1867 W T Thornton wrote an article for the Fortnightly 
Review which began by quoting Proudhon's famous declaration, 
'la propriété c'est le vol'[1867, p477], Thornton's piece was 
entitled "Stray Chapters From a Forthcoming Work On Labour" 
and in it he explored the wide question of a man's right to 
live by labour. In the book itself On Labour which appeared 
in 1869 Thornton presented a critique of supply and demand 
analysis, an appraisal of the union movement and a discussion 
of the future of 'labour and capital in alliance' which, he 
argued, lay in the development of industrial partnership and 
the cooperative movement. John Stuart Mill reviewed the book 
in the Fortnightly Review for May and June 1869, and in this 
review he made his famous recantation from the wages fund 
doctrine. Mill sketched out what he perceived this doctrine 
to be:
"There is supposed to be, at any given instant, a sum of wealth, which is 
unconditionally devoted to the payment of wages of labour. This sum is 
not regarded as unalterable, for it is augmented by saving, and increases 
with the progress of wealth; but it is reasoned upon as at any given 
moment a predetermined amount. More than that amount it is assumed that 
the wages-receiving class cannot possibly divide among them; that amount, 
and no less, they cannot but obtain. So that, the sum to be divided being 
fixed, the wages of each depend solely on the divisor, the number of 
participants, in this doctrine it is by implication affirmed, that the 
demand for labour not only increases with cheapness, but increases in 
exact proportion to it, the same aggregate sum being paid for labour 
whatever its price may be" [1869, p515].
Mill then went on to attack the theory, arguing that the 
demand for labour does not increase with cheapness, and that 
the wages fund is not predetermined. Mill was quick to point 
out that on the supply side 'the law as laid down by 
economists remains intact' [1869, p517] and that Thornton had 
not damaged the population principle. This was not the case
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with regard to the labour question however, and it was in 
this context that Mill produced his famous recantation
statement;
"The doctrine hitherto taught by all or most economists (including
myself), which denied it to be possible that trade combinations can raise
wages, or which limited their operation in that respect to the somewhat 
Garlier attainment of a rise which the competition of the market would 
have produced without them, - this doctrine is deprived of its scientific 
foundation, and must be thrown aside. The right and wrong of the 
proceedings of Trades' Unions becomes a common question of prudence and 
social duty, not one which is peremptorily decided by unbending
necessities of political economy." [1869, p517-518]
Thus in a few short paragraphs Mill apparently disposed of 
a central tenet of Classical economics and one which had a 
long history. Elements of the wages fund doctrine are to be 
found in the Wealth of Nations in 1776 and articles 
attempting to defend it were still being produced over a 
hundred years later.  ^ During the intervening century the 
wages fund doctrine began to take shape in the work of the 
early Classical writers and was given precision and rigidity 
by Malthus in 1798 and McCulloch in 1825. On the one hand it 
was popularized by Marcet [1816] and Martineau [1832] among 
others, and employed in more vulgar forms in political 
debates; on the other, it was also used much more carefully 
and technically by the Classical economists to produce a wide 
range of economic predictions. Mill's recantation came at the 
end of a decade of change for the British trades union 
movement; the decade which spawned the debate concerning the 
wages fund doctrine beginning with the work of Fawcett [1860] 
and including the critiques of Longe [1866] and most 
importantly Thornton [1869].
It is not surprising that the recantation has held an 
important place in the history of economic thought, for in
 ^ see for example the articles by Sumner [1882] and Bonar [1891], 
referred to in chapter seven below pl31.
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recanting. Mill was not rejecting an obscure idea but an 
important element of Classical economics and one which had 
had a long and rich history. The events of 1869 have been 
taken as a powerful symbol of the break up and decline of 
Classical economics, and indeed, viewed with hindsight, the 
recantation, with the marginal revolution only two years 
away, appears as a sign of degeneration. Also the recantation 
is a rare, if not unique, example of a major writer 
rejecting an important piece of theory which he 
apparently once held so dear. Moreover, the recantation was 
very influential. Apart from one or two attempts to revive it 
the doctrine was effectively abandoned from Mill's 
recantation onwards. Rarely in the history of economics has a 
change of mind had such consequences.
For my thesis the recantation is both a beginning and an 
end. It is a beginning because the recantation of a key part 
of Classical theory by the leading economist of the day poses 
a number of questions in the history of economic thought. Why 
did Mill reject the theory at the time that he did? Was it an 
aberration on his part? Was he misguided by his friendship 
with Thornton or was he acting rationally in rejecting a 
theory which was already degenerating ? In order to answer 
these questions what is required is an examination of the 
the development and decline of the wages fund doctrine using 
a theoretical apparatus suitable to the task. In this sense 
the recantation episode prompts an analysis of the doctrine 
as a whole. The recantation is also an end for the thesis for 
effectively marked the end of the doctrine. The doctrine 
was not immediately abandoned, and some attention will be 
to the attempts by Cairnes and others to defend it, but
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nevertheless the doctrine never recovered from Mill's 
onslaught.
So far I have focused on the short run wage fund theory 
and the recantation. The Classical economists of course also 
had developed a long run theory of wage determination which 
related the rate of change of the wage rate to the rates of 
change of the capital stock and population. This long run 
theory must be distinguished from population theory in which 
the rate of change in the population is the dependent 
variable and which is related to a number of factors. The 
wages fund doctrine and the long run wage theory were closely 
linked, and Classical economists often passed from one to the 
other without pause or comment. Given this and given that the 
long run theory involves changes in the wages fund I propose 
to use the term 'wages fund doctrine ' to apply to short run 
and long versions of the Classical theory of wage 
determination,^  and in chapter three I will carefully spell 
out the various versions of the wages fund doctrine and their 
relationship with population theory.
The wages fund doctrine has been subjected to careful 
analysis and differing interpretations in the history of 
economic thought. Pigou [1949, ppl71-180] took issue with the
In doing so I am engaging in a preliminary piece of rational 
reconstruction, for it is conventional to use the term 'wages fund 
doctrine' to refer only to the short run doctrine. There are two reasons, 
however, for using 'the wages fund doctrine' as a generic term. First, 
from the point of view of a rational reconstruction the term is 
appropriate; the short run and long run theories are logically related 
and both make use of the wages fund, or changes in it, to explain the 
wage rate, or changes in it. Secondly, from an historical point of view, 
the Classical economists often went from the short run to the long run 
without explicitly acknowledging the change of time scale, and they often 
talked in terms of a two period analysis where the wages fund could alter 
from one production period to another. It seems appropriate therefore to 
use the notion of the 'wages fund doctrine' and its offspring the 'wages 
fund research programme' to apply to the analysis as a whole, pointing 
out within this the importance of the various time scales - see chapter 
three below pp51-57.
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predetermined nature of the short run wages fund and with the 
point input-point output production processes implicit in the 
analysis. Breit [1967, pp511-528] argued that perhaps Mill 
never really understood the wages fund doctrine, and that he 
fGil into a hopeless confusion between money and real wages 
in the recantation. Hollander [1968, pp320-341] originally 
Grgued that Mill came to realize that it was not possible to 
^Gintain the naive 'orthodox' notion of the short run wages 
fund as a fixed pre—determined quantity of wage goods, within 
the context of the normal Classical assumption of fixed and 
constant capital—labour coefficients in the production 
sector• Hollander subsequently revised his view and argued 
that Mill ' s recantation was based on Mill ' s view of the 
demand for labour as derived demand [1974, pp87-98]. Ekelund 
[1968, pp66-86] rejected Hollander's earlier view and argued 
that the source of Mill's recantation position was a 
confusion in his thinking between the notion of a 'money 
wages fund' which could be varied and a 'real wages fund' 
which in the short run could not. Schwartz [1972, pp90-101] 
Grgued that Mill's recantation rested on the rejection of the 
Classical discontinuous production function. West and Hafer 
[1978, pp603-619] also rejected Hollander's original position 
and maintained that the main emphasis in Mill's review of 
Thornton was his analysis of the way in which unions could 
protect their members from the effects of the Malthusian 
population response. Vint [1981, pp71-88] argued that the
weakness with Ekelund's approach is that it ignored luxury 
consumption by workers, and that Hollander's arguments 
concerning an inelastic labour demand curve can be 
incorporated within a two sector interpretation. Negishi
1 : Introduction 6
[1986, pp567-577] has argued that Mill's recantation must be 
seen in the context of an analysis by Thornton of 
disequilibrium trading « Forget [1990, pp33—35] argued that 
Mill s recantation was prompted by a desire to change the 
attitudes of the middle classes towards the interests of 
workers.
What none of these studies do is to establish a clear 
framework within which to consider the development and 
decline of the wages fund doctrine as a whole. The doctrine 
had a period of genesis, a period of successful existence and 
^ period of degeneration, refutation and abandonment, and 
what is required is a framework comprising a set of concepts 
and tools which will enable us to trace through this process 
in the hope of producing a new and improved history and 
understanding. The work of Imre Lakatos on mathematical 
conjectures and refutations [1976] and on the methodology of 
GGientific research programmes [1970] provides such a 
framework. It is the aim of this thesis to use a Lakatosian 
framework to rationally reconstruct the history of the wages 
fund doctrine. Such a reconstruction will produce a new and 
interesting history and provide evidence for the rationality 
of the Classical economists in both adhering to and then 
abandoning the doctrine. In addition, the reconstruction will 
constitute an important historical novel fact which will 
provide fresh support for Lakatos' meta-methodolgy - the 
methodology of historiographical research programmes.
In the next chapter I will take up the methodological 
issues and examine the basis for a Lakatosian approach in 
inore detail. In chapter three I will outline the 'hard core' 
of the wages fund research programme and explore the extent
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to which such a hard core was apparent in the work of the 
early Classical writers. Chapter four examines the dichotomy 
between real and money conceptions of the wages fund doctrine 
and, making use of concepts developed by Lakatos in Proofs 
Gjid— Refutations [1976], I will examine the strategy adopted 
by Malthus and McCulloch in order to defend the doctrine from 
the Lakatosian 'monster' of money. This chapter also examines 
some early criticisms of the doctrine, and I will argue that 
despite the existence of the dichotomy between real and money 
funds these early criticisms made no impact. In chapter five 
^ ^ill explore the extent to which the programme made
theoretical progress. I will argue that it was very
productive of novel facts although few of them were
empirically corroborated, and that this theoretical progress 
accounts for the doctrine's longevity despite the dichotomy 
outlined in chapter four. Chapters six and seven present a 
^^•^^^Gal examination in Lakatosian terms of the wages fund 
debate in the 1860s. Chapter six again employs the tools of 
— ând— Refutations, this time in order to examine the 
Thornton-Mill debate on supply and demand. I will argue that 
Mill carefully and cautiously defended supply and demand 
theory against the potential counterexamples of Thornton. 
Mill, however, did concede that the labour market was one of 
Thornton s exceptions where supply and demand theory may be 
problematic, and this provided the link with the wages fund 
debate. Chapter seven presents a Lakatosian appraisal of 
Longe, Thornton and Mill's criticisms of the wages fund
doctrine. I will argue that Mill put forward two powerful 
arguments against the hard core and was clearly unwilling to 
employ the 'McCulloch defence' discussed in chapter four. The
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fact that Mill did not immediately abandon the doctrine in 
the 1871 edition of the Principles, and that Cairnes and
others defended it, I will argue, is also evidence for
Lakatosian processes at work. Chapter eight presents some
conclusions on my rational reconstruction of the wages fund 
doctrine, and its significance for Lakatos' methodology of 
historiographical research programmes and for the history of 
economic thought.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE METHODOLOGY OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH PROGRAMMES AND
RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION 
I Introduction
Post-Popperian developments in the philosophy of science have 
generated a very productive debate on the methodology of 
economics, and this debate has in turn had some important 
consequences for the history of economic thought.  ^ As de
Marchi[1988, pi] has recently noted, in the days of the
logical positivists the main concern of philosophers of 
science was with meaning and not knowledge; consequently, 
philosophers of science were uninterested in the activities 
of scientists.^  However, later approaches to the philosophy 
of science, as found in the work of Kuhn [1970a] and Lakatos 
[1970] for example, did raise questions about what scientists 
actually did, and thus economic methodologists looked to the 
history of economics for evidence. This development in turn 
served to invigorate the history of economic thought as
historians of economics found themselves presented with 
promising new sets of concepts and tools with which to work. 
This was particularly true in the case of the Lakatosian 
approach, which has been applied to a number of episodes in 
the history of economics.  ^ These days, then, historians of 
economics and economic methodologists are interested in the
 ^ See Blaug[1980], Caldwell[1982], de Marchi[1988] and Klant[1984] for 
discussion of recent methodological developments and their impact on 
economics.
 ^ See Caldwell[1982 ppl-63] for a clear discussion of the development 
logical positivism, logical empiricism and Popper's methodological 
falsificationism; also Blaug[1980 pp94-156] and Pheby[1988 ppl-36] for a 
discussion of the impact of positivism on economics.
3 see for example, Blaug [1976, 1980], Latsis [1976], de Marchi [1976], 
Fisher [1986], Fulton [1984], O'Brien [1976], Remenyi [1979], Weintraub 
[1985].
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past ideas and activities of economists in order, in varying 
degrees, to test the descriptive power and the heuristic 
capabilities of the approaches they have developed.
The work of Lakatos, comprising the methodology of 
scientific research programmes (MSRP) and the methodology of 
historiographical research programmes (MHRP), has been one of 
the most important focal points of the post-Popperian debate 
in economic thought and methodology. This has been the case 
for two reasons. First, as I have already noted, Lakatosian 
methodology brought powerful new analytical concepts and 
tools. Secondly, and more importantly, it was in Lakatos' 
work that the tensions between descriptive history of ideas 
and prescriptive methodology were very sharply demonstrated 
and utilized. With regard to this second point the question 
arises as to whether either the history of science or 
methodological analysis could be successfully carried out in 
the absence of the other. There are strong grounds for 
arguing that the answer to this question is no. First, as 
Caldwell [1982, p229] has argued, a purely prescriptive
methodology which is not related to actual scientific 
practices will not be followed by scientists. Secondly, as 
Blaug[1980, p33] notes, historians of science will be bound 
to tell their histories in one way rather than another, and 
the choices that they make are determined by their underlying 
views concerning the nature of scientific explanation.  ^
History and methodology then are necessary for each other. As
Blaug[1980, p33] argues that the notion that the history of science 
can be written without reference to methodology is an example of the myth 
of induction at work in the writing of intellectual history; a purely 
inductive history is not possible because we must choose some 
observations and not others, and these choices are made with the use of 
theory.
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Lakatos himself put it recasting Kant's dictum: 'Philosophy
of science without history of science is empty; history of 
science without philosophy of science is blind.'[1971, p91]^ 
It was Lakatos' intention to develop an approach to 
methodology which would combine descriptive history with 
prescriptive methodology in a coherent and rigourous manner.^
In this thesis I will be applying a Lakatosian analysis to 
the Classical wages fund doctrine. I will be making full use 
of the range of tools and concepts which Lakatos developed, 
and will argue that the history that I will produce firmly 
supports a Lakatosian view of the growth of knowledge. To 
this extent the historical analysis has a methodological 
objective. The framework that I will be developing will 
however entail some modifications and qualifications to 
Lakatos' original argument. These relate primarily to the 
notions of hard core and novel facts and I will discuss these 
in later chapters.
Turning to the subject matter of the thesis, the wages 
fund doctrine does not exist in modern theory and would be 
regarded as an error or detour in the development of 
economics by anyone employing a grid or transverse analysis. 
In such an analysis the past is interpreted with the aid of 
modern concepts in order to determine which aspects of past 
doctrines are correct and which are not.^ Yet during the
 ^ See Weintraub [ 1990] for the contrary view that in economics, 
methodology can have nothing to say about practice, but the history of 
economic thought might.
 ^ This position is developed by Lakatos in his "History of science and 
Its Rational Reconstructions" in R Buck and R Cohen, PSA 1970; In Memory 
of Rudolf Carnap; Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Vol. VIII, 
1971, pp91-136. This contribution appeared later in J Worall and G Currie 
(Eds), Imre Lakatos - Philosophical Papers. Vol. 1, [1978, ppl02-138].
 ^ For example Schumpeter interpreted Ricardian economics as a 'detour' 
[1954, p474] in the development of the science on the grounds that he
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period from the time of Adam Smith to the Marginal Revolution 
wage analysis stood at the very centre of Classical economic 
theory. Throughout the nineteenth century the wages fund 
research programme grew and changed, was exploited for 
political ends, was attacked, defended and finally abandoned. 
A history of the wages fund doctrine must try to encapsulate 
some of these features within a framework that will 
facilitate the exploration and examination of the forces and 
tensions at work.
A modified Lakatosian framework will enable me to carry 
out the sort of history which I have just outlined. As I will 
argue below, the framework contains a vocabulary and a set of 
concepts which will enable me to deal with the development, 
maturation and decline of ideas. The wages fund doctrine 
flourished for much of the nineteenth century despite 
external criticism and internal inconsistencies, and the 
Lakatosian approach provides the appropriate conceptual 
framework to deal with these aspects as well as the later 
refutation, recantation and rejection.
The Lakatosian approach is also capable of dealing with 
the appropriate level of analysis. In this case I am seeking 
to understand the development of a particular doctrine and 
would thus wish to avoid any framework which operates on a 
bigger scale dealing with broader movements in economics - 
Classicism, Neoclassicism, Keynesianism or Monetarism for 
example. Lakatos' approach has often been used on the larger 
scale to deal with Classical or Keynesian economics as 
research programmes, but as I shall argue below it is
believed in the labour theory of value, which in Schumpeter's view is 
erroneous. See Fisher [1986, pp57-59] for a discussion of the problems 
with the transverse approach.
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possible to employ a version of the Lakatosian framework at 
the level of particular doctrines.
So far I have outlined some of the key features of a 
useful analytical framework and have established a prima 
facie case for the employment of some form of Lakatosian 
approach. In the rest of the chapter, I will outline and 
discuss Lakatos' methodology of scientific research 
programmes (MSRP) and the related methodology of 
historiographical research programmes (MHRP) in order to 
establish some of their strengths and weaknesses, and the 
extent to which in a modified form they may meet the 
objectives outlined above.
For my purposes Lakatos ' work can best be examined in 
three sections. In section II of this chapter I will examine 
the concepts of the 'research programme', 'hard core', 
'positive and negative heuristics', and 'protective belt'; 
these are the structural elements of MSRP. Section III 
presents a discussion of the processes of theoretical change 
engendered by the responses which scientists make when 
confronted by counterexamples to theories. This analysis 
derives from Lakatos' early work on mathematics written in
the 1960s and published later as Proofs and
Refutations F1976]. In section IV I will examine the notions 
of scientific progress and decline developed in Lakatos' 
later work on MSRP. Finally, in section V I will examine 
Lakatos' methodology of historical research programmes and 
the history of science.
II MSRP; The Elements of the Framework
Imre Lakatos' methodological work known as the Methodology 
of Scientific Research Programmes (MSRP) was first developed
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in his doctoral thesis which later appeared in four parts in 
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science [1963-64], 
and in Proofs and Refutations [1976]. The approach was 
further developed in his article "Falsification and the 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes" in Criticism 
and The Growth of Knowledge, edited by Lakatos and A. 
Musgrave [1970]. In his earlier work in Proofs and 
Refutations he was primarily concerned with the logic of 
scientific discovery or the ways in which mathematical 
conjectures faced with counterexamples could be defended or 
extended to incorporate the examples. In the later work he 
built upon the earlier analysis and developed a methodology 
of scientific research programmes (MSRP) in which the focus 
was the progress or decline of research programmes. A 
research programme was defined as a series of theories 
related to a common 'hard core' and comprised a 'protective 
belt', and 'positive and negative heuristics' and it is 
these features which I will now briefly outline in the rest 
of this section.
According to Lakatos, theories are connected by a 
continuity - 'reminiscent of Kuhnian normal science' - and
form research programmes [1970, pl32]. A research programme 
is characterized by a negative and a positive heuristic. The 
negative heuristic is the hard core of the programme - a set 
of principles to which all those working in that programme 
subscribe.® The negative heuristic of the research programme 
directs scientists to divert criticism and testing away from
® Berkson [1976, pp52-53] has argued that there is no general support 
for the notion of the 'hard core'. He argues that the history of field 
theory in the nineteenth century shows that scientists were able to make 
independent judgments about what was fundamental.
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these central hard core principles on to the 'protective 
belt ' of auxiliary, observational hypotheses and initial 
conditions. Thus as Lakatos puts it "...the core is 
'irrefutable' by the methodological decision of its 
protagonists" [1970, pl33]. This would seem to imply that the 
core is not necessarily irrefutable in a logical sense but is 
accepted as irrefutable by members of the research programme. 
Others have seen this point slightly differently however. For 
example, Leijohnhufvud [1976] has interpreted Lakatos' notion 
of hard core to mean a proposition which is logically 
irrefutable and I shall return to this point later.^
In addition to the negative heuristic, Lakatos argues that 
every programme will have a positive heuristic which he 
argues '...consists of a partly articulated set of 
suggestions or hints on how to change, develop the refutable 
variants of the research programme, how to modify, 
sophisticate, the "refutable" protective belt' [1970, pl3 5]. 
This positive heuristic gives some order to the research. The 
anomalies or counter-evidence cannot all be dealt with at 
once, nor are they dealt with in random order. Rather, the 
scientist knows in advance what his or her research policy 
will be. The positive heuristic will spell out in advance the 
refutations of the theories produced by the programme and 
will set out a strategy for dealing with them. This will 
involve a spelling out of the development path of the
 ^ The two principal examples which Lakatos gives of research programmes 
^re those of Newton and Bohr. In Newton's work the hard core consisted of 
the three laws of dynamics and the law of gravitation, while in Bohr's 
work on light emission there were five postulates concerning energy 
radiation in simple atomic systems. These laws, postulates or axioms then 
are regarded as irrefutable by supporters of the programme and attention 
is directed to a whole series of hypotheses derived from the core 
propositions.
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research programme which it is hoped in the end will result 
in these refutations being turned into corroborations. This 
then renders invalid the naive falsificationist's view that 
as soon as a theory is refuted by testing it must be 
abandoned, and replaces it by a new view of the progress of 
science based on a more sophisticated falsificationism.
Ill Counterexamples and Theoretical Change
Lakatos dealt with the processes of theoretical change and 
innovation in two different but related formats. In Proofs 
and Refutations the emphasis was on defence. What strategies 
did scientists adopt when defending theories against 
potential counterexamples, and what were the consequences of 
these strategies? The optimal outcome was one which would 
increase the content or scope of the theory by incorporating 
the counterexamples within it, as we shall see. In the MSRP 
the emphasis was on innovation in the form of the production 
of 'novel facts' but here again crucial importance was 
attached to increasing content. Thus those research 
programmes which continued to increase their content via the 
production of novel facts were scientific; those which failed 
to do so were not. I will discuss each of these approaches to 
theoretical change in turn.
Lakatos' initial contribution in Proofs and Refutations 
focused on the ways in which a mathematical conjecture 
(prediction) could be defended against counterexamples or 
modified to take account of them. This work formed a 
foundation-stone of Lakatos' whole approach because it 
discussed ways in which the consequences of counterevidence 
may be resisted or postponed. It is this resistance or 
postponement which distinguishes the 'sophisticated'
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falsificationism of Lakatos from the 'dogmatic' 
falsificationism of Popper in which counterexamples 
immediately result in the abandonment of theories. In this 
early work Lakatos was considering questions concerning 
mathematical discovery, but it is clear that the arguments 
presented are relevant to and underpin the later work on MSRP 
which is meant to be a model applicable to all science. Thus 
although there are few references to the earlier work in the 
MSRP article Lakatos does make it clear in a footnote that 
the earlier work can be seen as a 'detailed case study' of 
the arguments being put forward concerning research 
programmes, although the notion of a research programme had 
not been developed at the time of writing Proofs and 
Refutations.
Most economists who have applied Lakatos' method to 
economics have paid little if any attention to the early work 
with the result that much of the debate has focused on the 
subsequent and later questions of what constitutes the hard 
core, the protective belt and so on.^ What this has meant in 
general terms is that little effort has been spent in 
examining in detail the strategies of defence and 
consolidation that economists, like other scientists, have 
engaged in.
Lakatos' book Proofs and Refutations takes the form of a 
discussion about aspects of mathematics and the terminology 
is a little different from that usually encountered by 
economists in dealing with methodology. It will be useful
See Lakatos [1970, pl35, nl].
One exception is Fisher [198 
some of the other studies in later sections.
6]. I will return to various aspects of
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therefore to follow Fisher's relabelling of Lakatos' 
c o n c e p t s . T h u s  for Lakatos the logic of mathematical 
discovery rests on the development of a collection of lemmas 
(postulates, assumptions) which can be combined together to 
form a proof the conclusions of which form a conjecture. 
Fisher proposes to substitute the idea that the logic of 
scientific discovery is based on the development of a number 
of lemmas which can be combined together to form a 
demonstration the conclusions of which form a theorem or more 
loosely a prediction. He also argues that typically we will 
be dealing with more than one theorem at a time (unlike 
Lakatos in Proofs ) and proposes the notion of a 'model ' which 
comprises a number of lemmas, demonstrations and consequent 
theorems or predictions [1986, ppl2-13].
Three features of Lakatos' work are worth noting before 
discussing his analysis of particular strategies open to 
scientists. First the approach is based upon the notion of 
falsificationism in that we can infer nothing about the 
status of a theorem from evidence which corroborates it but 
we can make inferences from evidence which falsifies it. Thus 
an observation which contradicts a theorem or prediction 
implies that (1 ) an auxiliary theorem is false, (2 ) the 
stated initial conditions are false or (3 ) one of the lemmas 
of the model is false. Secondly, Lakatos' work assumes the 
use of a type of inference called the modus tollens or the 
principle of the retransmission of falsity which says that 
the existence of a counterexample where the auxiliary 
theories and initial conditions are accepted as true implies
2^ See Fisher [1986, ppl2-13].
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that one of the lemmas of the theorem is false. In other 
words the existence of a global counterexample (which is a 
counterexample to a theorem) implies the existence of a local 
counterexample (which is a counterexample to a l e m m a ) . ^ ^  
Thirdly, as Lakatos points out [1976, pp42-47], the existence 
of a global counterexample or 'monster' without a 
corresponding local counterexample is due to lack of rigour. 
This can be remedied by discovering the implicit lemma that 
provides the local counterexample (this will be discussed 
more fully below in dealing with the response of lemma- 
incorporation).
In Proofs and Refutations Lakatos classifies responses to 
such counterexamples or 'monsters' according to whether they 
result in a decrease or an increase in content. Altogether 
five content-decreasing responses are identified - (a)
surrender (b) monster-barring (c) monster-adjustment (d) 
exception-barring (e) lemma-incorporation. According to 
Lakatos, surrender takes place if in the face of a global 
counterexample a theory or model is abandoned [1976, ppl3- 
1 4 ] . It is a central thrust of Lakatos' work that this in 
fact does not typically happen in the development of science. 
There is much work to be lost in throwing out the whole of a 
particular project, and scientists are reluctant to abandon
Modus tollens passes falsity backwards from the conclusions to one or 
more of the assumptions of a theory. Modus ponens is the form of argument 
where the truth of a conclusion is argued from the truth of the 
assumptions; truth is here passed forward from the assumptions to the 
conclusions, see Boland[1979, pp503-505] for further discussion of modus 
tollens and modus ponens, and their significance for the realism of 
assumptions debate in economics.
14 The example that Fisher gives of this in economics is that of the 
'discovery' of the upward sloping demand curve as a global counterexample 
to Walrasian economics which predicts that all demand curves are downward 
sloping, surrender here would mean the abandonment of all Walrasian 
economics and would be a good example of 'dogmatic f alsif icationism ' at 
work in economics.
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theories in the absence of any alternatives.^^ 'Monster- 
barring' refers to the process by which definitions are 
respecified so that the 'monster' - the counterexample - is 
barred on the grounds that it does not meet the specification 
of the model [1976, ppl4-24].l^ The scientist who employs the 
technique of 'monster-adjustment ' reinterprets the 
counterexample as consistent with the theory [1976, pp30-
33].17
With the strategies of 'exception-barring' and 'lemma- 
incorporation ' more effort is made to take the counterexample 
seriously than with the previous two techniques. The 
exception-barrer will provide a list of exceptions to the 
theory [1976, pp24-30].l® The problem with this is that the 
demonstration or proof of the old theory no longer applies to 
the new. This problem is overcome in the technique of 'lemma- 
incorporation ' [1976, pp33-42]. Here when faced with a global
15 Fisher refers to the wages fund issue in this context arguing that 
attacks on the doctrine did not result in the 'failure' of Classical 
economics which only came about as a result of the rise of marginalism 
[1986, pl4]. However, it is not quite clear what is meant by 'failure' 
here. Fisher is presumably not talking about abandonment for important 
parts of Classical theory survived into the twentieth century to confront 
Keynes and if he is not talking about abandonment it is hard to see the 
relevance of this to the question of surrender. The problem that Fisher 
is running up against here is the issue of the level at which Lakatos' 
approach is most appropriately applied, it is a major argument in this 
thesis (see below pp43-49) that the most appropriate level is that of 
particular doctrines and in those terms the question of the abandonment 
of Classical wage theory (as opposed to all Classical economics) is 
problematic.
The example that Fisher provides of this in the work of Jevons is 
where he defines a market as perfectly competitive which, since his 
theory is only meant to apply to markets, 'bars' the monster of monopoly 
[1986, ppl76-178].
1^  Thus in Jevons ' work substitute commodities are potential 
counterexamples to the equations of exchange. Jevons deals with this by 
re -interpreting substitutes as one homogeneous commodity of variable 
strength which brings them within the scope of the theory, see 
Fisher[1986, pl62].
1® Fisher [1986, pl62] argues that Jevons took this approach when
dealing with his "Failures of the Equations of Exchange", where cases of 
indivisibility were pointed out as anomalous.
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counterexample the scientist searches for the lemma which 
will provide the local counterexample. 1^  Now the old proof 
still works for the new theorem. The new theorem is more 
limited of course - there has been some loss in content but 
this has been kept to a minimum compared with the result that 
may have obtained by exception-barring 2®
All of these strategies then suffer from weaknesses. The 
method of surrender leads to total abandonment of a theory 
which could possibly be saved by further theoretical 
adjustment. Monster-barring and monster-adjustment inhibit 
the growth of theories because the criticism offered by the 
counterexample is muted and hidden either in a change of 
definitions or empirical reinterpretation. Exception-barring 
has some merit in that the implications of the counterexample 
are not avoided but at the same time the proof is weakened. 
Lemma-incorporation is the 'least-worst' of these strategies 
in that the proof is retained albeit with some reduction in 
content. Thus not all the predictive power of the old theory 
survives the addition of the lemma.
None of these strategies is as satisfactory as those 
which increase the content of a theory by adjusting the 
theoretical arguments in such a way that the counterexample 
is turned into a corroboration of the theory. Such content- 
increasing responses may be undertaken by replacing the lemma
Thus with the Gif fen good case referred to earlier, the lemma to 
which the global counterexample is a local counterexample is revealed to 
be the assumption of an additive utility function. The incorporation of 
this lemma gives the improved but more limited theorem 'the demand curves 
of individuals with additive utility functions are downward sloping', see 
Fisher[1986 pl6 ].
20 Thus exception-barring may have led to the theorem 'the demand curves 
for normal goods are downward sloping'[1986, pl6 ]. This latter 
proposition is of course more limited in that the demand curves for most 
inferior goods are downward sloping.
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that provided the local counterexample, adding auxiliary 
hypotheses or making semantic changes such as concept- 
stretching where the meaning of terms is expanded.21 The new 
theory then explains the counterexample while retaining the 
former unrefuted content.
This early work of Lakatos in Proofs is very important for 
i t  underpins his later c o n t r i b u t i o n s 2 2  and will provide us 
with some useful concepts with which to approach the ways in 
which Classical wage theory was rendered immune from
attacks.22
IV Progressive and Degenerative Problemshifts
The aim of Lakatos' work in his "Falsification and the 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes"[1970]24 was to 
produce an approach to the philosophy of science which he 
called sophisticated falsificationism in order to improve on
The example that Fisher gives of this refers back again to the Gif fen 
case [1986, pl7 ]. We saw when dealing with lemma-incorporation that the 
addition of the assumption of an additive utility function deals with the 
counterexample (the upward sloping demand curve) by limiting the new 
theory to apply to only those individuals with additive utility 
functions. If this lemma is now replaced by a general utility function 
the theory predicts both downward and upward sloping demand curves under 
certain conditions,
22 See Toulmin [1976, pp656-662] for a discussion of the similarities 
and differences between Lakatos' work in Proofs and Refutations and the 
later work on MSRP.
22 See Marchi [1980, pp445-458] for a detailed discussion of the way in 
which Lakatos explains how proofs and refutations can be used together to 
improve refuted or even unrefuted conjectures. Marchi argued that a major 
weakness in Lakatos ' approach is that it has a poor theory of what counts 
as a problem - any conflict between theory and fact is assumed to be a 
problem, whereas historical evidence from mathematics shows that 
'conflict between theory and fact is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
reason for a problem being chosen as research' [1980, p454]. She also 
argues that Lakatos' approach cannot explain which problems are important 
and which are not. Following Agassi [1975, pp208-210], she argues that, 
historically, metaphysics has been used as one way of choosing problems 
[Marchi, 1980, p454]. See also Marchi [1976, pp387-393] for a discussion 
of some of the difficulties associated with Lakatos' approach to 
mathematical growth in Proofs and Refutations.
24 This paper developed Lakatos' earlier article "Criticism and the 
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes", Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, ns, vol LXIX, [1968, ppl49-186].
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the earlier 'dogmatic' and 'methodological' falsificationism 
of Popper[1970, p93].25
Falsif icationism in its dogmatic form assumes that
theories can be disproved by the facts, and that scientific 
honesty demands that theories should be specified in such a 
that they can be falsified. That is to say that they
should be constructed in such a way as to forbid certain
observations. If such observations are found then the theory 
is falsified. Once falsified the dogmatic falsificationist 
would demand the theory be immediately abandoned. A key
weakness with this approach is that it assumes that there is 
what Lakatos calls a 'natural, psychological borderline 
between theoretical or speculative propositions on the one 
hand and factual or observational (or basic) statements on 
the other'[1970, p97]. But such a natural demarcation does 
not in fact exist. Many important observations of science, 
G&Iilëo's observations of mountains on the moon for example, 
depend upon instruments (the telescope) and theories (the 
optical theory of the telescope). Even where no such formal 
theory is involved and where one may be tempted to argue that 
all that is required is a mind passive and empty waiting to 
receive observational inputs, the argument would still not 
hold for, as Lakatos put it, there can be 'no sensations 
unimpregnated by expectations'[1970, p99]. There is a second 
major weakness with the approach and that is that even if we 
could 'naturally' separate theory from observation many of 
the 'most admired scientific theories simply fail to forbid
25 For a critical review of Lakatos' work see Finocchiaro [1973, pp357- 
373], Hacking [1979, pp381-410], and Adler and Elgin [1980, pp411-420].
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any observable state of affairs'[1970, plOO].^^ Also some 
scientific theories (and most in economics) are specified 
together with ceteris paribus clauses which means that by 
replacing the ceteris paribus clause with a different one, 
theories can always be retained in the face of 
counterevidence.2?
These weaknesses led Popper to develop what has become
known as 'methodological falsificationism' beginning with
Loqik der ForschunaF1934]. later translated as The Logic of
Scientific Discovery in 1959. He realized that single
refutations or counterexamples should not be sufficient to 
overthrow theories, but that some limits needed to be set 
concerning the ways in which theories could be safeguarded 
from criticism. He therefore proposed some methodological 
rules relating to the employment of conventional strategems 
in defence of theories. The result he produced was a
sophisticated integration of falsificationism and 
conventionalism. A theory will no longer be abandoned when 
falsified by a test. Modifications are allowed but Popper 
outlines the dangers of adopting conventionalist strategems. 
These he identifies as adding ad hoc hypotheses, modifying 
assumptions or adopting a sceptical view of the theoretician 
or experimenter. The danger of adopting conventionalist 
strategems is of course that no theories are ever likely to
The example that Lakatos uses here involves Newton's mechanics and 
the law of gravitation. These can be employed to calculate the paths of 
pl3-uets. If such calculations were carried out for a newly discovered 
planet and if it were discovered that the planet deviated from the 
predicted path, would Newton's dynamics and theory of gravitation now be 
^andoned? ^ The answer Lakatos suggests would be no. Scientists would 
invent auxiliary hypotheses such as the existence of another invisible 
and unknown planet to account for the anomaly, see Lakatos[1970, pplOO-
27 see Lakatos [1970, plOl].
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be rejected and poor theories can be retained in the face of 
the counterevidence. What is needed. Popper argues, are some 
rules which will enable the scientist In advance of the test 
to decide what stratagems would be acceptable and what the 
conditions are for the rejection of the hypothesis. For 
example he proposes that:
"As regards auxiliary hypotheses we decide to lay down the rule that only 
those are acceptable whose introduction does not diminish the degree of 
falsifiability or testability of the system in question, but on the 
contrary, increases it" [1959, pp82-83].
Later in the same chapter he argues that:
" ...a few stray basic statements contradicting a theory will hardly 
induce us to reject it as falsified. We shall take it as falsified only 
is we discover a reproducible effect which refutes the theory. In other 
words, we only accept the falsification if a low-level empirical 
hypothesis which describes such an effect is proposed and corroborated. 
This kind of hypothesis may be called a falsifying hypothesis” [1959, 
PP86-87].
There are a number of such rules outlined in The Logic of 
Scientific Discoverv. 28
While this is a significant improvement over dogmatic 
falsificationism there are two principal weaknesses, 
according to Lakatos, which it still shares with the dogmatic 
version. First, it suggests that science is a 'two-cornered 
fight' between theory and experiment whereas the history of 
science shows that tests are usually 'at least three-cornered 
fights between rival theories and experiment'[1970, pll5]. 
Secondly, it still remains that the only interesting 
conclusions are refutations of theories whereas in practice 
many interesting experiments result in the confirmation of 
theories [1970, pll5]. The solution to these problems, 
according to Lakatos, is to build upon the work of Popper, 
attempt to further reduce the element of conventionalism
28 For a complete list of the rules see Johannson [1975, pp4-ll]. For a 
discussion of these and more examples see Blaug [1980, ppl8-19].
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(although recognizing that it cannot be eliminated 
altogether), and to provide a new rationale of falsification. 
This rationale is provided via new rules of acceptance and 
falsification. The early 'naive' falsificationist would allow 
any theory which can be interpreted as experimentally 
falsifiable as acceptable or scientific. Lakatos' 
sophisticated falsificationism would only allow a theory to 
be regarded as scientific if it has 'excess empirical content 
over its predecessor (or rival), that is , only if it leads 
to the discovery of novel facts'[1970, pll6]. This leads to 
two versions of this rule of acceptance. 'Acceptability^' 
relates to the situation where the new theory has excess 
empirical content relating to the production of novel facts 
and this can be checked instantly by a priori logical
analysis. 'Acceptability2 ' is where some of the excess
empirical content is verified and this may take 'an
indefinite time'[1970 pll6].
With regard to falsification, the naive falsificationist 
would reject a theory as falsified if there existed an 
observational statement which conflicted with it. But as 
Lakatos points out for the sophisticated falsificationist the 
situation is different;
"The sophisticated falsificationist regards a scientific theory T as 
falsified if and only if another theory T' has been proposed with 
following characteristics :(1) T' has excess empirical content over T: 
that is, it predicts novel facts, that is, facts improbedale in the light 
of, or even forbidden, by T; (2) T' explains the previous success of T, 
that is, all the unrefuted content of T is contained (within the limits 
of observational error) in the content of T'; and (3) some of the excess 
content of T' is corroborated."[1970, pll6 ]
The argument in this passage is that a theory will be 
falsified only if it is superseded by another theory which 
has increased content. We can now see that Lakatos' earlier 
work in Proofs and Refutations concerning content-increasing
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responses to counterexamples is absolutely central to his
later conception of scientific progress in the MSRP. The 
notion of increasing content is now not simply a part of an 
albeit complex discussion of the methodology of mathematics
but has become the central criterion for evaluating
scientific progress and indeed science itself. Moreover these 
definitions of acceptability and falsification give shape to 
the subsequent structures that Lakatos constructs. Thus the 
fact that both entail the comparison of theories rather than 
the confronting of a theory with the 'facts' led Lakatos to 
develop the notion of the research programme which consists 
of a succession of related theories. Lakatos sets up this
later discussion by reformulating his criteria of acceptance
and falsification in terms of a series of theories:
"Let us take a series of theories, T^, T2 , T3 ,...where each subsequent 
theory results from adding auxiliary clauses to (or from semantical 
reinterpretations of) the previous theory in order to accommodate some 
anomaly, each theory having as much content as the unrefuted content of 
its predecessor. Let us say that such a series of theories is 
theoretically progressive (or 'constitutes a theoretically progressive 
p^obleiashift') if each new theory has some excess empirical content over 
its predecessor, that is, if it predicts some novel, hitherto unexpected 
fact. Let us say that a theoretically progressive set of theories is also 
empirically progressive (or 'constitutes an empirically progressive 
problemshift') if some of this excess empirical content is also 
corroborated, that is, if each new theory leads us to the actual
discovery of some new fact. Finally, let us call a problemshift
progressive if it is both theoretically and empirically progressive, and 
degenerating if it is not. We 'accept' problemshifts as 'scientific' only 
if they are at least theoretically progressive; if they are not, we 
'reject' them as 'pseudo-scientific'. Progress is measured by the degree 
to which a problemshift is progressive, by the degree to which the series 
of theories leads us to the discovery of novel facts. We regard a theory 
in the series 'falsified' when it is superseded by a theory with higher 
corroborated content" [ 1970, pll8 ].
This modification of Popper's approach has quite radical 
and significant consequences. Now the scientist adopting this 
approach will no longer decide to accept or reject a theory 
simply on the basis of the evidence. No observation or 
experiment will be allowed to falsify a theory; falsification
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can only occur now when a better theory emerges. As Lakatos 
himself succinctly puts it:
"'Falsification' in the sense of naive falsificationism (corroborated 
counterevidence) is not a sufficient condition for eliminating a specific 
theory; in spite of hundreds of known anomalies we do not regard it as 
falsified (that is, eliminated) until we have a better one. Nor is 
'falsification' in the naive sense necessary for falsification in the 
sophisticated sense: a progressive problemshift does not have to be
interspersed with 'refutations'. Science can grow without any refutations 
leading the way" [1970, pl21].
What is true of problemshifts. also applies to research 
programmes. Programmes must continue to make at least 
theoretical progress by predicting novel facts if they are to 
avoid degenerating. The condition attached to the empirical 
corroboration of such facts is as we have seen not at all 
stringent. Thus Lakatos argues that empirical progress may be 
held up by a period of refutations until an additional 
auxiliary hypothesis is added which enables the scientist to 
'turn a chain of defeats - with hindsight"" into a resounding 
success story'[1970, pl34]. In this way refutations do not 
result in the abandonment of the hard core as long as there 
is no other more successful research programme in the offing. 
Moreover this retention of the hard core in the face of 
refutations is seen to be 'rational' and not merely 
strategic. An objective reason to reject a programme is 
provided by Lakatos and this is where there is 'a rival 
research programme which explains the previous success of its 
rival and supersedes it by a further display of heuristic 
power' [1970, pl55]. By heuristic power Lakatos means 'the 
power of a research programme to anticipate novel facts in 
its path'[1970, pl55].
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V Rational Reconstruction and the History of Science;
MSRP and MHRP
As I noted above, Lakatos argued that history of science 
and philosophy of science are necessary for each other.29 in 
his 1971 paper on 'Rational Reconstructions' Lakatos proposed 
a historical method for evaluating rival methodologies, and 
this paper raised a number of important questions concerning 
the relationship between history of science and 
methodology. 28 %n this section I will discuss the key aspects 
of Lakatos' argument. First I will examine his attempt to 
provide a meta-methodology for examining rival methodologies. 
Secondly I will discuss some important points relating to 
internal and external history raised by Lakatos' discussion. 
Thirdly, I will consider the difficult question of the 
relationship between theory appraisal and advice to 
practitioners of science.
(a) Rational Reconstruction and MHRP
Lakatos' solution to the problem of the evaluation of 
rival methodologies rests upon the fundamental notion that 
'all methodologies function as historiographical (or meta- 
historical) theories (or research programmes) and can be 
criticized by criticizing the rational historical 
reconstructions to which they lead' [1971a, pl09].2l He goes 
on to apply both falsificationism and the methodology of 
scientific research programmes at the 'normative 
historiographical meta-level' [1971a, pl09]. On this basis
29 See above pll.
28 See Toulmin [1976, pp657-675] for a discussion of Lakatos' evolving 
views on the importance for methodology of the history of science and 
historical case studies.
21 Original emphasis.
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falsificationism is refuted while the methodology of 
historiographical research programmes, Lakatos argues, 
'supplies a general theory of how to compare rival logics of 
discovery in which (in a sense carefully to be specified) 
history may be seen as a test of Its rational 
reconstructions'[197la, pl09].22
In applying falsificationism at the meta-methodological 
level Lakatos develops a meta-methodological rule that 'a 
rationality theory - or demarcation criterion - is to be 
rejected if it is inconsistent with an accepted 'basic value 
judgment' of the scientific élite'[1970, pllO]. This rule at 
the meta-level, Lakatos argues, corresponds to Popper's lower 
level methodological rule (falsificationism), that 'a 
scientific theory is to be rejected if it is inconsistent 
with an ('empirical') basic statement unanimously accepted by 
the scientific community'[1971a, pllO]. Moreover, just as at 
the lower level Popper had a basic rule that the scientist 
must specify in advance the conditions for the rejection of a 
hypothesis, so a similar rule must apply at the meta-level. 
Thus Lakatos argues that if Newtonian scientists were asked 
to specify which kind of observation would refute Newtonian 
science as a whole, as opposed to specific Newtonian 
explanations, they would be unable to answer. Thus 
'falsificationism' is falsified [1971a, pll3]. Lakatos also 
points out that Popper regarded work on an inconsistent 
system to be irrational, whereas some of the greatest 
scientific research programmes were based on inconsistent
22 Original emphasis.
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foundations. Again falsificationist methodology was falsified 
[1971a, pll3].33
The methodology of historiographical research programmes 
seeks to provide a framework in which rival theories of 
rationality can be compared. According to MHRP, a methodology 
will be judged to be progressive if it can rationally 
reconstruct, predict or postdict novel 'historical' facts, 
thereby paralleling at the meta-level the criterion of novel 
facts pertaining at the lower level. Within MHRP Popper's 
falsificationist methodology could be judged progressive 
compared with earlier methodologies, such as inductivism.^* 
By the same standard, Lakatos argues [1971a, pll7], MSRP will 
be judged more progressive than falsificationism; it will 
reconstruct more historical examples as rational. The history 
of science then, rationally reconstructed, plays a crucial 
role in evaluating methodologies. Central to the question of 
rational reconstruction is the matter of the relationship 
between internal and external history, and it is to this that 
I now turn.
(b) Internal and External History
In the first footnote to his 1971a paper Lakatos makes it 
clear that his definitions of internal and external history 
are unorthodox and novel, and that moreover they form the 
hard core of his historiographical research programme [1971a,
22 See Lakatos [1974, pp241-273] for an earlier discussion of this 
point. This paper was written in 1969, and revised in 1971. See also 
Popper [1974] for a reply to Lakatos on the falsifiability of Popper's 
methodology. Popper argued that his 'theory of falsifiability' is 'not 
empirical, but methodological or philosophical, and it need not therefore 
be falsif iable ' [1974, plOlO]. He went to argue that in chapter 2 of
Logic der Forschuna he had taken the view that methodology was not an 
empirical science [1974, plOlO].
24 According to Lakatos, Popper's methodology enabled more of the 
history of science to be interpreted or reinterpreted as rational. See 
Lakatos [1971, pi17].
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p91, nl].25 In the standard usage, as Kuhn[1971, pl40] points 
out, internal history focuses primarily on the professional 
activities of scientists, while external history is concerned 
with the relationship between scientists and the larger 
culture. For Lakatos internal history is the basis of 
rational reconstruction and in MSRP would focus on 
theoretical and empirical rivalry, progressive and 
degenerative problemshifts, and the victory of one programme 
over another [1971, pl05]. While there would be some
agreement between Lakatos' conception of external history and 
the standard u s a g e , h i s  approach to internal history is 
much narrower and therefore much more is consigned to 
external history.27 Thus standard internal history would 
include many personal aspects relating to theoretical change 
excluded by Lakatos.28 Lakatos goes further than this
See Elkana [1974 pp247-249] for a critique of Lakatos' distinction 
between internal and external history. Elkana relates his criticisms to 
Lakatos' criteria for theoretical progress, arguing that 'Lakatos claims 
that a research programme is progressing as long as its theoretical 
growth anticipates its empirical growth, that is as long as it keeps 
predicting novel facts with success. It stagnates when it only gives post 
hoc explanation of "chance" discoveries'[1974, p247]. Elkana goes on to 
argue that for these criteria to be accepted one has to allow that at 
some stage 'pure experimental work really precedes theoretical work. We 
even have to accept the existence of chance discoveries'[1974, pp247- 
248]. Elkana, then, seems to infer that the 'external' is related to the 
idea of chance discoveries, the possibility of which he denies. In turn 
these are related to the notion of degeneration. As Kulka [1977a, pp327- 
328] has argued, this would appear to confuse Lakatos' (MSRP) criteria 
for progress with his later (MHRP) analysis where the internal-external 
distinction is important.
26 See Hesse [1970, ppl34-146] on the relationship between internal and 
external history, and the difficulties associated with any attempt to 
construct a general defence of an autonomous internal history of science.
27 See Hacking [1979, p395] for a discussion of the usefulness of 
Lakatos' apparatus - hard core, monster—barring etc. for organizing
generalizations into internal history.
28  ^Kuhn argues that Lakatos excludes from internal history 'all
considerations of personal idiosyncrasy, whatever its role may have been 
in the choice of a theory, the creative act which produced it, or the
form of the product which resulted...such historical data as the failure
of the man who creates a new theory and of his entire generation to see 
in that theory consequences which a later generation found
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however, for, he argues, not only will the historian omit 
from internal history everything that is irrational in the 
light of his rationality theory, but his selection of 
methodologically interpreted facts may occasionally be their 
radically improved version[1971a, pl06]. Thus if an element 
(discovered later perhaps) that rationally belongs to a 
research programme is actually omitted, it should
nevertheless be included by the historian.2^  Lakatos then
proposes the radical notion that one way to delineate history 
from rational reconstruction is 'to relate the internal 
history in the text, and indicate in the footnotes how actual 
history misbehaved in the light of its rational
reconstruction'[1971a, pl07].4°
I argued in the previous section that rational
reconstruction was the key to Lakatos' meta-level analysis — 
MHRP; a theory of scientific rationality makes progress if it 
leads to the discovery of novel historical facts, 'by the 
reconstruction of a growing bulk of value-impregnated history 
as rational'[Lakatos, 1971a, pll8]. The difficulty with this 
is that if historians are encouraged not only to make a 
methodological selection of facts with which to create 
internal history but also to provide radically improved 
versions[1971a, pl06], how could the MHRP ever be judged a
there.. .consideration of mistakes or what a later generation will see as 
having been mistakes and will accordingly feel constrained to correct.
Historical data of these sorts are all central and essential for the 
internal historian of science' [1971 pl40].
29 The example which Lakatos provides relates to the scientific work of 
Bohr. The concept of electron spin fits into the original outline of 
Bohr's research programme of light emission (in early quantum physics), 
but was not included by Bohr. The historian rationally reconstructing the 
research programme should include it, and discuss Bohr's failure to do so 
in a footnote [1971, pl07].
48 Kuhn [1971, pl41] has argued that Lakatos should have eschewed the 
term internal history and referred instead to rational history, or 
history constructed from rational elements in a science's development.
2: MSRP and Rational Reconstruction 34 
failure?4^ It would appear that with careful selection of 
methodologically interpreted facts, radical improvement of 
some of them, and relegation of non-rational facts to 
external history, all historical episodes should be capable 
of rational reconstruction. In what sense then is the extent 
of rational reconstruction a test of MHRP? Lakatos is not 
clear on this point. He appears to allow for the possibility 
that the history of science can be seen as irrational[1971a, 
pll9], implying a failure to produce novel historical facts. 
Immediately, however, he argues that this can be remedied by 
'historiographical innovation and proliferation of 
historiographical theories'[1971a, pll9], implying further 
attempts to rationally reconstruct. Hall interpreted Lakatos' 
meta-theory to mean that 'we should prefer that methodology 
according to which more of the actual science is internal and 
rational, and more of scientists' own judgments about science 
are correct' [1971, pl51]. This reasonable interpretation was 
attacked quite vehemently by Lakatos on the grounds that it 
left 'scientist' undefined 'giving carte blanche to any 
pseudoscientific group to set itself up as supreme 
authority'[Hall, 1971b, pl79].42 %t is not clear from this 
whether Lakatos objects to the first part of Hall's 
interpretation for Lakatos reacts only to the second part.
41 See Kuhn [1971, ppl41-142], and Koertge [1976, p366] for this
argument. See also Sarkar [1980b, pp409-413] for a critique of Koertge.
42 See also Maull [1976, ppll9-128], for a discussion of the problems 
with using historical case studies as evidence for philosophical claims 
about scientific rationality. She points out that there is a problem with 
using case studies in the extent to which they are theory-infected by the 
philosophy of science. She argues that the extent of counterevidence to 
the meta-methodology must be made explicit, and if there are a large 
number of 'irrational' episodes which cannot be accounted for by 
supplementary historical or other arguments, the meta-methodology must be 
abandoned [1976, ppl24-125]. See also McMullin [1979, pp63-70] for
further discussion.
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but the first part is important because if such a reading of 
Lakatos is possible then we could still retain some way of 
assessing methodologies within the MHRP.
(c) Appraisal and Advice
Another difficulty for the Lakatosian project - both MSRP and 
MHRP - is the question of the extent to which methodological 
appraisal can be satisfactorily divorced from the provision 
of advice to scientific practitioners on methodology. This 
difficulty arises because of Lakatos' claim that we can often 
ascertain whether progress has been made 'with h i n d s i g h t  
Both Kuhn[1970] and Feyerabend[1970] took issue in different 
ways with Lakatos on this particular aspect.*4
Kuhn has argued that Lakatos must 'specify criteria which 
can be used at the time to distinguish a degenerative from a 
progressive research programme; and so on. Otherwise, he has 
told us nothing at all' [1970b, p239]^2^ Feyerabend's
criticism of Lakatos was to argue that Lakatos' standards 
could only have 'practical force' if they were combined with 
a time limit [1970, p215]. Without such a limit the standards 
would be vacuous - one would not know when to apply them. 
Imposing a limit would simply invite a version of the 
argument used against naive falsificationism with its 
tendency for instant judgment. Reimposition of a time limit 
then raises the question, as Feyerabend [1970, p215] points 
out - if one is permitted to wait, why not wait a little
Thus Lakatos argues 'the novelty of a factual proposition can 
frequently be seen only after a long period has elapsed' [1970, pl5 5 ]. 
This consideration he argues ' lends new emphasis to the hindsight element 
in our appraisals'[1970, pl56].
44 See Quinn [1972, ppl35-149]. Smart [1972, pp266-274], and Musgrave 
[1976, pp473-482] for a discussion of this debate.
45 My emphasis.
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longer? So Lakatos' theory is either vacuous or can be 
criticised in terms very similar to those which led to 
Lakatos' approach in the first place. The difficult question 
then is at what point should the research programme be 
abandoned, if at all? Any abandonment of the programme may be 
unwise in the end, for the next term in the series may turn 
out to be the first in a long line of theoretically and 
empirically progressive terms. For this reason Feyerabend 
argues that we should 'stop appealing to permanent standards 
which remain in force throughout history and govern every 
single period of scientific development and every transition 
from one period to another'[1970, p215]. In short Feyerabend 
is 'against method' in science.
In assessing Lakatos' position in relation to these 
criticisms there are three points. First, there are objective 
criteria which can be used at the time to distinguish a 
degenerative from a progressive research programme; a 
programme is progressive 'if it is both theoretically and 
empirically progressive, and degenerating if it is not'[1970, 
pll8].4G Lakatos also argues, as we have seen,*? that there 
is an objective reason to reject a programme and that this is 
'provided by a rival research programme which explains the 
previous success of its rival and supersedes it by a further 
display of heuristic power' [1970, pl55]. By heuristic power 
Lakatos means 'the power of a research progreimme to 
anticipate novel facts in its path'[1970, pl55]. Kuhn then is
46 See above p27.
47 See above p28.
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wrong to say that Lakatos tells us nothing; he tells us a 
great deal.
Secondly, while there are objective criteria which will 
enable us to judge at any particular time whether a research 
programme is degenerating or not, or whether one programme is 
superior to another, what Lakatos' approach cannot guarantee 
is that these judgments will remain in force forever. The 
demand by Kuhn and Feyerabend for a time limit is a demand 
for just such a guarantee. But no such guarantee can ever be 
given, for it is always possible that a degenerating 
programme or one that has already been taken over by a rival, 
may once again become progressive if some theoretical 
amendment begins to produce novel facts once again.
Thirdly, the fact that no guarantees can be given means 
that any advice to practitioners is not infallible, and this 
led Lakatos into 'a kind of intellectual schizophrenia' as 
Blaug [1980, p40] put it. On the one hand, at the level of 
the individual scientist, Lakatos appeared to be tempted by 
Feyerabend's anarchism, arguing that it may indeed be 
rational to 'stick to a degenerating programme until it is 
overtaken by a rival and even after'[1971a, pl04].48 Again in
_ Feyerabend was favourably disposed towards the work of Lakatos, even 
dedicating his book Against Method [1975] to him as a 'friend and fellow 
anarchist'. Feyerabend regarded Lakatos' work as 'anarchism in disguise' 
[1975, p200] for while the methodology of scientific research progrcunmes 
provides standards that aid the scientist in evaluating the historical 
situation in which he makes his decision; it does not contain rules that 
tell him what to do" [1975, pl8 6 ]. Feyerabend's own argument is that 
'there is only one principle that can be defended under all circumstances 
and in all stages of human development. It is the principle; anything 
goes' [1975, p28]. However, as Kulka [1977a, p280] points out, if this 
principle is taken to mean 'do not select' or 'do not discriminate 
between theories' or 'treat all ideas with equal respect' then it has 
been falsified by history. See also Bergstrom [1980, pp8 -ll] for a 
critique of Feyerabend's notion that rationality is a threat to 
scientific progress, and a discussion of the applicability of utility 
maximization to scientific rationality.
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replying to critics he conceded:
"I, of course, do not prescribe to the individual scientist what to do in 
a situation characterised by two rival progressive research programmes : 
whether to try to elaborate one or the other or whether to withdraw from 
both and try to supersede them with a Great Dialectical Leap Forward. 
Whatever they have done, I can judge; I can say whether they have made 
progress or not. But I cannot advise them - and do not wish to advise 
them - about exactly what to worry about and in which direction they 
should seek progress" [1971b, pl78].
The individual then is not to be given advice. At the level 
of the science profession, however, Lakatos is prepared to be 
much more authoritarian. Thus he argues that while it may be 
rational for the individual to stick to a degenerating 
programme what one must not do is 'deny its poor public 
record'[1970, pl04]. Here the profession must exert its
authority: editors of scientific journals should refuse to 
publish papers and research foundations should refuse money 
to those who stick to degenerating programmes [1970, pl05].49 
VI Conclusions: MSRP and Historical Analvsis
As I argued at the beginning of the chapter, there are a 
number of arguments for employing a version of Lakatos ' ideas 
to the history of Classical wage theory. A key theme of the 
chapter and of Lakatos ' work has been that history and 
methodology are necessary for each other - methodology can 
provide a framework for the historian and history may provide
See Sarkar [1980a, pp371-390] for a discusssion of the potential 
inconsistency in Lakatos' position revealed in his apparent willingness 
to give advice to historians of science on which meta-methodology to 
follow, while being reluctant to give methodological advice to 
practitioners of science. One superficial response to Sarkar is to argue 
that Lakatos ' reluctance to give methodological advice was based on the 
fact that the situation may change in the future - a degenerating 
programme may become progressive if it begins once again to generate 
novel facts; advice to historians of science does not suffer from this 
difficulty for they are concerned with existing evidence. Against this it 
^ght be argued that historical evidence has to be discovered and 
interpreted, and that novel historical facts may appear at any time to 
turn a degenerating meta-methodology into a progressive one, or vice 
versa. In this sense the same objections can be raised against the 'facts 
of history' as against the 'facts of nature', see Kulka [1977b, p281]
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evidence for the methodologist. I will consider each of these 
points in turn.
Lakatosian analysis can provide the historian with many 
useful tools and concepts with which to work. Even the 
methodological anarchist Feyerabend has argued that Lakatos' 
concepts of hard core, protective belt and so on are useful 
tools with which to improve on intuition [1976, ppl27-128]
The Lakatosian framework, then, can provide the points of 
departure and analytical tools with which to approach many 
questions in the history of economics in general, and the 
history of Classical wage theory in particular. Did the wages 
fund doctrine form a research programme and if so what was 
the nature of the hard core? Was the hard core protected from 
testing in the way that Lakatos suggests? Were there any 
'monsters' and how were they dealt with? Is there any 
evidence that the programme made theoretical or empirical 
progress? Was Mill's recantation a refutation and if so, what 
impact did this have? Is the theoretical vacuum which 
appeared in the immediate aftermath of the refutation, 
evidence of Lakatosian processes at work? These are 
interesting questions thrown up by the application of
Thus Feyerabend argues as follows: "Let us therefore from now on
regard such case studies (of Lakatos and followers) as historical studies 
and let us evaluate them on that basis. We see at once that they are 
superior to earlier studies of the same kind. Guided by a complex 
methodology (the) account is richer and more sophisticated than the 
alternative accounts. It is history of ideas in the best sense of the 
word. It is history because it deals with facts. It is history of ideas 
because it shows conceptual connections between these facts. It is 
sophisticated history of ideas because it uses a rich inventory of 
conceptual tools (hard core; protective belt; heuristic; progressiveness; 
degeneration; monster adjustment; recovery of hidden lemmas ; and so on) 
rather than relying on intuition in all cases. The researcher is equipped 
with instruments that aid him on his way and are open to inspection so 
that he can criticize them and replace them by better instruments. It is 
true - the wish of the writers to arrive at some 'objective' judgment has
made these instruments overly intellectual But there are definite
advantages when one compares the history with what other methodologists 
have got to offer"[1976 ppl27-128].
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Lakatosian methodology to a particular case, and the answers 
to these questions will produce a new and different history.
From a Lakatosian perspective, history is very important 
for methodology, as we have seen. The historical analysis 
undertaken in this thesis, using the tools of MSRP will 
rationally reconstruct Classical wage theory as a research 
programme, and provide evidence for MHRP. I will argue that 
the Classical economists were rational, in a Lakatosian 
sense, to subscribe to the wages fund doctrine and long run 
wage theory, despite the fact that these theories are
regarded as erroneous in terms of modern theory. I will also 
argue that Mill ' s recantation was rational and so was the 
decision not to abandon the Classical wage theory research 
programme until a potentially more progressive theory came 
along. All of this is powerful evidence for MHRP.
The task in the remaining chapters is to apply the
Lakatosian framework which we have been developing to the 
history of the wages fund doctrine. In chapter three I will 
outline the development of the wages fund doctrine and
examine the extent to which a 'hard core' and the related 
superstructure of a research programme appeared in the work 
of the early Classical writers. This analysis will build upon 
the discussion of the structural elements of Lakatos' 
approach which I outlined in section II of the present 
chapter. Chapter four presents an analysis of the 
difficulties created by the emergence of the "monster of 
money ' - a potential counterexample to the wages fund
doctrine. This discussion makes use of the concepts and
strategies outlined in section III above. The notions of 
scientific progress and decline outlined in section IV of
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this chapter are taken up and applied to the wages fund 
doctrine in chapters five, six and seven.
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CHAPTER THREE
CLASSICAL WAGE THEORY AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE HARD CORE: 
SMITH, MALTHUS, RICARDO AND JAMES MILL 
I Introduction
In the last chapter I laid out the case for adopting a 
Lakatosian framework, and in this and subsequent chapters I 
will be applying this to the history of the wages fund 
doctrine. An important starting point, of course, is the 
notion of the research programme itself and the associated 
hard core. It is this which is adhered to by all subscribers 
to the programme and rendered safe from attack by the 
negative heuristic and the protective belt. In section II of 
this chapter I will explore more carefully the notion of the 
research programme and consider the level at which the
analysis should be applied.
1'
A second major task of this chapter is to review the work 
of the early Classical writers in order to examine the extent 
to which a hard core of a Classical wage theory research 
programme began to appear in their work. It is clearly 
recognized by Lakatos that a hard core may take time to 
appear^ and therefore one must not expect to see something 
which is fully fledged in the work of these early writers, 
but rather elements and fragments of what later may become a 
hard core in the fullest sense. My approach will be to sketch 
out the elements of a Classical wage theory hard core as it 
can be rationally reconstructed and how it is typically . 
portrayed in twentieth century accounts, and armed with this 
hypothetical hard core I will undertake the historical
Thus Lakatos argues; "The hard core of a programme does not emerge 
fully armed like Athene from the head of Zeus. It develops slowly, by a 
long preliminary process of trial and error"[1970, pl3 3 ].
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analysis. This 'stereotypical' hard core will provide a 
powerful comparative tool in carrying out the analysis in 
this and later chapters. There may be a convergence of the 
statements of the Classicists and the elements of the hard 
core over time in which case this will be strong evidence of 
Lakatosian processes at work. On the other hand there may be 
many divergences from, and inconsistencies with, the hard 
core as outlined, and this may also present some interesting 
conclusions about both the accuracy of the twentieth century 
accounts and the efficacy of the Lakatosian approach. Either 
way the adoption, a priori, of such a yardstick gives a 
direction and momentum to the analysis that would otherwise 
be lacking. Accordingly in section III I will outline a 
hypothetical version of the hard core of the Classical wage 
theory research programme as it has been typically 
characterized in the history of economic thought. In section 
IV I will examine in more detail the work of Smith, Ricardo 
and James Mill to see the extent to which elements of the 
short run versions of the hard core began to appear in their 
work. In section V I will discuss the contribution of
Malthus to the development of both the long run and short run 
hard cores.
II The Wages Fund Doctrine as a Research Programme
In applying the Lakatosian approach to economics the 
first set of questions to be addressed concerns the level at 
which the research programme is perceived to exist, and the 
consequences of this for the specification of the hard core. 
There have been three broad responses to this set of 
questions in previous studies which have applied Lakatos' 
work to economic thought. The first has been to argue that
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the research programme exists at the level of the discipline 
as a whole, focusing on the economic behaviour of agents as 
key elements in the hard core. A second approach has been to 
retain the emphasis on the behaviour of agents but to apply 
this to a part of the discipline only. The third approach 
focuses on particular pieces or branches of theory, and 
attempts to characterize the hard core more specifically in 
terms of particular laws or principles. I will adopt the 
third view and argue that there was a wages fund research 
programme with a clearly identifiable hard core. This 
programme developed, progressed and declined, and much of the 
history of this can be traced to problems with the hard core 
and to developments in the protective belt.
The first view lay at the back of the studies of Latsis 
[1976], Blaug [1976], O'Brien [1976], and Remenyi [1979]. 
Latsis and Remenyi argued that Neoclassical economics 
constituted the research programme, the hard core of which 
comprised the assumptions underlying the competitive model.^ 
Blaug [1976, ppl60-161] went further than this, arguing that 
both Classical and Neoclassical economics rested on one hard
2 Latsis' hard core consisted of the following propositions: (i)
decision-makers have correct knowledge of the relevant features of their 
economic situation, (ii) decision-makers prefer the best available
alternative given their knowledge of the situation and of the means at 
their disposal, (iii) given (i) and (ii) situations generate their own 
internal 'logic' and decision-makers act appropriately to the logic of 
their situation, (iv) economic units and structure display stable and 
coordinated behaviour, see Latsis [1976, p22]. Remenyi argued that the 
hard core of neoclassical economics consisted of the following items: (i) 
consumers and producers can legitimately be assumed to be rational 
decision-makers who know their wants (ii) economic activity is motivated 
by self-interest (iii) more is better than less (iv) given perfect 
knowledge and good government, economic welfare is maximized by free 
competition (v) although welfare and economic welfare are not synonymous, 
the latter is a good approximation for the former (vi) stable Pareto-
efficient equilibrium solutions can be defined for any and all markets
relevant to economic research and analysis (vii) everything has its
opportunity cost (viii) abstract, reduced-form models and simplifying 
assumptions are valid tools of economic analysis [1979, pp56-59].
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core - the assumptions of the competitive model - 'handed 
down since the time of Adam Smith. ' [1976, pl61]^. O'Brien 
[1976, pl46], on the other hand, drew distinctions between 
the research programmes of Smith, Malthus and Ricardo,
although all three essentially built on the concept of self-
interest outlined by Smith.^ There are differences, then,
between these studies in their perception of the nature of 
the research programmes in economics, but all of them see the 
research programme at work at the level of the whole 
discipline. Moreover there is another similarity in that all 
of them placed emphasis on the self-interested rational
decision-making characteristics of the economic actors.
The second view is to be found in the work of Rizzo [1982] 
and Weintraub [1985]. Rizzo [1982, p57-59] applied the
Lakatosian approach to the Austrian methodological framework 
developing a hard core which comprised basic presuppositions 
concerning individual behaviour in a world of uncertainty.^ 
Weintraub [1985, pl09] outlined the key features of the neo- 
Walrasian research programme and here again the hard core was 
built from general statements concerning economic behaviour.^
 ^ Blaug's hard core comprised the assumptions of competitive theory
expressed in a weak form - rational economic calculations, constant 
tastes, independence of decision-making, perfect knowledge, perfect 
certainty, perfect mobility of factors and so on [1976, pl61.
 ^ Thus O'Brien [1976, pl46] argues that Ricardo's hard core was spelt 
out in terms of class conflict - a change from smith's vision. Malthus in 
turn differed from Smith in including, according to O'Brien, other new 
elements in his hard core - those relating to 'sexual proclivities, and 
possible agricultural progress, as well as propositions about property 
distribution'.
 ^ The hard core which Rizzo proposes for Austrian economics consists of 
the following: (i) individuals perceive a decision-making environment
(ii) perceptions take place in a world of uncertainty (iii) individuals' 
perceptions are not always correct (iv) there is a tendency toward 
coordination of individual activities. See Rizzo [1982, pp57-59]. For a 
discussion of the similarities and differences between Rizzo's hard core 
and that of Latsis[1976] see Langlois [1982, pp78-80].
 ^ Weintraub's neo-Walrasian hard core consists of the following
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While in both cases the hard core propositions were very 
general they were, unlike the earlier studies, not meant to 
apply to the discipline as a whole.
The third view is associated with the work of Fulton 
[1984], Leijohnhufvud [1976] and Fisher [1986]. Fulton [1984, 
ppl90-192] has argued that the hard core formulations of 
Latsis, Remenyi, and Blaug differ in character from the sort 
of hard core that Lakatos had in mind. The elements 
comprising these hard cores constitute what Leijohnhufvud 
[1976, p70-72] has called 'presuppositions' or, in other
words, judgments about the behaviour of agents or the nature 
of science itself. These, Fulton argues, are different to the 
more formal theoretical statements described by Lakatos as 
the hard core of the programmes of Newton or Bohr.
According to Lakatos, the hard core of these programmes 
are specific laws or axioms and he cites Newton's laws of 
gravity, and Bohr's five postulates on energy emission in 
simple atomic systems as examples of this.? Building on the 
work of Leijohnhufvud, Fulton argues that every research 
programme will have a formal hard core of this kind built 
against the background of some general presuppositions 
concerning the nature of scientific activity itself [1984, 
ppl92-195]. Leijohnhufvud presented the notion that 'a market 
economy is self-regulating' as an example of a 
presupposition, while a hard core proposition might be, he
propositions; (i) there exist economic agents (ii) agents have 
preferences over outcomes (iii) agents independently optimize subject to 
constraints (iv) choices are made in interrelated markets (v) agents have 
full relevant knowledge (vi) observable economic outcomes are 
coordinated, so they must be discussed with reference to equilibrium 
states [1985, pl09].
? See Lakatos for a discussion of Newton's hard core [1970, ppl33-134] 
and [1970, pl41] for a discussion of Bohr.
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argues, the statement that 'the substitution effect is always 
negative' [1976, p80, n27]. The latter is clearly a much more 
formal hard core proposition than are the sorts of statements 
put forward by Blaug, Latsis, Remenyi and O'Brien.
Fulton also quotes the work of Zahar [1973] who employed 
Lakatos' framework to explain the triumph of Einstein's work 
over that of Lorentz. In Zahar's treatment, it is argued, 
there is some confusion over what constitutes the positive 
heuristic of Einstein's programme. Zahar describes two rather 
formal requirements - "(1) a new law should be Lorentz-
covariant and (2) it should yield some classical law as a 
limiting case" [1973, p243]. Elsewhere, however, he refers to 
certain metaphysical beliefs which Einstein had which became 
important in the development of his work:
" (I)... .Science should present us with a coherent, unified, 
harmonious, simple organically compact picture of the world...(II) the 
second heuristic device is more difficult to formulate. Its metaphorical 
underpinning is the claim that since God is no deceiver, there can be no 
accidents in nature. All observationally revealed symmetries signify 
fundamental symmetries at the ontological level. Hence the heuristic 
rule; replace any theory which does not explain symmetrical observations 
as the manifestations of deeper symmetries - whether or not descriptions 
of all known facts can be deduced from the theory" [Zahar, 1973, pp224- 
225] .
It is Fulton's contention that any confusion that may arise 
over which of these two sets of propositions constitutes the 
positive heuristic can be dispelled by regarding the latter 
metaphysical statements as presuppositions leaving the former 
more specific formulation as the positive heuristic.
Fulton goes on to apply this approach to an example of a 
Neoclassical research programme based on the production 
function. He outlines nine presuppositions concerning the 
nature of economic theory and maximizing behaviour. The hard 
core consists of a precise description of the production 
function itself which could be expressed in mathematical form
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[1984 pl97]®. Fisher [1986] adopted a similar approach when 
applying Lakatos' work to the marginal revolution. He argued 
that there were three separate marginalist research 
programmes but that the most important elements of their 
separate hard cores were common to all three and made up what 
he called the hard core of the overall programme [1986, 
pl72]^. Like Fulton then, Fisher has produced an analysis of 
research programmes at a level below that of the whole 
Neoclassical programme, and the hard core consists of a 
number of statements some of which at least are of a far more 
formal nature than the general behavioural assumptions of 
earlier studies.
It is possible then to think in terms of two Lakatosian 
models which can be applied to the history of economics. One, 
the Blaug-Latsis (B-L) version, constructs the hard core of 
the research programme from general propositions concerning 
maximizing behaviour and the nature of economic analysis. The 
protective belt would then comprise theories or hypotheses 
developed from these hard core assumptions. Taking this view 
it may be possible to argue, as indeed Blaug does, that all 
Classical and Neoclassical economics from the time of Adam 
Smith shared a common hard core. The perspective is a very 
wide one with stress laid on continuity although this has not
® "The hard core can be written concisely in a mathematical form. Let
Y — f ( / •X'2 /...., Xj2 ) ( i )
represent a continuous, twice differentiable production function defined 
for one output (Y) and n inputs (x^), with all Xj > 0. It has the further 
properties that
df/dx^ > 0 for all (ii)
d^f/dXj^ < 0 for all > Xj^ ® (iii)
(iii) being the principle of diminishing returns" [1984, pl97].
5 This common hard core comprised; (i) the individual as a key unit of 
analysis (ii) the law of utility maximization (iii) the marginal 
utility/total utility distinction (iv) the law of diminishing marginal 
utility (V) the prevalence of competition (vi) the potency of the 
equilibrating mechanism, see Fisher [1986, pl72].
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prevented the occurrence of competing interpretations of the 
precise content of that hard core. An alternative to this may 
be labelled the Fulton-Leijohnhufvud (F-L) version. According 
to this view, various schools within economics may have 
shared over time certain presuppositions concerning the 
nature of the discipline but within Classical or Neoclassical 
economics it is possible to spell out specific research 
programmes each of which has its own formal hard core. The 
focus then is much narrower and the approach facilitates the 
analysis of the progress and change in particular doctrines 
within the history of e c o n o m i c s . M y  preference, then, is 
for this F-L version on the grounds that it seems closer to 
Lakatos ' original argument and that it provides a framework 
for discussing important developments in particular sub­
disciplines in economics. I will argue that the wages fund 
doctrine constitutes a research programme which was built 
upon a clearly identifiable hard core and it is to the 
specification of this that I now turn.
Ill The Hard Core of the Wages Fund Research Programme
An important aspect of Lakatos' concept of the hard core 
is the notion of irrefutability and it is useful to begin the 
discussion of the hard core by examining briefly what is
I have already argued that Fisher's recent study is a good example of 
how the approach can be developed on the smaller scale. In addition 
Fulton refers to two other studies which have used the smaller scale with 
success, one is the study by De March! [1976, ppl09-127] of the impact of 
the Leontief paradox on the Hecksher-Ohlin model as developed by Lerner 
and Samuelson. The other is the study by Blaug [1980, pp224-239] of what 
he called the human capital research programme. The hard core of this 
programme, according to Blaug, was the concept of human capital viz. the 
'notion that people spend on themselves in diverse ways, not only for 
present enjoyments but also for the sake of future pecuniary and non- 
pecuniary returns' [1980, p225]. see also Haddock's work on rational
expectations; Haddock's hard core consisted of the following elements : 
(i) expectations are formed rationally, anticipating the effects of any 
policy rule (ii) deviations from the natural rate arise from expectations 
failures [1984, pp291-304].
3: Emergence of the Hard Core 50 
meant by 'irrefutability' in this context. In many of the 
economic applications of Lakatos' work, economists have 
interpreted 'irrefutability' to imply the construction of the 
hard core from statements which are either value judgments - 
'more is better than less', or allegedly untestable 
behavioural assumptions - utility maximization and so on.^^ 
However it is clear from reading Lakatos that he meant 
something quite different to this. He does not make the point 
that Newton's laws are untestable hy their nature but that 
they are to be not tested as a result of a methodological 
decision of the members of the research programme. That 
decision is that "anomalies must lead to changes only in the 
protective belt of auxiliary, 'observational' hypotheses and 
initial conditions" [1970, pl33].^^ This immediately raises 
the question of whether this is no more than an exercise in 
classical conventionalism. Lakatos' argument is that the 
negative heuristic rationalizes conventionalism to a 
considerable extent, for while refutations may not lead to 
immediate abandonment of programmes, programmes may 
eventually be abandoned if they are making no theoretical
progress.
11 See above pp44-46
12 My emphasis.
13 Lakatos argues as follows; "We may rationally decide not to allow 
'refutations' to transmit falsity to the hard core as long as the 
corroborated empirical content of the protecting belt of auxiliary 
hypotheses increases. But our approach differs from Poincaré's 
justificationist conventionalism in the sense that, unlike Poincaré's, we 
maintain that if and when the programme ceases to anticipate novel facts, 
its hard core might have to be abandoned; that is, our hard core, unlike 
Poincaré's, may crumble under certain conditions. In this sense we side 
with Duhem who thought that such a possibility must be allowed for; but 
for Duhem the reason for such crumbling is purely aesthetic, while for us 
it is mainly logical and empirical" [1970, pl34]. Original emphasis.
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There would appear, then, to be no requirement that all or 
any of the elements of a hard core have to be in themselves 
logically 'irrefutable'; 'irrefutability' arises as a result 
of the decision of subscribers to the programme to direct 
anomalies and criticisms elsewhere. 1^  What is required is 
that the hard core be set up in fairly formal terms - in the 
form of laws or principles. With this in mind it is possible 
to rationally reconstruct the hard core of the wages fund 
research programme.
Before doing so however it is necessary to discuss the 
question of the time periods of the analysis. There are two 
reasons for this. First, with regard to the issue of the time 
period I will specify both short and long run versions of the 
wages fund doctrine and I need to expand more carefully on 
the differences. Secondly, in looking at the work of the 
Classical economists it will be seen that they often move 
from the short run to the long during the same discussion 
without making clear their usage of terms.
There are in fact two ways of distinguishing the short run 
from long run which are relevant to Classical wage theory, 
indeed to all Classical theory. One refers to what was later 
to become well-known as the Marshallian distinction between 
the short run during which no further fixed capital may be 
constructed, and the long run during which it can. The second 
distinction is the Malthusian one between the short run 
during which time the population, or more relevantly the
For another view on the question of irrefutability see Leijohnhufvud 
[1976, especially pp79-81 and n.28].
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labour supply, is fixed^^ and the long run in which it can
vary.
The Marshallian distinction is important to my discussion 
because of the nature of the production process assumed by
most Classical writers and present in the hypothetical hard
core. This production process is of the point input - point 
output variety. Thus at a point in time, a given stock of 
fixed capital is assembled, and during the period of 
production work is carried out by workers using this fixed 
capital together with materials, resulting in output at the 
end of the period. During the period of production then, no 
additions can be made to the fixed capital stock, and it was 
this approach to production which led to some discussion of 
the wages fund doctrine with respect to the role of fixed 
capital, the importance of fixed technical coefficients, and 
the possibility of a zero elastic demand curve for labour.
The Malthusian distinction is of course relevant because 
the wages fund doctrine, as it has usually been conceived and 
as I have spelt it out in hard core terms, involves the 
allocation by competition of a pre-determined quantity of 
wage goods among a labour supply that is fixed in the 
(Malthusian) short run. However, as I have already noted, 
writers quite often referred to the short run consequences of 
changes to the wages fund within this Malthusian short run. 
This practice was quite common when applying the wages fund 
doctrine to various matters and thus will be important when
There has been some debate as to whether the Classical economists 
regarded the short run supply curve of labour as perfectly inelastic, 
upward sloping or backward bending. See for example O'Brien [1975, pll3], 
O'Brien [1970, p360ff] and Hollander [187, pl60].
See below pp286-297.
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considering the question of novel facts which I shall argue 
are produced by such applications • In many of these 
examples the analysis is short run in the Malthusian sense 
but long run in the Marshallian sense in that changes can now 
be made to the wages fund, the stock of fixed capital or 
capitalists' consumption plans• This sort of analysis was 
involved in the discussions on the impact of machinery, the 
proposition that the 'demand for commodities is not the 
demand for labour' and other issues, and the consequences 
were traced through for changes in the wage rate. Some of 
these were significant questions for the Classical school and 
the applications of the wages fund produced important and 
controversial novel facts. The short run formulation must be 
extended to include this form of analysis, which I will refer 
to as two period analysis where changes can be made in the 
allocations to the wages fund from one production period to 
another while the population remains static. This distinction 
between the short-run and the two period analysis is very 
important not only because it will illuminate the 
interpretation of a number of applications of the wages fund 
doctrine, but also because a failure to appreciate the 
existence of the two different forms has led commentators to 
misinterpret the wages fund doctrine. Thus the fact that the 
wages fund has appeared to alter has been taken by some as 
evidence that it was not predetermined at all.^®
See chapter five, ppl61-224.
Thus, for example. Levy claims in his biography of Nassau Senior that 
'Senior's conception of a wages fund had no reference to a rigidly-fixed 
and unalterable amount as the Iron Law of wages would imply ' [1970, p328, 
n430]. He reaches this conclusion on the basis of a passage in a letter 
from Senior to Lord Chancellor Brougham on the Poor Law where the wages 
fund varies over time according to the diligence of the workers and the 
amounts paid in poor rates, see letter to Lord Chancellor Brougham 14th.
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It is useful at this stage to sketch out a hypothetical 
Fulton-Leijohnhufvud version of the hard core of the 
Classical wage theory research programme consistent with the 
views typically characterized in twentieth century history of 
economic thought. One of my tasks, when reviewing the 
history of wage theory, will be to assess the extent to which 
an actual hard core emerged resembling this hypothetical 
stereotype. The hard core consists of three parts each 
relating to a time period - the short run, the two period and 
the long run.
(i) The Short Run Analvsis. This is short run in both 
Marshallian and Malthusian terms:
September 1832, Nassau Senior Collection, National Library of Wales, 
Aberystwyth in Levy [1970, p259 and p328 n430]. See below p216 for a 
fuller discussion. Levy's conclusion has the added demerit of confusing 
the short run with the long.
Two examples will serve to give a flavour of how the doctrine has 
typically been portrayed, oser presents us with his own clear version of 
Mill's approach and this seems to contain all the elements of a 
stereotype of the doctrine: "Mill, like Senior, Malthus, Ricardo, James 
Mill, and Smith before him, accepted what has been called the wages-fund 
theory. Wages, he said, depend mainly upon the demand for labour and its 
supply. The demand for labour depends on that part of capital set aside 
for the payment of wages. The supply of labour depends on the number of 
people seeking work. Under the rule of competition, wages cannot be 
affected by anything but the relative amounts of capital and population. 
Wage rates cannot rise except by an increase of the aggregate funds 
employed in hiring labourers or by a diminution in the number of workers 
for hire. Nor can wage rates fall except by a diminution of the funds 
devoted to paying labour or by an increase in the number of labourers to 
be paid. The wages-fund theory therefore presupposes a unitary elasticity 
of demand for labour; no matter what the wage rate, the same sum is 
expended for labor" [1970, pl23]. The main weakness in Oser's account is 
that he attributes the wages fund doctrine to Smith, Malthus, Ricardo and 
James Mill while I will argue that only elements of the approach are 
apparent in their work. Ekelund and Hebert provide another very clear 
statement: "The wages-fund doctrine held that at the end of a production 
period, a given stock of circulating capital is advanced to laborers to 
tide them over the next production period. This stock of capital is 
determined by many variables, including the productivity of labor and 
capital in previous periods, the amount of investment in previous 
periods, and so forth. In crude terms, the doctrine indicated that at a 
macroeconomic level, the average wage rate over a productive period would 
be given by dividing the stock of capital by the number of laborers. 
Thus, in real terms, a maximum real wage (that is, all the goods consumed 
by laborers) is determined at the beginning of the production period. 
Properly stated, and given the assumption of a discrete time period of 
production in the economy, the wages-fund doctrine forms an integral, and 
indeed an inextricable, part of the dynamics of the classical systems." 
[1983, pl64]
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1 Production of goods (both wage goods and luxuries) is 
carried out using discrete (point input - point output) 
production processes undertaken during discontinuous 
production periods. 0^
2 Wages are advances of goods or money from capital.
3 A predetermined fund of goods is destined for the
payment of wages, and is set aside by the capitalists at 
the beginning of the production period.
4 The supply of labour in the short run is fixed.
5 The real wage rate in the short run is determined by 
dividing the pre-determined wage fund by the labour 
supply.
More formally this can be written as:
WS = WF/N Where WS = Short run real wage rate
WF = Wages fund 
N = Labour supply
(ii) The Two Period Analvsis. This analysis is long run in 
Marshallian terms but short run in Malthusian terms:
1 The size of the wages fund may be altered between
production periods.
2 In the short run the labour supply is fixed.
3 The change in the short run real wage rate will be 
determined by dividing the change in the wages fund by 
the labour supply.
20 See Ekelund [1976, p68].
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More formally: 
= A  WF/N Where ^  WS 
A  WF 
N =
= Change in the short 
run real wage rate 
= Change in the wages 
fund
Labour supply, fixed 
in the short run
(iii) The Long Run Analvsis
1 In the long run increases or decreases in capital 
accumulation will lead to increases or decreases in the 
wages fund.
2 In the long run the population may change in response 
to changes in the real wage rate.
3 The trend of the wage rate over time will depend on 
the relationship between capital accumulation and 
population growth.
More formally: 
• ♦ •
W = K - P Where W
#
K
P
= Rate of change of the
wage rate over time
= Rate of change of the
capital stock over 
time
= Rate of change of
population over time
Here then are three 'laws', and these 'laws' perform an 
analogous role in the Classical wage theory research 
programme to that played by Newton's three laws of dynamics
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and the law of gravitation in his research programme. These 
laws form the hard core, and they are, from a Lakatosian 
perspective 'irrefutable'. These hard core elements taken 
together also constitute a 'model' as defined in chapter two. 
IV Elements of the Hard Core: Smith, Ricardo and James Mill 
In section III I outlined the two parts of the short run 
wages fund hard core - the short run analysis and the two 
period analysis. In this section, I will briefly examine the 
work of Smith, Malthus, and Ricardo and James Mill in turn to 
examine the extent to which there was evidence in their 
writings for the existence of either of these parts of the 
hard core. My overall conclusion will be that while elements 
of the hard core appear in the work of all these writers, and 
indeed while both parts of the hard core are fully developed 
by Malthus in the Essay on Population in 1798, the wages fund 
research programme was not fully formed in the work of these 
early writers. This is because these early writers did not 
clearly and consistently subscribe to a shared set of hard 
core statements, in the same way that they did after the work 
of Marcet and McCulloch which I will discuss in the next 
chapter. This is true even of Malthus who having outlined 
both parts of the short run hard core in 1798 presented a 
less well articulated analysis of wages in the Principles of 
Political Economy in 1820 and 1836.
There is also evidence at this early stage of some 
fundamental questions concerning the wages fund doctrine 
which were to recur throughout its later history. First there 
is the question of the level at which the analysis applies - 
at the level of the individual capitalist or the economy as a 
whole. Secondly, there is the question of whether the
3: Emergence of the Hard Core 58 
analysis applies to both the productive and unproductive 
sectors. Finally there is the question of whether the 
analysis should be developed in real or money terms. All of 
these questions were to present difficulties for the wages 
fund doctrine; indeed all of them were present in Mill's 
^®view of Thornton's On Labour in 1869, and formed elements 
in Mill's recantation argument.
(a) Adam Smith
In Adam Smith's early comments on wages there were 
elements, if only in embryonic form, of the later wages fund 
^^^lysis. One part of the short run hard core (element 2) as 
I have outlined it was present — the notion that wages are 
advanced to workers by capitalists from capital. What was 
missing was the notion (element 3) that these advances are 
P^®^®t62^ined or fixed. The hard core then was beginning to 
emerge but it was by no means fully formed at this stage. 
There were also a number of other important distinctions 
apparent in Smith's work which did assume great importance
on. First, there was the distinction between real and 
money funds which was apparent even in these brief early 
comments. Secondly, there was the distinction between the 
Productive and unproductive sectors, an issue often ignored 
but always there in the background. Thirdly, there was the 
distinction between the individual (micro) level discussion 
of wages and the aggregate (macro) level. I have constructed 
the hypothetical hard core of the research programme at the 
3-99rsga.te level and the wages fund has been commonly seen as 
an aggregate analysis. But a continuing tension throughout 
the debate, particularly in Mill's recantation, and linking
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indeed with the question of money, was the issue of the level 
at which the analysis was assumed to operate.
In the introduction to his discussion in Book II of The 
Wealth of Nations 'Of the Nature, Accumulation, and 
Employment of Stock',[1776, p276]^^ Adam Smith makes the
fundamental link between the division of labour, the 
maintenance of workers and the prior existence of stocks of 
goods :
"But when the division of labour has once been thoroughly introduced, the 
produce of a man's own labour can supply but a very small part of his 
occasional wants. The far greater part of them are supplied by the 
produce of other men's labour, which he purchases with the produce, or 
what is the same thing the price of the produce of his own. But this 
purchase cannot be made till such time as the produce of his own labour 
has not only been completed, but sold. A stock of goods of different 
kinds, therefore, must be stored up somewhere sufficient to maintain him, 
and to supply him with the materials and tools of his work, till such 
time, at least, as both these events can be brought about" [1776, p276].
He goes on to say that such a stock in the case of, say, a
weaver must be in the possession of the weaver himself or in
that of someone else. A similar argument is put in Book I
Chapter VIII on wages although here the emphasis on the role
of the employer is more marked:
"It seldom happens that the person who tills the ground has wherewithal 
to maintain himself till he reaps the harvest. His maintenance is 
generally advanced to him from the stock of a master, the farmer who 
employs him, and who would have no interest to employ him, unless he was 
to share in the produce of his labour, or unless his stock was to be 
replaced to him with a profit" [1776, p83].
In these two passages one can see a fundamental element 
( element 2 ) of the later wages fund doctrine - the notion 
that wages are a part of the (capital) stock of the employers 
advanced to the worker to bridge the gap between the input of 
work and the output of product and these advances are made 
with the objective of earning a profit. However it is 
important to note that the emphasis is on what allows
2^ All references to the wealth of Nations are to volume II of The 
Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith, edited by 
R H Campbell and A S Skinner, Oxford University Press, 1976.
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employment to take place and not on what determines the wage 
rate and therefore other items are listed. Also there is no 
evidence here that these stocks are in any way fixed or 
predetermined.
The nature of the production process envisaged by Smith in 
his agricultural example is of the point input - point output 
type. His example is an agricultural one but he makes it 
quite clear that the same arguments apply in other sectors of 
the economy:
"The produce of almost all other labour is liable to the like deduction 
of profit. In all arts and manufactures the greater part of the workmen 
stand in need of a master to advance them the materials of their work, 
and their wages and maintenance till it be compleated. He shares in the 
produce of their labour, or in the value which it adds to the materials 
upon which it is bestowed; and in this share consists his profit" [1776, 
p83].
Two focal points of Smith's approach to wages (and profits) 
are the time involved in production and the ownership of the 
means of that production, including the subsistence necessary 
to bridge that gap in time. Sometimes the ownership resides 
with the workman himself if he has enough stock to maintain 
himself through the production period. Under these 
circumstances the worker would derive two distributive 
shares, although this situation would be rare.^2
Having stressed the dependence of workers on the masters 
it is perhaps natural for Smith at this point to elaborate on 
the nature of the contract between them and it is here that
22 Thus Smith argued: "It sometimes happens, indeed, that a single
independent workman has sufficient stock both to purchase the materials 
of this work, and to maintain himself till it be completed. He is both 
master and workman, and enjoys the whole produce of his own labour, or 
the whole value which it adds to the materials upon which it is bestowed. 
It includes what are usually two distinct revenues belonging to two 
distinct persons, the profits of stock, and the wages of labour.
Such cases, however, are not very frequent, and in every part of 
Europe, twenty workmen serve under a master for one that is independent; 
and the wages of labour are everywhere understood to be, what they 
usually are, when the labourer is one person, and the owner of the stock 
which employs him another" [1776, p83].
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he turns his attention to the question of the determination 
of the wage rate. In Smith's 'bargaining theory', which is
what follows, the masters clearly have the upper hand for
they are fewer in number and are not prevented by law from
combining. Thus Smith argues :
"The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily; and 
the law, besides, authorizes, or at least does not prohibit their 
combination, while it prohibits those of the workmen. We have no acts of 
parliament against combining to lower the price of work; but many against 
combining to raise it. In all such disputes the masters can hold out much 
longer. A landlord, a master manufacturer, or a merchant, though they did 
not employ a single workman, could generally live a year or two upon the 
stock which they have already acquired. Many workmen could not subsist a 
week, few could subsist a month, and scarce any a year without 
employment. In the long-run the workmen may be as necessary to his master 
as his master is to him; but the necessity is not so immediate" [1776, 
pp83-84].
The ownership of capital then puts the employers in a 
stronger position than the workers. Moreover the employers 
often combine, although their combinations are rarely heard 
of. Indeed 'such combinations are... frequently resisted by a 
contrary defensive combination of workmen' although workmen 
sometimes combine 'without any provocation of this kind ' 
[1776, p84]. The lower limit to which wages may be pushed by 
the efforts of the masters is provided by Smith's notion of 
minimum subsistence wages below which a man will not be able 
to bring up his f a m i l y . It is quite clear from what Smith 
says elsewhere in the book that this is a cultural minimum.
smith describes minimum subsistence as follows: "But though in
disputes with their workmen, masters must generally have the advantage, 
there is however a certain rate below which it seems impossible to 
reduce, for any considerable time, the ordinary wages even of the lowest 
species of labour. A man must always live by his work, and his wages must 
at least be sufficient to maintain him. They must even upon most 
occasions be somewhat more; otherwise it would be impossible for him to 
bring up a family and the race of such workman could not last beyond the 
first generation" [1776, p85].
24 Thus Smith argues : "By Necessaries I understand, not only the
commodities which are indispensably necessary for the support of life, 
but whatever the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable 
people, even of the lowest order, to be without.."[1776, pp869-870].
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Smith's bargaining theory of the labour market was to have 
a prolonged existence as a basis for explaining imperfectly 
competitive labour markets. As I shall show in later 
chapters, McCulloch built upon it in 1824 in an article which 
may have influenced Harriet Martineau; both Fawcett and Mill 
argued along Smithian lines in the 1860s, and the influence 
of Smith is apparent in Mill's r e c a n t a t i o n . Like the later 
writers. Smith strongly disapproved of the 'the recourse to 
the most shocking violence and outrage' which sometimes 
occurred as a result of union action [1776, p84]. Unlike the 
later writers, however. Smith did not make a theoretical case 
for the role of unions within the market system in terms of 
their role in raising wages when below equilibrium or in 
obtaining a share of increased profits; nor did he anywhere 
express approval of their existence. Nevertheless the tone of 
Smith's argument, with its critical almost cynical stance 
towards the employers who always seem to have the upper hand, 
implies that to the extent to which workers combinations can 
redress the balance within the labour market, they are to be 
welcomed.
In the space of three pages then Smith has developed the 
notion of wages and maintenance being advanced from stocks, 
argued for a bargaining theory of wage determination and 
introduced the concept of the long-run minimum subsistence 
wage. While there is an element of the wages fund hard core 
present at this stage - the advance of wages from capital - 
there is clearly not a wages fund analysis of the wage rate. 
Such an analysis would imply a competitive outcome and here
25 see below pp232-237 and 285-297.
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on the contrary Smith points to an uncompetitive solution 
'upon all ordinary occasions'[1776, p 8 3 ] T h e  wage rate is 
determined by the power - economic, strategic and legal - of 
the employers vis à vis the workers. Smith however quickly 
turns to consider the circumstances under which the employers 
lose the bargaining edge. It is important to note that it is 
here that Smith outlines a competitive solution to the 
determination of the wage rate where demand is rising and it 
is in the subsequent sections, where the nature of this 
demand is explained, that there is the first of the 
references to 'the funds which are destined for the payment 
of wages' [1776, p 8 6 ] T h e  chain of argument begins with a 
discussion of the circumstances in which the usual 
combinations of employers can be broken. Where there is a 
continually increasing demand for labour, whether labourers, 
journeymen or servants, workers have no need to combine to 
try to raise their wages:
"The scarcity of hands occasions a competition among masters, who bid 
against one another, in order to get workmen, and thus voluntarily break 
through the natural combination of masters not to raise wages" [1776,
p86].
Smith goes on to expand this discussion and refers to two 
kinds of labour demand. An increase in the revenue or income 
to a landlord or monied man above what he may require for his 
family will lead him to employ more servants. An increase in
25 See Hollander [1973, pl56-160, and ppl85-187] for discussion of
Smith's wages fund and bargaining approaches.
27 Another example can be found in ch.ix on the "Profits of Stock". Here 
Smith argues as follows : "The diminution of the capital stock of the
society, or of the funds destined for the maintenance of industry, 
however, as it lowers the wages of labour, so it raises the profits of 
stock, and consequently the interest of money' [1776, pllO]. Taussig has 
^gued that such phrases were the 'parent of the word "wages-fund" as it 
is used in later literature' [1896, pl45]. See also Schumpeter [1954, 
pp268-270] on Smith's approach to wage theory. Schumpeter argued that the 
'joker that lurks behind the word "destined" was responsible for many a 
headache later on' [1954, p269].
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the stock of an independent journeyman above what he may need 
for employing himself will lead him to employ one or more 
journeymen's.
There are a number of points to note about this 
discussion. First, the emphasis is entirely on the demand 
side with no reference to wage rate determination although 
the wage rate outcome could be inferred from this analysis 
taken together with the earlier arguments. Secondly, Smith 
places a great deal of emphasis on the distinction between 
revenue and stock. These terms are not well defined here 
although they are explained more clearly later on.^^ The 
important point about this for wage theory is that Smith 
firmly sets up his discussion of labour demand in two 
sectors, each linked to a particular form of income. This two
Smith argued as follows: "The demand for those who live by wages, it 
is evident, cannot increase but in proportion to the increase of the 
funds which are destined for the payment of wages. These funds are of two 
kinds; first, the revenue which is over and above what is necessary for 
the maintenance; and, secondly, the stock which is over and above what is 
necessary for the employment of their masters. When the landlord,
annuitant, or monied man, has a greater revenue than what he judges
sufficient to maintain his own family, he employs either the whole or a
part of the surplus in maintaining one or more menial servants. Increase 
this surplus, and he will naturally increase the number of those
servants.
When an independent workman, such as a weaver or a shoe-maker, has got 
more stock than what is sufficient to purchase the materials of his own 
work, and to maintain himself till he can dispose of it, he naturally 
employs one or more journeymen with the surplus, in order to make a 
profit by their work. Increase this surplus, and he will naturally 
increase the number of his journeymen. The demand for those who live by 
wages, therefore, necessarily increases with increase of the revenue and 
the stock of every country, and cannot possibly increase without it. The 
increase of revenue and stock is the increase of national wealth. The 
demand for those who live by wages, therefore naturally increases with 
the increase of national wealth, and cannot possibly increase without it" 
[1776, pp86-87].
25 Thus in Book II Chapter III for example. Smith makes it clear that by 
'stock' he means both fixed and circulating capital and by 'revenue' he 
means the income earned by the ownership of capital or land. In the above 
passage smith links the employment of productive workers to the funds 
emanating from stock, and the employment of unproductive workers from 
those funds coming from revenue. In Book II Chapter III he makes the 
point that productive workers can only be maintained from stock whereas 
revenue may be used to maintain either unproductive or productive workers 
[1776, pp332-333].
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sector approach although employed by Malthus was often lost
sight of in later Classical discussions. The fact that it was 
often ignored was one source of later misunderstanding and 
confusion.30 Thirdly, Smith is dealing here in money terms. 
Revenue is a money concept and his reference to stock is 
couched in terms of money. This contrasts with the reference 
to stock, in real terms, as goods 'stored up somewhere ' 
[1776, p276].3l Finally, in this discussion Smith at first 
refers to the landlord, annuitant, monied man or independent 
workman but later switches to an aggregate analysis, relating
revenue and stock to national i n c o m e . 32
Although Smith did not develop a wages fund analysis, in 
many ways he set the tone for much of the ensuing debate. Two 
broad pictures of the economics of the labour market began to 
emerge from his approach, developed in later decades, which 
underlay all subsequent discussion of the wages fund doctrine 
and in particular the recantation. In one, there is the
^  important element in the debate concerning Mill's recantation is 
the issue of whether or not this discussion implied the existence of one 
or two sectors. See Hollander[1968, p324] and Vint [1981, pp71-88].
3^ See above p59.
32 Interestingly, in Book II chapter I smith deals with capital at the 
aggregate level and he is very careful to define in material or real 
terms the nature of circulating capital and the role of money. He argues 
that the general stock of a country consists of three portions. First, 
the stocks of goods purchased but not yet fully consumed - food, 
clothing, household furniture etc. Secondly, fixed capital which 
comprises all machines and instruments which facilitate and abridge 
labour, buildings, land improvements and 'acquired and useful abilities 
of all the inhabitants or members of the society'[1776, p282]. Thirdly 
and most importantly for my purposes is circulating capital which 
consists of four parts - 'the provisions, materials and finished work of 
all kinds that are in the hands of their respective dealers, and of the 
money that is necessary for circulating and distributing them to those 
who are finally to use, or to consume them' [1776, p283].
Money then is included as an element in circulating capital but only 
as a means of distributing the others. The function of both fixed and 
circulating capital is to 'maintain and augment the capital stock which 
may be reserved for immediate consumption' [1776, p283]. It is the size 
of the latter stock which determines the 'riches or poverty ' of the 
people [1776, p283].
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individual capitalist allocating his expenditure at the 
beginning of the production period between unproductive 
consumption, fixed and circulating capital. Here the 
capitalist exists at the centre of decision-making and both 
plans and finances production and labour demand. The analysis 
is in money terms and the question arises by what means is 
the outcome, the wages bill, predetermined in real terms? 
The second picture is developed in aggregate terms with 
output in the economy as a whole being produced in discrete 
time periods with a 'fixed' portion of this 'set aside' to 
support labour in the next production period. This analysis 
is in real terms and the problem of money is absent, but now 
the question is to what extent is the final output of wage 
goods in the control of the capitalists? Output depends 
partly on the decisions of capitalists at the beginning of 
the period, partly on industrial productivity and partly on 
the quality of the harvest. Capitalists still organise and 
finance production but the output of wage goods in the 
economy as a whole is not purely a capitalist's decision. It 
was the conflicts inherent in these money versus real, and 
individual versus aggregate, conceptions of the wages fund 
that was finally its undoing. Malthus and McCulloch came 
closest to resolving some of the conflict but, as I shall 
argue, the approach that they developed was out of line with 
that of other major writers such as Ricardo and Mill. In 
Smith's work the embryo of the Classical wage theory research 
programme is present - elements of the hard core are clear, 
but they are not well f o r m e d . 33 what are also present are the
25 Those texts which date a fully fledged wages fund analysis from the 
work of Smith are therefore misleading. Thus Oser argues that "Mill, like
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seedlings of the difficulties which were to beset the 
programme for almost a century, and the non-competitive 
bargaining model to which the Classical school was to return 
time and time again when considering the question of unions 
and strikes.
(b) David Ricardo 
There is no simple, clear statement of the wages fund 
doctrine as outlined above to be found in Ricardo's
Principles of Political Economv or any of his other published
works or correspondence, but there are a number of points 
that emerge from his discussion. First, in the chapter on 
wages there is very clear evidence for element (2) of the 
h&rd core but none for element (3). Secondly, in the same 
chapter Ricardo develops a two period analysis which is 
consistent with the wages fund doctrine although the hard 
core is not explicitly spelt out. Thirdly, in the chapter on 
machinery Ricardo does present an example in which the wages 
fund is predetermined in real and money terms. Fourthly, I 
will show that there are other passages in the Principles and 
his correspondence where Ricardo's approach to wages runs 
counter to the simple wages fund doctrine. Finally, Ricardo 
does develop an analysis in which wage goods are bartered
directly for labour services but I will argue that here 
Ricardo is primarily interested in the question of
Profitability and that a general belief in a predetermined 
wages fund cannot be inferred from this discussion.
In the chapter "On Wages" in the Principles Ricardo argues 
that the market price of labour is determined by the 'natural
Senior, Malthus, Ricardo, James Mill, and Smith before him, accepted what 
has been called the wages-fund theory” [1970, pl23]. See also Ekelund and 
Hébert [1983, p97].
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operation of the proportion of the supply to the demand' 
[1817, p94], and the long run 'natural price of labour' is 
determined by the cost of maintenance [1817, p93], which is 
not be regarded as fixed but which 'depends on the habits and 
customs of the people' [1817, p97]« As I will argue below, 
Ricardo subscribed to a view of the long run determination of 
the wage rate which is consistent with the long run hard core 
which I have set out.^^ In addition he took the view that 
population would tend to outstrip the growth in capital and 
that wages would fall to their natural level - the Iron Law 
of Wages - as it later became known.
Elsewhere in the chapter on wages, however, Ricardo is 
more concerned to analyze the immediate effects of an 
increase in capital and once again the analysis is a two
period one. First he defines what he means by capital:
"Capital is that part of the wealth of a country which is employed in 
production, and consists of food, clothing, tools, raw materials, 
machinery, etc., necessary to give effect to labour" [1817, p95].
There is nothing here formally about a 'wages fund' and 
the argument concerns the requirements necessary to 'give 
effect' to labour and not just to maintain workers. At the 
beginning of the chapter on wages Ricardo argues that the 
power of the worker to support himself and his family depends 
not on the amount of money wages but 'on the quantity of 
food, necessaries, and conveniences become essential to him 
from habit, which that money will buy' [1817, p93]. Wages are 
paid in money and are spent on food, clothing and other 
goods which are part of capital. Wages, then, are part of 
capital and to this extent Ricardo's analysis reveals the 
element (2) of the short run hard core as I defined it. But
^4 See above p56.
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this is as far as it goes; once again element (3) relating to 
pre-determination is absent.
Having defined capital Ricardo goes on to develop a two 
period analysis of the impact of a change in quantity of 
capital on labour demand. He outlines two possible scenarios. 
In the first, additions are made to the food and clothing of 
the country which rise in price due to diminishing returns 
[1817, p95]. In the second, additions may be made to the
stock of food and clothing which due to the use of machinery 
are produced at no extra cost.^^ The increased demand for 
labour will tend to raise the market wage rate above the 
natural (culturally determined subsistence) rate in both 
cases but the population response will vary. In the first 
case, the increase in the prices of wage goods will absorb 
much of the increase in wages and thus 'a small supply of 
labour, or a trifling increase in the population, will soon 
reduce the market price to the then increased natural price 
of labour' [1817, p96]. In the second case, real wages will 
rise and 'it will not be till after a great addition has been 
made to the population, that the market price of labour will 
again sink to its then low and reduced natural price'[1817, 
p96]. In both cases, then, the population response will bring 
the wage rate down to the natural level, while in the short
Ricardo argued as follows: "...but the addition may be made by the aid 
of machinery without any increase, and even with an absolute diminution 
in the proportional quantity of labour required to produce them. The 
quantity of capital may increase, while neither the whole together, nor 
any part of it singly, will have a greater value than before" [1817, 
p95]. In the third edition he took the argument slightly further and 
added to the end of this passage the words: "but may actually have a 
less" [1821, plOl]. This change may have reflected Ricardo's increased 
concern with questions to do with machinery in the third edition which 
now contained the new chapter (chapter 21) on the subject. In fact, while 
the new chapter stresses the possible detrimental effects of machinery, 
this change made in the chapter on wages reinforces the argument for the 
benefits of machinery.
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run the workers can become better off. But how is this result 
achieved? Ricardo says nothing about the short run labour 
supply conditions in this passage but his view is clear from 
his later treatment in the chapter on 'Taxes on Raw Produce'. 
Here Ricardo stresses the time needed for the labour supply 
to respond to increased wages. Whilst the market price of a 
commodity such as hats cannot for long exceed its natural 
price this is not so with labour:
"... .whilst the funds for the maintenance of labour increase or diminish 
rapidly, there must be a considerable interval before the price of labour 
is exactly regulated by the price of corn and necessaries"[1817, pl65].
Thus in Ricardo's two examples real wage can rise in the
short run as a result of increases in the allocations of food
and clothing. Increased money allocations are made to a given
labour supply, and this enables the workforce to purchase the
increased quantity of food and clothing. It is difficult to
infer anything about the pre-determined nature or otherwise
of the wages fund from this because the fund is changing but
it is possible to argue that the analysis is consistent with
the logic of the wages fund doctrine as I have described it.
Once the increased wage fund has been allocated to the fixed
labour supply the real wage rises, and this conclusion is
perfectly consistent with my two period short run hard core
as outlined.
In chapter XXXI 'On Machinery' Ricardo analyzed the impact 
of machinery on wages and I will discuss this in chapter 
five. It is worth noting here, however, that in the course of 
laying out an example Ricardo presented a clear case of a 
predetermined wage fund:
"Each year the capitalist begins his operations, by having food and 
necessaries in his position of the value of £13,000, all of which he 
sells in the course of the year to his own workmen for that sum of money, 
and, during the same period, he pays them the like amount of money for
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wages: at the end of the year they replace in his possession food and 
necessaries of the value of £15,000, £2,000 of which he consumes himself, 
or disposes of as may best suit his pleasure and gratification. As far as 
these products are concerned, the gross produce for that year is £15,000, 
and the net produce £2,000"[1821, l, p380].
Here the fund for the payment of wages is predetermined in 
both goods and money terms and Ricardo makes the role of 
money very clear in this particular case. Thus while wages 
are paid in money, these wages are used to buy the 
predetermined stock of wage goods from the employer. This 
analysis is perfectly consistent with the short run hard core 
as I have described it.
In contrast to the example from the chapter on machinery 
in the chapter on 'Taxes on Raw Produce' Ricardo uses a 
similar two period approach but here the results are not 
consistent with the short run hard core and indeed raise 
important difficulties for the wages fund doctrine. In this 
chapter Ricardo is concerned to show that a high price of 
corn may result from different causes and accordingly produce 
different consequences for labour supply and demand. One 
source of an increased corn price is an increase in demand 
which can only come about as a result of a previous increase 
in labour demand:
"An accumulation of capital naturally produces an increased competition 
^Mong the employers of labour, and a consequent rise in its price. The 
increased wages are not always immediately expended on food, but are 
first made to contribute to the other enjoyments of the labourer. His 
improved condition however induces and enables him to marry, and then the 
demand for food for the support of his family naturally supersedes that 
of those other enjoyments on which his wages were temporarily expended." 
[1817, PP162-3].
The wages fund here then is not a simple pre-determined 
quantity of wage g o o d s . T h e  amount of money allocated to 
labour on the form of wages has risen - the money fund has 
grown - but workers have taken the opportunity to spend some
36 see Hollander [1979, pp326-339].
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of the increase on 'the other enjoyments of the labourer'. 
There is no hint here of the argument later employed by 
McCulloch,^^ whereby proportional rises in goods prices 
offset the increases in money wages leaving the real wages 
biii unchanged. In this passage Ricardo is quite clear that 
living standards can and will rise as a result of the wage 
increase but this is not, as in the earlier case, a result of 
an increase in the real quantity of wage goods being 
allocated, but as a result of an increase in the money fund 
being spent on other enjoyments. The nature of these 
enjoyments are spelt out more clearly in the chapter dealing 
with Malthus' views on rent ;
"It is by giving the workmen more money, or any other commodity in which 
wages are paid, and which has not fallen in value, that his situation is 
improved. The increase of population, and the increase of food will 
generally be the effect, but not the necessary effect of high wages. The 
amended condition of the labourer, in consequence of the increased value 
which is paid him, does not necessarily oblige him to marry and take upon 
himself the charge of a family - he will, in all probability, employ a 
portion of his increased wages in furnishing himself abundantly with food 
and necessaries - but with the remainder he may, if it pleases him, 
purchase any commodities that may contribute to his enjoyments — chairs, 
tables, and hardware; or better clothes, sugar and tobacco. His increased 
wages then will be attended with no other effect than an increased demand 
for some of those commodities; and as the race of labourers will not be 
materially increased, his wages will continue permanently high. But 
although this might be the consequence of high wages, yet so great are 
the delights of domestic society, that in practice it is invariably found 
that an increase of population follows the amended condition of the 
labourers; and it is only because it does so, that, with the trifling 
exception already mentioned, a new and increased demand arises for food. 
This demand then is the effect of an increase of capital and population, 
but not the cause - it is only because the expenditure of the people 
takes this direction, that the market price of necessaries exceeds the 
natural price, and the quantity of food required is produced; and it 
because the number of people is increased, that wages again fall"[1817, 
pp406-7].
Again in correspondence with Trower, Ricardo makes the same 
point:
"The aggregate capitals will be increased! Now if labour cannot be 
procured no more work will be done with additional capital, but wages 
will rise, and the distribution of the produce will be favourable to the 
workmen. In this case no more food will be produced if the workmen were 
veil fed before, their demand will be for conveniences, and luxuries. But 
the number of labourers are increased, or the children of labourers! Then
3*7 See below ppl07-115.
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indeed the demand for food will increase and food will be produced in 
consequence of such demand. It would be wrong to infer always that an 
increase of capital will produce an increased quantity of work to be 
done; it will be followed by no such effect if the labourers happen to be 
in a position to enable them to command the whole addition to the fund 
for the maintenance of labour, without doing any more work" [1951, VIII, 
p258].
The point at issue with both Malthus and Trower was whether 
accumulated stocks of food were a prerequisite for population 
growth. Ricardo's argument is that capital accumulation leads 
to wage increases which may, after a lag during which time 
workers consume conveniences and luxuries, lead to increased 
population which then generates a demand for food. There is 
no suggestion here that workers are limited in their 
consumption to previously stored up wage goods, or that 
increased money allocations when spent on such a pre­
determined stock will produce price rises that will leave the 
workers no better off. On the contrary, workers can become 
better off and consume luxuries — at least in the short run 
until the temptations of domestic society lead them to have 
more children.
Further evidence for Ricardo's rejection of the wages fund 
doctrine is seen in his attitude to combinations revealed in 
correspondence with Malthus. In the fifth edition of the 
Principles of Population [1817] Malthus had argued that 
workers combinations were 'not only illegal, but irrational 
and ineffectual ' because attempting to keep up wages in an 
industry:^®
".. .must have the effect of throwing so many out of employment as to make 
the expense of their support fully equal to the gain acquired by the 
higher wages, and thus render these higher wages in reference to the 
whole body perfectly futile" [1817, p371].
38 All references to Malthus' Essay on the Principle of Population are 
to the Variorum edition edited in two volumes by Patricia James in 1989. 
The date in the brackets refers to the date of the relevant edition of 
the Essay; the volume number and the page numbers refer to the Variorum 
edition.
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In a letter dated 21st October 1817 Ricardo rejected this
argument on the grounds that:
"A combination among the workmen would increase the amount of money to be 
divided among the labouring classes"[1951, VII, p203].
Although in the examples just discussed Ricardo does not 
adopt a simple wages fund analysis, Hollander [1979, p334- 
338] has argued that, in places, Ricardo constructs a very 
simple model of the labour market where the decision about 
the acquisition of wage goods is taken out of the hands of 
the workers. Here, Hollander argues, the notion of a pre­
accumulation of goods is present. In a letter to Trower on
the 25th of September 1820, Ricardo once again makes the
point that an 'increased demand for labour will not 
necessarily produce an increased demand for food, but an 
increased demand for other things agreeable to the
labourer.'[1951, VIII, p235]. Ricardo develops the argument:
"A producer has a right to demand either his own commodity or some other. 
If he intends to add to his capital he naturally seeks to possess himself 
of that commodity which will be in demand by those whose labour he wishes 
to dispose of: it may be corn but there is no more necessity of its being 
corn than cloth, shoes, stockings, tea, sugar, iron or any other thing" 
[1951, VIII, p236].
The employer then seeks a variety of commodities with
which to employ labour and Hollander argues that this is
strong evidence for the notion of a pre-accumulation of wage
goods. A similar argument is made in Ricardo's draft notes on
'Absolute Value and Exchangeable Value' of 1823:
"Before a man can work for a year a stock of food and clothing and other 
necessaries must be provided for him. This stock is not his property but 
is the property of the man who sets him to work" [1951, IV, p365].
Hollander argues [1979, p337], quite rightly, that it is
unlikely that an economist who has laid so much stress on the
variety of goods consumed by workers could elsewhere have
visualized the labour market in terms of pre-accumulated
stocks of wage goods. In that case why did Ricardo resort to
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this analysis? Hollander [1979, p337] suggests that it may 
have been because it was a useful expository device although 
he does not say why. It could be argued, however, that in 
both these passages, Ricardo is concerned with an aspect of 
the matter with which he did not concern himself in the other 
examples cited. In both cases he is at pains to point out 
that a crucial consideration from the employer's point of 
view is the state of the 'real terms of trade' between the 
commodity, or commodities produced, and wages goods. These 
terms of trade will be important in determining 
profitability. In the letter to Trower he argued that the 
most effective way to increase capital was to produce 
something that will not fall in value, and in the draft notes 
on 'Absolute Value and Exchangeable Value' of 1823 he very
carefully spells out the factors affecting profitability:
"It greatly depends then on the proportion of the finished work which the 
master is obliged to give in exchange to replace the food and clothing 
expended on his workmen what shall be his profits, it not only depends on 
the relative value of the finished commodity to the necessaries of the 
labourer, which must always be replaced, to put the master in the same 
condition as when he commenced his yearly business but it depends also on 
the state of the market for labour (or the quantity of necessaries which 
competition obliges the master to give for these necessaries), for if 
labour be scarce the workman will be able to demand and obtain a great 
quantity of necessaries (or what is the same thing to the master, 
luxuries)"[1951, IV, p366].
It seems very likely that the easiest way for Ricardo to 
analyse the relationship between profitability and the terms 
of trade between commodities produced and wages goods is to 
approach the problem in a 'barter model' format, abstracting 
for the moment from the potential complication of the 
reconciliation of money and real funds. Thus what appears to 
be an example of a rigid predetermined wages fund analysis is 
merely an expository device for discussing factors affecting
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profitability and was not intended to reflect Ricardo's view 
of how the labour market really worked.
(c) James Mill
Ricardo's friend James Mill began the discussion of wages 
in his Elements of Political Economv, first published in
1821, by carefully separating out wages from capital:
"When we speak of labour, as one of the instruments of production, and 
capital, as the other, these two constituents, namely, the instruments 
which aid labour, and the materials on which it is employed, are all that 
can be correctly included in the idea of capital. It is true that wages 
are in general included under that term. But, in that sense, labour is 
also included; and can no longer be spoken of as an instrument of 
production apart from capital" [1821, pl7].
He goes on to say of wages that:
"...being advanced by the capitalist out of these funds, which would 
otherwise have constituted capital in the destructive sense of the word, 
and being considered as yielding the same advantage, it is uniformly 
spoken of under the name of capital, and a confusion of ideas is 
sometimes the consequence" [1821, p24].
The freshness of this approach is maintained temporarily at 
the beginning of the chapter on wages. Here he argues that 
since commodities are produced by both capitalists and 
labourers together they should both take their rewards from 
the product. However, he argues, it is to the convenience of 
the labourers for them to receive their share in advance. The 
next section is entitled 'That the Rate of Wages Depends on 
the Proportion between Population, and Employment, in other 
words. Capital, ' but Mill does not go as far as Malthus, 
Marcet or McCulloch^^ in pointing out that the wage rate is 
obtained by dividing the wages fund by the workforce. Indeed, 
Mill's discussion from now on is essentially long run, 
although there is an example later of what I have called two 
period analysis where the population is assumed to be 
constant. Mill argues, completely in line with my specified
35 For Malthus see below pp85-91, and for Marcet and McCulloch see below 
pplOl-115.
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long run hard core that wages depend upon the 'ratio which
capital bears to population' [1821 p44], and that if the rate 
of growth of capital exceeds that of population wages will 
rise and vice versa. So, having warned us of the possibility 
of confusion of ideas arising from speaking about wages 
'under the name of capital ' [1821, p24]. Mill proceeds to
focus his attention in the chapter on wages on the ratio 
between the two without any further qualifications. In his 
defence it could be said that now the Malthusian thrust of
the discussion has become clear and it is no longer important
for Mill to pin down precisely what is included in capital, 
but on the other hand that was also probably true of most 
other writers against whom Mill's earlier warning was 
directed.
Later in the book, however. Mill turns his attention to 
the question of taxes on wages and here wages are no longer 
just subsistence or food advanced to the labourer but money, 
although this is not explicitly stated. Mill outlines two 
cases. In the first, wages are at the subsistence minimum and
tax on wages in these circumstances will simply reduce 
the supply of labour and this will be followed by a rise in 
wages back to subsistence. Presumably it is being assumed, 
although it is not stated, that this adjustment takes place 
in the 'Malthusian' long run. In the other case wages are 
above subsistence and the tax on wages represents a 
redistribution of purchasing power from labourers to the 
government. Prior to the redistribution the labourers 
'presented a demand for so much of the operations of fixed 
capital, so much of those of immediate labour' [1821, p264].
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The final outcome depends upon the government's pattern of 
expenditure:
"Where the same amount is transferred to the government, the 
government presents in like manner a demand for so much of the operations 
of fixed capital, so much of those of immediate labour. If the 
proportions of the demand for the produce of fixed capital and immediate 
labour were the same in both cases, there would be no alteration in the 
demand for labour, in consequence of the tax, and the whole of it would 
fall upon the labourers. If the government presented a greater demand for 
the produce of immediate labour, less for that of fixed capital, than was 
presented by the labourers, there would so far be an increase of demand 
for labour, and a rise of wages, which would so far be a compensation to 
the labourer for the tax, at the expense, however, of profits, and with 
an uncompensated loss to the extent of all the produce which the 
superseded capital would have yielded" [1821, pp264-265].
Here again, then, we see an example of two period analysis at
work. The intention is not to trace through the consequences
of the tax for the population response but to analyze the
immediate effect on labour demand. Also, as with the
Ricardian examples we saw e a r l i e r , w a g e s  here are seen as
consisting of money, not wage goods, thus enabling the
government to receive money via taxation, which it is then
able to spend as it wishes. An analysis of taxation using a
real wage goods model would lead to the conclusion that the
wage goods given up in 'taxation' would simply be used in
turn by the government in demanding labour. Labour demand
under these circumstances would remain the same. As it is,
the analysis based on a money model of wages leads to a
variety of other outcomes.
Thus Mill, like Ricardo, subscribed to the long run wage 
theory described by our hard core and believed in addition 
that the population would grow faster than capital. Also, 
like Ricardo, when dealing with a specific example involving 
allocations to labour - in this case relating to taxation - 
he made use of a money concept of wages in which the outcome
40 See above pp71-73,
3: Emergence of the Hard Core 79 
for the workers in terms of labour demand and the wage rate 
was not related in any simple way to a pre-determined stock 
of wages goods.
V The Wages Fund Doctrine and Population Theory; The
Malthusian Legacy 
Having now discussed the short run hard core of the wages
fund doctrine research programme in the work of the early
Classical writers, it is appropriate at this point to outline 
the key features of population theory and relate this to both 
short run and long run wage theory. Malthus is a central 
figure in this debate in two respects. First, Malthus clearly 
distinguished population theory from wage theory, and this 
distinction influenced later writers. Secondly, in discussing 
the long run population question in the first edition of the 
Principles, Malthus put forward some important arguments 
relating to the short run and two period wage fund analyses. 
I shall discuss these contributions separately.
(a) Population theory and long run wage theory 
The long run wages fund theory was subscribed to by the 
early Classical writers - Smith, Malthus and Ricardo. 
Hollander [1979, p388] has argued that Ricardo and Malthus 
both took a view of the long run determination of the wage 
rate which was essentially based on Smith's a p p r o a c h . I n
41 Smith made the point that the level of wages is governed by the rate 
of growth of the national wealth in relation to population: "It is not
the actual greatness of national wealth, but its continual increase, 
which occasions a rise in the wages of labour. It is not, accordingly, in 
the richest countries, but in the most thriving, or those which are 
growing rich the fastest, that the wages of labour are highest. England 
is certainly, in the present times, a much richer country than any part 
of North America. The wages of labour, however, are much higher in North 
America than in any part of England" [1776, p87]. The reason for North 
American high wages is economic growth and the empirical evidence is 
provided by the growth of population - the fund for maintaining the 
labourers increasing faster than the workforce. Thus with economic growth 
the funds destined for the payment of wages can increase even in a 
country with a small national income and wages can rise above
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this view the real wage rate in the long run is determined by 
the relationship between the rate of capital accumulation and 
the rate of population growth. Thus a high but constant rate 
of capital accumulation will lead to a 'high' wage rate and 
an increase in the rate of accumulation will lead to an 
increase in the wage rate. In his Principles of Political 
E c o n o m y ,  42 Ricardo referred approvingly to a full statement 
of the long run argument which appeared in the second edition 
of the Essav on Population published in 1803:43
"The price of labour, when left to find its natural level is a most 
important political barometer, expressing the relationship between the 
supply of provisions, and the demand for them, between the quantity to be 
consumed, and the number of consumers; and, taken on the average, 
independently of accidental circumstances, it further expresses, clearly, 
the wants of society respecting population; that is, whatever may be the 
number of children to a marriage necessary to maintain exactly the 
present population, the price of labour will be just sufficient to 
support this number, or be above it, or below it, according as the state 
of the real funds for the maintenance of labour, whether stationary, 
progressive, or retrograde" [1803, I, pp355-356].
This model was of course consistent with a wide range of 
possible trends of real wages, capital accumulation and 
population growth, and it is also well described by the 
hypothetical long run hard core outlined above which is 
perfectly general and lacking in any specific empirical 
content. In later chapters I will show that the approach was 
adhered to by later Classical writers.
subsistence. Smith goes on to argue that if these funds remain the same 
from year to year population growth in response to the above subsistence 
wage will eventually drive the wage rate down to the minimum and he cites 
China as an example. If the funds destined for the maintenance of labour 
'decay' over time wages cannot remain at subsistence level and 'want, 
famine and mortality' [1776, p91] reduce population. This, Smith argues, 
was the situation in Bengal at the time.
42 Ricardo makes his comment on Malthus when discussing Buchanan's 
treatment of Adam Smith's analysis of a tax on wages. He refers to 
Buchanan having quoted Malthus' 'able' passage in Buchanan's edition of 
the Wealth of Nations [1814, volume IV pp62-63]. See Ricardo, Principles, 
[1817, PP218-219].
43 All references to Malthus' Essav on the Principle of Population are 
to the Variorum edition edited in two volumes by Patricia James in 1989. 
The date in the brackets refers to the date of the relevant edition of 
the Essay; the volume number and the page numbers refer to the Variorum 
edition.
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The long run wage theory must be distinguished from 
population theory. The former related the rate of change of 
the wage rate - the dependent variable - to growth in the 
capital stock and population. The latter related the rate of 
change of population - now the dependent variable - to the 
real wage rate, the habits and customs of the working 
classes, and a number of other factors influencing both the 
birth and the death rates. Quite clearly these two theories 
are intimately related but they are logically separable. 
Malthus was quite clear in his own mind about the 
relationship of the two. After discussing the fund 
appropriated to the maintenance of labour in the first 
edition of the Essav Malthus argues:
"On the state of this fund, the happiness, or the degree of misery of the 
lower classes of people in every known state, at present chiefly depends. 
And on this happiness, or degree of misery, depends the increase, 
stationariness, or decrease of population" [1798, I, p206].
The early Classical writers used to move between the two
theories quite automatically, and discussions of policy
issues were often undertaken using a mixture of these ideas.
However the later writers such as McCulloch, Senior and J S
Mill were much more careful in separating out these differing
treatments and a clearly separate and identifiable hard core
of long run wage theory is identifiable in their work, most
ably outlined by Mill in the Principles [1848, CW, III,
pp719-732]. I will return to this particular point in the
next chapter.
There was of course much discussion of the population 
principle from the publication of Malthus' Essav onwards 
throughout the Classical period, and its implications were 
applied to number of issues - the Poor Law, minimum wages, 
the question of emigration and so on. From a Lakatosian point
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of view its status with regard to long run wage theory is
that of an auxiliary hypothesis which gave some empirical
content to an otherwise perfectly general long run wage
theory. The empirical content was provided because in 
discussing the population principle the Classical economists 
made various judgments about the relative rates of growth of 
capital and population. Thus both Malthus and Ricardo were 
pessimists and argued that a key factor in boosting 
population growth was the wage rate, and that in the absence 
of workers' habits changing increased wages will produce 
increased population. As Ricardo put it:
"It is when the market price of labour exceeds its natural price that the 
condition of the labourer is flourishing and happy, that he has in his 
power to command a greater proportion of the necessaries and enjoyments 
of life, and therefore to rear a healthy and numerous family"[ 1817, p94].
By natural price Ricardo was referring to the subsistence
wage rate and the consequences of this proposition about
population for the long run wage rate is immediately
discussed:
"When, however, by the encouragement which high wages give to the 
increase of population, the number of labourers is increased, wages again 
fall to their natural price, and indeed from a reaction sometimes fall 
below it" [1817, p94].
Later Ricardo makes it absolutely clear that population will 
outstrip capital growth;
"In the natural advance of society, the wages of labour will have a 
tendency to fall, as far as they are regulated by supply and demand; for 
the supply of labourers will continue to increase at the same rate, 
whilst the demand for them will increase at a slower rate" [1817, plOl].
When considering the effects of accumulation on profits Ricardo 
appears to argue that the population will respond quite quickly. Thus in 
chapter VI on profits: "Whilst the land yields abundantly, wages may
temporarily rise, and the producers may consume more than their 
accustomed proportion; but the stimulus which will thus be given to 
population, will speedily reduce the labourers to their usual 
consumption" [1817, pl25]. Again in chapter XXI on the effects of
accumulation on profits and interest Ricardo argues: "If the funds
destined for the maintenance of labour were doubled, trebled or 
quadrupled, there would not long be any difficulty in procuring the 
requisite number of hands, to be employed by those funds" [1817, p289].
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Thus via the addition of an auxiliary hypothesis concerning 
population long run wage theory was given some empirical 
content and in this form was known as the 'Iron Law of 
Wages '. It is important to note that this auxiliary 
hypothesis was consistent with Malthus' argument (Malthus I) 
in the first edition of the Principles of Populationri7981, 
where population would tend to outstrip food supply and is 
kept back by various forms of vice and misery. As Blaug[1985, 
pp70-71] has clearly demonstrated, Malthus' view (Malthus II) 
changed significantly in the second edition [1803], and he 
was now prepared to accept that people could engage in moral 
restraint without v i c e . 45 ^ number of assumptions about the 
trends in population and capital growth are now consistent 
with Malthus' model.
The 'Iron law', based on Malthus I, was faced with both 
theoretical and empirical counterargument in the 1830s as 
Blaug [1956, p46] has shown. Nassau Senior was the first
Classical economist to argue strongly against the Malthusian 
orthodoxy. In the Two Lectures on Population [1829], Senior 
argued that the desire of man to better himself was at least 
as important as sexual desire and he was quite clear that 
this went against the prevailing orthodoxy.46 This was a much
45 In Book IV chapter II of the second edition of the Essav entitled 'Of 
the Effects Which Would Result in Society from the General Practice of 
the Virtue', Malthus presents a full discussion of the virtue of moral 
restraint and argues, contra the first edition, that moral restraint is 
possible without vice, see the Essav [1803, II, pp96-103].
46 Senior argued as follows: "But I must admit that this is not the
received opinion. The popular doctrine certainly is that population has a 
tendency to increase beyond the means of subsistence, or, in other words, 
that, whatever be the means of subsistence, population has a tendency 
fully to come up to them, and even to struggle to pass beyond them, and 
is kept back principally by the vice and misery which that struggle 
occasions. I admit that population has the power (considered 
abstractedly) so to increase, and I admit that, under the influence of 
unwise institutions, that power may be exercised, and the amount of 
subsistence bear a smaller proportion than before to the number of
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more optimistic view of the question, and the approach was to 
permeate the work of later writers such as Mill. In addition 
to this theoretical argument against the Iron Law there was 
also some empirical conterevidence as Blaug [1956, p45] has 
shown. Thus Barton argued in An Inouirv into the 
Progressive Depreciation of Agricultural Labour [1820, pp40- 
43], that it was not a rising birth rate but a falling death 
rate which was responsible for the increase in population. 
McCulloch in A Statistical Account of the British Empire 
[1837, pp417-420], produced data to back up Barton and also 
to show that there was by 1831 a significant decline in the 
rate of population growth.
The evidence against the Malthusian (Malthus I) conception 
of population growth has raised a major question about 
Classical economics. Why in the face of this evidence did 
Classical economics not crumble - in the 1830s rather than 
the 1870s? Blaug[1956, pp57-58] has focused on the need to 
determine the wage rate in the absence of any other 
acceptable mechanism for achieving this. While this has a 
faintly Lakatosian ring to it, I will argue that there is a 
much more simple and straightforward Lakatosian explanation 
to hand and that is that the refutation of Malthus ' 
population principle took place in the protective belt of 
Classical wage theory. The hard core of the long run wage 
theory was left untouched, and could be provided with 
alternative empirical content by the addition of a range of
people; and that vice and misery, more or less intense and diffused, 
according to the circumstances of each case, must be the result. What I 
deny is, that, under wise institutions, there is any tendency to this 
state of things. I believe the tendency to be just the reverse" [ 1829, 
p35-36].
4*7 See also Blaug [1958, pll6].
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auxiliary hypotheses concerning the rates of growth of 
capital and population including Malthus I (and all 
consistent with Malthus II). This was, in essence, the 
approach taken by Mill in the Principles [1848, CW, III, 
pp719-732] and I will discuss this more fully in the next 
chapter. For the moment, I will simply note that, with regard 
to this issue, a Lakatosian approach is capable of providing 
a coherent and convincing explanation of the longevity of 
Classical long run wage theory in the face of changing 
empirical evidence.
(b) Population theory and the short run wages fund 
doctrine
So far I have argued that elements of the short run hard 
core appeared in the work of Smith, Ricardo and James Mill 
but that the hard core was by no means fully formed. The core 
of the wages fund doctrine was taking time to emerge and 
develop and this is consistent with Lakatos' approach as I 
noted at the beginning of this c h a p t e r . 4® Further evidence 
for this is found in Malthus' work, a significant feature of 
which is the variability in his approach to wage theory 
apparent in the various editions of the Essav on Population 
and the Principles of Political Economv. Thus hard core 
elements are quite clear in the first edition of the Essav in 
1798, whereas they are not so well developed in the first 
edition of the Principles of Political Economv in 1820. Hard 
core development then, in Malthus' case, is not a linear 
process. The first edition of the Principles of 1820 contains 
a less well developed hard core than either the first edition
48 See above p42.
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of the Essav published over twenty years earlier, or the 
second edition of the Principles which was in preparation 
from 1820 onwards.
Elements of the short run wages fund doctrine are outlined 
in the following passage in the first edition of Essav on 
Population;
"The fund appropriated to the maintenance of labour, would be, the 
aggregate quantity of food possessed by the owners of land beyond their 
own consumption. When the demands upon this fund were great and numerous, 
it would naturally be divided in very small shares. Labour would be ill 
paid. Men would offer to work for a bare subsistence, and the rearing of 
families would be checked by sickness and misery. On the contrary, when 
this fund was increasing fast; when it was great in proportion to the 
number of claimants; it would be divided in much larger shares. No man 
would exchange his labour without receiving an ample quantity of food in 
return. Labourers would live in ease and comfort; and would consequently 
be able to rear numerous and vigorous offspring" [1798, I, p325].
Here elements of the short run wages fund doctrine are
expressed in terms of food. Whatever food is left over after
the landowner's share has been taken is divided by the
'number of claimants'. It is not clear, however, whether the
recipients are the labour force or the population more
generally.
Later in the Essav in the chapter entitled 'Of Increasing 
Wealth as it affects the Condition of the Poor', Malthus puts 
forward a clear example of the two period analysis. In this 
example the funds destined for the maintenance of labour are 
increased while the labour force is not:
"The comforts of the labouring poor must necessarily depend upon the 
funds destined for the maintenance of labour ; and will generally be in
proportion to the rapidity of their increase. The demand for labour which
such an increase occasions will of course raise the value of labour; and 
till the additional number of hands required are reared, the increased 
funds will be distributed to the same number of persons as before, and 
therefore every labourer will live comparatively at his ease" [1798, I, 
p380].
Thus the wage rate will rise as long as the funds for the 
maintenance of labour are increasing and the labour force is 
constant. Malthus went on to criticize Smith for
'representing every increase of the revenue or stock of a
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society as an increase of these f u n d s ' , 45 arguing that for 
such increases to represent a 'real and effectual fund for 
the maintenance of an additional number of labourers•••the 
whole, or at least a great part of this increase of the stock 
or revenue' must be 'convertible into a proportional quantity 
of provisions' [1798, I, p381]. Malthus went on to explain 
this by means of an example in which he assumes that every 
year a nation adds solely to its manufacturing capital and 
not to the capital employed in land. This nation would be 
getting wealthier, Malthus notes, according to Smith's 
definition of wealth which consists of the annual produce of 
the nation including manufactured produce. But, Malthus 
points out, there will be no increase in the means for 
supporting labour, although there will be increased labour 
demand from the manufacturers. The increased demand will 
raise wages but 'if the yearly stock of provisions in the 
country was not increasing, this rise would soon turn out to 
be merely nominal, as the price of provisions must 
necessarily rise with it' [1798, I, p381]. Malthus went on to 
make this point again on the following page:
"It is a self-evident proposition, that any general rise in the price of 
l^our, the stock of provisions remaining the same, can only be a nominal 
cise, as it must very shortly be followed by a proportional rise in 
provisions. The increase in the price of labour therefore which we have 
supposed would have little or no effect in giving to the labouring poor a 
greater command over the necessaries and conveniences of life" [1798, I, 
p382].
Here then Malthus is putting forward an analysis of wages 
which is very rigid. Any increase in money wages unmatched by 
an increase in the fund for the maintenance of labour, which 
in this case consists entirely of provisions, will simply
45 The passage in the Wealth of Nations with which Malthus disagreed is 
in Book I, chapter Vlll 'Of the Wages of Labour'; see above p64, footnote 
29.
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raise prices of provisions and the labourers' real wages will 
remain unchanged.^® Malthus then put forward two
qualifications to the argument. First, he argues that the 
increase in the prices of provisions may lead to increased 
investment and therefore by implication increased output in 
agriculture, but he maintained that this 'is an event which 
may take place very slowly' [1798, I, p384]. Secondly, 
Malthus accepted that in a small country the increased wages 
could be spent on extra imports, but that the price of 
provisions must be very high for this to be a solution in 
large countries [1798, I, p385]. Malthus goes on to argue 
that China provides an example of this process at work.^^ 
Implicit in Malthus ' argument is the assumption that workers 
consume only provisions and nothing else. Malthus confirms 
that this is indeed the assumption he is making in the 
analysis, when in the rewritten version of this chapter in 
the sixth edition of 1826 he puts forward the same argument 
but goes on to add an additional qualification:
"But, in the first place, the comforts of the lower classes of society do 
not depend solely upon food, nor even upon strict necessaries; and they
Malthus also put forward a similar argument when discussing the 
consequences of the English Poor Laws; "Suppose, that by a subscription
of the rich, the eighteen pence a day which men earn now, was made up
five shillings, it might be imagined, perhaps, that they would then be 
able to live comfortably, and have a piece of meat every day for their 
dinners, but this would be a very false conclusion. The transfer of three
shillings and sii^ence a day to each labourer would not increase the
quantity of meat in the country. There is not at present enough for all 
to have a decent share, what would then be the consequences? The 
competition among the buyers of meat would rapidly raise the price from 
six pence or seven pence, to two or three shillings in the pound; and the 
commodity would not be distributed among many more than it is at present" 
[1798, PP348-349].
5^ Malthus argues as follows; "An immense capital could not be employed 
in China in preparing manufactures for foreign trade, without taking off 
so many labourers from agriculture, as to alter this state of things, and 
in some degree to diminish the produce of the country. The demand for 
manufacturing labourers would naturally raise the price of labour; but as 
the quantity of subsistence would not be increased, the price of 
provisions would keep pace with it; or even more than keep pace with it, 
if the quantity of provisions were really decreasing" [1798, I, p387].
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cannot be considered as in a good state unless they have the command of 
some conveniences and even luxuries" [1826, II, p80].
It is clear, then, that Malthus believed that workers would 
consume some luxuries, and that an assumption that they 
would, on the contrary, consume only provisions, was
necessary to produce the rigid result noted above.
Malthus' discussion is very significant in terms of the 
later development of the wages fund research programme. As I 
noted a b o v e , f r o m  the beginning of the development of the 
wages fund doctrine there was a conflict between money and 
real conceptions of the analysis. One way in which a rigid 
real fund, fixed in the short run, could be maintained was to 
argue along the lines that Malthus did. Increases in money
wages, with a fixed food stock, will raise food prices
proportionally, leave real wages unchanged and the real fund 
for the maintenance of labour constant.
Malthus' argument was very clear and impressive. Apart 
from element one, which is implicit rather than explicit, all 
the other short run hard core elements are present. Wages are 
clearly paid from capital and are predetermined (although 
that term is not used), and Malthus explicitly argued that 
the demands on 'the fund' would be divided into shares. In 
addition Malthus provides an explicit analysis of the impact 
on real wages from increasing money wages, arguing that this 
made no difference due to price movements. Implicit in 
Malthus' argument in the first edition (and made explicit in 
the sixth edition) is the assumption or lemma that workers 
only consume workers' 'provisions' and never luxuries. 
Adoption of this lemma enabled Malthus to argue that an
52 See above pp65-67.
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increase in money wages will produce a proportional increase 
in the price of provisions. This argument was implicit in 
McCulloch's attempt in 1825 to defend the wages fund doctrine 
against the 'monster' of money, and I will analyze the 
approach of both Malthus and McCulloch in Lakatosian terms in 
the next chapter.
A strong case can be made for Malthus to be regarded as 
the founder of the short run wages fund doctrine on the 
grounds that nearly all the elements of the analysis were 
present for the first time in the Essav of 1798.^3 This is 
not to say that the hard core of the short run doctrine had 
fully developed at this stage in the sense that subsequent 
writers clearly subscribed to it. The elements of the wages 
fund doctrine were not as clearly laid out in Ricardo's work 
as in Malthus' Essav and I argued earlier that Ricardo put 
forward some arguments which ran counter to the wages fund 
doctrine. Moreover in Malthus' later work, the Principles of 
Political Economv of 1820, his analysis of wages does not 
contain the full and clear outline of the elements of the 
wages fund doctrine to be seen in the Essav. Indeed, as I 
shall argue shortly, the first edition of the Principles of 
Political Economv presents a more poorly articulated analysis 
of wage rate determination than either the earlier Essav or 
the second edition of Principles. Given this it can be argued 
that the wages fund doctrine hard core hardened with the work 
of Marcet and McCulloch rather that at the hands of Malthus, 
outstanding as his contribution was.
53 Bonar argues that 'without knowing it' Malthus was 'certainly the 
father of the theory of a Wages Fund' which, Bonar argues, is sometimes 
expressed in the following manner: 'wages depend on the ratio of
population to capital' [1885, p270]. I have argued that the short run 
hard core was more consciously outlined by Malthus than Bonar implies.
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In the first edition of the Principles of Political 
Economv in 1820 the emphasis was once again on the long run 
but the hard core elements were not as clearly spelt out as 
in the earlier editions of the Essav. Much of the discussion 
was Smithian in tone and Smith's work is a focal point for 
much of the discussion. Thus when discussing wages Malthus 
argued as follows;
"Adam Smith is practically quite correct, when he says, that, 'the money 
price of labour is necessarily regulated by two circumstances; the demand 
for labour and the price of the necessaries and conveniences of life'" 
[1820, p243].
Although there is nothing explicit here about the supply of 
labour, it is clear that the notion of supply and demand 
informs Malthus' subsequent interpretation of Smith's 
approach to relative wages, and he chides Smith for 
forgetting, on occasion, to apply the principle as 
rigourously as he might [1820, pp245-246].
Having laid out some definitions and made the case for 
supply and demand in the first section, Malthus then proceeds 
to examine in the remainder of the chapter the factors 
influencing the 'habits' of the workers with regard to the 
standard of living, the factors influencing the demand for 
labour, and the history of wages during the previous five 
centuries. In these sections in the first edition of the 
Principles of Political Economv, Malthus' discussion of wages 
was not very well developed and the elements of the hard core 
were not spelt out. Labour demand was loosely related to 
growth in capital or resources. By contrast, in the second 
edition of the Principles of Political Economv, which was
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finally published in 1836,^4 Malthus' discussion of wages is
much fuller and much closer to a wages fund approach.
In the second section of the chapter in the first edition 
Malthus argued that:
"The condition of the labouring classes of society must evidently depend, 
partly upon the rate at which the resources of the country and the demand 
for labour are increasing; and partly, on the habits of the people in 
respect to their food, clothing and lodging" [1820, p248].
In the second edition this passage appeared as:
"The condition of the labouring classes of society must evidently depend, 
partly upon the rate at which the funds for the maintenance of labour and 
the demand for labour are increasing; and partly, on the habits of the 
people in respect to their food, clothing and lodging" [1836, p224].
The 'resources of the country' have now been replaced by the
more specific notion of 'funds for the maintenance of
labour'. As Pullen [1989, vol. 2, p399] notes, there are many
similar alterations in the ensuing pages. Thus in section
three of the chapter on wages in the first edition, Malthus
examines the demand for labour initially within the theme of
population growth:
"What is mainly necessary to a rapid increase of population, is a great 
and continued demand for labour; and this is occasioned by, and 
proportioned to, the rate at which the whole value of the capital and 
revenue of the country increases annually" [1820, p261].
Possibly in response to comments by Ricardo in his Notes on
Malthus, M a l t h u s  amended this and the following paragraph.
Malthus appears to have begun work on a second edition of the 
Principles of Political Economy very shortly after publication of the 
first but other commitments delayed him, and the second edition was not 
published until after his death. However, Malthus made extensive 
manuscript revisions after 1820, and these enable some estimates to be 
made of the timing of the changes Malthus was preparing. See J Pullen, 
"Introduction to the Variorum Edition" of Malthus' Principles of 
Political Economy, edited by John Pullen, Cambridge University Press, 
[1989, vol. 1, ppxxvi-lxix]. See also the following two footnotes.
See Pullen [1989, vol. 2, pp401-402]. Ricardo argued that the demand 
for labour does not depend on the value of capital and revenue as Malthus 
had suggested, but on 'the quantity of capital - or that portion of 
capital which employs labour' [1951, II, note 148]. Ricardo appears here 
to be criticizing Malthus for doing in the Principles of Political 
Economy what Malthus had criticized smith for in the Essay of 1798. In 
the Essay, as we saw above (p87), Malthus took pains to cirgue, contra 
Smith, that every increase in stock or revenue will not necessarily 
increase the fund for the maintenance of labour.
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and added four new paragraphs in the second edition. Pullen 
suggests that Malthus may have initiated these changes to the 
manuscript in 1822.^^ The passage I have just referred to was 
changed as follows :
"What is essentially necessary to a rapid increase of population is a
great and continued demand for labour; and this is proportioned to the
F&te of increase in the quantity and value of those funds, whether 
arising from capital or revenue, which are actually employed in the 
maintenance of labour" [1836, p234].
Once again Malthus is now careful to point out that the
demand for labour is determined only by those funds employed 
In the maintenance of labour. Moreover in the second edition 
Malthus goes into a little more detail on the composition of 
these funds;
"These funds consist principally in the necessaries of life, or in the 
means of commanding the food, clothing, lodging and firing of the
labouring classes of society" [1836, p234].
In going on to explain this further in the four new 
paragraphs added in the second edition, Malthus develops the 
discussion in terms of what I have defined as two period 
analysis. He argues that it is possible to imagine a country 
in which there is no production of luxuries but where all the 
surplus over and above what is required to produce wage goods 
goes to maintain servants. Under these circumstances it would 
be possible for capital accumulation to take place without 
increasing the demand for labour if some expenditure on 
servants were transferred to luxuries.5?
56 See Pullen [1989, vol. 2, pp202-203].
Malthus argued as follows: "...it is obvious that capital, even the 
exchangeable value of the whole produce may increase without any increase 
in the demand for labour. If the circulating capital applied to the 
production of luxuries and conveniences employed only those persons who 
would otherwise be maintained as unproductive labourers by the surplus of 
necessaries, not only no addition is thereby made to the demand for 
l^our, but if the persons before engaged in personal services were 
dismissed faster than they could be employed in the production on 
luxuries and superior conveniences a diminished demand for labour might 
take place under an increasing capital"[1836 p235]. Here then, the wages 
fund is being altered by the reallocation of resources away from
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In the first edition of the Principles of Political 
Economy, Malthus also dealt carefully with the factors 
affecting the size of the wages fund - the quantity of wage 
goods and their price. This was a long run analysis but what 
was interesting about it was the attention paid to labour 
market adjustment. If goods prices rise with no increase in 
quantity, the money funds in the hands of employers will 
increase but this will only have a limited effect on labour 
demand to the extent that money wages do not rise in 
proportion. If the real wage continues to fall in this 
manner, at some point the population will become stationary 
and increased money funds due to increased prices at this
expenditure on servants towards luxury production and therefore the time 
scale is longer than the Marshallian short run. But the real object of 
the exercise is not to follow through the implications of this in the 
context of a population response, which would be the object of a long run 
analysis, but to discuss the short run consequences of this change in the 
wages fund. The interesting points about this passage are the use of the 
two sector analysis and the complexities that Malthus introduces. On one 
level the principal conclusion, that capital can increase without 
necessarily increasing the demand for labour, is merely terminological - 
the wage goods involved, switched from the service sector, were not 
previously defined as capital. If Malthus' own definition of the wages 
fund is adhered to - food, clothing, lodging and firing - the wages fund 
has not changed. Were it not for the problem of timing, labour demand 
would not fall. However, Malthus does point to the issue of timing and 
this is interesting in itself as an example of a Classical economist 
arguing that the market mechanism may not work smoothly. It is also 
significant that Malthus, like Smith, discusses the labour market 
explicitly in terms of two sectors and in this respect both were more 
careful than some later Classical writers who often tended to ignore the 
service sector or discuss the wages fund in terms so loose that it could 
be implied to cover all demand and yet still referred to it as coming 
from 'capital'. It is likely that many later Classical writers did not 
pay that much attention to the service sector because their general 
concern was with the growth of productive resources in the economy. 
Malthus, of course, took a different view from the Classical orthodoxy on 
the matter of the tendency towards full employment and stressed the role 
of unproductive consumption in maintaining employment. It is perhaps 
therefore natural that he should remind the reader of the importance of 
considering both sectors when discussing the wages fund, particularly 
since in doing this he was simply following Adam Smith with whom he 
nevertheless professed to disagree.
Malthus went on to argue that neither the initial state (no luxury 
production) assumed in the example, nor the opposite state where the net 
revenue was entirely spent on luxuries, is realistic. The former would 
lack a stimulus to production and in the latter luxury consumption 
without servants would mean luxury possessions with no one to maintain 
them and such consumption would soon stop. Malthus conceded that there 
was likely to be a positive relationship between the growth of national 
output and the 'wages fund', but he was adamant that this relationship 
was not one of strict proportionality [1836, p236].
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stage cannot increase employment. The money wage will then 
rise proportionally to leave the real wage constant at the 
subsistence m i n i m u m ^ O n  the other hand if goods prices fall 
so rapidly that they cause a decrease in revenue to employers 
there will be a slackness in the demand for workmen 'for a 
time', presumably until money wages fall (or goods prices 
rise) to bring the real wage back down again^^. So once again 
Malthus is being very careful to allow for the possibility 
that the labour market will not adjust instantaneously. It 
may take time for money wages or goods prices to adjust and 
during this period the demand for labour is slack. An 
increase in funds with steady or slightly falling prices 
would increase demand considerably but it is likely in 
practice that prices would rise and this rise in both 
quantity and price will create the greatest demand for 
labour.
VI Conclusions
In this chapter I have explored the nature of the 
Lakatosian hard core and the way it can be applied in 
economic thought. I have argued for the employment of the 
notion of the hard core at the level of specific doctrines 
and developed a hard core for the wages fund research 
programme which encapsulated the key features of the 
Classical approach.
Malthus argues: "An increase of price with little or no increase of 
quantity, must be followed very soon by a nearly proportionate increase 
of wages : while the command of these increased money wages over the 
necessaries of life goes on diminishing, the population must come to a 
stop, and no further rise of prices can occasion an effective demand for 
labour"[1820, p239].
The argument is as follows:" On the other hand, if the quantity of 
produce be increased so fast that the value of the whole diminishes from 
excessive supply, it may not command so much labour this year as it did 
in the last, and for a time there will be no demand for workmen" [ 1820, 
p239].
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Against this background I have examined the work of the 
early Classical writers with respect to wages. Some elements 
of the short run hard core as I have specified it are present 
in the work of Smith, Ricardo and James Mill, and all are 
present in Malthus' Essay in 1798. Elements of the two period 
analyses are also apparent in these early writings and 
Malthus presents a clear analysis of the impact of increasing 
money wages on the real wages fund. However, the development 
of the short run hard core in this period is uneven. Malthus' 
later articulation of wage theory in the Principles is not as 
full or complete as the discussion in the Essav. Moreover 
there is some evidence of an approach which runs directly 
counter to the wages fund doctrine in the work of Ricardo 
where increased money allocations to labour in the short run 
may enable the workers to become better off and consume 
luxuries.
The long run hard core is well established and in the 
early part of the Classical period is usually accompanied by 
the additional hypothesis that population will grow faster 
than capital. By the 1830s this view was discredited and the 
Classicists were optimistic that capital may grow faster than 
population.
I have already referred to a number of problems emerging 
in relation to wage theory in dealing with the work of Adam 
Smith. By far the most serious of these for the later 
prospects of the research programme was the notion of a wages 
fund expressed in money terms. The idea of a potentially 
elastic money fund in the hands of employers is a potent 
counterexample to the idea of a pre-determined fund of real 
wage goods. The idea of a money wages fund was already
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present - a Lakatosian 'monster' lurking in the wings. As I 
shall argue the monster was never truly vanquished, and the 
failure of the Classicists to deal with it was ultimately 
responsible for J S Mill's recantation. This is not to say 
that no attempts were made to deal with this problem. As I 
showed above, Malthus argued that increases in money wages 
with a constant stock of food would generate offsetting 
increases in food prices leaving real wages unchanged, and in 
the next chapter I will explore McCulloch's effort in this 
direction and analyze both his and Malthus' contributions in 
Lakatosian terms. I will also trace through the continuing 
dichotomy between real and money funds in the work of John 
Stuart Mill and Robert Torrens.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HARD CORE; RIGIDITY, DICHOTOMY AND 
CRITICISM 
I Introduction
In chapter three I argued that in the work of some of the 
early Classical writers - Smith, Ricardo, Malthus and James 
Mill - there was clear evidence of the existence of the long 
run hard core and that some of the elements of the short run 
hard core were also present in the work of Smith, Ricardo and 
Mill. All the elements of the hard core were apparent in 
Malthus ' work but the hard core had not fully developed in 
the sense that all these early writers subscribed to a 
clearly articulated and shared hard core. Problems too were 
Gvident at this stage. One of the most important of these was 
the question of whether the wages fund doctrine was expressed 
in real or money terms. The wages fund envisaged in aggregate 
terms as a stock of real wage goods stored to maintain 
''^ o^ kers throughout the production period had an unambiguous 
logic and rigidity. The wages fund doctrine seen in money 
terms, however, was a flexible conception, and the notion 
that money payments to workers could be changed relatively 
quickly served to undermine the rigidity of the 'real' 
version. This dichotomy between the real version and the 
money version was never satisfactorily resolved and 
ultimately was a major factor in Mill's recantation.
In section II of this chapter I will examine the further 
development of the hard core at the hands of Jane Marcet and 
J R McCulloch, and I will argue that their contributions were 
to reaffirm the hard core first presented by Malthus. After 
their work the hard core can be said to have fully developed
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to the extent that later writers accepted the elements of the 
hard core outlined in chapter three. Although the hard core 
developed in the 1820s, the dichotomy between money and real 
funds was still present and in section III I will analyse the 
attempts by Malthus and McCulloch to resolve this dichotomy. 
In particular I will argue that the approach that they 
adopted can be analyzed using the concepts that Lakatos 
employed in Proofs and RefutationsF 19761^. The money version 
of the wages fund doctrine stood as a potential 
counterexample to the rigid real version - a 'monster' in 
Lakatosian terms, - and Malthus and McCulloch employed a 
particular strategy, lemma incorporation, to defend the 
doctrine against it. The particular lemma which they adopted 
was the assumption that workers only consume wage goods and 
never consume luxuries. This 'solution' resulted in a wages 
fund doctrine that was more rigid and more restricted, but 
while the real fund-money fund dichotomy was thus resolved in 
terms of theoretical consistency, there was some loss of 
content.
While lemma incorporation produced a more rigid, more 
coherent but more limited theory, it is clear that other 
Classical writers wanted to be more flexible in their 
analysis. I have already argued that Ricardo (and Malthus 
himself in later editions), unlike McCulloch, allowed that 
workers may sometimes consume luxury goods. I shall argue in 
section IV that both Torrens and J S Mill also employed the 
wages fund doctrine with much more variety and flexibility 
than the McCulloch strategy would allow for. The real fund-
1 See above, ppl6-22.
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money fund dichotomy was still present but Mill did not adopt 
the McCulloch approach and did allow for luxury consumption 
by workers.
In section IV I will also examine the approach taken by 
McCulloch, Torrens and Mill to the question of trades unions, 
and again a main theme of the argument is the variety of 
approaches adopted by the Classical writers to the issues. I 
wiii argue that in the main these authors, unlike the 
popularizers, did not employ the wages fund to argue against 
the unions. Mill made one such application of the doctrine 
but his overall view of the role of the unions was positive. 
McCulloch based his analysis of combinations on Smith's 
bargaining approach, arguing strongly in favour of the repeal 
of the combination laws. Torrens did use the wages fund to 
discuss trades unions, but he used it explicitly and clearly 
to show that unions could raise wages, presaging Mill's 
argument in the recantation.
The 1820s also witnessed the first attacks on Classical 
economics in general and wage theory in particular. I will 
examine these critiques in section IV, and I will argue that 
while they were potentially powerful counterexamples to the 
emerging research programme they lacked both the focus and 
the force to make any real impact. The Classical economists 
did not feel impelled to reply to the specific criticisms of 
wage theory provided by West, Hodgskin and others. These 
attacks and particularly those of the Ricardian Socialists 
did, however, add to the concern felt by prominent figures in 
society about the need to popularize the 'truths' of 
political economy to a wider audience. One important 'truth' 
that was popularized was the notion that given that the
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aggregate real wages fund was predetermined, strike action 
could not raise the average real wage rate of the workers. 
Since this was a prediction from the wages fund doctrine I 
will deal with this question when I consider 'novel facts' in 
the next chapter.
II Developing the Hard Core; McCulloch and Marcet
McCulloch has been seen by different authors as having, in 
various ways, an important historical role in the development 
of the wages fund doctrine. For Schumpeter [1954, p669] he 
was the 'leading exponent' of the doctrine. O'Brien [1970, 
p360, n4] quotes Bonar [1885, p272] as arguing that McCulloch 
was the author of the doctrine. In fact Bonar put the case as 
follows ;
"The theory of the wages fund was formed from the facts of a perfectly 
exceptional time, and on the strengths of two truths misapplied, the 
doctrine of Malthus (on Population) in its most unripe form, and of
Ricardo (on value) in its most abstract, j .r . Mcculloch seems to have
been the first who put the two together to deduce a rigid law of
wages"[1885, p272].^
Thus it is rigidity that Bonar is referring to and not 
authorship. He refers to Mrs. Marcet as having put the case 
'more carefully' in 1817 [1885, p272], and he was not the
only one to link Marcet and McCulloch together. Thus Cannan 
argued;
"That the rate of wages depends on the proportion between the
labouring population and 'capital' had been laid down in Mrs. Marcet's
Conversations. But it was reserved for McCulloch to give definiteness and
rigidity to Mrs. Marcet's doctrine by illustrating it with an
arithmetical example'[1893, p263].^
2 Further support for the view that Bonar considered Mcculloch to be the 
author of the wages fund doctrine is provided in his article in the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics for 1892, where he argued that the wages 
fund doctrine was orthodox theory in England from about 1825 to 1870, and 
in a footnote he explains that the date of 1825 refers to McCulloch ' s 
article on political economy in Encyclopaedia Britannica [1892, pl46]. 
Mcculloch's article in fact appeared in the 6th edition supplement of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1824, and contained very little directly on 
the question of the wages fund.
2 O' Brien himself argues that Marcet was probably the author of the
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McCulloch, then, has been seen by important historians of 
economic thought to be a prominent exponent of a 'rigid' 
wages fund analysis which may have originated with Marcet's 
Conversations on Political Economv in which Elements of that 
Science are Familiarlv Explained [1816], but which was 
originally expounded, I have argued, by Malthus. It will be 
useful at this point to consider Marcet's work in a little 
more detail.
According to one study by D L Thomson [1973, pll] Jane 
Marcet became the first woman to be identified with 
economics.  ^After initial success with an educational book on 
chemistry, she produced the volume on political economy that 
was to make her reputation. In this volume two characters - 
the pupil, Caroline and the teacher, Mrs.B - engage in 
twenty-two conversations on a wide range of economic topics. 
This book was a great success and contemporaries acknowledged 
that her work had made the subject popular and that her 
contributions were of high quality.^
Marcet ' s view of the periodic nature of production is seen 
in her discussion of capital:
wages fund doctrine, although in saying this he is probably following 
Cannan [1970, p360].
4 As a young woman Marcet was influenced by the work of Mary 
Wollstencraft who in A vindication of the Rights of Women had argued that 
women deserved equality with men and urged that education should be the 
vehicle which would make women 'rational creatures and free citizens' 
[1792, pl74]. Wollstencraft recommended a wide ranging curriculum to be 
taught in the Socratic dialogue form. It seems likely that Marcet was 
influenced by this plea and in any event produced a Socratic dialogue on 
chemistry Conversations on chemistry [1806] which was presented in 
twenty-six lessons and was aimed at women.
 ^ Lord Macaulay wrote in 1825 that: "Every girl who has read Mrs.
Marcet's little dialogues on political economy could teach Montagu or 
Walpole many lessons in finance". McCulloch himself wrote in 1845 that 
her work was "on the whole perhaps the best introduction to the science 
that has yet appeared" and Jean Baptiste Say grudgingly admitted that she 
was "the only woman who has written on political economy and shown 
herself superior even to men" (see Thomson [1973, pp24-25]. The comments 
quoted by Thomson were all taken from the Dictionary of National 
Biography, vol. 12, ppl007-1008).
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"When the poor man applies to the rich one for a maintenance, offering 
his labour in return, he does not say — for the food you give me during 
the present year, I will produce an equal quantity of food next year - 
because he knows that he would not be employed on such terms; he must by 
the prospect of some advantage induce the capitalist to exchange food 
that is already produced for something that is yet to be produced. He 
therefore says — for the food you give me now, i will raise you a greater 
or more valuable supply next year" [1816, p90].
From this passage it can be seen that maintenance is provided 
to enable work to be done during the production period at the 
end of which output is generated. Here then goods are set 
aside for the workmen and it is possible to infer from this 
that they are predetermined although this is not explicit. A 
few pages later Mrs.B is explaining to Caroline that the 
demand for labour is limited by the extent of capital and
here again the annual basis of the production process is
clear to see:
"Let us imagine a tradesman, a shoe-maker for instance, to be master of a 
capital which will enable him to maintain ten workmen, and that the 
following year he finds that he has gained £100 by the profits derived 
from their l^our. This £100 constitutes his income ; if he spend it, his 
G^fit&l remains what it was before : but if he adds it to his capital it
ylll enable him to maintain and provide work for a greater number of
Let us say that he can now employ twelve instead of ten men: 
these will make him a greater quantity of shoes, and the additional 
arising from their sale will, if added to his capital, still 
farther increase his means of employing workmen. Thus the demand for 
labour, or, in other words, employment for the poor, will ever increase 
the increase of capital, and be limited only by its deficiency" 
[1816, PP96-97].
Twenty pages later the question of the determination of the 
wage rate appears:
Caroline: What is it that determines the rate of wages?
Mrs.B: It depends upon the proportion which capital
bears to the labouring part of the 
population of the country.
Caroline: Or, in other words, to the proportion which
subsistence bears to the number of people to 
be maintained by it?
Mrs B: Yes, it is this alone which regulates the
rate of wages, when they are left to pursue 
their natural course [1816, ppll7-118].
Here are the key elements of the wages fund doctrine and
Mrs B. goes on to illustrate this using the example of a
desert island where a colony has established itself and since
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the settlers are 'both proprietors and labourers, they reap 
the whole reward of their industry'[1816, pll8]. Imagine, she 
asks Caroline, a shipwreck which now brings a supply of 
labourers saved from the sea. Caroline is sceptical of the 
outcome having by now learnt a little about capital and 
wages:
Caroline: But if those settlers have not raised a
greater quantity of subsistence than is 
necessary for their own use, how can they 
maintain the new-comers? Without capital, 
you know, they cannot employ labourers.
Mrs.B: You are perfectly right. But it is probable
that the most industrious of them will 
have raised somewhat more subsistence than is 
absolutely necessary for their own 
consumption. They will possess some little 
stock in reserve, which will enaible them to 
maintain and employ at least a few of the 
shipwrecked crew. Yet as these poor destitute 
men will all be anxious to share in this 
little surplus, each will offer his labour in 
exchange for the smallest pittance that will 
support life. Thus the capital of the island 
being adequate to the maintenance of its 
population, the competition amongst the 
labourers to get employment will render wages 
extremely low, and the capitalist will derive 
a high profit from the industry of his 
labourers. A small capital, therefore, creates 
but a small demand for labour [1816, ppll8-119].
Although there is nothing explicit here concerning the
predetermined nature of the wages fund it is hard to
interpret this desert island example in any other way. The
new-comers can only be maintained by the stock of previously
stored up goods and, because this quantity is fixed, the
greater the number of ship-wrecked crew the lower will be the
wage rate.
McCulloch's views on wages are contained in two main 
works. The Principles of Political Economv 1825, and the 
Essav on Wages 1826 revised and enlarged as the Treatise on 
the Rate of Wages 1854. In the chapter on wages in The
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Principles he outlines the elements of a wages fund approach:
"The capacity of a country to support and employ labourers, is in no 
degree dependent on the advantageousness of situation, richness of soil, 
or extent of territory. These, undoubtedly, are circumstances of very 
great importance, and must have a powerful influence in determining the 
rate at which a people advances in the career of wealth and civilization. 
But it is obviously not on these circumstances, but on the actual amount 
of the accumulated produce of previous labour, or of capital, devoted to 
the payment of wages, in the possession of a country, at any given 
period, that its power of supporting and employing labourers must wholly 
depend. A fertile soil affords the means of rapidly increasing capital; 
but that is all. Before this soil can be cultivated, capital must be 
provided for the support of the labourers employed upon it, just as it 
must be provided for the support of those engaged in manufactures, or in 
any other department of industry" [1825, pl73].
This is a very clear statement of the predetermined nature of 
the wages fund. Apart from Malthus, Marcet may have been the 
first to argue that wages depended on the proportion which 
capital bears to the labouring population' but in her work 
the predetermined nature of wages fund can only be inferred 
from her discussion of the 'shipwreck' example (see above 
ppl02-105). By contrast McCulloch, in the above passage, 
argues explicitly that a country's ability to employ workers 
depends on the existence of an 'amount of the accumulated 
produce of previous labour'.^ McCulloch goes on to explain 
the determination of the wage rate arguing that it depends on 
the 'proportion which the whole capital bears to the whole 
amount of the labouring population' [1825, pl73]. This
statement is followed by the numerical example referred to by 
Cannan^ and this is used by McCulloch to illustrate his
McCulloch is less clear on this point in later editions. Thus in the 
1849 edition when discussing the ability of a country to support workers 
he simply refers to 'amount of its wealth, or of its capital applicable 
to the employment of labour'[1849, p397].
 ^ Not only was McCulloch prompted to flesh out Marcet's wages fund 
argument by a numerical example but the influence of the moral message in 
her Conversations may well have led him in later editions of the 
Principles to stress the more general implications of his approach. It 
had been alleged, he reminds us in the 1849 edition, that the interests 
of the workers and capitalists may conflict. This view cannot be 
supported, he argues, because: "Capital and labour are alike dependent 
upon, and necessary to each other: without the former the latter cannot 
exist, and without the latter the former would be valueless"[1849, p399]. 
This harmony of interests between workers and capitalist was an important
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argument that it is only that part of capital devoted to 
wages that is involved in wage rate determination:
"To illustrate this principle, let us suppose, that the capital of a 
country appropriated to the payment of wages, would, if reduced to the 
standard of wheat, form a mass of 10,000,000, of quarters: If the number 
of labourers in that country were two millions, it is evident that the 
wages of each, reducing them all to the same common standard, would be 
five quarters: and it is further evident, that this rate of wages could 
not be increased otherwise, than by increasing the quantity of capital in 
a greater proportion than the number of labourers, or by diminishing the 
number of labourers in a greater proportion than the quantity of capital" 
[1825, pl73].
So far the discussion has been in real terms, concerned 
with the quantity of wages 'rated in commodities'.® This is 
not to say, of course, that McCulloch thought that wages were 
actually paid in wheat - the example was purely illustrative. 
Here then are the key elements (elements 2, 3, 4, and 5) of 
the short run wages fund doctrine clearly articulated. The 
short run hard core had now developed to the extent that from 
the time of McCulloch's work onwards the major Classical 
economists accepted these elements. The dichotomy between 
money and real funds was still present and McCulloch went on 
like Malthus to address this issue and produce a more limited 
rigid version of the wages fund doctrine; but this was not so 
widely accepted, except by the popularizers of the subject.
theme of the wages fund doctrine and was given much attention by 
popularizers of the theory such as Jane Marcet and others. Thus in 
Conversations on Political Economy Caroline expresses surprise at the 
notion suggested by Mrs.B that there is a reciprocity of benefit from 
employment and Mrs.B elaborates: "The rich and poor are necessary to each 
other; it is precisely the fable of the belly and the limbs; without the 
rich the poor would starve, without the poor the rich would be compelled 
to labour for their own subsistence" [1816, p88]. ).
® In the Treatise on the Rate of Wages McCulloch again faithfully 
repeats the standard wage fund argument at the outset. "This principle", 
he argues, "is so very plain as hardly to require or admit of 
illustration" [1826, p5 ]. McCulloch is not only arguing that the wages 
fund doctrine is self-evident but he comes close to saying that it is 
untestable by its nature. Notwithstanding this, however, he does at this 
point put forward an illustration similar to that in the Principles 
although this time it is in money terms: "Suppose, however, that a 
country with two millions of labourers, has a capital of £30,000 
sterling, annually appropriated to the payment of wages, it is evident 
that the wage of each, reducing them all to the same common standard, 
will be £15"[1826, p5].
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III Malthus, McCulloch and the 'Monster' of Monev^
Having established the key elements of the short run wages 
fund doctrine McCulloch emphasizes, a few pages later, the 
point that labourers ' wages are usually paid in money and he 
counters very firmly the objection that wages will depend 
more on the amount of money in circulation than on the amount 
of capital, for whatever the quantity of money received by 
the worker it will only enable him to buy a given share of 
national output:
*If the quantity of money in Great Britain were reduced a half, the rate 
wages, estimated in money, would decline in the same proportion; but 
unless some change had, at the same time, taken place in the amount of 
that portion of the capital of the country which consists of food, 
clothes and other articles consumed by the labourer, he would continue in 
precisely the same position. He would carry a smaller quantity of pieces 
of gold and silver to market than formerly ; but he would obtain the same 
quantity of commodities in exchange for them" [1825, pl74].
As I argued in the previous chapter, from the outset a key
issue in the wages fund discussion was the question of
whether it was a money or a real fund and this was to become
an important aspect of Mill's recantation.^® In the above
® ^he arguments in this section are based on J Vint, "The 'Rigid' Wages 
Fund Doctrine: McCulloch, Mill and the 'Monster' of Money", in w J Barber 
(ëd). Perspectives in the History of Economic Thought. Edward Elqar, 
London, 1990. —
Although in the Treatise on the Rate of Wages McCulloch's
Illustration is in money terms ( see above footnote 8 ), this of course
does not obviate the necessity of making it clear that money will make no 
difference to the determination of the real wage rate. McCulloch here 
repeats virtually word for word the passage from the Principles on this: 
W3.ges being most commonly paid and estimated in money, it may perhaps be 
thought that their amount will, in consequence, depend more on the supply 
of money in circulation, than on the magnitude of capital. But a little 
reflection will serve to show that the amount of money paid to the 
labourers is immaterial. They always receive such a sum as is equivalent 
to the portion of the national capital falling to their share. Men do not 
live on coin or paper. Work people carry the money paid to them direct to 
the retail dealers, and expend it on necessaries and conveniences. And it 
is by the amount of these which comes into their possession that their 
wages are really to be measured. Were the money in Great Britain suddenly 
doubled, wages in no long time would also be doubled. But if no 
corresponding change took place in the supplies of food, clothes, and 
such like articles, their price would equally rise, and the condition of 
the labourers be precisely the same as before" [1826, pp5-6]. There are a 
number of novel features in this version. First, the amount of money has 
become the supply of money. Secondly the example he uses now is one where 
the supply of money is increased and not decreased. While this makes no 
analytical difference, this format is more relevant to a discussion of
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passage McCulloch attempted to argue that money made no 
difference to the underlying idea that workers would only be 
able to obtain what had been set aside for them to obtain. 
This was essentially the same issue that Malthus had analyzed 
in the first edition of the Essay. In the Essay the context 
of the problem was different, for Malthus was examining 
Smith's approach to capital, but analytically his approach 
was the same. This approach here can be rationally 
reconstructed using the concepts developed by Lakatos in 
Proofs and Refutationsr1976]^^.
In chapter three I outlined the elements of the hard core 
of the wages fund research programme, and I argued that these 
constituted a m o d e l , i n  Fisher's terminology,^® where this 
is defined as a collection of lemmas (postulates, 
assumptions) which can be combined together to produce 
various theorems or predictions. The two parts of the short 
run wages fund doctrine, the short run analysis and the two 
period analysis, produce two separate but related theorems:
Theorem 1: The average real wage rate is determined by 
dividing the predetermined fund of wage goods by the 
labour supply.
Theorem 2 : The average real wage rate can only be
altered between one production period and another by
trade union behaviour although McCulloch does not use it this way. 
Thirdly, McCulloch is even more emphatic about the outcome - the 
labourers' condition will be precisely the same. This version also 
appeared in McCulloch's article on wages in the Encvclooaedia Britanni 
in 1840 (volume XXI, p675).
H  See above ppl6-22.
See above p57.
See above pl8.
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altering the size of the fund of wage goods allocated to 
a fixed labour supply.
The payment of wages in money presents a 'monster' or 
counterexample to both these theorems. Formally this can be 
described as follows :
'Monster' of money: Changes to the money wages paid to 
workers between one production period and another, or 
during one production period, even where the 
predetermined fund of real wage goods and the labour 
supply remain unchanged, can result in changes to the 
average real wage rate of the workers.
This 'monster' is a global counterexample to both theorems, 
and was potentially extremely damaging to the whole wages 
fund research programme. Faced with the monster and not 
wishing to surrender, McCulloch was faced with very little 
real choice of what strategy to adopt. Given the importance 
of money and the fact that most wages were paid in money he 
could hardly engage in monster-barring and argue that the 
monster does not meet the specification of the model. To do 
this would be to limit the wages fund argument to the 
agricultural sector and to those parts of it where workers 
were still directly maintained by produce stored up from the 
previous harvest. It is also hard to see how monster- 
adjustment could take place. This would require some special 
interpretation of money to bring it into line with the theory 
and it is difficult to imagine what this could be. It is not 
possible to simply assume that wages paid in money behave in 
the same way as wages paid in goods without making some 
further assumptions and to make further assumptions is to 
adjust the model and not the monster. Again, exception-
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barring is not really an option where the exception to be 
barred is money wages.
The option that was left was lemma incorporation where the 
addition of a new lemma improves the theorem although it
results in some limited loss of content. A demonstration
analysis reveals that the lemma embedded in both theorems to
which the 'monster' of money was a local counterexample, was 
the assumption that workers consume only wage goods and never 
luxuries. This lemma and its significance for the wages fund 
doctrine had earlier been outlined by M a l t h u s . I t  was not, 
however, explicit in McCulloch's approach but it was 
implicit, and a rational reconstruction requires it. Given 
this lemma, and given a predetermined quantity of wage goods, 
during or between production periods, an increase in money 
wages will only increase goods prices proportionally to leave 
the workers no better off. Thus regardless of what is 
happening to money wages the real wage fund remains constant. 
Incorporation of this lemma produces two improved but more 
limited theorems :
Theorem 1 ' : The average real wage rate of workers who 
are assumed to consume no luxuries is determined by 
dividing the predetermined fund of real wage goods by 
the labour supply.
Theorem 2 ' : The average real wage rate of workers who 
consume no luxuries can only be altered between one 
production period and another by altering the size of 
the fund of real wage goods allocated to a fixed labour 
supply.
^4 See above pp86-89.
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The 'monster' of money is not a counterexample to these more 
restricted but logically stronger and more rigid theorems. In 
rationally reconstructing McCulloch's approach and outlining 
the required lemma which was not spelt out by McCulloch 
himself, I have provided what Lakatos called a 'radically 
improved version' of the research programme.
It is this rationally reconstructed version which 
implicitly underlay all later popular discussion and 
employment of the wages fund doctrine to predict the futility 
of union activity to raise w a g e s . The confidence with which 
the assertion was made that the trades unions could not raise 
wages rested on the implicit assumption that workers' 
consumption was limited to wage goods. It is important to 
note that the major Classical writers did not use the 
doctrine in this way, with the notable exception of John 
Stuart Mill, and his views were subject to some change over 
the years. I will deal with the question of wage theory and 
the trades unions in section four of this chapter. With this 
rigid version of the doctrine the real fund-money fund 
dichotomy was resolved, and the hard core was protected, but 
the research programme suffered a loss in content because the 
theory could be applied only to workers who never consume 
luxuries. The challenge posed by the monster of money was how 
to resolve this dichotomy without a loss in content, and no 
adequate solution was ever found to this problem.
Had the majority of Classical writers clearly subscribed 
to and stood by this rigid version one would be able to say
see above pp32-33.
See the discussion of the work of Martine au[18 32] and Ellis[1854] in 
the next chapter ppl75-186.
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that the hard core had fully developed into a more limited 
but more consistent form. But the major Classical writers did 
not clearly subscribe to this version. I have already 
a r g u e d t h a t  Ricardo thought that under certain 
circumstances the workers would spend increased wages on 
luxuries. J S Mill also took this l i n e , a n d  Torrens argued 
that under certain circumstances an increase in the wages 
fund would go entirely to the workers.^® It is clear that 
there was something of a tradition among the major writers in 
arguing that workers could improve their living standards, 
albeit temporarily, by consuming luxuries under certain 
circumstances when their money wages were increased. The 
circumstances that were required were that the population 
should be constant and that the workforce should already be 
fully supplied with necessaries. Thus the general form of the 
short run wages fund doctrine as outlined in chapter three 
was reaffirmed by McCulloch and may be said to have developed 
at this point. The more limited rigid theorem was never so 
accepted except by the popularizers.
Of course the lemma that was implicit in Malthus and 
McCulloch's analysis was open to criticism due to its lack of 
realism, but this could have been defended on the analytical 
grounds that some assumptions have to be made about behaviour 
in different sectors of the economy, and on the empirical 
grounds that luxury consumption was only likely to be a very 
small part of workers' total consumption. By contrast, in not 
adopting this lemma consistently, other Classical economists
see above pp71-73.
See below ppl21-123.
See below pll6.
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were being more realistic and more optimistic in allowing for 
a growth in the standards of living of ordinary workers, but 
were leaving the wages fund doctrine open to attack on the 
grounds that money funds were flexible even if real funds 
were fixed. Significantly it was partly over the question of 
the flexibility of money funds that Mill recanted from the 
doctrine in 1869.®®
I argued above that in the work of the later Classical 
writers the long run theory of wages and population theory 
were given separate treatment. This is true of McCulloch and 
indeed of Mill but in both cases some further qualification 
is necessary. I will briefly discuss McCulloch's analysis 
here, returning to Mill's approach to the long run in the 
next section. McCulloch first discusses the question of 
population in section five of Part II of the Principles which 
is headed 'Production of Wealth', and McCulloch aims to 
investigate what circumstances 'determine the increase and 
diminution of man himself'[ 1825, pl06]. Population is clearly 
the dependent variable here and the discussion follows 
Malthusian lines• In the midst of this discussion however 
McCulloch stresses that 'the importance of controlling the 
population may be shown by comparing the natural ratio of its 
increase, with the natural ratio of the increase of 
capital'[1825, pl09]. He then goes on to argue that the
general condition of society will depend on whether the 
growth of population outstrips that of capital or vice versa. 
This is effectively the long run wage theory although the
®® one modern writer, R Ekelund Jr.[1976], who sought to defend the 
original wages fund doctrine against Mill's recantation, used precisely 
the same argument as McCulloch albeit more fully developed and refined in 
neoclassical language, and I will return to consider this in more detail 
in chapter seven below.
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reference is to the 'condition of the people' and not the 
wage rate per se. The fact that its construction is not 
precise is perhaps significant because McCulloch's aim here 
is not to discuss the determination of wages as such but to 
emphasize the importance of controlling population.
The long run theory is more precisely outlined in the 
later chapter - on wage rate determination immediately
following the passage on money wages discussed above:
"Whatever, therefore, may be the state of money wages in a country - 
whether they are Is. or 5s. a day - it is still certain, that if the 
^ount of the national capital and the population continue the same, or 
increase or diminish in the same proportion, no variation will take place 
in the rate of wages. Wages never rise, except when the proportion of 
capital to population is enlarged; and they never really fall, except 
when that proportion is diminished"[1825, ppl74-175].
This analysis is consistent with the long run hard core and 
McCulloch goes on to discuss evidence from the relative 
experience of Great Britain and Ireland [1825, ppl75-176]. He 
then proceeds to discuss the Poor Laws and the need for 
public education for the working class so that they may be 
made more aware of their position and the forms of behaviour 
which were truly in their best interests [1825, ppl87-191]. I 
will return to the Poor Law issue when considering the 
possibility of novel facts and the long run theory in the 
next chapter. In the work of McCulloch then, population 
theory and long run wage theory are separate but wage theory 
is used in the discussion of population for illustrative 
purposes, and population theory underlies the applications 
made of wage theory to Poor Law and education matters where 
workers attitudes and behaviour are seen as crucial.
4: Development of the Hard Core 115 
IV The Hard Core at Work; McCulloch, Torrens and Mill
I have argued so far in this chapter that a rigid version 
of the wages fund doctrine was developed by Marcet and 
McCulloch and that this underlay the popular argument that 
strikes were futile. At the hands of other Classical 
economists, however, the doctrine was used in a much more 
flexible fashion and the approach adopted towards the unions 
was much more complex. In this section I will illustrate the 
variety of uses to which the theory was put with reference to 
some of the work of McCulloch, Torrens and Mill. In the work 
of Torrens and Mill the issue of money versus real funds is 
present, and in the work of Mill in particular it continued 
to be an important dichotomy which was left unresolved. First 
in part (a) of this section I will address the issue of money 
versus real funds in the work of Torrens and Mill. In part 
(b) I will argue that wage theory was used in a variety of 
ways with regard to the questions of the existence and role 
of trades unions. Adherence to the wages fund doctrine went 
hand in hand with tolerance of and even strong support for 
trades unions. Both McCulloch and Mill had important 
contributions to make in this respect and Mill's views 
changed in successive editions of the Principles. I will 
leave consideration of Mill's position in the 1860s until 
chapter six, where I will argue that further changes were 
made by Mill in response to changing times and conditions. In 
part (c) I will examine the approach of Torrens and Mill to 
the long run hard core.
(a) Monev Funds and Real Funds 
The work of Robert Torrens reveals how the wages fund 
could be used in practice by an unorthodox member of the
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Classical school. There are two important features of 
Torrens' contribution. First, in his initial approach to the 
determination of the wage rate he engaged in monster-barring 
in restricting his analysis to real terms. Secondly, he 
employed the wages fund doctrine to show that where there is 
capital accumulation and a constant labour supply all the 
increase in capital must go the workers in the form of higher 
wages.Torrens' main contributions to the debate on wages 
are to be found in his volume Wages and Combinations 1834. 
The importance which he attached to the topic is proclaimed 
on the first page, where he argues that political economy is 
a useful subject because:
"It claims the peculiar attention of the benevolent and good, mainly 
because it explains the causes which depress and elevate wages and 
thereby points out the means, by which we may mitigate the distress, and 
^prove the condition of the great majority of mankind. Political Economy 
is not, as has erroneously been stated, the appropriate science of the 
statesman and the legislator; it is peculiarly and explicably, the 
science of the people" [1834, ppl-2].
Torrens goes on from here to discuss the determination of the 
wage rate. In his analysis wages are in the form of food 
(wheat) and are firmly part of capital. Torrens goes on to 
argue that the actual wage rate will be determined between 
the maximum and minimum by "the proportion between the number 
of labourers and the quantity of that component part of our 
farmer's capital which he can exchange for labour" [1834, 
pl5]. If at the end of the harvest the capitalist spends less 
on himself but allocates more capital (in the form of wheat) 
to the employment of workers, the wage rate will rise with a 
given labour force:
"When the number of labourers remains the same, nothing can prevent new 
accumulations of capital from appearing under the form of increased
The question of money versus real funds also appeared in Torrens 
treatment of the long run, which I will discuss in sectioin (c); see 
below, ppl36-138.
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wages, except such an intimate understanding and concert amongst 
capitalists, as would induce each individual of the class, instead of 
seeking for additional hands, to allow all his new accumulations of 
capital to remain idle and unproductive" [1834, ppl6-18].
Torrens then goes on to analyze how far this process can 
go and the consequences to which it can lead. The limit of 
maximum wages, not surprisingly, is set by minimum profits,
which, Torrens argued, could not fall below seven percent.
Moreover, Torrens argues, this maximum, far from stimulating 
a Malthusian response in line with the Iron Law, could become 
an equilibrium if the workers acquired a taste for superior 
living.23 This is a very good example of the wages fund
doctrine being used to show that capital accumulation is 
entirely in the interests of workers as long as they can 
control population growth. This result can only come about if 
workers control their numbers; failure to do so will of
course result in lower wages.
It is worth noting that the issue which arises in the 
'McCulloch case' - the possibility of offsetting price 
changes - does not apply here where the analysis is in real
Thus he argues : " Here wages would have reached their maximum for the 
farmer,... .would gain no more than the minimum profit of seven per cent, 
which, by the supposition, is necessary, to induce him to carry on his 
business" [1834, pl8].
23 Thus he argues: "Under these circumstances, it is plain that if the 
number of labourers did not increase, wages would continue at their 
maximum, should the labouring class, during the increase of capital and 
advance of wages, have acquired a taste for superior modes of living, the 
minimum, below which wages cannot fall without reducing the supply of 
labour, might be made to coincide with the maximum, beyond which they 
cannot rise without suspending the employment of capital. When the 
coincidence of minimum wages is brought about by superior habits of 
living among the people, raising the former to the level of the latter, 
the labouring classes will be in the most affluent condition in which, in 
the nature of thing, it is possible they should be placed" [1834, pl8].
24 Torrens argues as follows : "This affluent condition can be preserved 
to the labouring classes so long only as they may refuse to burden 
themselves with families sufficient to keep up the race, unless they 
receive the highest wages which can be paid, without trenching upon the 
minimum rate of profit. An increase in the number of labourers, without 
contemporaneous and proportional increase in the quantity of those 
ingredients of capital by which labour is maintained, is inevitably 
followed by a decline of wages" [1834, pl9].
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terms. Despite the fact that McCulloch's argument was at odds 
with that of Ricardo and that of J S Mill, all Classical 
''^ J^ iters, including these three, would have agreed that in two 
Period analysis increased real allocations to the wages fund 
where the labour supply is fixed lead to an increased average 
real wage rate. However few, if any. Classical writers made 
it as clear as Torrens that such increased allocations must 
unambiguously go to the workers and his analysis shows how 
powerful the harvest version of the wages fund doctrine could 
be in analyzing income distribution in the Classical model. 
Torrens ' use of the harvest model is also a good example of 
'monster-barring' in action. The monster of money was barred 
because the analysis was specified in terms of wheat.
J S Mill was a central figure in the development of the 
wages fund doctrine and, in addition to his contribution to 
the debate about money versus real funds, he also developed a 
long run analysis, discussed a number of novel facts derived 
from the wages fund doctrine and, of course, produced the 
famous recantation in 1869. In this section my focus will be 
on the money-real fund dichotomy, leaving the novel facts and 
recantation questions for later chapters.23 jn approaching 
the wages fund doctrine Mill did not engage in monster- 
barring or lemma incorporation. On the contrary, he developed 
a sophisticated approach to the analysis of workers' 
consumption behaviour, which when applied to an analysis of 
the wages fund doctrine in money terms produced a range of 
possible outcomes.
23 See below, chapter 5 ppl61-224 for a discussion of Mill and novel 
facts, and chapter 7 pp281-304 for analysis of Mill's recantation.
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In Chapter IV of the Principles [1848, CW, II, p55] Mill 
reminds us that the function of capital is to assist 
production by providing labour with the supplies, materials 
and tools required to maintain itself through the production 
period. Money itself cannot do this, he argues, although it 
can be exchanged for items required by labour.2® Mill then 
goes on to make the point that the amount of wealth that is 
to become capital depends on the decisions of capitalists,2^  
and he provides two examples. In the first, a capitalist 
receives his proceeds from the sale of his stock of iron 
goods. Mill assumes that with part of these proceeds the 
manufacturer initially intended to maintain a pack of hounds 
or a number of servants, but that in changing his mind uses 
the money to employ more workers who can now consume the food 
which otherwise would have been consumed by the hounds or 
servants [1848, CW, II p56]. Mill does not say what has 
happened to the population or to the service workers made 
redundant. If the workforce has remained constant or only
23 Mill argues as follows; "Capital by persons wholly unused to reflect 
on the subject, is supposed to be synonymous with money. To expose this 
misapprehension, would be to repeat what has been said in the 
introductory chapter. Money is no more synonymous with capital than it is 
with wealth. Money cannot in itself perform any part of the office of 
capital, since it can afford no assistance to production. To do this, it 
must be exchanged for other things; and anything, which is susceptible of 
being exchanges for other things, is capable of contributing to 
production in the same degree. What capital does for production, is to 
afford the shelter, protection, tools and materials which the work 
requires, and to feed and otherwise maintain the labourers during the 
process. These are the services which present labour requires from past, 
and from the produce of past, labour. Whatever things are destined for 
this use - destined to supply productive labour with these various 
prerequisites - are capital" [1848, CW, II p55].
27 "The distinction, then, between Capital and Non-Capital, does not lie 
in the kind of commodities, but in the mind of the capitalist - in his 
will to employ them for one purpose rather than another; and all 
property, however ill adapted in itself for the use of labourers, is a 
part of capital, so soon as it, or the value to be received from it, is 
set apart for productive reinvestment. The sum of all the values so 
destined by their respective possessors, composes the capital of the 
country" [1848, CW, II, p57].
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grown slightly since the previous production period, then it 
is not unreasonable to assume that some at least of the new 
productive sector jobs will be taken by erstwhile service 
sector workers. However, none of these consequences is 
clearly traced through. Mill then turns to the second example 
where the manufacturer is assumed initially to have planned 
to spend part of the proceeds on plate and jewels, and this 
part of the proceeds is diverted to the employment of 
workers ;
"The labourers, on receiving their increased wages, will not lay them out 
in plate and jewels, but in food. There is not, however, additional food 
in the country; nor any unproductive labourers or animals, as in the 
former case, whose food is set free for productive purposes. Food will 
therefore be imported if possible; if not possible, the labourers will 
remain for a season on their short allowance: but the consequence of this 
change ^ in the demand for commodities, occasioned by the change in the 
expenditure of capitalists from unproductive to productive, is that next 
year more food will be produced, and less plate and jewellery" r 1848, CW, 
II, PP56-57].
Despite his warnings against confusing money and capital Mill 
here uses two concepts of the wages fund - a real stock of 
goods which is fixed and a money fund which is increased 
compared with the previous period (although it is thereafter 
fixed). Workers then receive increased money wages which with 
a fixed stock of wage goods and no Imports will leave workers 
on the same real wage. For this result to occur, goods (food) 
prices will rise to perfectly offset the increase in money 
wages, although Mill does not say this. A rise in the price 
of food can however be inferred from this passage, for Mill 
argues that food output will rise next year, and this must be 
due to increased prices and profits in agriculture.2® Thus 
where workers are not fully supplied with the necessaries of 
life increased money wages will be directed towards
o o
Malthus made a similar point ; see above p88. See also Ekelund [1976, 
pp74-78].
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consumption of necessaries exclusively, forcing their prices 
up. In other words consumption of luxuries by workers in this 
state is ruled out. Here Mill Is making use of the hard core 
'McCulloch version' of the wages fund doctrine and again in 
this case the price changes necessary to reconcile money and 
real versions are implicit not explicit. This then is a good 
example of the rigid hard core in action and it contrasts 
with a later example of Mill's in which fully clothed and fed 
workers when given increased money wages can consume luxury 
goods.2® Prices or wage goods in this later example do not 
rise to perfectly offset money wages.
The later example occurs when Mill is considering his 
first proposition on capital - that industry is limited by 
the extent of capital. Here Mill turned his attention to the 
argument, which he very strongly opposed, that unproductive 
consumption by the rich is necessary for the poor. On the 
contrary. Mill argued, all acts of investment by capitalists 
involving transfers of expenditure from unproductive 
consumption to the employment of workers will benefit either 
the income or employment levels of the workers. In dealing
It must be made clear that the relationship between wages and prices 
being discussed here by Mill (and earlier by McCulloch) and relating to 
the demand side is entirely different and separate from the discussion of 
the relationship between prices and wages elsewhere in the Principles 
which relates to the supply side. Thus in Book III ch.xxvi on 
'Distribution As Affected By Exchange' Mill described a case where real 
wages rise while goods prices remain the same. Money wages must therefore 
rise and Mill traces through the consequences; "The expense of these 
increased money wages falls wholly on the capitalist. There are no 
conceivable means by which he can shake it off. It may be said - it is, 
not unfrequently, said - that he will get rid of it by raising his 
price. But this opinion we have already, and more than once, fully 
refuted" [1848, CW, II, p699]. The references to earlier passages are, 
first, to Book III ch IV on the 'Ultimate Analysis of Cost of Production' 
where Mill argues that a general rise of wages cannot affect relative 
prices and the error in thinking that wages increases could affect the 
general price level 'can only be seen when we come to the theory of 
money' [1848, CW, II, p479]. The quantity theory is not developed here 
but clearly this is what he has in mind and the matter is fully discussed 
in the chapters on money in Book III. The second reference is to Book III 
ch XXV where Mill makes similar points [1848, CW, II, p692].
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with this issue Mill reveals the continuing dichotomy in the 
wages fund analysis between money and the real fund
conceptions. Thus the Malthusian approach rested on the
argument that reductions in unproductive consumption would be
detrimental to the working classes because the increased 
output produced by the consequent increase in productive 
activity would remain unsold. But, Mill argues, this is not 
the whole story:^®
"In the case supposed, there would no longer be any demand for luxuries, 
on the part of capitalists and landowners. But when these classes turn 
their income into capital, they do not thereby annihilate their power of 
consumption; they transfer it from themselves to the labourers to whom 
they give employment. Now, there are two possible suppositions in regard 
to the labourers ; either there is or there is not, an increase of their 
numbers, proportional to the increase of capital, if there is, the case 
offsrs no difficulty. The production of necessaries for the new 
population, takes the place of the production of luxuries for a portion 
of the old, and supplied exactly the amount of employment which has been 
lost. But suppose that there is no increase of population. The whole of 
what was previously expended in luxuries, by capitalists and landlord, is 
distributed among the existing labourers, in the form of additional 
wages. We will assume them to be already sufficiently supplied with 
necessaries. What follows? That the labourers become consumers of 
luxuries; and the capital previously employed in the production of 
luxuries is still able to employ itself in the same manner: the
difference being, that the luxuries are shared among the community 
generally, instead of being confined to a few." [1848, CW, II, pp67-68]
Here Mill is arguing that in the case of a fixed labour
supply the workers are assumed, unlike in the earlier
example, 2^  to have all the necessaries they require.
Increases in the money funds will not simply be offset by
rising wage goods prices because there is no added
competition for such commodities. Instead workers can use
their increased money (and real) incomes to purchase luxury
goods. It is interesting to note that it is only when workers
3® Pigou was the first person to realize the significance of this 
passage for Mill's recantation in an excellent article "Mill and the 
Wages Fund" in the Economic Journal. 57, [1949, ppl71-180], reprinted in 
Rima[1970]. Pigou explicitly links this passage with Mill's recantation 
argument that capitalists can vary the amount of their own consumption 
and thereby the size of the wages fund [1970, ppl05-10]. see below
chapter seven p300.
31 See above ppl20-121.
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are fully "supported with necessaries" that they will attempt 
to consume luxuries. Mill imagines a hierarchy of goods and 
while consumption of the higher level luxuries by workers is 
allowed for it is only when their more basic needs are being 
met.22
Mill's work then is central to the whole wages theory 
debate not just because of the recantation, important as that 
is, but also because of his approach in the Principles. His 
analysis of workers' consumption of luxuries is far more 
sophisticated than that implicit in McCulloch's approach and 
in the later interpretation of Ekelund [1 9 7 6 ].23 Mill's 
approach to this and the continuing dichotomy between money 
and real conceptions of the fund set the scene for the later 
recantation.2^
(b) Wage Theorv and the Trades Unions
I have argued that McCulloch developed a rigid version 
of the wages fund doctrine which underlay some of the later 
popularizations used to argue against the efficacy of
Hollander[1968, p326] has argued that this passage supports an 'ex 
post' model of the wages fund subscribed to by Torrens, cairnes and Mill. 
In this version of the wages fund theory the wages bill is 'determined as 
the competitive outcome of a demand-supply equation, and hence will 
depend upon the actual size of the working population'ri968. p326,
Hollander's emphasis]. Hollander argues that in this alternative theory 
the demand for labour is perfectly inelastic due to fixed technical 
coefficients in the short run. However while is clear from Mill's
discussion that the wages bill is not pre-determined in the case of a 
short run fixed supply of labour, this was never ruled out by the
orthodox theory In the case of an investment increase, and it is not 
possible to infer anything about the shape of the ledsour demand curve in 
a case where the labour supply is fixed and the labour demand curve 
shifts, see Vint [1981, pp77-80].
22 Ekelund accuses Mill of confusion in the recantation and argues that
^ 1 1 's writings reveal a clear misunderstanding of 'the nature,
implications, and limitations of the doctrine'[1976, p67]. Ekelund's
conclusions are based on the invalid assumption that workers only consume 
workers' goods and capitalists and landlords consume only luxuries, see 
below p301.
34 Further support for this interpretation of Mill's approach can be 
seen in Mill's analysis of the long run, see below ppl41-144.
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strikes. But as Taussig has pointed out^S the Classical 
economists themselves, up until Mill's Principles in 1848, 
did not use the doctrine in this way. In this section I will 
examine the ways in which some of the major writers, 
McCulloch, Torrens and Mill^®, addressed the question of 
trades unions and wages in the first half of the century, and 
emphasis will again be placed on the diversity of approaches 
adopted by the Classical writers. McCulloch, eschewing the 
wages fund doctrine in this context made a powerful case for 
trades unions in 1824; Torrens by contrast made use of the 
wages fund analysis to show that unions could act to raise 
wages. Mill did use the wages fund doctrine to deny the 
effectiveness of union action in 1848 but his case was 
heavily qualified and he made a distinction between a general 
and a partial rise in wages which was to be important in his 
recantation discussion in 1869.
In 1824 in the midst of the debate on the repeal of the 
Combination Laws, McCulloch wrote an article on trades unions 
for the Edinburgh Review, which ranks as probably the fullest 
discussion of the economic impacts of unions in the first 
half of the nineteenth c e n t u r y . 2^  His approach was greatly
23 See Taussig [1896, pl94].
23 Nassau Senior's main contribution to the debate on combinations was 
contained in the extraordinary Report on combinations which he wrote 
together with Thomas Tomlinson in 1834. This report was commissioned by 
Lord Melbourne, secretary of state for the Home Department, who felt that 
the existing legislation gave too much encouragement to strikes. The 
report proposed vei^ draconian changes in the legislation which would 
have virtually prohibited unions. The report was regarded as politically 
impossible and was not acted upon. A draft of the Report on combinations 
dated 21st August 1832, is in the Nassau Senior Collection, the National 
Library of Wales, Aberystwyth. The report contains nothing of interest 
regarding the economic theory of the labour market. Senior's views on the 
wages fund doctrine will be examined in some detail in the next chapter 
in the context of a discussion of novel facts.
2^ J R McCulloch, "Combination Laws - Restraints on Emigration",
Edinburgh Review, vol. 39, No. LXXVIII, pp315-345. Mcculloch's article
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influenced by Adam Smith's bargaining theory of the labour 
market to which McCulloch refers several times in this
article. Thus far from arguing against unions, McCulloch
argued strongly in favour of repeal of the combination laws,
in order to remove the injustice of punishing men for
attempting 'to meet combination by combination'[1824, p325]. 
In the course of the argument, McCulloch made two major 
points concerning union behaviour and wage rates.2® First, he 
argued that if the wage rate of any set of workmen was below 
the 'natural and proper level'[1824, p319] a combination to 
raise wages would be desirable because 'no master ever 
willingly consented to raise wages'[1824, p5l9]. In such
circumstances, the employers could not break the strike by
bringing in cheaper labour because the wage rate being 
offered was below the natural rate. Eventually the masters 
will realize that in order for their capital to earn a return 
they will have to pay the higher rate.2® a  combination then 
is able to achieve what the market should achieve but is 
unable to do because of the superior bargaining position of 
the employers. Thus McCulloch argues:
was expanded into An Essay on the Circumstances which Determine the Rate 
of Wages and the Condition of the Labouring Classes. Edinburgh, 1826. 
McCulloch made a number of smaller contributions to the debate on 
combinations in the Scotsman between 1818 and 1825, as well as an article 
on combinations in the Encvclopædia Britannica, in 1854 (8th Edition, 
Vol. VII, ppl60-161). See O'Brien [1970, pp366-370], Grampp[1979, pp505- 
506], and also Schwartz[1968, pp75-77] for a discussion of McCulloch's 
role in the debate on the repeal of the Combination Laws.
38 These points first appeared in an article in the Scotsman on July 
26th 1823, and were repeated almost word for word in an article in the 
Scotsman on November 12th 1825.
3® Although the precise meaning of the 'natural and proper rate of 
wages' is not spelt out by McCulloch, it would seem to imply the market 
rate of wages at which profits are at their natural level. A wage rate 
below the natural level implies a profit rate above its natural level, 
ceteris paribus, and thus the capacity on the part of the employers to 
absorb the higher 'proper rate' after bargaining. A wage rate above the 
natural, on the other hand, would imply a profit rate below its natural 
level and this would induce the masters to strongly resist.
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"Every attempt to prevent combination in such cases as this is neither 
more nor less than an attempt to hinder the workmen from making use of 
the only means by which their wages can be speedily and effectually 
raised to their just level. It is committing injustice on behalf of the 
strong, at the expense of the weaker party" [1824, p320].
Combinations, then, are a proper part of the mechanism by
which workers receive their just reward, and workers should
be allowed to form them.
Secondly, where wages are at or above their 'natural and 
proper' rate, McCulloch argues that voluntary combinations to 
attempt to raise wages will be 'improper and 
unreasonable'[1824, p320]. The masters would resist such
demands and, referring directly to Smith, McCulloch repeats 
the argument from the Wealth of Nations*® that the greater 
stock and credit of the masters will enable them to hold out 
longer than the workers [1824, p321]. Under these
circumstances the workers would, in the absence of government 
interference, realize the futility of voluntary combinations 
to raise wages above the natural rate, and would not engage 
in them [1824, p322].^^ Thus McCulloch was strongly in favour 
of the repeal of the Combination L a w s , 2^ although he was 
vehemently opposed to any violence that may result from union 
activities.^ 2
40 See A. Smith, Wealth of Nations. [1776, Bk I, ch. VIII, p84].
It is important to note that McCulloch was not here arguing that the 
unions would disappear after repeal, as Grampp[1970, p505] and Hutt[1936, 
pl88] have argued. Francis Place, a leading figure in the push for 
repeal, did argue in this way, writing along these lines to Sir Francis 
Burdett in 1825 (see Wallas[ 1918 p217] ), but McCulloch's argument must be 
seen as limited to the notion that workers will perceive that voluntary 
combinations to raise wages where they are already at or above the 
natural rate will be pointless, and that they will therefore not engage 
in this type of combination. As we have seen, McCulloch also argued that 
combinations where wages were below the natural rate were desirable, and 
there is no suggestion that these would wither after repeal.
42 McCulloch was more than just a passive commentator on these events 
for the Edinburgh Review article swung many M.P.s in favour of repeal. 
See Thompson [1980, p567].
43 See McCulloch, [1824, pp317-318]. All of these arguments were
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Robert Torrens also did not use the wages fund against the
trades unions. I argued earlier that Torrens in Wages and
Combinations [1834] used a simple two period wheat model of
the wages fund doctrine to argue that where the labour force
is constant any increase in capital allocations to workers
will raise the wage rate. The limit of maximum wages was set
by minimum profits which, Torrens argued, could not fall
below seven percent. Torrens built upon this argument when
addressing the question of combinations. Thus he argued that
in countries with no overseas trade, workers in combination
can bargain successfully for wage increase if profits are
above the necessary minimum, although these gains could be
eroded by the population response [1834, pp55-59]. The
significance of this point lies in the fact that although the
analysis is in real wheat terms, there is no hint of the
notion that the wages fund is predetermined and cannot be
altered. Instead what is present is the forerunner of Mill's
recantation argument that unions can bargain for increased
wages up to a certain limit. This is not to say that the
outlook for trades unions is a particularly optimistic one,
repeated in Mcculloch's article on combinations in the Enc vc lopædi a 
Britannica in 1854. See also the articles in the Scotsman. August 1st 
1818, p245; August 29th 1818, p277; September 12th 1818, p292; July 26th 
1823, p473; July 2nd 1825, p422; October 5th 1825, p638; November 12th 
1825, p721. In the early Scotsman articles of 1818 McCulloch was 
concerned with the violence that had occurred in Manchester as a result 
of the cotton spinners' strike, and he argued that the violence must be 
met with the most rigorous of measures. At the same time, however, he 
argued that the Combination Laws must be repealed. As a result of the 
wave of industrial unrest which followed the repeal in 1824, further 
legislation was introduced in 1825 strictly limiting the kind of 
persuasion or intimidation which unionists could employ. In the article 
of July 2nd 1825 McCulloch expressed relief that this legislation was not 
more draconian and went on in the October article to argue against any 
further repression. What was needed he argued was the popularization of 
political economy: "If the government do not suffer itself to be hurried 
away by weak, designing, or blood-thirsty alarmists all will soon be 
well; and instead of employing spies or agitators - police or soldiery - 
let them pay an Economist for writing a popular treatise, and hawkers for 
disseminating the work at a cheap rate, that these misguided men may be 
brought under the laws, from being disabused of their prejudices" [The 
Scotsman. October 5th 1825, p638].
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for Torrens goes on to make a number of qualifications to the 
position. Thus he argues that in countries with overseas 
trade, combinations may raise wages and lower profits to a 
minimum but this will expose manufacturers to the risk of 
being undersold in the foreign market by foreign producers 
whose higher profits allow him to reduce prices [1834, pp60- 
73]. However if the increase in wages is accompanied by 
increased productivity or where a country possesses a 
comparative advantage in manufacturing, then wage gains can 
be secured by combinations [1834, pp73-89]. Torrens goes on 
to argue that Britain has tremendous comparative advantage in 
manufactures but that the workers cannot benefit from this in 
higher wages either through legislation or combination 
because of the higher price of corn. Ultimately then their 
welfare is tied, inter alia, to a repeal of the Corn Laws 
[1834, ppl20-133].
Until the Principles in 1848 J S Mill had very little to 
say concerning the economic consequences of trades unions, 
regarding them as transitory phenomena and hoping for 
increased cooperation between capital and l a b o u r . I n  the 
first edition of the Principles Mill did turn his attention 
to the trades unions and here he clearly distinguished 
between combinations designed to raise the general level of 
wages and those designed to raise wages in particular 
occupations, a distinction which was to be important in 
Mill's later recantation discussion. With regard to 
combinations to raise the general level of wages Mill made 
explicit use of the wages fund doctrine. He begins his
44 See Schwartz[1968, p69].
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argument on a very positive note arguing that if the unions 
could raise the general wage rate by combining together 'this 
would be a thing not to be punished, but to be welcomed and 
rejoiced at' [1848, CW, II, p929]. Unfortunately, Mill 
argues, the working class is too numerous and scattered to 
combine effectively, although if they could they might 
succeed in diminishing the hours of labour and obtaining the 
same wages for less work [1848, CW, II, p930]. However Mill 
is much more circumspect when it comes to wages, and here the 
wages fund doctrine is employed:
"But if they aimed at obtaining actually higher wages than the rate fixed 
by demand and supply - the rate which distributes the whole circulating 
capital of the country among the entire working population, this could 
only be accomplished by keeping a part of their number permanently out of 
employment" [1848, CW, II, p930].
Here then, at last, is an example of a Classical political 
economist using the wages fund doctrine to argue against 
action by trades unions to raise wages. It should be noted 
however that this is in the context of a very positive 
overall view of trades unions, quite different to the 
somewhat negative tone adopted by some of the popularizers of 
the 1 8 3 0 s ."^2 Mill goes on to make the observation that the 
workers who are made unemployed will be unable to receive 
public charity because they would be capable of work, and 
therefore would be forced to seek support from the trades 
unions of which they were members. Using the wages fund 
notion again Mill concludes that 'the workmen collectively 
would be no better off than before, having to support the 
same numbers out of the same aggregate wages'[1848, CW, II, 
p930]. This outcome would force the working class to 
understand the necessity of 'proportioning the supply of
43 See below ppl70-186.
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labourers to the demand'[ 1848, CW, II, p930] if high wages 
were their objective.
When he turns to the question of a partial rise in wages 
in particular occupations as a result of union action. Mill 
outlines two possibilities. First, he argues that the wage 
rise may be at the expense of the consumer; the producer will 
only suffer to the extent that total revenue will fall and 
that may not h a p p e n . M i l l  argues that if the wage rise 
could be obtained without affecting the rest of the working 
class it ought to be regarded as 'a benefit' for although the 
consumer must pay for it, 'cheapness of goods is only 
desirable when the cause of it is that their production costs 
little labour, and not when occasioned by that labour being 
ill remunerated'[1848, CW, II, p930]. Mill then goes on to 
consider the argument that partial combinations will 
inevitably hurt the interests of other workers, and again the 
wages fund doctrine is applied to the problem:
"It may appear, however, at first sight, that the high wages of the type­
founders (for example) are obtained at the general cost of the labouring 
class. This high remuneration either causes fewer persons to find 
employment in the trade, or if not, must lead to the investment of more 
capital in it, at the expense of other trades : in the first case, it 
throws an additional number of labourers on the general market; in the 
second, it withdraws from that market a portion of the demand : effects, 
both of which are injurious to the working classes"[1848, CW, II, p931].
This is a straightforward application of the wages fund
doctrine either in the short run or two period form. Either
fewer people are employed immediately, or in the next
production period extra capital must enter that particular
trade at the expense, ceteris paribus, of other trades.
Mill argues as follows; "..the capitalist who produces the commodity 
being only injured in so far as the high price tends to narrow the 
market ; and not even then, unless it does so in a greater ratio than that 
of the rise of price; for though, at higher wages, he employs, with a 
given capital, fewer workmen, and obtains less of the commodity, yet if 
he can sell the whole of this diminished quantity at the higher price, 
his profits are as great as before"[1848, CW, II, p930].
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However, Mill argues that while these effects might pertain 
in the short run, in the long run the ultimate regulator of 
wages is the customary standard of living:
"The habitual earnings of the working classes at large can be affected by 
nothing but the habitual requirements of the labouring people; these 
indeed may be altered, but while they remain the same, wages never fall 
permanently below the standards of these requirements, and cannot long 
remain above that standard "[1848, CW, II, p931].
Given this, partial combinations were responsible for holding 
back population growth:
"If there had been no combinations in particular trades, and the wages of 
those trades had never been kept above the universal level, there is no 
reason whatever to suppose that the universal level would have been 
higher than it now is. There would merely have been a greater number of 
people altogether, and a smaller number of exceptions to the ordinary low 
rate of wages"[1848, CW, II, p931].4'
Under these circumstances. Mill argues, 'combinations to keep 
up wages are therefore not only permissible, but useful, 
whenever really calculated to have that effect'[1848, CW, II, 
p931].48
In discussing the role of trades unions, then. Mill 
employed a much more simplistic predetermined model of the 
wages fund doctrine compared with the approach adopted 
elsewhere in the Principles, which I discussed in section (a) 
above. It is difficult to pin-point the reasons for this 
difference, although there are a number of possibilities. 
First, it may be that Mill simply failed to work through the 
consequences of an example in one part of his work for his
The precise mechanics of the population response are not spelt out by 
Mill. Presumably those workers who have gained higher wages by 
combination will become used to the higher standard of living and limit 
their families.
48 Ekelund and Kordsmeier have argued that while Mill described the long 
run Malthusian effect of unionization 'in no sense did he use this 
argument to justify the existence of such combinations'[1981, p533].
However the passage here quoted which is from the 1848 and 1849 editions 
of the Principles, but which only appears as a footnote in the Collected 
Works, reveals that this is not the case. Mill clearly argues that unions 
were useful for their Malthusian effects.
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analysis in another. The example I discussed in section (a)^^ 
^oi’kers could consume luxuries was a case taken from 
Book If chapter v of the Principles where change occurred on 
the demand side when increased money allocations were made to 
workers. The analysis of trades unions much later in the 
book/ by contrast, concerns attempts by workers to operate on 
the supply side. Although the demand side case had 
potentially important implications for the trade unions 
issue, as became clear in the recantation. Mill simply did 
not work through these implications in the Principles. 
Secondly, there is throughout Mill's Principles an underlying 
concern with the consequences for the working classes of 
excessive population growth, and this permeated the 
discussion of trades unions. The benefits of trades unions 
derive from reduced population numbers in the case of partial 
combinations, and improved understanding of the consequences 
of superfluity of numbers'[ 1848, CW, II, p930] in the case 
of general combinations. In the case of the latter the 
beneficial results only occur as a result of the operation of 
the simple wages fund mechanism. Mill's attention, then, was 
much more focused on the population implications of unionism 
than on the precise mechanics of wages theory as applied to 
it.
For whatever reason, there was a noticeable difference in 
Mill s treatments of the wages fund doctrine in his analysis 
of capital and his analysis of unions, and there was a 
significant difference between Mill's approach to unions and 
that taken by McCulloch and Torrens. The difference in Mill's
4® See above ppl21-123.
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approaches was to be addressed in the recantation, but it did 
not begin there. It really began in the 5th edition of the 
Principles where he incorporated some new passages on trades 
unions containing elements of the Smithian position, and in 
niaking these changes Mill was influenced by his friend Henry 
Fawcett and the trades union leader T J D u n n i n g . T h i s  
change in Mill's position came in the early 1860s at the 
beginning of a decade which saw major developments with 
regard to trades unionism as well as the debate over the 
wages fund doctrine. Indeed Fawcett's Westminster Review 
article in 1860 and Mill's subsequent alterations to the 5th 
of the Principles must be seen as the first 
contributions to that debate, and I will deal with these in 
chapter six below.
I have argued that Mill made extensive use of the wages 
fund analysis in discussing trades unions and while he was 
dismissive of the ability of combinations to raise general 
wages he took a much more favourable view of partial
combinations. Mill, however, made a number of qualifications 
to this approach. First, he argued that unions must be 
voluntary, and secondly they must refrain from threatening 
violence [1848, CW, II, p933]. Thirdly, Mill argued that
piece work was important in order to provide incentives to
effort, and condemned unions for having rules forbidding 
this. 2 In 1852 Mill had made a change to the text of the
. ^ Fawcett, "Strikes: Their Tendencies and Remedies", Westminster 
Reyiew, n.s. XVIII, July 1st, 1860, ppl-23; T J Dunning, Trades Unions 
and Strikes: Their Philosophy and Intention. London 1860.
31 See below pp232-239.
Mill argues as follows: "...but in many trades unions, it is among 
the rules that there shall be no task work, or no difference of pay 
between the most expert workmen and the most unskilful, or that no member
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third edition of the Principles. and this was related to the 
question of piece work. In place of the passage reflecting on 
the usefulness of unions quoted in the above paragraph. Mill 
substituted a passage containing the argument that 
'combinations to keep up wages are seldom effectual, and when 
effectual, are, for the reasons which I have assigned, seldom 
desirable'[1852, CW, II, p932]. The reason for this change of 
mind was the strike by the Amalgamated Society of Engineers 
aimed at ending piece work and overtime. 3^ This affront to 
Mill's sensibilities regarding incentives and personal 
freedom^^ must been seen together with the hope shown in the 
1852 edition of the Principles regarding the possibilities of 
cooperation between workers :
"But when the elevation of the character and condition of the entire body 
has at last become a thing not beyond the reach of rational effort, it is 
time that the better paid classes of skilled artisans should seek their 
own advantage in common with, and not by the exclusion of, their fellow- 
labourers"[1852, CW, ll, p931]
This passage shows that Mill had changed his mind regarding 
the utility of partial unions compared with the position he 
adopted in 1848. This must, however, not be seen as 
representing a major decline in Mill's sympathy with the 
working class, for at the same time as his position towards 
the unions hardened, he grew more favourable to socialism. 
Indeed, as Schwartz points out. Mill seemed keen to 'grasp
shall earn more than a certain sum per week, in order that there may be 
more employment for the rest,.. Hardly anything worse can be said of the 
worst laws on the subject of property and industry, than that they place 
the energetic and the idle, the skilful and the incompetent, on a level; 
and this it is the avowed object of the regulations of these unions to 
do"[1848, CW, II, PP933-934].
33 See Schwartz[1970, p86].
24 In the 1852 edition of the Principles in the discussion on piece 
work. Mill's reference to 'laws on the subject of property and 
industry'(see above, footnote 44) was amended to refer to 'laws on the 
subject of industry and its remuneration, consistent with the personal 
freedom of the labourer[1852, CW, II, p934]. My italics.
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any argument which would allow him despite everything to see 
unionism in a favourable light' [1968, p87]. The opportunity
to do this formally in the Principles came ten years later
when he made the changes to the 5th. edition.
In this section I have argued that the wages fund doctrine 
was used in a variety of ways with regard to the trades 
unions. Although Mill rather reluctantly conceded in 1848, 
using the wages fund analysis, that combinations to raise 
general wages or partial wages would fail, McCulloch, Torrens 
and Mill himself were all very positive about the role of 
unions, although they remained very critical of violence and 
intimidation. McCulloch's position reveals the continuing 
importance of Adam Smith's bargaining model of the labour
market, and this view of a struggle (or a competition in 
Thornton's words) between organized capital and labour was a 
key strand in the later recantation debate; ultimately Mill 
argued in the recantation that the wage rate will be
determined by bargaining between the parties.23 of all the 
Classical writers, Torrens was the one who applied the logic 
of the wages fund most simply and starkly to the issue of 
combinations, and he showed, contrary to the popularizers, 
that the wages fund doctrine could be used to demonstrate how 
combinations could raise wages. That the effect of union 
action may be limited by other factors does not affect the 
central point that, in Torrens' analysis, it is not the logic 
of the wages fund per se which set such limits; on the 
contrary, the ability of unions to raise wages derives from 
the very logic of the wages fund doctrine itself.
33 See below pp290-297
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(c) Torrens and Mill on the Long Run
Both Torrens and Mill dealt with long run wage theory 
and their treatments reflect a diversity of approaches and 
the persistence of the dichotomy between real and money 
funds. Also in Mill's work there is a marked shift away from 
the long run position taken by Smith, Malthus and Ricardo. 
Mill continues to subscribe to the long run model as 
indicated in the discussion of the long run (see above p85), 
but now he grafts on to this an alternative auxiliary 
hypothesis which leads to a different prediction concerning 
the likely long run trend of wages.
Torrens ' long run analysis is developed when he turns to 
the question of the impact for wages of the declining 
fertility of marginal land. Minimum wages are fixed 'by 
climate, and by the habits of living prevalent among the 
labouring classes' [1834, p20] whereas maximum wages are
determined by the quality of the soil, the extent of laissez
faire and the skills of labour [1834, pp20—21]. Returning to 
the notion that the wage rate is determined by the ratio of 
labour to capital destined for the maintenance of labour, 
Torrens points out that this can lead to the misunderstanding 
that to maintain workers' living standards, all that is 
necessary is that capital should grow at least as fast as 
population. This argument, attributed to James Mill, takes a 
narrow and incomplete view he argues • Keeping the ratio 
constant by matching population growth with capital 
accumulation will not keep wages constant:
"But though labour and capital should go on increasing in the same
proportion, and though they should constantly preserve the same ratio to 
each other, yet the necessity of resorting to inferior soils might
gradually reduce the maximum of wages until it coincided with the extreme 
minimum, below which labour cannot be sustained. At this point the supply 
of labour could be no further increased; and if habits of frugality
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amongst the opulent classes continued to convert revenue into capital, 
the ratio of capital to population might go on increasing without 
producing the slightest advance of wages" [1834, p22].
O'Brien [1966, p337] has argued that Torrens here has
abandoned the simple wages fund doctrine. Resort to inferior 
soils reduces the productivity of labour and the maximum of 
wages even though capital and labour increase in proportion. 
However, O'Brien's analysis is incomplete for a number of 
reasons. First, Torrens is here making use of a long run 
analysis and not the short run wages fund doctrine. Secondly 
O'Brien misses the point that a money fund must be implicit 
in this argument. If not, then for the real wage rate to 
fall, productivity in agriculture must be such that the real 
wages fund grows slower than the supply of labour. But if 
this is the case then capital would not be increasing 
proportionally with labour which it is according to Torrens. 
What Torrens must be implicitly assuming then is that the
money wages fund is keeping pace with population but that
resort to inferior soils raises the price of corn through 
declining productivity and thereby lowers the rate of growth 
of the real fund below the growth of the labour force leading 
to a falling real wage rate. Only in this light can sense be 
made of the last part of the argument that the "opulent 
classes" may continue to accumulate capital even when the 
population is in long run stationary equilibrium without 
affecting wages. Here, the labour supply is constant in long 
run equilibrium, but unlike the previous case capital 
accumulation does not accrue to the workers in the form of 
higher real wages. Why not? Torrens could have tackled this 
question using the McCulloch approach and argued that 
increased allocations to labourers will lead to increased
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demand for necessaries because the labourers are at 
subsistence and are not therefore already fully supplied with 
such goods. This increased demand in the face of fixed 
supplies will raise prices proportionally and leave workers 
at the same real subsistence wages rate. Significantly, this 
was not the line that Torrens took. Instead the effects of 
capital accumulation in the stationary state are dealt with 
differently:
"When in the progress of wealth and population, wages and profits have 
fallen to their minimum, and when the next quality of land to be taken in 
cannot be made to yield a reproduction sufficient to pay these minimum 
wages and to replace advances with minimum profits, then that which is 
saved from revenue to be added to capital cannot be employed at home, and 
will be invested in foreign loans and foreign adventures. At this point 
the most rapid accumulation of capital, though going on while population 
remained stationary, could have no possible influence on wages" [1834,
p22].
Thus capital accumulation does not affect wages or prices 
because where domestic profits are at a minimum further 
accumulations are invested abroad. Torrens goes on to argue 
that there is no tendency for population to out run capital 
and that this is shown by the historical e v i d e n c e . 2®
J S Mill shared Torrens ' view that in the long run 
population would not outstrip capital, although his analysis 
differed in other respects. I argued in the case of McCulloch 
that he dealt separately with population and wage theory but 
that these were intimately connected. Very much the same 
thing can be said about Mill's contribution although his 
approach differs markedly from that of McCulloch and indeed
33 Torrens argues as follows: "Were it true, as has been sometimes 
stated, that population has a tendency to increase more rapidly than 
capital, all endeavours to improve the condition of people would be 
completely idle and abortive. The existence of such a tendency would fix 
the labouring class in a state, not only of hopeless, but of perpetually 
increasing misery, and would cause in each succeeding year a greater 
number to be cut off by famine, and by the epidemics it engenders. The 
fact, that the condition of the labouring classes has improved with the 
progress of wealth and civilization, demonstrates that population has not 
a tendency to increase faster than capital" [1834, pp27-28].
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from that of Ricardo, Malthus and his father James Mill. J S 
Mill deals with population first in Book I, chapter X, 'Of 
the Laws of the Increase of Labour ' and here he discusses 
Malthusian population theory. The implications of Malthusian 
theory for long run wage theory were dealt with by Mill in 
subsequent chapters. In Book I, chapter X, Mill briefly 
outlines the Malthusian theory, and argues that population 
will be restrained either by deaths (in the case of backward 
societies), or prudence (in more advanced societies), driven 
by the desire to maintain or improve living standards. This 
is clearly Malthus of the second edition of the Principles of 
Population (Malthus II), and it is this approach which Mill 
adopts throughout the rest of the Principles.2^  indeed Mill 
is even more explicit in Book II, chapter XI, 'Of Wages'. 
Here he defends the supporters of Malthus from the criticism 
that they had falsely argued that 'population is usually 
gaining ground upon subsistence ...and that population, in 
any improving community, tends to increase faster than, or 
even so fast as, subsistence'[ 1848, CW, II, p353]. The word 
tendency was being used here differently from the usage 
adopted by Malthus' supporters. Mill claimed. They had argued 
that there was a tendency of population to outstrip food 
supply only 'if it were not checked either by mortality or by 
prudence'[1848, CW, II, p353].
Mill's ultimate judgment was an optimistic one, and much
later in Book IV, chapter vii, 'On the Probable Futurity of
the Labouring Classes', he argues that prudence will prevail: 
"It appears to me impossible but that the increase of intelligence, of
2^ Mill also refers to some information on countries in Europe - 'facts 
brought together by Mr Malthus'[ 1848, CW, II, pl58]; and this information 
came from Malthus' second edition, added after his European tour.
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education, and of the love of independence among the working classes, 
must be attended with a corresponding growth of the good sense which 
manifests itself in provident habits of good conduct, and that 
population, therefore, will bear a gradually diminishing ratio to capital 
and employment"[1848, CW, II, p765].
The strength of Mill's belief in personal growth and 
development alone as the keys to the question of population 
pressure, compelled him throughout the Principles to 
challenge 'expedients' and 'devices' which people advocated 
in order to conceal from themselves the need for restraint. 
Thus although Mill was an advocate of Malthus II, and an 
optimist, he still felt that the need for population 
restraint was paramount. Such restraint, however, was to be 
derived from increasing intelligence, education and prudence, 
not vice and misery.
The two expedients, food imports and emigration, are 
considered by Mill in Book I, chapter XIII. The importation 
of cheap food. Mill argues, cannot solve the population 
problem in the short run, due to the difficulty of obtaining 
adequate supplies immediately; in the longer run, output can 
adjust but by then population will also have grown [1848, CW, 
II, ppl90“194]. By contrast, emigration may work in the short 
run, but it is unlikely. Mill argues, that it could continue 
to absorb adequate numbers in the long run [1848, CW, II, 
pl94]. Three 'devices', minimum wages, allowances and 
allotments are then considered by Mill in Book II chapter XII 
'Of Popular Remedies for Low Wages'. The discussion of these 
generated three novel facts or predictions from long run wage 
theory and I will consider these separately in the next 
chapter.
Much later in Book IV ch III on the 'Influence of the 
progress of Industry and Population, on Rents, Profits, and 
Wages' Mill outlines a long run wage analysis. Here he
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carefully presents a general analysis of long run wage 
determination similar to the long run model I outlined in 
chapter t h r e e , 28 and one which resembles, in the structure of 
the argument, the analysis of his father James Mill.2® He 
argues that the key factors affecting wages in the long run 
are the rates of change of the capital stock, population and 
technical change ('improvements in production') [1848, CW,
II, p719]. Mill first deals with two easy cases where 
technology is assumed to be unchanging and argues that if 
population increases faster than the capital stock wages will 
fall and vice versa. He then goes on to consider the case 
where population and capital increase at the same rate with 
given technology. Here his analysis differs both from his 
father's and from Torrens who had taken issue with the older 
Mill on this m a t t e r . J a m e s  Mill had argued that if capital 
increased by one-eighth and population also by one-eighth the 
wage rate would remain the same. Torrens argued against this, 
as I have noted, and employed a money version of the fund in 
doing so, the quarrel with the elder Mill essentially 
revolving round the question of which capital was growing at 
the same rate as population - money capital or real capital? 
Mill's approach differed in that he made a constant real wage 
rate the test of equality in the rates of population and 
capital growth ah Initio and then went on to discuss the 
effects on rents and profits [1848, CW, II, p723].
Finally Mill examined the impact on wages, rents and 
profits of a 'sudden improvement made in the arts of
38 See above p56.
3® See above pp76-77.
30 See above pl36-137.
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production' given a constant population and capital stock
[1848, CW, p723“729]. Mill argues that the outcome depends on
whether the improved technology cheapens the production of
the necessaries consumed by workers or luxuries 'consumed 
exclusively by richer people' [1848, CW, II, p724]. At first 
sight this seems to indicate that Mill believed that workers 
consumed entirely different goods from capitalists and 
landlords. If so, this would give support to the McCulloch 
approach and be at odds with the passage in the Principles, 
which I discussed a b o v e , w h e r e  workers could under certain 
circumstances consume luxuries. But a little further on Mill 
argues that when prices fell:
".... of those goods which labourers generally do not consume ... all who 
consume them, whether landlords, capitalists, or skilled and privileged 
labourers, obtain increased means of enjoyment ... The landlords and the 
Privileged classes of labourers, if they are consumers of the same
commodities, share the same benefit" [1848, CW, II, p724].
In fact this passage lends support to the view taken by both
Mill and Ricardo that workers' consumption of luxury goods
depends upon their level of real income. Ricardo [1951,
p258]®^ argued that capital accumulation with a constant
population will lead to luxury consumption by workers if 'the
workmen were well fed before'. Mill, as I argued earlier,
made a similar point, arguing that workers will consume
luxuries if they were 'already sufficiently supplied with
necessaries'[ 1848, CW II p68]. In the passage above Mill
reinforces this general approach by arguing that some better
off sections of the workforce - who are presumably well fed
or sufficiently supplied with necessaries - can and do
See above ppl21-123. 
^2 See above pp72-73. 
See above pl22.
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consume luxuries. The rigid separation of workers' and
capitalists' consumption required to bring about the price 
effects McCulloch referred to is entirely absent in this
discussion. Where workers are not well fed however, as I
argued above, they may continue to demand more food when 
given increased (money) wages, and with no more food 
available offsetting price effects will come into operation. 
Having dealt with luxuries. Mill goes on to make the point 
that if technological change lowers the cost of necessaries, 
workers will be able to consume more of these in the short 
run although in the end the population response is likely to 
reduce the real wage rate down to its former level [1848, CW, 
II, p728].
So far, then. Mill has presented a general analysis in 
which a large number of possible outcomes are allowed for. In 
Book IV, ch VII, as I pointed out above. Mill makes his own 
optimistic judgment about the likely course of events. He 
argues that gradually the population were being educated by 
newspapers and popular tracts and that this trend was likely 
to continue and be augmented by more formal education for the 
working classes [1848, CW, II, p764] leading to improvements 
in 'habits of conduct' and population growth lagging behind 
capital growth. Thus Mill is grafting on to the basic long 
run model an auxiliary hypothesis different to that of 
Ricardo and Malthus^^ (Malthus I). Capital accumulation is 
likely to exceed population growth. Mill argued, and not the 
other way round.
64 See above pp41-42.
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At the hands of Mill then the long run Classical wage 
theory became perfectly general. It is embroidered with 
Malthusian references, but these are references to the second 
and subsequent editions of Malthus' Essay. The attacks by 
Senior and others, noted in chapter three, had succeeded in 
destroying the ' Iron Law ', but the long run hard core was 
intact and any combination of population and capital growth 
rates were consistent with it.
V Wage Theory; Early Critics and Ricardian Socialists
At the same time during the mid-182Os that McCulloch was 
developing the rigid version of the wages fund doctrine there 
appeared the first attacks upon Classical political economy 
in general and wage theory in particular. Some of the 
specific attacks on wage theory were by relatively little 
known and subsequently neglected economists'^ - Sir Edward 
West[1826], Godfrey Higgins[1826], Richard Jones[1833], and 
Thomas Hopkins[1834]. A more general critique which only 
occasionally focused on Classical wage theory was developed 
by members of the radical and socialist group known as the 
'Ricardian' Socialists - Thomas Hodgskin [1825], William 
Thomson [1824,1827], John Gray [1825,1831,1848], and John 
Francis Bray [1839]. One task in this section is to examine 
which of these criticisms constituted potential 
counterexamples to the wages fund research programme. I will 
argue that two contributions - those of West and Hodgskin did 
represent powerful potential counterexamples which addressed 
real weaknesses in the research programme. West's arguments 
focused on the ubiquitous dichotomy between money and real
66 Attention was first drawn to the work of these authors with regard to 
the wages fund doctrine by Breit[1967]
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funds, while that of Hodgskin centred on the nature of the 
production process. A second task is to attempt to assess the 
extent to which these criticisms had any impact, and to 
attempt to explain any impact or lack of it that may have 
occurred. The Lakatosian framework enables us to examine and 
analyse the ways in which potential counterexamples are dealt 
with by a research programme. In the case of McCulloch, the 
counterexample was posed by McCulloch himself, and he 
provided the strategy to deal with it. With regard to the 
arguments being considered in this section, they were put 
forward, from the outside as it were, as criticisms of 
orthodoxy, but there is no evidence that they were 
specifically countered in any way by members of the Classical 
school. In this sense the arguments produced no response, and 
I will also argue that they had no impact on the nature of 
Classical analysis. This is not to say that they produced no 
response whatsoever, for the anti-capitalist critiques of the 
Ricardian Socialists produced renewed efforts by the 
popularizers of political economy in the 1830s®®. I will 
argue that the failure of the critiques to impact on 
Classical analysis can be most satisfactorily explained 
within the Lakatosian framework.
The important question of the relationship between money 
funds and real funds was raised by Sir Edward West in The 
Price of Corn and Wages of Labour [1826]. In this work West 
reviewed the arguments of Smith, Malthus and Ricardo 
concerning the effects on wages of fluctuations in corn 
prices. He argued that while wages were paid from capital and
66 See below ppl71-175.
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could not be increased in real terms without an increase in 
capital, the earlier writers failed to realize that an 
increase in capital is usually the effect of some earlier 
increase in labour demand:
"It is true and most obvious that the real wages of labour cannot be 
increased without an increase of the capital which constitutes the 
maintenance of labour, such as food, clothing etc. But the increase of 
this capital is generally the effect, and not the cause, of the increased 
demand for labour; there may be an additional demand for labour without 
any proceeding increase of capital, such increased demand for labour 
causes an increase of the money wages of labour, and that increase of the 
money wages effects an additional demand for and an increase of the 
quantity of such capital" [1826, p79].
The error, according to West, lay in thinking entirely in 
real terms:
"It is obvious that if wages were all paid in kind, and not in money, an 
increase of capital must precede any increase of the demand for labour 
and of wages. These wages would be the real wages of labour, and they 
could not be increased without an increase of capital, that is, of the 
necessaries, etc. of which the real wages are constituted. Wages 
certainly in this sense could not be increased without an increase of 
capital; nor could the number of coats be increased without an increase 
of the quantity of cloth. But we might just as well say, that the demands 
for coats depends upon the quantity of cloth, as that the demand for 
labour depends upon the quantity of capital. Though the number of coats 
cannot be increased without an increase in the quantity of cloth, 
increase the demand for and the price of coats, and the cloth will soon 
be manufactured; so increase the demand for and the price of labour and 
the necessaries which the labourers require will soon be raised and 
manufactured" [1826, pp80-81].
This is an interesting argument because here West is 
focussing on the fundamental problem of money versus real 
funds that I discussed earlier. West makes it absolutely 
clear that if the wages fund doctrine could always only be
portrayed in real terms there would be no difficulties. The
difficulties arise because in the real world wages are paid
in money and this has certain consequences which West tries 
to spell out:
"But when we take facts as they are, and the state of society as it is; 
when we consider that wages are not paid in kind but in money, the result 
will be found to be very different; it will be found that a larger or 
smaller expenditure in money may be given to the labouring population, 
that their money-wages will accordingly rise or fall; their demand for 
the articles necessary for their consumption will be increased or
diminished, and the price and quantity of them increased or diminished in 
the same proportion" [1826, p83].
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This analysis seems to imply that the increased money 
allocations to workers will result in increased wage goods 
prices and/or quantities. Given West's earlier remarks about 
the rigidity of the real wages fund it is difficult to 
imagine that the above passage should be read to imply that 
workers' wage good consumption could change within the 
current production period. What it appears to mean, 
therefore, is that prices will change in the immediate term, 
and that this will lead to an increase in wage good output in 
later periods.®? It is in this sense, then, that the wages 
fund increases as a result of changing money allocations to 
workers. In West's work then the difficulty associated with 
the dichotomy between money and real conceptions of the wages 
fund doctrine once again appears very early on in the 
development of the research programme. However, while West's 
earlier work on the corn price and distribution was regarded 
highly by Ricardo®®, there is no evidence that West's 
comments on the wages fund doctrine made any impact on 
established thought.®^
In the same year as West's contribution, T Perronet 
Thompson criticized James Mill's version of the wages fund: 
"That 'wages depend on the proportion between population and capital,' is
This had been argued by both Malthus (see above p88) and J S Mill 
(see above ppl20-121).
Ricardo wrote to Malthus in 1815, concerning West, saying that: "I 
have read his book with attention and I find that his views agree very
with west as having "presented to the world, nearly at the same moment, 
the true doctrine of rent"(see Principles [1817], Preface, p5).
w!«=-h ^ [1970, PP334-335] has argued that, superficially, Edward
West might be taken as a forerunner of Keynes, to the extent that he 
appears to argue that an increased demand for output must precede an 
demand for labour. However, as E G West points out [1970, 
p335], Edward West's argument required a prior increase in the demand for 
labour, which in turn generated an increase in the demand for goods.
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tantamount to saying, that the greater share a man gets, the richer he 
will be. But it is never stated why the proportion between population and 
capital is different at one time and place from what it is at another, or 
what it is that induces such a condition of things as makes their shares 
different" [1826, p24].
Thompson went on to argue that variations in the level of 
wages between societies or between social classes will be
influenced by cultural expectations or habits [1826, pp329-
7 n
330]. Thus, a simple division of capital by population 
cannot provide an adequate explanation of the wage rate.
Both Higgins in his Observations on Mr McCulloch's 
Doctrines Respecting the Corn Laws and the Rate of 
Wages [ 1826 ], and Jones in his Svllabus of a Course of 
Lectures on the Wages of Labour[1833] focused most of their 
attention on the potential for confusing total capital with 
the wages fund, but this was a relatively minor point and 
neither author built upon this foundation. Higgins took 
McCulloch to task?^ for referring to wages being dependent on 
the relationship between capital and population, but 
McCulloch was not alone among Classical economists in talking 
in these terms when he really did mean, as Higgins points 
out, the relationship between capital devoted to the payment 
of wages and the labouring population. The criticism would 
have been valid had Higgins pointed out that capital 
accumulation could take the form of additions to the fixed 
capital stock leaving the wages fund constant. This would 
have been an acceptable criticism, although a pedantic one to 
the extent that McCulloch had taken pains to argue on the
Thompson argued that while Englishmen could subsist on potatoes they 
'have not the habit' to do so, whereas a labourer in Ireland may bring up 
a family upon potatoes [1826, pp328-329]. Also, 'public opinion and
custom require, for example, that a shopkeeper shall wear a good coat, - 
shall drink at all times malt liquor...' and so on [1826, p330]. These 
factors influence people's decisions concerning the number of children 
they will have.
See Higgins [1826, p251.
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previous page that the wage rate was determined by dividing 
the wages fund by the labouring population, and had even 
provided a numerical example to illustrate the p o i n t . T h e  
looser usage of the terms capital and population must be seen 
as a form of shorthand, which was acceptable given the 
extreme improbability that capital accumulation would take 
place with none of the increase being added to the wages 
fund.?®
In the year following Jones' lectures, Thomas Hopkins 
published Great Britain, for the Last Forty Years; being an 
Historical and Analytical Account of its Finances# Economy, 
and General Condition during that Period [1834]. This book 
contained a radical critique of the relation between capital 
and population, and Hopkins argued against the notion that 
with a given wages fund a smaller labouring population will 
result in a higher wage rate. Workers, he argued, produced 
the capital from which wages were paid, and thus the fewer 
they were in number the smaller would be the amount of 
capital from which wages would be paid. This spirited attack 
on the wages fund doctrine and the anti-populationists seems, 
not surprisingly, to have gone unheeded by mainstream
In fact Higgins did not argue along these lines but went on to assert 
that some accumulation may be in the form of money thereby confusing 
money with capital which Mcculloch and the major Classical writers kept 
completely separate [1826, pp251-2].
?® A similar warning note about confusing capital with the wages fund 
was sounded by the Reverend Richard Jones, who was praised by Marx who 
described him as Britain's first historical economist. In his course of 
lectures in 1833 he pointed to the 'necessity of not confusing the word 
capital when used to describe the whole of the wages fund with capital in 
the sense of that "portion of a stock of a country which is employed with 
a view to profit"' [1833, p45]. Jones went on to point out that the 
amount of capital devoted to the maintenance of labour may vary 
independently of changes in the total amount of capital but he does not 
explore the implications of this or his earlier distinctions.
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Classical writers.?^ The views of this early, 'neglected' 
group of writers were disparate and of uneven quality* West 
focused on what was potentially the most damaging aspect - 
the issue of money versus real funds - but did not develop it 
adequately• There is no evidence that any of these arguments 
had any impact upon the wages fund doctrine.?®
I will now turn to that group of writers consisting of 
Thomas Hodgskin, William Thompson and others commonly known 
as the Ricardian Socialists • This group of writers based 
their work on the labour theory of value, and a fundamental
A Similar argument to that of Hopkins was put by John Francis Bray in 
1839 in a book entitled Labour's Wrongs and Labour's Remedies, or the Age
— .Might and the Age of Right r 18391. Again, as for other Ricardian
Socialists writers, labour was the sole source of all wealth most of 
which was taken from them by capitalists through "no other than a 
barefaced though legalized robbery" [1839, p50]. in the course of the 
discussion Bray develops a telling critique of Classical wage theory. He 
points to the long hours and low pay of British workers, and to the 
'accursed system of unequal exchanges., [which] enables one-fifth of the 
nation to seize upon one-half of all that is produced'[1839, pl02]. Among 
the many explanations which have been developed to explain these 
inequalities, he argues, is the political economists' 'fallacy' of supply 
and demand. He then presents a clear account of the wages fund doctrine 
pointing out that a principle conclusion from the analysis is that for 
to be kept at their 'proper level' the numbers of workers must be 
limited. Since the wages fund is fixed a glut of labour will reduce the 
average wage rate. All of this is disputed with vigour. Bray argues that 
'there never yet has been, and there is not now, and there cannot be for 
thousands of years, such a thing as a 'glut of labour"[1839, pl04]. Such 
a glut would require that everyone had a 'sufficiency of every necessary 
and luxury that for consumption', or,, that there were insufficient raw 
materials [1839, ppl04-105], and neither of these is in fact the case. 
Thus the economists ' analysis is faulty and only has reference to the 
current system of inequality and injustice. What is needed, he argues, is 
the removal of the system which creates this evil. For a discussion of 
the influence of Bray's work on Marx see J P Henderson [1985, pp73-75].
?® Mountifort Longfield, while not directly attacking the wages fund 
doctrine produced, in 1834, an approach to wage determination which was a 
potential alternative [1834, pp200-221]. Longfield argued that wages are 
paid from current output: "It is evident that the wages of labour like 
the exchangeable value of everything else, must depend upon the relation 
between the supply and the demand. It is also plain enough, that the 
supply consists of the present existing race of labourers. But on what 
does the demand depend? Undoubtedly, in the case of the great body of 
labourers, the demand is caused by the utility or value of the work which 
they are capable of performing. Menial servants, and those labourers 
usually termed unproductive, must be maintained by funds derived from 
other sources: but the wages of the great mass of labourers must be paid 
out of the produce of their labour" [1834, pp209-210]. As with the rest 
of these early contributions, Longfield's work made no impact; indeed 
Blaug argues that only one writer of the day, John Eisdell, made any 
reference to Longfield [Blaug, 1958, pl28].
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tenet of their approach to distribution was that since all 
output was in their view produced by labour, therefore all 
output should accrue to labour. In addition they all accepted 
utilitarianism as the test of social justice and harmony. The 
greatest happiness of the greatest number could only be 
achieved by a radical change in society so that those who 
produced the output received the 'just' reward of their 
labour. These authors have usually been known collectively as 
the Ricardian Socialists because of the use they allegedly 
made of Ricardo's concepts and tools, and in particular, his 
theory of value.?®
The most powerful attack on the wages fund doctrine by a 
member of this socialist group was made by Thomas Hodgskin. 
Hodgskin was perhaps the most well known of the group, and 
inspired by the repeal of the Combination Laws, he wrote 
Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital, in 1825.?? In 
this volume Hodgskin laid out the claims of capital, as 
supported by the theories of political economy, in order that 
these theories may be criticized and rejected. Hodgskin 
pointed out that according to conventional political economy 
labour's share consists of the 'necessaries and conveniences
?® others have challenged this view. Hunt [1977, pp322-345 and 1980, 
ppl84-198] and Hollander [1980, pp372-3] have argued Ricardo's theory of 
value was not made use of by the early socialists and, indeed, that they 
were hostile to many aspects of Ricardo's ideas. A number of writers 
including Myrdal [1953, p30], Schwartz [1968, pl6], Hollander [1980,
pp377-379] and Thompson [1984, pp82-110] have argued that the socialists 
were more influenced by Smith than Ricardo. Their treatment of wage 
theory was variable and some had much more to say than others. See King 
[1983] for a discussion of the influence of the Ricardian Socialists on 
Marx. King also acknowledged the debt the Ricardian Socialists owed to 
smith [1983, p349].
?? Originally a naval officer Hodgskin came to the attention of Francis 
Place as a result of whose influence he joined the staff of the Morning 
Chronicle in 1823. His connections with the labour movement led to his 
establishing (along with Robertson) the Mechanics Magazine in the same 
year and to argue for a Mechanics Institute which was eventually founded.
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required for the support of the labourer and his family; or 
that quantity which is necessary to enable the labourers one
with another, to subsist and to perpetuate their race,
without either increase or diminution' [1825, p31]. It is
true, he argues, that everywhere workers tend to receive a 
bare subsistence with the surplus going to landlords and
capitalists, but in what way is this justified? Political 
economists justify a return to capital because it performs 
certain functions. He quotes McCulloch as arguing that 
without circulating capital "the labourer never could engage 
in any undertaking which did not yield an almost immediate 
return" [1825, p35]. He goes on to put the Classical view in 
his own words :
"The only advantage of circulating capital is that by it the LABOURER is 
enabled, he being assured of his present subsistence, to direct his power 
to the greatest advantage. He has time to learn an art, and his labour is 
rendered more productive when directed by skill. Being assured of 
immediate subsistence, he can ascertain which, with his peculiar 
knowledge and acquirements, and with reference to the wants of society, 
is the best method of labouring and he can labour in this manner, unless 
there were this ASSURANCE there could no continuous thought, no 
invention, and no knowledge but that which would be necessary for the 
supply of our immediate animal wants" [1825, p36-37].
Hodgskin then proceeds to challenge the notion of this 
predetermined wages fund. He admits that productive activity 
could not continue if people did not have the knowledge that 
subsistence was available. But he continues:
"It is this assurance, this knowledge, this confidence in obtaining 
subsistence and reward, which enables and induces men to undertake long 
and complicated operations, and the question is, do men derive this 
assurance from a stock of goods already provided (saved from the produce 
of previous labour) and ready to pay them, or from any other source?" 
[1825, p37].
The answer he gives to this question is no. Articles which 
workers consume such as food, milk, meat and beer are only 
prepared for sale a short time before consumption. There may 
be small stocks of items such as clothing or imported tea but 
these are small compared to the overall consumption of them.
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Workers' ability to produce, then, is not dependent upon a 
pre-existing stock of commodities but on their knowledge of 
the existence of co-existing labour:mrnmma
Hodgskin, then, presents a powerful critique of the first
element of short run hard core - the point input - point
output notion of the production process envisaged by the
Classical writers, where wages are 'advanced' by capitalists
to workers to maintain them through the production period.
This IS all swept aside in favour of synchronized activity by
co-existing labour. Production is seen as continuous rather
than discrete, and Hodgskin presents a very clear
understanding of the difference between stocks and flows.
Hodgskin went on from here to argue that fixed capital is
merely stored-up labour and derives its 'utility' or
generates a profit not because of the act of saving or
storing-up, but because they are employed and can only be
employed along with living labour. The capitalist then is
seen as a middle man who unjustly intervenes to appropriate
the largest share of the product which rightly belongs to the 
labourer.
Hodgskin's analysis strikes at the very heart of Classical 
wage theory. For Hodgskin's view to be accepted, the hard 
core of the Classical research programme would have to be 
abandoned. In fact this did not happen in the 1820s for 
reasons which I consider later, but what was presented by
4: Development of the Hard Core 154
Hodgskin was a real alternative and not just a partial
critique.
Other members of this group such as William Thompson?® 
and John Gray?^ while critical of Classical economics only 
briefly touched on orthodox wage theory, and neither 
confronted the wages fund doctrine directly.
Collectively the 'Ricardian' socialists made a powerful 
attack on orthodox political economy but their individual 
discussions of wage theory were variable. Hodgskin made an 
important criticism in attacking the hard core's first 
element, whereas the work of Gray and Thompson only touched 
on the question. Hodgskin's analysis of the nature of
production stood as a potentially devastating critique of the
hard core of the wages fund doctrine for he was not only not 
in any sense obeying the negative heuristic but also along 
with others was developing a rival programme. In broader
^6 william Thomson was a disciple of Robert Owen and a believer in the 
co-operative ideal. His first book An Incmiry into the Principles of The 
Distribution of Wealth Most Conductive to Human Happiness 1824, is 
founded on explicit utilitarian principles and, like Hodgskin, Thompson 
argues that labour is the sole source of value and, given this, the
working class should receive all output. In his later book Labour 
Rewarded 1827, Thompson, by now a firm supporter of Owen, argued for a 
commonwealth of co-operatives where a free and voluntary system of
exchange would exist. He spends some time in the book considering wages 
but although he criticizes the 'higgling of the market' for not 
reflecting the utility of the labour or the skill needed, his analysis 
concentrates on relative wages, which he argued should be brought into 
equality.
John Gray in his Lecture on Human Happiness 1825 also adopted the 
theory of value as a centre-piece for a radical critique. This work
reveals him as a convinced socialist keen to outline the institutional 
arrangements necessary to run an ideal society in which production and 
distribution would reflect labour embodied. In his later works he focused 
his attention mainly on grand schemes for monetary reform. In both The 
Social System : A Treatise on the Principle of Exchange, 1831, and the 
Lectures on the Nature and Use of Money 1848, Gray outlined a system in 
which a national bank would decide the quantities of labour time 
necessary for different goods, and certificates of value to be used in 
exchange would be issued to producers and consumers in relation to the 
labour time they contributed to output. In the Social System Gray argues 
that the average price of labour should be 'a subject of mutual 
consultation and agreement between the government and the Chamber of
Commerce'[1831, p99], although the basis for this agreement is not made 
clear.
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terms the whole of the Ricardian socialist approach resting 
as it did on the labour theory of value constituted a 
cz^tigue of wage theory; the capitalist may nominally advance 
the worker goods or money, but these goods were produced by 
workers in earlier periods. If on these grounds the workers 
were entitled to the whole of the output, the whole idea of 
'advance' economics, and wages as part of capital, would have 
to be abandoned. There was considerable potential for this 
sort of argument, but the project soon failed. From the mid- 
1830s onwards, as Thompson [1984] has argued, Ricardian 
socialism went into decline. At the same time orthodox wage 
theory survived, flourished even, making theoretical progress 
in the 1830s and 1840s as I shall argue in the next chapter. 
As far as the individuals involved were concerned, Hodgskin 
increasingly devoted his time to the advocacy of free trade. 
Gray became obsessed with monetary reform, Thompson had died 
in 1833, and Bray had emigrated in 1842. This group had 
achieved much in the 1820s and 1830s, presenting a separate 
radical political economy - effectively a rival research 
P^oç^ramme - which was very popular among the working 
classes.
Thompson [1984, pp222-228] has suggested several reasons 
''^ hy this alternative body of theory ultimately degenerated. 
There were theoretical weaknesses. Much emphasis was placed 
on the idea of rent, profit and interest being additions to 
the natural labour values of goods, and this led to a focus 
on exchange relations rather than the fundamental questions
See Thompson[1984] for a fuller discussion.
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of property ownership.®^ Allied to this was the tendency to 
stress elements of the approach which appeared to be rather 
crude in theoretical terms. Thus the notion that labour 
should exchange at its 'natural value' could easily turn into 
the idea of 'a fair day's work for a fair day's pay', 
reducing an initially strong theoretical position to a rather 
mild form of bargaining strategy.
Other factors were undoubtedly also important. Radicals in 
the 1830s had many other more practical outlets for their 
energies - in factory reform, the People's Charter and other 
activities. It is also a possibility that increased well­
being was important in reducing the impact of their critique. 
Thompson [1984, pp226-227] dismisses this on the grounds that 
while this may account for a decline in popular support for 
such a radical analysis, it cannot account for the 
degeneration of the theoretical base. Later in the century 
economic growth did not restrain Marx from developing a 
critique of capitalism. The reason for the difference in 
success between the 'Ricardian' socialists and Marx, Thompson 
argues [1984, pp227-228], is that the letter's analysis could 
explain the existence of economic prosperity under capitalism 
while the former could not. But this is rather too easy. For 
one thing, it is not at all clear that Marx was any more 
successful in the short run in England in getting his ideas 
accepted than were the 'Ricardian' socialists. Secondly and 
more importantly, there is another interpretation available. 
From a Lakatosian point of view one would be less interested
This can clearly be seen in some of the favoured schemes for reform: 
the establishment of joint-stock companies to issue their own money so 
that goods could be exchanged at labour embodied values, and the 
development of co-operative trading societies, for example.
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in the weaknesses of counterexamples than in the strength of 
the research programme in question. Lakatos argues that a 
research programme will not be abandoned in the face of
counterexamples if theoretical progress is taking place or is 
prospect. Subscribers to a newly formed research programme 
are by Lakatos ' account not likely to abandon such a 
programme in the face of criticism until some time has 
elapsed. In the mid-182Os the wages fund doctrine had only 
just come to full development at the hands of Marcet and 
McCulloch, but by 1830 the programme was beginning to make 
theoretical progress at the hands of Senior and Mill, as I 
shall show in the next chapter. Moreover, while the 
popularizers may not have changed the views of the working 
classes, they may well have convinced a number of the
educated middle classes to whom the professional economists 
would turn for succour and support. Thus despite its 
theoretical weaknesses no orthodox economist was going to 
simply abandon Classical wage theory at this early and 
promising stage. The situation facing Marx some thirty years 
later was entirely different. Classical economics was in
crisis; in particular, wage theory was degenerating and value 
theory was to be overthrown in the early 1870s. Despite this, 
however, those with severe doubts in the 1880s about the 
wages fund doctrine and long run wage theory did not turn to 
Marx for an alternative, but to the pages of The Ouarterlv 
Review of Economics and the idea of marginal productivity 
theory.
VI Conclusions
The central theme of this chapter has been the
development of the hard core of the wages fund doctrine and
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the associated dichotomy between real and money conceptions 
of the theory. This dichotomy persisted throughout the 
history of the doctrine and underlay the debates concerning 
the rigidity of the fund, the strengths and weaknesses of the 
theory and Mill's recantation. I have endeavoured to address 
this issue in Lakatosian terms and to rationally reconstruct 
this phase in the history of the doctrine. This rational 
reconstruction has produced some useful results.
First, I have argued that McCulloch clearly realized the 
significance of the danger posed by the 'monster' of money 
and tried to protect the doctrine against it. The Lakatosian 
conceptual framework was useful here. It revealed the 
approach taken by Malthus and McCulloch to be logical and 
potentially successful albeit involving a loss in content. 
The resulting rigid version of the wages fund doctrine was 
more limited but more robust. The lemma required to produce 
the more limited but more robust 'rigid' doctrine, explicit 
in Malthus ' Essay was not made explicit by McCulloch but was 
rationally part of the research programme.
Secondly, all of this helped in assessing the claim that 
McCulloch was the 'founder' of the wages fund doctrine. I 
have argued that McCulloch was not the founder of the 
doctrine; Malthus was. Marcet and McCulloch, however, 
reaffirmed the key elements of the hard core and these were 
subscribed to by the Classical economists in the ensuing 
decades. Malthus and McCulloch did however give the doctrine 
rigidity by implicitly incorporating a lemma that protected 
it from a potentially lethal counterexample; and this 
strategy is in line with Lakatos' interpretation of 
scientific development.
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Thirdly, examination of Mill's work reveals that the 
analysis of workers' consumption was quite sophisticated and 
that while under certain circumstances the McCulloch approach 
was adopted, there were others in which workers' consumption 
of luxuries was a possibility as a result of increased money 
allocations from capitalists. Thus Mill was not prepared to 
adopt the lemma required to protect the theory and this was 
one of the points which precipitated his recantation.
The Lakatosian framework reveals Torrens engaging in 
monster-barring, undertaking his discussion of maximum and 
minimum wages entirely in terms of a real wheat model of the 
economy. Torrens' work, then, makes it clear how powerful the 
more limited 'harvest' model of the wages fund doctrine could 
be in predicting an improvement in the workers ' share of 
output where capital accumulation takes place against a 
static population.
I also argued that subscription to the wages fund research 
programme did not go automatically hand in hand with an anti­
union stance. Indeed Torrens showed how the wages fund 
analysis could be used to argue the case for union action. 
Things were not quite so straightforward with regard to 
McCulloch and Mill. McCulloch, having developed a rigid wages 
fund formulation in his Principles. turned to a Smithian 
bargaining model when considering the question of 
combinations, developing a position towards the role of 
unions that was to reappear in the wages fund debate in the 
1860s. Mill turned out to be the most orthodox in terms of 
applying the wages fund doctrine to union i s s u e s , a n d  the
Hollander [1985, p419] has accused Mill of 'breast-beating' in the 
recantation by admitting to having earlier subscribed to a rigid wages
4: Development of the Hard Core 160 
differences in approach apparent in Mill's work reveal once 
more the continuing dichotomy at the heart of the wages fund 
doctrine.
In this chapter I have also examined some criticisms of 
the wages fund doctrine, and have argued that while these in 
some cases constituted potential counterexamples to the newly 
developed research programme they failed to make any impact. 
The programme had much potential and went on to make 
theoretical progress in the 1830s and 1840s. The framework
has also provided a language with which the issues
surrounding the growth of a doctrine can be discussed and 
this enabled discussion of the monster of money and its 
impact on the analysis.
Finally, the framework is a unified one that makes it 
possible to link these events to others earlier in the period 
Ricardo's treatment of luxuries for example; and to events
later in the period - the progress of the theory at the hands
of Senior and Mill, popularization by Martineau and Ellis, 
and the recantation itself. These aspects of the wages fund 
theory will be dealt with using some of the tools already 
applied as well as other elements from the Lakatosian 
framework thus providing important linkages at the conceptual 
level. The sub-history of the contributions of Marcet, 
McCulloch, Torrens and Mill is not therefore limited to an 
analysis of what they said about wage theory but can be and 
will be related to the development of the wages fund doctrine 
as a whole.
M??? It is true as Hollander shows, and as I have argued, that
^  ^ complex view in discussing the first theorem on capital
in the Principles, but is also nevertheless clear that Mill did take a
S ' g g e :  of union,.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THEORETICAL PROGRESS AND NOVEL FACTS; RICARDO, SENIOR AND 
MILL
I Introduction
In the last chapter I discussed the attempts made by 
Malthus and McCulloch to deal with the threat posed to the 
wages fund doctrine by the existence of money wages, the 
result of which was a more limited but more robust theory. By 
applying Lakatosian concepts it was possible to attach a 
special significance to McCulloch's work, consistent with but 
different from conventional accounts. In the longer run 
McCulloch's efforts were unable to preserve the doctrine. The 
dichotomy between money and real funds remained and played an 
important role in Mill's recantation. But in 1825 Mill's 
recantation was almost half a century away and during the 
intervening years the doctrine was applied to a number of 
issues and problems of analysis and policy. Writers such as 
Senior and Mill ignored the complications of money versus 
real funds and employed the wages fund doctrine as part of 
the Classical economics apparatus.
Conventional accounts of the wages fund doctrine tend to 
stress the 'birth' of the wages fund and the recantation but 
pay relatively little attention to the 'middle' period.^ They 
are often written as if most, if not all. Classical 
economists believed the same set of simplicities and that 
nothing ever changed until 1869. A Lakatosian analysis by 
contrast would attempt to explore the extent to which there 
was change in the form of theoretical or empirical progress
This is especially true of the basic history of economic thought 
texts; some of the more advanced texts and some of the journal literature 
give some attention to the middle period, see overleaf footnote 3.
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or decline. In this chapter I will attempt to measure 
theoretical progress by establishing the extent to which the 
applications of the wages fund to various issues were 
productive of theoretical innovation. According to Lakatos, 
as I noted in chapter two®, theoretical progress occurs if a 
research programme continues to generate excess empirical 
content over its predecessors i.e. if it produces novel 
facts. Empirical progress occurs if some of these novel facts 
are corroborated by empirical evidence. A prime requirement 
for a discussion of the relationship of novel facts to a 
particular research programme is the identification of those 
statements which may constitute novel facts.
With regard to classical wage theory, three major 
Classical economists, Ricardo, Senior and J S Mill, have 
provided a rich variety of examples and applications of wage 
theory which are candidates for the status of novel fact. On 
matters ranging from the questions of the impact of machinery 
on wages, the relationship of the demand for commodities to 
the demand for labour to the consequences of the non­
residence of landlords on domestic employment, these major 
economists made predictions based on the wages fund 
analysis. Some of these owed their origins to Ricardo's 
famous chapter XXXI 'On Machinery' in the 1821 edition of the
® See Lakatos[1970, pll8], and above p27.
While conventional accounts of Classical wage theory have paid 
relatively little attention to this rich variety of applications, there 
are two notable exceptions, one is A c Pigou, "Mill and the Wages Fund", 
Economic Journal, 1949, who discussed a number of 'applications' of the 
wages fund doctrine. These included cycle theory, 'the demand for 
commodities is not the demand for labour ', war loans and the effects of 
machinery, all of which I will argue are novel facts. see Pigou in 
Rima[1970, pplOO-107]. The other exception is Hollander[1968, pp320-341] 
who has argued that evidence from Mill's first and third propositions on 
Capital support a Torrens—Cairnes—Mill version of the wages fund 
analysis. I will argue that this argument cannot be supported.
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Principles. Others are to be found in Mill's well-known
propositions on capital. Yet others were contained in 
discussions explicitly aimed at rebutting potential 
counterexamples to the wages fund doctrine. Thus Nassau
Senior in the Three Lectures on the Rate of Wages [1830]
discussed seven 'opinions inconsistent with' the wages fund 
doctrine and these were reproduced in the Outline of
Political Economv in 1836 and in following editions.^
Similarly, J S Mill in the Principles of Political Economy 
[1848] discussed six 'facts in apparent contradiction to' the 
wages fund doctrine. It is clear from Lakatos' discussion 
(see above ppl6-22) that research programmes will make 
progress and gain content if they can deal successfully with 
counterexamples or anomalies, and this is precisely the
context in which both Senior and Mill analyze the strength of 
the wages fund doctrine. In addition to these predictions
made by the major writers I will include a prediction not 
often made by the Classical economists themselves, although 
warmly endorsed by popularizers and other commentators, that 
union activity to bid up the wage rate will not be
successful.
Although these applications have been given relatively 
little attention, in the history of wage theory at least, it 
is important to note that these propositions were not obscure 
or trivial. Those deriving from Mill's discussion of capital.
In Nassau Senior and Classical Economics Bowley refers to Senior's 
treatment of the seven opinions inconsistent with the wages fund 
doctrine, regarding it 'as an elaborate discussion, which is not of much 
interest'[ 1937, pl88]. This is an odd comment given that not only did 
Senior obviously regard these matters of importance, devoting twenty 
full pages to the discussion, but Bowley herself adds a note on them 
extending to two and a half pages at the end of her chapter on Senior's 
theory of wages. Moreover as I have already noted some of these 
propositions were very controversial and important.
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for example, attracted much theoretical debate; others such 
as those relating to machinery, strikes and the Poor Law were 
concerned with the great issues of the day.
I will examine all these possible examples of novel facts 
in section three against the background of the discussion of 
the nature of factual novelty developed in the next section. 
I will argue that the wages fund doctrine did make some 
theoretical progress as judged by the Zahar-Worrall 
modification of Lakatos and the fact that it did so in the 
face of a major anomaly, the monster of money, provides some 
evidence for a Lakatosian view of scientific change.
Conventional grid accounts could not attach much 
importance to arguments against opinions inconsistent with a 
piece of theory dismissed as erroneous. A Lakatosian approach 
on the other hand gives these novel facts a great deal of 
importance and indeed revives, respects and reinterprets 
their historical importance - the importance attached to them 
by the major economists of the period who discussed them and 
argued about them for over half a century. More importantly 
perhaps, a Lakatosian analysis provides an explanation 
of the longevity of the wages fund theory despite the 
underlying theoretical difficulties and the criticism and 
opposition to which it was subjected - quite simply the wages 
fund research programme did make theoretical progress.
11 The Nature of Novel Facts
Before I can begin to assess the extent to which Classical 
wage theory made theoretical progress I must examine what is 
meant by 'novel facts'. One approach to this question, a 
purely temporal view, is usually ascribed to Lakatos in 
Proofs and Refutations [1976] and rests on the notion that
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all hypotheses and evidence 'known to science' when the new 
theory is proposed should be regarded as background
knowledge. The only test which can confirm the new theory is 
therefore one which tests the prediction of a novel fact - a 
fact not 'known to science' when the theory was developed. 
This approach was criticized by Zahar [1973]® on the grounds 
that it would rule out much evidence that has been counted in 
support of some well developed and important theories. Zahar 
and Worrall have proposed their own approach to novel facts 
which is line with MSRP and which modifies and improves it. 
They argue that a fact can be regarded as novel as long as it
was not involved in the construction of the theory in
question (see Zahar [1973, pl03], and Worrall [1978, p50]). 
In this view the background knowledge to a new theory would 
contain not all previously known facts which it explains but 
only those which played a role in its construction.®
Thus Zahar [1973, pplOl-2] argued that Galileo's experiments on free 
fall supported Newton's theory of gravitation, the facts of the 
procession of the perihelion of Mercury supported the general theory of 
relativity, and the results of the Michelson-Morley experiment supported 
special relativity despite the fact that all of these results were known 
to the scientific world before the publication of the theories which 
explained them. If this evidence were to be discounted confirmation would 
thereby be made very hard. Zahar makes the point that Lakatos watered 
down his approach in the 1970 paper on MSRP by claiming that some known 
facts may be turned into novel ones in the light of the new theory. Thus 
he argued that while Balmer's discovery that hydrogen lines obey a 
formula predated the work of Bohr, Bohr succeeded in turning the formula 
into a novel fact by connecting it with the energy levels of the electron 
in the hydrogen atom. Lakatos justifies this on the grounds that there 
can be no '"observational level" untainted by theory, and impervious to 
theoretical change' [1970, pl56]. The danger with this approach as Zahar 
[1973, pl02] points out is that new theories would then always be able to 
reinterpret old facts, however trivial, as novel predictions. 
Confirmation, Zahar argues, is now made too easy.
® Musgrave [1974, ppl3-14] initially argued that this would make
empirical support a person-relative affair in that two scientists may 
introduce the same theory which was supported differently in each case, 
because each used it to explain different facts. Worrall replied that 
this was a reasonable anxiety stemming from the occasional use by Zahar 
of the format - 'a theory is not supported by the facts it was devised to 
explain' (see Worrall [1978, p51]). Worrall argued however that the
important point was whether or not the fact was used in the construction 
of the theory. This he claimed was capcü^le of being decide objectively by
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There have been a number of other contributions to this 
debate but at present the Worrall definition is taken to be 
the standard Lakatosian usage.? Thus the Lakatosian MSRP as 
modified by Zahar-Worrall argues that theoretical progress 
will be made if the research programme continues to produce 
'novel facts' - predictions not used in the construction of 
the theory - and empirical progress if these facts are 
intermittently supported by empirical evidence. The strengths 
of this approach are that it is in line with actual behaviour 
- existing experimental evidence is often used to support new 
theories - and yet it also prevents the same facts being used 
to both construct and test a theory.
Hands [1985, 1990] has criticized the application of the 
Lakatosian approach to economics, focusing in particular on 
the production of novel facts as a criterion of progress. He 
points out [1985, p4] that according to Lakatos, 'a general 
definition of science thus must reconstruct the 
acknowledgedly best gambits as 'scientific': if it fails to 
do so it must be rejected" [Lakatos, 1971a, pl24]. If one 
employs the Zahar-Worral definition of factual novelty as a 
criterion of progress. Hands argues [1985, pp7-10], the best 
gambits in economics, notably Keynesian economics, would fail 
the test of progrèssivity and therefore be regarded as not
a logical analysis of the theory and of the research programme which 
produces it and this was accepted by Musgrave [1978, pl86].
? More recently Gardner [1982, ppl-15] has put forward another
definition of factual novelty - a fact is novel if it was unknown to the 
person who constructed the theory at the time. This would appear to be an 
entirely subjective and person-relative approach for how can one judge 
what the individual knew at any time? No amount of detailed analysis of 
publications, notebooks, diaries, or correspondence could enable one to 
make such judgments. Also as Carrier [1988, p210] points out, were two 
scientists to put forward the same hypothesis on the basis of the same 
evidence, the scientist who knew less would be regarded as the more 
praiseworthy, see also Lawson [1985, pp393-407] for a recent defence of a 
purely logical approach to confirmation.
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scientific. In arguing this case Hands [1985, p8] disputes 
Blaug's claim [Blaug, 1976, pl64] that the Keynesian
revolution can be seen as an instance of the replacement of a 
degenerating research programme by a progressive one with 
excess empirical content. Blaug's main contention had been 
that the principal novel prediction of the Keynesian research 
was 'the chronic tendency of competitive market 
economies to generate unemployment' [1976, pl62]. Hands
argued that unemployment could not count as a novel fact 
because it would have been used in the construction of the 
theory.® However as Blaug [1990a, pp97-101] notes, and Hands 
[1990,pp76—77] concedes, there were other examples of novel 
facts in Keynes' work, in particular the notion that the 
value of instantaneous multiplier is greater than one.* In 
Lakatosian terms then, Keynesian economics - one of 
economics' best gambits - was progressive and therefore 
scientific.
Having conceded this much Hands then goes on to deny the
general relevance of assessing economics terms of the
Lakatosian concept of progress:
Why^ should we want to accept the position that the sole necessary 
condition for ^ scientific progress is predicting novel facts not used in 
the construction of the theory? Surely humankind's greatest scientific 
accomplishments have amounted to more than this. We in economics and 
those in every other branch of science choose theories because they are
Ahonen [1989, p263] raises an interesting question: when referring to 
a fact being used in the construction of a theory, should 'theory' be 
taken to mean both the explanans and the explanandum? If one were simply 
referring to the explanans alone, then unemployment could be argued to be 
a novel fact, in that it is part of the explanandum. However, the Zahar— 
Worral definition must, I think, be read as referring to both the 
explanans and explanandum. See also Ahonen [1990 pp94-101], on the Hands 
- Blaug debate.
* Other novel facts in Keynes' work, Blaug points out, are the 
Predictions that the marginal propensity to consume varies according to 
household income, that the interest—elasticity of investment is very low, 
that the interest-elasticity of the demand for money is very high and 
that the community's average propensity to consume tends to decline as 
national income rises [1990a, p99].
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deeper, simpler, more general, more operational, explain known facts 
better, are more corroborated, are more consistent with what we consider 
to be deeper theories: and for many other reasons. Even if we can find a 
few novel facts here and there in the history of economics, and even if 
those novel facts seem to provide an occasional 'clincher', the history 
of great economics is so much more than a list of these novel facts" 
[1985, p78].
As Blaug [1990, pl04] notes. Hands seems here to have moved 
from a critique of novel facts and MSRP, to an attack on 
MHRP. Moreover, Hands' view of intellectual history is that 
scientific change and development occur for essentially 
arbitrary reasons - any number of factors can be put forward, 
all of which are equally true. The history of the wages fund 
doctrine presents powerful evidence against this view. One 
could argue that the wages fund doctrine was, in its day, 
great economics - it was simple and very general. These 
categories, however, provide no way of explaining why this 
successful doctrine was ultimately abandoned. It cannot be 
said that it was refuted and recanted because there was a 
more simple or more general theory to hand; on the contrary 
the doctrine was not immediately abandoned because there was 
no alternative theory to hand, a point which reinforces a 
Lakatosian view. The reason why the wages fund doctrine was 
vulnerable to refutation in the 1860s was that, having made 
theoretical progress in the 1830s and 1840s, it ceased to do 
so in the 1850s and was degenerating in Lakatosian terms from 
then on. Factual novelty then, explains both the progress and 
the decline of the wages fund doctrine in a way that other 
notions of simplicity or generality cannot. I will now turn 
to the question of theoretical progress, returning to the 
issue of degeneration and recantation in chapters six and 
seven.
5: Theoretical Progress and Novel Facts 169 
III Classical Wage Theory, Novel Facts and Progress
In this section I will explore the extent to which the 
Classical wage theory research programme made theoretical 
progress according to the Lakatos criteria as modified by 
Zahar-Worrall • I will also briefly examine the extent to 
which any novel facts produced by the research programme 
received empirical support. The greater part of this section 
focuses on the wages fund doctrine in its short run and two 
period forms which were more productive of novel facts, 
although bereft of empirical support. By comparison the long 
run doctrine produced only a few novel facts but it was 
ultimately more theoretically robust.
1. The Wages Fund Doctrine: Short Run and Two Period 
Analyses
A large number of novel facts^® were produced by the wages
fund doctrine in its short run and two period forms. These
are listed here before discussing each of them in turn:
(a) Strike action to increase wages will not benefit 
the working class.
(bl) The introduction of machinery, the construction of 
which uses labour previously employed in the wage goods 
sector, will reduce the general wage rate.
(b2) The introduction of 'animated machines', or fixed 
capital in the form of horses and working cattle which 
consume the same goods as workers will reduce the 
general wage rate.
(b3) The introduction of machinery, with the exception 
of the two cases above, will either increase or leave 
unaltered the general wage rate.
I® The prediction that the wage rate is determined by dividing a 
predetermined wages fund by a given supply of labour is part of the hard 
core itself. Any attempt therefore to use the wage rate to confirm the 
theoretical or empirical progress of the theory is ruled out on two 
grounds. First, it is ruled out according to Zahar-Worrall because it was 
used in the construction of the theory, and secondly it is ruled out 
because it is part of the hard core and this is not to be tested 
according to the negative heuristic of the programme.
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(c) The demand for commodities is not the demand for 
labour.
(d) All acts of investment by capitalists involving 
transfers of expenditure from unproductive consumption 
to the employment of workers will benefit either the 
income or employment levels of the workers.
(el) War loans raised at the expense of the wages fund 
will lead to lower wages in the short run if the loan is 
used to pay for foreign soldiers.
(e2) War loans raised at the expense of the wages fund 
will not reduce the wage rate if the loan is spent on 
soldiers recruited from the domestic pool of productive 
labour.
(f) Landlord absenteeism will not reduce the employment 
level or wage rate of the working class.
(g) Imports will not reduce domestic employment.
(h) The general level of wages cannot be permanently 
altered by changes in demand.
(11) Higher prices as a result of higher overseas demand 
may lead to a higher average wage rate.
(12) Higher prices as a result of some restrictive 
practices will not raise the average wage rate.
( j ) Minimum wage policy with government support can 
raise the average wage rate in the short run.
I will now turn to the first and possibly the most
controversial of these predictions.
(a) Strike action to increase wages will not benefit the
working class.
Taussig quite rightly argued in Wages and Capital
[1896, pp239-240] that the major Classical writers did not
use the wages fund doctrine to attack trades unions but
tended to focus their attention on the population question
when applying wage theory to policy matters. Yet J S Mill
recanted from the wages fund specifically on the grounds that
the theory could be used that way, arguing that:
"the doctrine hitherto taught by all or most economists (including 
myself), which denied it to be possible that trade combinations can raise
wages, this doctrine is deprived of its scientific foundation, and
must be thrown aside" [1869, p517].
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Mill's point here is of course not counterevidence to Taussig 
because Mill does not say that economists actually used the 
wages fund doctrine to argue against unions, merely that the 
doctrine contained a prediction that trade combinations 
cannot raise wages. With regard to his own earlier approach 
as I argued earlier, Mill had made a qualified statement in 
Book V, chapter X of the Principles on government 
intervention:
"If they [the multitude of workers] could do so [combine effectually], 
they might doubtless succeed in diminishing the hours of labour, and 
obtaining the same wages for less work. But if they aimed at obtaining 
actually higher wages than the rate fixed by demand and supply - the rate 
which distributes the whole circulating capital among the entire working 
population - this could only be accomplished by keeping a part of their 
numbers unemployed" [1848, CW, II pp929-30].I^
While this makes the point about the futility of attempts by 
combinations to raise wages and employs the wages fund in 
doing so. Mill's purpose in this chapter is to argue against 
combination laws, and he argues that union activity to raise 
wages is legitimate if this succeeds in bringing wages up to 
the market level.
Why then the concern with the use or potential use of the 
doctrine in a more hostile fashion against the trades unions? 
The answer lies in the use made of the doctrine and Classical 
wage theory in general by popularizers of political economy. 
The role played by political economy in this respect must be 
seen as part of a larger and older struggle for the hearts 
and minds of what Webb [1955] has referred to as the British 
working class reader. Since the end of the eighteenth
II See above pl29.
12 Mill made only a very minor change to this passage in the 1871 
edition following the recantation. See below p317.
13 For a discussion of the emergence of a literate working class in the
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century the authorities had been engaged in a struggle to 
limit the influence and impact of the working class and 
radical p r e s s . D u r i n g  the 1820s there was increased 
emphasis on the need for working class education. This 
education was not to be aimed at stimulating the analytical 
or critical skills of the workers but rather to help them to 
understand that social harmony was both possible and 
desirable, that their own ends were served by appropriate 
moral behaviour, and generally to calm and reassure. 
Political economy had an important role in all of this. While 
politics as such were perceived as dangerous territory on 
which to engage the workers, political economy was seen as 
more 'neutral', as a body of 'scientific' or 'natural' laws
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century see Webb [1955] especially 
chapter one.
The end of the eighteenth century witnessed a tremendous surge of 
political literature aimed at the increasingly literate working class. 
Radical groups in London and other cities met to press for reform and 
encouraged their members to read, circulate and purchase books and 
pamphlets. Tom Paine's Rights of Manrl791/2l was a major source of 
inspiration and this had sold two hundred thousand copies by 1793. 
Radical pamphlets, penny sheets, and books were produced in large numbers 
and this produced the inevitable government reaction. Individuals were 
prosecuted for libel and legislation was enacted in the late 1790s 
limiting the holding of meetings and in other ways restricting the 
activity of radical groups. Conservative interests also counter-attacked 
by encouraging and supporting the production of anti-reformist tracts. 
Repression seemed to have the desired effect and there was less radical 
literature produced during the first decade of the nineteenth century. 
The Luddite troubles of 1811-12 and the Napoleonic Wars brought renewed 
anxieties and further legislation restricting the press. See Webb[1955, 
pp38-59, Aspinall [1949, ppl52-153], and Thomson [1980, pp60-62, ppll7- 
118, and pl55].
At the beginning of the post-Napoleonic period political economy was 
popularized to the middle classes only, with the intention that some of 
the 'truths' of the subject would trickle down from the middle classes 
through the school system. Perhaps the oldest and certainly the boldest 
attempt to popularize during this period was the work of Marcet[1816] 
which I have already examined (see above pplOl-104). Jane Marcet 
explicitly addresses the question of political economy for the working 
classes within one of her conversations. The ubiquitous Mrs B argues that 
one solution to the population problem was a 'general diffusion of 
knowledge, which would excite greater attention in the lower classes to 
their future interests'. A rather shocked Caroline proclaims - 'but 
surely you would not teach political economy to the labouring classes, 
Mrs B?'. 'No' Mrs B replies 'but I would endeavour to give the rising 
generation such an education as would render them not only moral and 
religious, but industrious, frugal, and provident' [1816, pl58].
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about which the working classes should know something. Thus 
there was a determined and concerted effort on the part of 
the educated middle and upper middle classes to awaken the 
working class or its teachers to the 'truths' of political 
economy and their significance for working class behaviour 
and attitudes • In addition to the message contained in 
popular books and novelizations of political economy, there 
was also a sustained attempt to inculcate the working class 
in the ways of political economy in the lectures at the 
Mechanics' Institutes,I® addresses at other public 
gatherings. Numerous articles arguing against trade 
combinations and strikes were written by journalists and 
others in newspapers, pamphlets and journals. This effort was 
9^ven extra stimulus by the anti—capitalist critiques of the 
Ricardian Socialists from the mid—1820s onward, i* By the mid—
the early days of the Mechanics' Institute movement there was 
considerable optimism that the 'truths' of political economy could be 
separated from political debate, and presented in the form of lectures, 
broadsheets and manuscript lectures, see Harrison [1961, pp79-83].
The case for working class education particularly with respect to
theory was made most forcefully by James Simpson in the Necessity of 
Popular—Education as a National obiect 1834, where he argued, referring 
to the striking labourer, that "Education alone will make it clear to 
him, that it is in vain for the labourers to expect, in a market where 
their numbers exceed the demand, to succeed ultimately in the object of a 
strike. Strike they must, in another sense, in the conflict, and then 
they will find that they have reduced the amount of the capital which 
alone can employ and maintain them, and that fewer hands can be engaged 
at the same wages, or else lower wages than those that induced the stop, 
must be taken by the same number" [1834, p22].
I® Brougham along with others set up the The Society for the Diffusion 
of Useful Knowledge in 1826 with the expressed aim of imparting 'useful 
knowledge' by means of regular publications made available to reading 
societies and Mechanics' Institutes. The ground to be covered was to be 
natural philosophy, ethics, political philosophy, history, and biography. 
While Brougham's initial vision seems to have included politics as part 
the subject matter to be disseminated by the society, in fact the 
Society's publications such as the Penny Magazine avoided political 
issues, and politics and even newspapers were excluded from Mechanics' 
Institutes.
15 The work of Hodgskin and others, together with the agricultural 
disturbances of 1830, prompted Jane Marcet, Harriet Martineau and others 
to increase their efforts in the early 1830s. Any reticence on Marcet's 
part about addressing the working classes was now abandoned. In the
5: Theoretical Progress and Novel Facts 174 
1860s then, the frequent outcries concerning the futility of 
strikes were bolstered by the tenets of political economy, 
popularized, vulgarized, used and abused, explicitly or 
implicitly in a whole range of material directed at the 
working classes. It was against this background and at the 
time of rapidly changing attitudes to trades unions that Mill 
made his recantation.
But what was it that was being promulgated by all this 
frenetic activity? The prediction as I have stated it at the 
heading to this section is very general and capable of a 
number of more specific interpretations. For example, is it 
meant to refer to all workers or just to productive or 
unproductive workers? Does the reference to the benefit of 
the workers refer to the standard of living of a particular 
group of workers or to that of all workers ; or is it a 
reference to the share of productive workers, unproductive 
workers or all workers in the national income? The wages 
fund doctrine has often been interpreted as a theory which 
does explain the share of labour in the national product, but 
it was also often employed when discussing the behaviour of 
individual capitalists. Indeed Mill's approach in the 
recantation lays emphasis on the individual employer. The 
McCulloch version of the doctrine, rationally reconstructed, 
in fact resolves all these difficulties. If the wages fund 
represents a fixed predetermined fund of real wage goods 
stored up and workers cannot consume anything other than 
these goods, then it matters little whether it is the
Preface to her John Hopkin's Notions of Political Economy published in 
1833 she indicated that the work was intended for the improvement of the 
lower classes [1833, pii].
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individual capitalist who is the subject of action or 
capitalists as a whole, for there are no more wage goods 
available at either level. If an individual capitalist gave 
more to a particular group of workers some other group would 
get less. If capitalists gave more money to the working class 
as a whole rising prices would perfectly offset the gains. 
Move away from this more limited 'rigid' theory, cast doubt 
on the lemma implicitly adopted by McCulloch and these 
consequences for the working class cannot be predicted. This 
was the message of the recantation.
Having said all of this and although it has been argued 
that the basic ideas of political economy including Classical 
wage theory played an important role in the ideology of 
capitalism,^® clear examples of the use of the short run 
wages fund doctrine to discourage strikes are s c a r c e . T h e r e
See Webb [1955, ppl37-158], Frazer [1974, ppl67-184] and Clements 
[1961-62, pp94-96]. The Economist newspaper played a leading role in 
promoting laissez-faire, employing the wages fund analysis in the 
process: '..it will only be as capital increases that wages can rise and 
the employed be prosperous'[ 18th June 1853]. In December of the same year 
a crude harvest model is employed by the Economist to argue against 
strikes; thus it is claimed that a union 'could not increase by a single 
grain the produce of last harvest, on which the quantity of food and the 
real wages to be distributed amongst the people is determined' [3rd 
December, 1853]. in its literature columns The Economist also strongly 
supported the popularization of political economy by Martineau, Ellis and 
others; see Scott Gordon [1955, pp461-488].
21 References to the futility of strikes and wage theory are to be found 
in the work of novelists such as Charles Dickens and Elizabeth Gaskell 
but, not unexpectedly, these are not as developed or detailed as the 
treatments given by writers such as Marcet and Martineau who set out 
explicitly to novelize political economy, in the preface to Mary 
Barton[1848, p38] Gaskell admits her ignorance of political economy and 
explicit references to economic matters in the novel are few. However, as 
Dentith[1983, ppl93-195] argues, the novel's portrayal of suffering among 
the Manchester working class can be read as a critique of political 
economy. Justification for this reading is provided by Greg's review of 
Mary Barton in the Edinburgh Reviewr1849. pp402-435] where he attempts to 
counter some of the implications of the book with reference to economic 
arguments. In North and Southr18551 perhaps as a result of Greg's review 
Gaskell now makes use of wage theory in a scene where someone is 
recommended a book on the wages fund in order that they will realize that 
'wages find their own level'[1855, pp292-293]. See Dentith[1983 ppl91- 
199], and Sanders [1986, pp30-57], on political economy in the work of 
Dickens and Gaskell.
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are three good examples, however, in the review by Francis 
Jeffrey [1825] of McCulloch's Discourse [1824a], in Harriet 
Martineau's Illustrations of Political Economv [1832], and in 
William Ellis' Lessons on the Phenomena of Industrial Life 
and the Conditions of Industrial Success [1854].
In a favourable review of McCulloch's A Discourse on the 
Rise, Progress, Peculiar Obiects and Importance of Political 
Economv [1824a], in the Edinburgh Review for November 1825, 
Jeffrey made a powerful case for the dissemination of the 
ideas of political economy to the working classes. Having 
argued that the upper classes must become more aware of 
political economy he went on to claim that 'it is still more 
emphatically true, that the lower orders will never be either 
contented, or tranquil, or comfortable, till they are also 
generally imbued with some at least of its most important 
doctrines' [1825, pl5]. The greatest misery, Jeffrey argued, 
arose from excessive population and in discussing this he 
made use of the predetermined wages fund doctrine and went on 
to apply it to the question of trades unions and strikes. He 
pointed out that income generated by capitalists was used 
either for their own consumption or it was allocated to the
maintenance of workers. He went on to argue that:
"The amount of both portions is limited; and, therefore, it is quite 
plain, that there is at any one time no more than a definite amount of 
wealth or subsistence to be expended in paying for the labour of those 
who have nothing but their labour to offer in return for it. It is 
equally plain that the labourers will always get the whole of this among 
them, but that they can never get any more; and, therefore, it follows as 
a necessary consequence, that the shares or wages of each will be greater 
or smaller, according to the proportion which their numbers bear to the 
actual amount of this capital" [1825, pl3].
The italics in this passage are Jeffrey's own, and this makes 
it clear that he is concerned to underline the predetermined 
nature of the wages fund doctrine. Jeffrey then applies the
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argument to the trades unions who he claims have a role in 
helping to make the labour market work effectively, but who
cannot increase their share of output by industrial action:
"Combinations and strikes of work may be necessary, upon any variation of
circumstances, to bring things sooner to their proper level, - like 
shakes given to a clogged engine, or the jerks of a machine not working 
sweetly - but they never can affect the grand r e s u l t s ; [1825, pl4].
The only remedy for the misery of the workers, Jeffrey
concludes, is for them to diminish the supply of labour
[1825, pl4 ]. There is nothing in any of this chain of
argument Jeffrey claims 'which is not level to the capacity
of any intelligent artisan, and might not be brought home to
his entire and permanent conviction' [1825, pl4].
Harriet Martineau's tale 'The Manchester Strike', which 
was no. 7 in her Illustrations series,presents a very good 
example of the way in which Classical wage theory could be 
used in trying to persuade workers to change their 
behaviour^^. The discussion very skilfully employed the wages 
fund doctrine and long run wage theory, and was woven around 
the three forms of analysis - the short run, the two period
and the long run, which I outlined earlier. Moreover,
Martineau explicitly made use of the McCulloch argument 
relating to money funds and real funds but, unlike the
Classical writers, also went on to use the wages fund
analysis to argue that strikes are futile.
The context of the story is a wage reduction by some
capitalists in Manchester and the book begins with a not
22 Martineau's work was extremely successful. Sales have been estimated 
at 10,000 for the first volume of Illustrations. This compares well with 
the novels of Dickens, for example, which typically sold only 2,000 or 
3,000 copies. See Fletcher[1974, p370].
22 It is likely that Martineau's Unitarian upbringing conditioned much 
of her approach to her writing. Unitarians typically believed that 
economic laws were as firm as those natural laws of the chemist and the 
geologist. See Sanders[1986, p6].
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unsympathetic description of the impact of this on a worker 
and his f a m i l y . I n  giving advice to the workers, Wentworth, 
a sympathetic employer, makes use of the wages fund doctrine 
by relating to the men in condescending tones a parable about
Adam talking to his gardeners. Adam called to his workers :
" 'Come, my good fellows, work hard and you shall have your shares.' 'And 
sir,' said the men,' what are we to live upon while our fruit and 
vegetables are growing?' 'Why,' said Adam, 'instead of my sharing the 
fruit with you when it is grown, suppose you take your portion in 
advance, it may be a convenience to you and it is all the same thing to 
me.' So the men looked at the ground, and calculated how much digging 
there would be and then named their demand; not in silver money with king 
George's head upon it, but food and clothing and tools.
'Then at harvest time,' observed Gibson, 'the whole produce belonged to 
Adam? '
'Of course. The commodity was made up, like all commodities, of capital 
and labour: Adam's capital and the men's labour'"[1832, p35].
Here, then, is a very simple and clear wages fund argument.
Wage goods are advanced by the capitalist to the workers to
allow them to subsist through the harvest period at the end
of which the whole produce is rightly the property of the
capitalist - his capital is returned to him when the crop is
sold.^^ Martineau then gets Wentworth to develop his argument
by exploring what happens in following periods, and here is
an example of two period analysis as I described it above.
The workers and Adam make their bargain, the work is carried
out and the crop is sold. 'What happens next season? '
enquires one worker:
"Next season, twice the number of men came to ask for work in the same 
plot of ground. Adam told them that he had very little more wages to pay 
away than he had the year before, so that if they all wanted to work 
under him they must be content with little more than half what each had 
formerly earned"[1832, p36].
2^ See Blaug [1958, ppl29-139] for a discussion of 'The Manchester
Strike' and some of the other tales.
25 It is interesting that in this simple harvest model, tools are 
included in the advances to labour as they often were in the early 
discussion by Smith. See above ppl8-19.
25 See above p55.
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To this the men agreed hoping that things would improve, but 
the next year four times the number of workers appear and, 
although capital had increased a little, each man had not so 
much as one third the original wages. This increase in the 
number of workers occurs in subsequent years, and ultimately 
leads to dissatisfaction and a withdrawal of labour. This, 
however, only makes things even worse according to Wentworth. 
Only half the harvest comes up as a result of the turn-out or 
strike, and wages fall even lower than they were before. In 
the short run then the inexorable logic of the wages fund 
doctrine meant that if the labour supply increased from one 
discrete time period to another by an amount proportionately 
greater than the growth in capital available to pay wages, 
the wage rate must fall. The short run doctrine then is 
absolutely uncompromising; whatever Adam has set aside for 
wages is simply divided by the labour force to get the wage 
rate. This discussion of Adam and his workers is in the form 
of a two period analysis but the main aim, of course, is to 
make it absolutely clear that at any one time the average 
wage rate is determined by the amount set aside for wages 
divided by the labour force - a numerator divided by a 
denominator. The differing time periods and differing 
denominators are being used simply to drive home this point.
At the outset then in 'The Manchester Strike ' the 
discussion of wage theory was in terms of a simple harvest 
model of the wages fund where the analysis is in real terms. 
Later in the story the men raise with Wentworth the quantity 
of money wages, to which he replies that the level of money 
wages matters little:
"'If a penny a week would enable a man to buy all the necessaries for
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himself and his family, and if a pound would do no more, would it signify 
to any man whether his wages were a penny or a pound'"[1832 p56]?
To this one man. Clack, replies that every child knew that
the prices of bread and other things vary. Wentworth presses
home the point in a passage remarkably similar to the passage
in McCulloch's Principles discussed earlier
" 'Very well. Your concern is about how much bread and other things you 
get in return for your labour, and not how many shillings. Shillings are 
of no value to you but for what they buy. If half the money in the 
kingdom were to be carried off by fairies this night so that you could 
have only half your present nominal wages, you would be no worse off than 
at present. The same quantity of food and clothing would be in the 
market, and you would get as much for sixpence as you now get for a 
shilling. This is why I said the nominal amount of your wages mattered 
little. I said nothing about the real amount'"[1832, p57].
Once again then there is the argument very clearly presented,
that what is important for the worker is the quantity of wage
goods available at any one time. If the amount of money wages
is varied, wage goods prices will adjust to leave the worker
just as well off as before. Once again it is assumed in this
analysis that workers only consume wage goods and not
luxuries.
Despite Wentworth's efforts the strike goes ahead and 
later in the story Wentworth has another opportunity to 
impress upon the workers the importance and relevance of wage 
theory. Referring to the situation that will pertain at the 
end of the strike he argues that by then the wages fund will 
be wasted:
We have been consuming idly, and so have you; and there have must needs 
have been great waste.- And what is it which has thus been wasted? The 
fund which is to maintain you; the fund out of which your wages are paid. 
Your strike has already lasted long enough to change our ground of 
dispute. You will find that the question with the masters now is, whether 
fewer of you than before shall be employed at the same wages, or fewer 
still at higher wages, or as many as before at lower wages than you have 
yet received. Keep on your strike a little longer, and the question will 
be, how many less shall be employed, at how much less. Keep it on long 
enough, and the question will be entirely settled; there will be no wages 
for any body. Do you understand me"? [1832, pp97-98].
27 See above pl07.
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So here then the wages fund doctrine is being explicitly 
employed by Martineau to argue against strikes and as I have 
already argued,^® this was something that was in the main 
avoided by the major Classical economists, apart from Mill. 
Again, while this is not explicit, the analysis relates to 
two time periods. Wentworth is examining the impact of a 
strike during this period of employment and output, upon 
employment and wages in the next period. The main effect of 
the strike is to reduce output and revenue in the current 
period thereby returning less capital to the employers and 
reducing the likely future size of the wages fund. The wages 
fund, of course, could be maintained at its previous level in 
the next period but only by reducing other forms of capital 
outlay and this would ruin the business. This is made clear 
by Wentworth in a passage which follows the last. Here a 
worker argues that while strikes are bad, it is sometimes 
necessary to take no wages for a while in order to gain 
higher wages later. To this Wentworth replies :
"Why, that would be very true if you had the power or were in the habit 
of keeping workmen and wages in proportion to each other.
If the masters had more capital than was necessary to pay you all at 
the rate you have hitherto received, you might gain your point by a 
strike, not as you sometimes do now, just for a little time till the 
masters can shake themselves free of their engagement,- but permanently. 
But this not the case. The masters' capital does not return enough to pay 
you all at the rate you desire. If they are to keep their capital entire, 
you must either take less wages, or fewer of you must take wages at all. 
If you will all have the wages you desire, the capital which pays them 
wastes away, and ruin approaches" [1832, pp98-99].
This passage subtly, almost in passing, reinforces the point 
made earlier about the importance from the workers' point of 
view of being able to keep 'workmen and wages ' or labour and 
capital in proportion to each other. If under these 
circumstances employers were not allocating as much to wages
28 See above pp26-27.
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as they were able to do they could be made to do so by strike 
action. Here is an example of the argument which was quite 
common, that one beneficial role for trades unions is that 
they may enable the market rate of wages to be arrived at if 
for some reason the usual competitive mechanism is not 
working.^* It is quite possible that Martineau took this idea 
from McCulloch, who as we saw in chapter four had argued 
along similar lines.Wentworth then argues is that this is 
not actually the case in this instance; there is no surplus 
or unallocated part of the wages fund. If employers were 
still somehow forced to pay a higher rate of wages to all the 
men now employed capital will 'waste away'. This must mean 
that as a result of having to pay a bigger wages bill, 
employers will make reduced outlays on fixed capital, tools 
and materials with the result that the capital employed as a 
whole will be less productive leading to falling returns and 
declining profits.
Harriet Martineau was not against the existence of trade unions as 
this passage indicates, in 1834, the year of the Tolpuddle Martyrs, she 
produced The Tendency of strikes and Sticks to Produce Low Wages and in 
this volume she argued that workers must attempt to ascertain what the 
state of the market for their labour is and then consult with their 
fellows as to whether anything should be done. She went on: "If there is, 
all will act more effectually by acting together. If they are really 
oppressed by their masters, they will best resist oppression by being 
combined" [1834, p7]. However while Martineau concedes a legitimate role 
for trades unions and often portrays working men sympathetically in her 
work, she revealed a profound dislike and distrust for the behaviour of 
trades unions and trades unionists. Thus later in the book she produces 
an appalling picture of the violence and intimidation by unionists 
referring to 'some well-known dreadful cases of men being hunted, and 
whipped or stoned, or ducked, because they wished to sell their own 
labour at their own price..[and]. .wives being assaulted and cruelly 
treated by dastardly cowards who would thus get the husbands into their 
power'[1834, p21]. Again in Martineau's Moral of Manv Fables [1834]
unions are seen as providing opportunities for 'meddling and governing, 
for rioting, for idling, and tippling, ' and simple working men are 'made 
tools of by a few sharpers and idle busybodies' [1834, p56]. See Sanders 
[1986, pp35-38].
30 See above pp27-29.
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It is possible to see in these passages how a two period
analysis was employed to analyse the implications of strike
action for the levels of output and revenue, and the future
volume of the wages fund. The futility of strikes thus 
derives from the argument that in the immediate term there is 
no more to be had by the workers, and that, moreover, strike 
action taken between now and the next production cycle, may 
damage the employers ' ability to pay even the same rate as 
now. ^ I Martineau's work then represents a powerful
integration of Classical theory and fictional narrative. 
The outcome of the story is ultimately a victory for the 
power of popular political economy; the workers eventually 
return to work, persuaded by the logic of wage theory.
At the back of this discussion is the argument, at times more 
explicit than others, that although workers are powerless in the short 
run, the power to improve their lot does lie with them in the long run. 
Thus while Classical long run wage theory is not fully or clearly spelt 
out it is clearly implicit in Wentworth's argument that with 'foresight 
and care, labour may be proportioned to capital as accurately as my 
machinery to the power of my steam-engine' [1832, pp37-38]. Wentworth
goes on from there to argue that unfortunately when things are good for 
workers and wages are high they tend to respond by bringing up large 
families. The effects of this are not immediately felt, but when they are 
the workers often fail to associate the accompanying fall in wages with 
their actions a generation before. Wentworth goes on to draw the obvious 
moral lesson from this and in doing so comes close to spelling out the 
dynamics of the long run wage theory in arguing that the worker should 
"...do what in him lies to prevent population from increasing faster than
the capital which is to support it" [1832, pl04].
22 See Empson [1833, ppl-39] for a favourable contemporary review of the 
work^ of both Martineau and Marcet. Empson was convinced of the power of 
fictionalized political economy and praised Martineau's stories for their 
'poetry and their painting'[1833, p26]. The significance of the message 
in the 'Manchester strike ', was clearly seen and Empson argues as 
follows: "It is the object of the view from Manchester, to impress on the 
artisan no less valuable a truth; viz. that wages depend on the 
proportion between capital and labour; and that wages cannot be kept up,
whilst the number of labourers seeking to be employed is out of
proportion to the capital appropriated for their employment"[1833, p26].
22 written fiction was not the only form in which aspects of political 
economy were dramatized. Martineau's 'The Manchester strike' inspired at 
least two factory plays in the 1830s. One, the 'Factory Lad' by John 
Walker was produced at the Surrey theatre in October 1832; the other 'The 
Factory Strike ' was put on at the Royal Victoria in 1838. Both were 
influenced by Martineau's work, although Walker was critical of laissez 
faire economics, see S Vernon, "Trouble up at 'T" Mill: The Rise and 
Decline of the Factory Play in the 1830s and 1840s", Victorian Studies, 
vol. XX, no. 2, winter, 1977.
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Things were, of course, very different from this in 
reality. It seems likely that the trades unions throughout 
the nineteenth century as a whole took a very pragmatic and 
shrewd approach to political economy compared with the naive 
acceptance portrayed at the end of 'The Manchester Strike 
Sometimes they accepted the tenets of political economy if it 
suited their i n t e r e s t s , a t  other times they argued against 
Classical theory.
Ellis's argument is contained in a volume he wrote in 1854 
appropriately called Lessons on the Phenomena of Industrial 
Life and the Conditions of Industrial Success and aimed at 
'instructing all classes in a knowledge of the rights of 
labour and its remuneration'.^^ Ellis first lays out a wages 
fund approach in the chapter on 'Wages' arguing that '[w]hat 
we may term the sufficiency of wages must depend upon the 
amount of capital out of which wages are to be paid compared
24 J Don Miller[ 1940, ppl08-112] argued that the principles of the wage 
fund theory were generally unknown to the general public, trades 
unionists and their representatives. This argument appears to rest solely 
on the absence of theoretical references in the Report of the Royal 
Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Organisation and Rules of 
Trades Unions and Other Associations 1867-9. This is a misleading 
interpretation, however, for the commissioners explicitly stated that 
their intention was not to consider the scientific or economical aspects 
of the matter. See E M Winton's reply to Miller in Winton[1941, pp343- 
344].
25 See Grampp[1979, pp517-519], and Thompson[1980, pp567-569] on the
attitude of trades unionists to the arguments relating to the repeal of 
the Combination Laws. The secretary of the London Bookbinders, Thomas 
Dunning in his Trades' Unions and Strikes; Their Philosophy and 
Intention r186 01 accepted the wages fund doctrine and its implications - 
see Fraser[1974, pl71], and Biagini [1987, p818]. Biagini also argues 
that trades unionists continued to support the wages fund doctrine after 
Mill's recantation [1987, pp822-824].
25 see Fraser [1974, ppl73-175], and Clements [1961-2, ppl02-104] on
trades union rejection of the wages fund doctrine.
27 w Ellis, Lessons on the Phenomena of Industrial Life etc.[1854], 
preface by the Rev. Richard Dawes, Dean of Hereford, pvi. Ellis was a 
popular lecturer on political economy, lecturing at the London Institute, 
the London Mechanics Institute and the London Literary Guild. His 
lectures at the latter venue were probably used by Brougham as the basis 
of his well known lectures at the London Mechanics Institute. See Berg 
[1980, pl64].
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with the number of labourers'[1854, p48]. He later proceeds 
in a chapter on 'Combinations, Strikes and Lock-outs' to 
apply the logic of the rigid wages fund precisely and 
clearly:
"In a general combination of labourers to obtain higher wages, success is 
impossible, because the capital out of which the increased wages are to 
be drawn does not exist, in a partial combination no such impossibility 
presents itself, since the increased wages secured for some merely 
absorbs a larger share of the capital, leaving less to be distributed 
among others" [1854, p224].
Ellis goes on to draw out the moral lesson arguing the 'these 
reflections lead irresistibly to the conviction that strikes 
and lock-outs are much more than great evils - they are great 
mistakes'[1854, p231]* The interests of the working classes 
then lie with those of the capitalists - wages can only be 
increased if capital is increased.
These efforts of Martineau and Ellis are classic examples 
of prediction (a) - perhaps the most well known and
contentious implication of the wages fund doctrine although 
the prediction concerning machinery also aroused considerable 
debate. Prediction (a) was a novel fact according to Zahar-
Worrall although of course doubt must be cast on the extent
of empirical support. People continued to form and join 
trades unions, to claim higher wages and to engage in strikes 
and some of these activities must have brought at least short 
term gains. Strenuous efforts were made to persuade people to 
behave differently in the interests of themselves, of 
capitalism and of course ultimately in the interests of
making the theory perform better. Indeed if the function of 
the Lakatosian positive heuristic is to improve the
capability of a theory to make predictions and deal with 
anomalies then one might argue that in a social science like 
economics, attempts to popularize theories and thereby modify
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behaviour are part of that positive heuristic. Of course, a 
reverse causality is also a possibility. Thus I will argue in 
chapters six and seven that the continuation of strikes and 
the more firm establishment of trades unions in the 1860s may 
have persuaded Longe, Thornton and Mill to reconsider the 
validity of the wages fund doctrine.^*
(b) The Machinerv Question.
Nassau Senior in his Three Lectures on the Rate of Wages 
1830, having first laid out the basic wages fund doctrine 
goes on to 'warn the reader that this proposition is 
inconsistent with opinions which are entitled to 
consideration, some from the number, and others from the 
authority, of those who maintain them'[1830, pl8] and 
proceeded on to discuss seven of these. It is in discussing 
and rebutting these 'erroneous' opinions that the wages fund 
doctrine is used to produce some predictions which are ah 
initio candidates for the status of novel fact. Two of the 
predictions relate to the wage rate itself and are therefore 
ruled out by the Zahar-Worrall criterion^*. Of the remainder
Goldstrom[1985, p271] makes a similar point asserting that when 'the 
iron law of wages was revealed for the nonsense it was, the classical 
economists were forced back to the drawing board'.There are a number of 
difficulties with this however. First, Goldstrom does not discuss the 
process of debate through which this took place. Secondly, it is not 
clear that whether Goldstrom is referring to the short run wages fund 
doctrine or to long run wage theory. Thirdly, it is an overstatement to 
assert that the theory was revealed as a 'nonsense'; the important thing 
was that certain key elements of the wages fund doctrine were criticized 
and could no longer be sustained. Fourthly, the classical economists did 
not in fact return immediately to the drawing board but, in the absence 
of an alternative theory, seemed to hope that the existing theory could 
be amended to take account of the criticisms made of it. I will argue in 
chapters six and seven that a Lakatosian analysis is capable of remedying 
all of these weakness in Godstrom's account.
25 First Senior discusses the 'doctrine that the rate of wages depends 
on the proportion which the number of labourers bears to the amount of 
capital in a country'[1830, pl8], and secondly he considers the 
proposition that 'wages depend on the proportion borne by the number of 
labourers to the revenue of the society of which they are members'[1830, 
pl9]. These amount to quibbles about the precise definition of the wages 
fund doctrine, and senior reasserts the argument that the wage rate will
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perhaps the most important is the fourth listed - the 
'doctrine that the general rate of wages can, except in two 
cases, be diminished by the introduction of machinery' [1830, 
p36]. Senior argues that this proposition, except in the two 
cases listed, is inconsistent with the wages fund doctrine.
The first exception relates to the case where 'labour is
employed in the construction of machinery, which labour would
otherwise have been employed in the production of commodities
for the use of labourers'[1830, p37]. This is the proposition
in Ricardo's famous chapter XXXI 'On Machinery' which led to
so much discussion, and Senior acknowledges Ricardo as the
source. The second exception is where 'the machine itself
consumes commodities which would otherwise have been consumed
by labourers, and that to a greater extent than it produces
them'[1830, p30]. This case applies only to horses and
working cattle which Senior termed 'animated machines'[1830,
p41]. In all other cases, according to Senior, the use of
machinery must 'either raise the general rate of wages, or
leave it unaltered'[1830, p43]. In essence then there are
three propositions here, all of which are predictions from
the wages fund doctrine and I will argue are novel facts
according to the Zahar-Worrall criteria:
b(i) The introduction of machinery, the construction of 
which uses labour previously employed in the wage goods 
sector, will reduce the general wage rate.
b(ii) The introduction of 'animated machines', or fixed 
capital in the form of horses and working cattle, which 
consume the same goods as workers, will reduce the 
general wage rate.
b(iii) The introduction of machinery, with the exception 
of the two cases above, will either increase or leave 
unaltered the general wage rate.
only depend on 'the extent of the fund for the maintenance of labourers, 
compared with the numbers of labourers to be maintained'[ 1830, pl8].
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With regard to the first of these propositions Ricardo's 
work is the starting point for this and for the fierce debate 
which e n s u e d . A s  Berg[1980] has argued, Ricardo's overall 
view of machinery was favourable. His case in chapter XXXI 
prompted by the work of Barton [1817] was that machinery may 
be harmful but 'tempered only the positive force of his
policy proposals on technical change'[Berg, 1980, p73]. His 
overall positive view was that machinery was useful - it 
could cheapen production and offset the effects of population 
growth, rising wages and falling profits.^I
Ricardo's apparent 'change of mind' in chapter XXXI, added 
in 1821,^^ has been attributed to the influence of John
Barton^^ who published a pamphlet in 1817 entitled
40 see Davis [1989, pp457-480] for a discussion of the philosophical and 
methodological foundations of Ricardo's chapter and its impact on 
distribution.
In the chapter on machinery added to the Principles in 1821 Ricardo 
admitted that he had given support to erroneous doctrines but had not 
previously published anything on the matter. In fact he refers to the 
effect of machinery in the Essay on Profits [1815] where he criticizes 
Malthus for suggesting that low corn prices resulting from free trade in
corn will harm the working classes. On the contrary, he argues that the
effects would be nearly the same as the effects of improved machinery 
which' has a decided tendency to raise the real wages of labour'[1815, 
p35]. According to Hollander in The Economics of David Ricardof1979, 
p348] what Ricardo had in mind here was that the yield on capital would 
rise with the use of improved machinery and this would provide the means 
for further accumulation which would then absorb the displaced workers. 
He also points out that Ricardo took a similar line in correspondence 
with Malthus in 1815: "In the case of great improvements in machinery, - 
capital is liberated for other employments and at the same time the 
labour necessary for those employments is also liberated, - so that no 
demand for additional labour will take place unless the increased 
production in consequence of the improvement should lead to further 
accumulation of capital, and then the effect on wages is to be ascribed 
to the accumulation of capital and not to the better employment of the 
same capital" [1815, VI, p228]. Ricardo's reference to earlier 'support 
to doctrines which I now think erroneous' in chapter XXXI probably refers 
to comments he made in Parliament on Robert Owens ' view of machinery 
where again Ricardo refused to allow that the demand for labour might be 
reduced (see Hollander [1979, p348n]).
42 Page references to the 1821 chapter XXXI are to volume I of the Works 
and Correspondence of David Ricardo, CUP, 1951.
42 See for example Berg[1980, p66]. Ricardo commented favourably on 
Barton in chapter XXXI although, as Hoilander[1979, pp351-357] points 
out, Ricardo's own contribution in that chapter is analytically different 
to Barton's. In Barton's work the incentive to introduce new machinery is
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Observations on the Circumstances Which Influence the 
Condition of the Labouring Classes of Societv. In his example 
a capitalist has capital to the value of £20,000 in a joint 
business of farming and manufacturing. Of this amount £7,000 
is invested in fixed capital and £13,000 in circulating 
capital. The profit rate is assumed to be 10% yielding £2,000 
per year. Ricardo then employs a very simple wages fund 
formulation to make his prediction that the introduction of 
machinery will reduce employment. The first step in the
argument is to develop a simple wages fund model:
"Each year the capitalist begins his operations, by having food and 
necessaries in his position of the value of £13,000, all of which he 
sells in the course of the year to his own workmen for that sum of money, 
and, during the same period, he pays them the like amount of money for 
wages : at the end of the year they replace in his possession food and 
necessaries of the value of £15,000, £2,000 of which he consumes himself, 
or disposes of as may best suit his pleasure and gratification. As far as 
these products are concerned, the gross produce for that year is £15,000, 
and the net produce £2,000" [1821, pp388-389].
Here then the funds available to pay workers are 
predetermined in both money and real terms. A restructuring 
of capital now occurs as the labour of some of the men is 
used to produce a machiné and not food and necessaries. As a 
result of this less food and fewer necessaries are produced 
in the following period, and this reduces the level of 
employment. 44
Ricardo's chapter was an important contribution in a 
developing debate about the machinery question and it aroused 
immediate reaction. Among the first to respond was McCulloch
provided by a preceding wage rate increase. In Ricardo's chapter the 
analysis is concerned with autonomous changes in process - the 
composition of a given capital stock is altered such that a larger 
fraction is taken by fixed capital thus allowing for the employment of 
fewer men at the going wage rate.
44 Hollander [1979, pp367-373] points out that in a second example in 
chapter XXXI Ricardo presents a different case. Here once the machine is 
in operation it is labour saving, and the capitalist requires less food 
and necessaries leading to a reduction in output in farming. See Ricardo 
[1821, PP382-383].
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who having just changed his mind in favour of machinery as a 
result of Ricardo's earlier favourable arguments, was furious 
to discover that Ricardo had now shifted his position,4^  and 
accused him of surrendering to Malthus.45 Others were 
concerned to show the special nature of Ricardo's case and to 
deny its importance. William Ellis in an article in the 
Westminster Review in 1826 argued that the strongest case 
against machinery is where it is constructed using capital 
formerly devoted to wages (the Ricardo case) and here wages 
could only be temporarily reduced. 47 But he goes on to 
dispute even this possibility on the grounds that the 'the 
additional capital devoted to the construction of a new 
machine is not drawn from the fund to which the labourers
45 Mcculloch's change of view is outlined in a letter to Ricardo written 
on 13 March 1821. Less than three months later he wrote again complaining 
of Ricardo's volte-face, see Hollander [1979, p359 and 369].
45 Ricardo replied that Malthus feared machinery because he was 
concerned ^ that the Increased output it produced would not be sold, 
whereas his objection was that the use of machinery would reduce gross 
output and therefore the ability to employ workers. Hollander points out 
that Ricardo was not being fair to Malthus here for Malthus in the
Principles— o^ Political Economy [1820, pp425n] had constructed a case
against machinery along the lines later employed by Ricardo, where the 
composition of a given capital stock was being altered by a shift from 
circulating to fixed capital. In fact if one accepts Hollander's view 
that Barton's contribution differed from Ricardo's in that Barton's 
analysis was predicated on an earlier wage rate change, then Malthus has 
a claim to be the originator of Ricardo's chapter XXXI position. See 
Hollander [1979, p367].
4y Ellis ^ argued that reductlo ad absurdum is usually sufficient to 
dispense with the case against machinery; "if the use of machinery is 
calculated to diminish the fund out of which the labourers are supported, 
then by giving up the use of the plough and the harrow and returning to 
the pastoral state, or by scratching the earth with our nails, the 
produce of the soil would be adequate to the maintenance of a much 
greater number of labourers" [1826, pl02]. However, he argues, there are 
still some who take a middle course and assert that machinery while 
generally beneficial can be harmful in some cases. Ricardo, an 
'enlightened philosopher', is distinguished from the 'vulgar objectors' 
to machinery but Ellis makes it clear that he finds Ricardo's argument 
'inconclusive', Westminster Review, Vol. V, No. IX, January 1826, pl02. 
Thomas Chalmers took a similar view and also made use of the wages fund 
doctrine, arguing that the adverse effects on employment will only be 
temporary; "...however the demand may vary or be lessened for particular 
kinds of work, the fund, out of which the wages come, is left unimpaired" 
[1832, p475].
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have to look for support' but from fresh savings[1820, pll6]. 
Torrens in a whole chapter on this topic in his 1834 volume 
On Wages and Combinations made essentially the same point 
denying that workers employed in producing wage goods are 
ever 'withdrawn from these occupations for the purposes of 
constructing machines'[1834, p41].
The debate ranged far wider than the leading political 
economists of the day. The advent of machinery was of 
tremendous significance to ordinary working people who 
resisted its arrival in many ways including machine breaking 
and riots. Major disturbances occurred in Lancashire in 1826 
as a result of a financial crash and the violence in the 
manufacturing districts was directed towards machinery. This 
outbreak prompted numerous calls for the spread of knowledge 
about political economy and machinery among the working
class.42
There were further riots related to the introduction of 
agricultural machinery in the rural areas of southern England 
in 1830 and this generated renewed concern about the need to 
educate workers in the 'truths' of political economy 
concerning machinery and w a g e s . 45 indeed these riots provided 
the initial impetus for Senior's discussion in his Three 
Lectures on the Rate of Wages 1830.
45 See Berg[1980, ppl02-106]. McCulloch attributed opposition to
technical progress to an ignorance of political economy in A Discourse on 
the Rise, Progress, Peculiar obiects and Importance of Political Economy 
[1824, p84].
45 The riots stimulated Martineau to attack machine-breaking in her 
second tale The Hill and the Valiev in 1832. The Society for the 
Diffusion of useful Knowledge published An Address to the Labourers, on 
the Subject of Destroying Machinery[18301 which sold in large numbers. 
This was followed by Results of Machinerv[18311 written for the S.D.U.K. 
by Charles Knight. See Webb[1955, pll2-122].
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Prediction b(i) then had a complex origin and a 
controversial history with disagreement among the Classical 
economists who were as anxious as others were to persuade the 
working classes to accept the changes now upon them. In 
considering this proposition as an exception to an opinion 
inconsistent with the wages fund doctrine Senior spells out a 
similar example to Ricardo's with different numbers where at 
the end of the production period the wages fund is diminished 
and wages have fallen. Senior does not deny this result in 
fact but first attempts to make the reader clear as to its 
precise implications:
"The vulgar-error on this subject supposes the evil to arise, not from 
its true cause, the expense of constructing the machine, but from the 
productive powers of that machine"[1830, p38].
Senior then argues that while it was necessary to 'state this 
possible evil as a part of the theory of machinery' he did 
not attach any 'practical importance' to it [1831, p39]. This 
was because most machinery was constructed from profits or 
rents and led eventually to an Increase in output and he 
cites the printing and cotton industries as examples here 
[1830, p40]. He then argues that there has never been an
instance of the 'evil' outcome occurring.
This general line of argument was adhered to by J S Mill 
in the Principles of Political Economv 1848 although he gave 
much more theoretical support to Ricardo's case. Mill 
discussed this issue not in the context of potential 
counterarguments to wage theory, but in Book I chapter VI 
which was specially devoted to the relationship between 
circulating and fixed capital. Here Mill constructs an 
example very similar to Ricardo's original - a person farms 
his own land employing a capital of two thousand quarters of
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corn. There is initially no fixed capital and the investment 
yields him twenty percent ie. four hundred quarters at the 
end of the year. In one particular year the farmer uses half 
his workforce to make a permanent improvement to the land. 
Now at the end of the year the employer has only one thousand 
quarters in capital to dispose of plus the improvement (the 
profits of four hundred quarters having been taken by himself 
and his family) and therefore can continue to employ only 
half the workers. This is precisely the Ricardo case and Mill 
is convinced of the harm it will do to the interests of the 
working class. 0^
Mill goes on to vary the example and now makes the 
assumption that the improvement does not displace labour but 
requires the original workforce and will produce a greater 
output all of which will be sold:
"The improver in that case will require the same number of labourers as 
before, at the same wages. But where will he find the means of paying 
them? He has no longer his original capital of two thousand quarters 
disposable for the purpose. One thousand of them are lost and gone - 
consumed in making the improvement. If he is to employ as many labourers 
as before, and pay them as highly, he must borrow, or obtain from some 
other source, a thousand quarters to supply the deficit. But these 
thousand quarters already maintained, or were destined to maintain, an 
equivalent quantity of labour. They are not a fresh creation; their 
destination is only changed from one productive employment to another; 
and though the agriculturalist has made up the deficiency in his own 
circulating capital, the breach in the circulating capital of the 
community remains unrepaired"[1848, CW, II, p95].
Here then the relentless logic of the rigid real wages fund 
formulation is being used to drive home Ricardo's point.
He concedes that if the improved land with the aid of only half the 
labour force subsequently produced the whole two thousand four hundred 
quarters 'the loss will be made up'[1848, CW II, p94]. But this is 
unlikely, he argues, for the farmer would have gained largely if the land 
were now to yield only one thousand five hundred quarters. This would 
represent a substantial increase in the profit rate from twenty to 
twenty-five percent on the whole capital and yet there would still be a 
reduction in the funds available to employ workers.
Pigou also argued that Mill's treatment of machinery represented a 
logical application of the wages fund doctrine. See Pigou [1949] in 
Rima[1970, ppl04-105].
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Ceteris paribus, the real wages fund has been diminished by 
the transfer of effort from wage good production to land 
improvement and no recourse to loose talk of obtaining the 
money elsewhere can skirt round this fact.
While Mill develops this argument in the context of a 
small example in agriculture he goes on to apply it 
hypothetically to technological advances in printing and in 
cotton manufacture, examples to which Senior had earlier 
favourably referred. Thus for example while the inventions of 
Hargreaves and Arkwright had led to very large amounts of 
circulating as well as fixed capital being employed in cotton 
manufacture the working classes may still have suffered as a 
result:
"But if this capital was drawn from other employments; if the funds which 
took the place of the capital sunk in costly machinery, were supplied not 
by any additional saving consequent on the improvements, but by drafts on 
the general capital of the community; what better were the labouring 
classes for the mere transfer? In what manner was the loss they sustained 
by the conversion of circulating to fixed capital made up to them by a 
mere shifting of part of the remainder of the circulating capital from 
its old employments to a new one"?[1848, CW, II, p96].
Mill then is adamant that in principle in all cases where
machinery is constructed at the expense of circulating
capital, the workers will s u ffer.^2 However he goes on to say
that in fact this is not likely to happen because
improvements are usually very gradual and 'are made by the
employment of the annual increase'[1848, CW, II, p97]. It is
in the context of this conclusion that one can be sure that
^2 In this section of the chapter Mill also went on to dismiss the 
argument that workers made redundant in one trade as a result of 
machinery would find employment elsewhere as a result of fresh additions 
to the wages fund generated by the savings to the consumer from lower 
product prices produced by the new equipment. This was an argument put 
forward by senior, and Mill disputed it on the grounds that the demand 
for commodities is not the demand for labour[1848, CW, II, p96]. I will 
return to this in considering Senior's discussion of prediction b(iii).
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the argument concerning the cotton industry was a 
hypothetical and not an empirical one.
I have argued, then, that Ricardo's original approach, far 
from withering under the attacks upon it, received if 
anything stronger theoretical support at the hands of Mill 
over a quarter of a century later, although in terms of its 
empirical significance Mill was to agree with the line taken 
by Ellis, Torrens, and Senior.
The second prediction - b(ii) concerning the introduction 
of 'animated machines' in the form of horses and working 
cattle - also owes its origins to Ricardo's chapter XXXI. 
Ricardo argues that where wage goods are diverted to the 
support of horses then unless the income obtained as a result 
increased enough to allow the support of the workers as well, 
the labourers would become redundant and their 'condition 
would sink in the general scale' [1821, p386]. This
proposition attracted little attention and was put forward by 
Senior as an exception to the general rule that machinery was 
beneficial. That this proposition is a prediction from the 
wages fund doctrine can be seen from Senior's treatment where 
he argues that
"We will suppose a farmer to employ on his farm twenty men, who produce 
annually their own subsistence, and that of six other men producing 
commodities for the use of their master. If five horses, consuming, we 
will say, as much as eight men, could do the work of ten men, it would be 
worth the farmer's while to substitute them for eight of his men, as he 
would be able to increase the number of persons who work for his own 
benefit from six to eight. But after deducting the subsistence of the 
horses, the fund for the maintenance of labourers would be reduced from 
wages for twenty-six men to wages for eighteen. I cannot refuse to admit 
that such cases may exist, or to deplore the misery that must accompany 
them" [1831, p41].
In this example the wages fund is diminished and consequently 
the workers are made worse off. Senior, in contrast to the 
previous example, then argues that such cases have occurred
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in Ireland and 'are occasioning much of the distress of that 
country'[1831, p41]. However such consequences are only short 
term for after a short interval output will rise and:
"The fund for the maintenance of labourers now becomes increased from two 
different sources - partly from the increased efficiency of human labour 
when aided by that of horses and cattle, and partly from the results of a 
part of the human labour force set free by the substitution of 
brutes"[1831, p43].
Thus, Senior argues, while the short term consequences may be 
distressing, the employment of animals eventually will 
increase the means to employ labour.
Senior then proceeds to consider the third and final case 
concerning machinery - b(iii) . This is the proposition that 
with the exception of the two cases already discussed the use 
of machinery will either raise or leave unaltered the general 
rate of wages and here again the wages fund analysis is 
employed. Senior indicates very clearly that the case now 
being considered is one where machinery is applied to the 
production of goods which are not either directly or 
indirectly consumed by workers. The example is one taken from 
experience - a factory in Birmingham making corkscrews, and a 
machine enables output to increase by a factor of sixty. 
There is a problem of redeployment but the wages fund 
doctrine is used by Senior to show that the effects are 
eventually beneficial because the wages fund remains 
unchanged:
"As the use of corkscrews is limited, it is not probable that the demand 
for them has sufficiently increased to enable the whole number of 
labourers previously employed in their manufacture to remain so employed 
after such an increase in their productive power. Some of the corkscrew 
makers, therefore, must have been thrown out of work, and the rate of 
wages in that trade probably fell. But as the whole fund for the 
maintenance of labourers, and the whole number of labourers to be 
maintained, remained unaltered, that fall must have been balanced by a 
rise somewhere else - a rise which we may trace to its proximate cause, 
by recollecting that the fall in the price of corkscrews must have left 
every purchaser of a corkscrew a fund for the purchase of labour, rather 
larger than he would possess if he had paid the former price"[1831, p44, 
my emphasis].
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Senior then appears to assume that the only thing that 
changes from one production period to another is the 
application of the machine. Where do the funds come from to 
finance this machine? It would have been possible to argue 
that they came from previous profits - the 'employment of the 
annual increase' as Mill put it^S. Senior had already made 
this point with regard to the first exception - prediction 
b(i) - and under these circumstances the wages fund would 
remain unaltered. However Senior decided to take a different 
line. What he seems to be arguing is that the wages fund is 
temporarily reduced 'in that trade' - workers are made 
redundant, but a lower price for corkscrews reduces 
expenditure elsewhere and allows the wages fund to be 
replenished. The machine is thus financed by a 'loan' from 
the wages fund but is ultimately paid for by the savings in 
real resources it generates. As I indicated above^* Mill 
argued against this proposition on the grounds that it 
involved the 'fallacy' that the demand for commodities was 
the demand for labour. I will be examining this issue in more 
detail later. For the moment I will examine how Mill applies 
it to the case of machinery. In the Principles 1848 Mill 
argues as follows:
"It is true, the consumers have now additional means of buying other 
things; but this will not create the other things, unless there is 
capital to produce them, and the improvement has not set at liberty any 
capital, even if it has not absorbed some from other employments. The 
supposed increase of production and of employment for labour in other 
departments therefore will not take place; and the increased demand for 
commodities by some consumers, will be balanced by a cessation of demand 
on the part of others, namely, the labourers who were superseded by the 
improvement, and who will now be maintained, if at all, by sharing, 
either in the way of competition or of charity, in what was previously 
consumed by other people" [1848, CW, II, pp96-97].
See above pl94.
See above pl94, n2.
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Thus Mill was prepared to go along with the general line 
taken by Ellis, Torrens, and Senior towards machinery but he 
was not prepared to argue that machinery regenerated the 
wages fund via reduced product prices.
I have discussed three predictions concerning machinery 
stemming from the wages fund doctrine. These predictions are 
novel facts in the Zahar-Worrall sense because they were not 
involved in the construction of the theory. These novel facts 
were controversial and provoked debate between the Classical 
economists as well as in the wider community. Berg argues 
that the machinery question existed 'as a truly national 
issue of debate'[ 1980, pl9] only in the early nineteenth 
century and her book on the subject ends in 1848. As far as 
political economy is concerned however I have argued that 
Mill, in the Principles published in that year, strongly 
supported Ricardo's approach, devoting a whole chapter to the 
question of turning circulating into fixed capital and these 
propositions remained as part of orthodox economic analysis 
throughout the rest of the Classical period.
(c) 'The Demand for Commodities is not the Demand for
Labour.'
In his important and controversial chapter XXXI Ricardo, 
in addition to discussing machinery, raised another matter 
which 'the labouring class have no small interest in' and 
this was 'the manner in which the net income of the country 
is expended' [1817, p392]. Ricardo went on to outline a
proposition which later became famous at the hands of J S 
Mill as 'the demand for commodities is not the demand for 
labour'. The essence of this proposition, at the hands of 
Mill, was that capitalists' expenditure when switched from
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the purchase of luxury commodities to the maintenance of 
labour creates new employment whereas a switch in the reverse 
direction merely leaves employment at the same level. This 
proposition, I will argue, was a prediction from the wages 
fund doctrine and since it was not used in the construction 
of that doctrine it also satisfies the Zahar-Worrall 
criterion for the status of 'novel fact'. Ricardo illustrates 
the first part of the proposition with an example of a 
capitalist who spends his money in maintaining a number of 
servants, and argues that he will thereby give more
employment than if he spent the money on luxury goods:
" If, however, I realized my revenue in the first set of commodities, no 
more labour would be consequently employed:- I should enjoy my furniture 
and my clothes, and there would be an end of them; but if I realized my 
revenue in food and clothing, and my desire was to employ menial 
servants, all those whom I could so employ with my revenue of £10,000, or 
with the food and clothing which it would purchase, would be added to the 
former demand for labourers, and this addition would take place only 
because I chose this mode of expending my revenue" [1817, p393].
Although it is not explicit, the key to this passage lies in
the notion that the change in the pattern of consumption from
commodities to services, generates an expansion in
agriculture. The workers made redundant in the luxury goods
industries would be reemployed in agriculture to produce the
food and necessaries required by the service labour. Ricardo
then went on to argue that this had implications for the
return to peace at the end of a war. Part at least of war
expenditure may be financed by a reduction in luxury
expenditure via taxation and this would lead to an increased
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demand for l a b o u r . 5^ Consequently the return to peace would 
lead to a fall in labour demand:
"At the termination of the war, when part of my revenue reverts to me, 
and is employed as before in the purchase of wine, furniture, or other 
luxuries, the population which it before supported, and which the war 
called into existence, will become redundant, and by its effect on the 
rest of the population, and its competition with it for employment, will 
sink the value of wages, and very materially deteriorate the condition of 
the labouring classes"[1817 p394].
The switching of expenditure then from consumer goods to 
service labour or the armed forces will increase labour 
demand and raise the wage rate and vice versa. In the former 
case the decision is made to add to the wages fund in order 
to support servants or soldiers and, conversely, a switch 
away from spending on servants or the demobilization of 
forces causes expenditure to be reallocated away from the 
wages fund towards consumer goods.
Senior's treatment of this argument in the Outline of 
Political Economv 1836 is not very convincing. He regards it 
as an example of an opinion inconsistent with the wages fund 
doctrine whereas I have argued and will further show that on 
the contrary it is a prediction from it. Senior dwells on a 
distinction he alleges Ricardo makes between wage payments in 
money to productive workers and wages in kind to servants. He 
argued that it appeared to Ricardo that in the latter case by 
purchasing commodities to be employed in maintaining menial
Ricardo argues as follows; "In the same manner, a country engaged in 
a war, and which is under the necessity of maintaining large fleets and 
armies, employs a great many more men than will be employed when the war 
terminates, and the annual expenses which it brings with it, cease. If I 
were not called upon for a tax of 5001. during the war, and which is 
expended on men in the situations of soldiers and sailors, I might 
probably expend that portion of my income on furniture, clothes, books, 
&c. &c. and whether it was expended in the one way or in the other, there 
would be the same quantity of labour employed in production; for the food 
and clothing of the soldier and the sailor would require the same amount 
of industry to produce it as the more luxurious commodities; but in the 
case of the war, there would be the additional demand for men as soldiers 
and sailors; and, consequently, a war which is supported out of the 
revenue, and not from the capital of a country, is favourable to the 
increase of population"[1817, pp393-394].
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servants 'the landlord would .. be able to spend his income 
twice over; to subsist twice as many persons as before'[1831, 
p53]. Thus the landlord buys food and clothing produced in 
the past (thereby in Senior's view enabling the workers who 
produced these to subsist) and then he can use these items to 
support menial servants. Senior argues that the landlord does 
not really spend this income twice but merely spends the 
servant's income for them and that if instead they were paid 
in money the point would disappear. But this really misses 
Ricardo's key point which is that a switch from luxuries to 
servants will employ both the servants and the workers 
previously employed producing luxuries who now will produce 
the servants' food and necessaries.
J S Mill took up this argument in his fourth and last
fundamental proposition concerning capital - 'the demand for 
commodities is not the demand for labour '. At the hands of 
Mill this argument provoked much later criticism from 
neoclassical economists and was regarded as a paradox. 
However, Thompson [1975, pl79] has pointed out, it followed 
quite logically from the wages-fund doctrine and it met with 
the approval of most economists of the time although Mill 
seemed to think that most of his contemporaries had failed to 
keep it "constantly and steadily in view" [1848, CW, II, 
p80].5G The main thrust of the argument was directed against 
the notion promoted by Malthus and others that unproductive 
consumption by capitalists benefits the working class. Mill 
outlines his view employing the wages fund doctrine:
Pigou regarded the proposition as an application by Mill of the wages
fund doctrine with which he disagreed on the grounds that the only
difference between spending money on goods compared with spending on 
labour directly is that in the latter case the labourer gets his wages 
earlier. See Pigou in Rima [1970, pl03].
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"Demand for commodities is not demand for labour. The demand for
commodities determines in what particular branch of production the labour 
and capital shall be employed; it determines the direction of the labour; 
but not the more or less of the labour itself, or of the maintenance or 
payment of the labour. These depend on the amount of the capital, or 
other funds directly devoted to the sustenance and remuneration of
labour...
I conceive that a person who buys commodities and consumes them 
himself, does no good to the labouring classes; and that it is only by 
what he abstains from consuming, and expends in direct payments to 
labourers in exchange for labour, that he benefits the labouring classes, 
or adds anything to the amount of their employment" [1848, CW, II, pp78- 
80].
Mill goes on to illustrate this basic case and from the
outset Mill is quick to point out that his analysis applies 
to the long run and assumes that demand changes can be 
foreseen. Sudden unexpected falls in commodity demand would 
leave commodities unsold and thus the capital that could have 
been available from the revenue is lost. If time and 
foresight allow for adjustment however some benefit can 
accrue from switching from commodities. Mill first of all 
looks at the case of a capitalist who employed bricklayers 
but switches his expenditure into demanding velvet. The 
change in consumer demand of itself will not create the 
capital required to produce the velvet so where does the 
capital come from? Mill argues that the bricklayers will 
either now go without or will obtain their necessaries 'from 
the shares of other labourers'[1848, CW, II, p81]. This will 
release the labour and capital previously employed in 
producing the necessaries for these bricklayers. Mill 
qualifies this:
"I do not mean that the very same labour and capital which produced the 
necessaries turn themselves to producing the velvet; but, in some one or 
other of a hundred modes, they take the place of that which does. There 
was capital in existence to do one of two things - to make the velvet, or 
to produce necessaries for the journeyman bricklayers; but not to do 
both. It was at the option of the consumer which of the two should 
happen; and if he chooses the velvet, they go without the necessaries" 
[1848, CW, II, pp81-p82].
Of course Mill here is not denying that by demanding 
commodities one is not allowing a further demand for labour
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to take place - by the capitalists who now switch from 
producing food to producing velvet. But there are two points 
about this. First the decision to employ the labour in velvet 
production rather than bricklaying lies not in the hands of 
the consumer of velvet but in the hands of the employer of 
l a b o u r . Increased demand for velvet alters the pattern of 
production but strictly speaking the actual demand for labour 
comes from those with capital to employ labour. It is thus a 
relentless application of the logic of the wages fund. 
Secondly, Mill is not arguing that increased luxury 
consumption will reduce employment because again the logic of 
the wages fund is used to argue that the bricklayers will 
join the labour market and compete for a share of a wages 
fund reduced now by the amount of capital devoted to 
purchasing velvet. The result then is a lower real wage 
rather than reduced employment. Mill goes on to consider the 
reverse case where the switch is from velvet to bricklayers 
and here new employment is created:
"The velvet manufacturer, supposing him aware of the diminished demand 
for his commodity, diminishes the production, and sets at liberty a 
corresponding portion of the capital employed in the manufacture. This 
capital, thus withdrawn from the maintenance of velvet-makers, is not the 
same fund with that which the customer employs in maintaining 
bricklayers; it is a second fund. There are, therefore, two funds to be 
employed in the maintenance and remuneration of labour, where before 
there was only one. There is not a transfer of employment from velvet- 
makers to bricklayers; there is a new employment created for bricklayers, 
and a transfer of employment from velvet-makers to some other labourers.
The two writers who came closest to capturing the spirit and essence 
of Mill's argument in this respect were Schumpeter [1954, p644] and Blaug 
[1985, pl84] who both saw the significance of Mill's statement to be in 
the emphasis he gave to the fact that the decision as to whether product 
revenues are turned into labour demand is a decision made by the 
capitalist and not the consumer. As Blaug put it: "What Mill was driving 
at was the idea that the total volume of employment is a direct result of 
the rate of capital accumulation and that consumers' demand, while it 
determines the allocation of labour between different industries, 
influences total employment only at one remove, since the decision 
whether the proceeds of sales will be used to reconstitute the wages fund 
rests with employers, demand for commodities is not necessarily demand 
for labour" [1985, pl84].
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most probably those who produce the food and other things which the 
bricklayers consume" [1848, CW, II, p82].
It is clear here as with the Ricardo example that now 
additional employment can be created as a result of a switch 
in expenditure. It is also very clear that this does assume 
that technical coefficients are the same throughout the 
economy.
(d) Unproductive consumption
I noted in chapter four^^ that Mill argued that all acts 
of investment hy capitalists involving transfers of 
expenditure from unproductive consumption to the employment 
of workers will benefit either the Income or employment 
levels of the workers^^, and this proposition can be regarded 
as novel fact (d) stemming from the wages fund doctrine. I 
argued in chapter four that in dealing with this issue Mill 
reveals the continuing dichotomy in the wages fund analysis 
between money and the real fund conceptions and thus there is 
no need for any further discussion of this novel fact at this 
stage.
(e) War Loans
Another example of the use of a wages fund argument is to 
be found in Mill's consideration of his third fundamental 
theorem on capital. The case Mill considers concerns the 
raising of government loans for 'war purposes or other 
unproductive expenditure'[1848, CW, II, p75]. Mill refers to 
the discussion on this subject undertaken by Chalmers in 
Political Economv [1832] and goes on to question the effect
This assumption is necessary in order that the capital and labour 
released from velvet production can be readily transferred into food 
production, see Johnson [1949] for an alternative view.
59 See above pl21-123.
50 See Mill [1848, CW, II, pp66-68].
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of loans on the economy. On the face of it, since they may be 
at the expense of productive investment, loans could be seen 
as harmful. Yet, Mill argues, years of war are often regarded 
as years of the greatest prosperity. The argument is that 
even if the whole of the loan is at the expense of productive 
employment, this will only result in a reduction in the 
portion of capital used to pay labourers with no reduction in 
the portion consisting of fixed c a p i t a l . T h u s  although 
wages will fall, as long as the workers do not starve but can 
put up with the wage reduction, or if charity intervenes,
their labour should produce the same output in the next year:
they produce as much as usual, having been paid less by so many 
Millions sterling, these millions are gained by their employers. The 
breach made in the capital of the country is thus instantly repaired, but 
repaired by the privations and often the real misery of the labouring 
class. Here is ample reason why such periods, even in the most 
unfavourable circumstances, may easily be times of great gain to those 
whose prosperity usually passes, in the estimation of society, for 
national prosperity"[1848, CW, II, p76].
One thing to note about this passage is that it is once again 
the money fund destined for the maintenance of workers which 
is altered. Since the real wage rate falls it must be 
inferred infer that goods prices remain stable. If prices are 
to remain stable with a lower level of money wages earned by 
productive workers and with output as high as in previous 
periods demand must be increased in some other quarter. In 
other words given that the workers now receive a smaller 
share of output who receives the portion they have forfeited? 
The answer of course must be the soldiers who are maintained 
by these wage goods. At first sight this example may appear 
to run counter to the rigid wages fund I discussed in the
51 Pigou regarded this as an application by Mill of the logic of the 
wages fund doctrine, although he argued that if investment and the 
consumption of non-wage earners is cut back the working class might not 
have to suffer, see Pigou[1949] in Rima [1970, pl04].
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previous chapter, and reveal further evidence of the
dichotomy between money and real conceptions of the doctrine. 
The money fund has been reduced but prices have not fallen 
and the real wage rate is reduced. But the example is
complicated by the inclusion of soldiers in the pool of
people to whom wage goods will now be allocated. The 
importance of this point is reinforced in the footnote which 
Mill adds in order to deal with the importance of the origin 
of these soldiers, for if they are drawn from the pool of
productive labour then entirely different results occur:
"On the other hand, it must be remembered that war abstracts from 
productive employment not only capital, but likewise labourers; that the 
funds withdrawn from the remuneration of productive labourers are partly 
employed in paying the same or other individuals for unproductive labour; 
and that by this portion of its effects war expenditure acts in precisely 
the opposite manner to that which Dr Chalmers points out, and, so far as 
it goes, directly counteracts the effects described in the text. So far 
as labourers are taken from production, to man the army and navy, the 
labouring classes are not damaged, the capitalists are not benefited, and 
the general produce of the country is diminished by war 
expenditure"[1848, CW, II, p76n].
The real wage rate fell in the first example because extra
persons in the form of the soldiers needed to be maintained
from a given wages fund. In the above passage a given wages
fund is divided by the soldiers and a smaller number of men,
resulting in no change in the wage rate. However Mill notes
that while this situation was the one that occurred in France
during the Napoleonic Wars it was not the case in England
#
where capital diverted from productive employment was used to 
supply armies of the Continental allies. Foreign soldiers 
then consumed directly or indirectly (through trade) the 
goods the British workers could no longer consume. There are 
then two predictions under this heading. Prediction e(l) that 
war loans raised at the expense of the wages fund will lead 
to lower wages in the short run if the loan is used to pay
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for foreign soldiers. Prediction (e2) that war loans raised 
at the expense of the wages fund will not reduce the wage 
rate if the loan is spent on soldiers recruited from the 
domestic pool of productive labour. Both are novel facts 
according to the Zahar-Worrall criterion.
(f) Absenteeism of Landlords
One of Senior's opinions 'inconsistent' with the wages 
fund doctrine was the proposition that the non-residence of 
landlords is detrimental to labourers [1831, pp20-35]. The 
notion rests on the argument that when landlords move away 
this results in unemployment amongst servants and the people 
who provided him with various commodities. Senior makes two 
points, both employing the wages fund approach. First, if the 
workers follow him to another part of the country then the 
wages fund in the original area would fall as would the 
number of labourers and vice versa in the new area leaving 
wages unchanged. Secondly, if the landlord went abroad the 
labourers could not follow but the landlord would find it 
more efficient to purchase manufacturers to be sent abroad 
and these would be purchased by the produce of his own 
estates. So the increased employment of manufacturing workers 
compensates for the reduced employment of servants, gardeners 
and tailors. Overall, the wages fund would remain the same. 
The novel fact here then is the argument - prediction (f)
Hollander [1968, pp327-330] argues that this is further evidence of 
the Torrens-Cairnes-Mill version. But once again there can be no evidence 
here to support an inelastic demand curve since it is demand and not 
supply which has changed. However one can agree with Hollander that the 
real wage is no longer pre-determined. What Is here is a two-period 
analysis where the consequences of increasing or decreasing money funds 
at the beginning of each production period are then worked through using 
the logic of the original wages fund approach (i.e. the money fund 
divided by the workforce) with the consequences for the real wage and the 
real wage fund being explained ex post depending on the assumptions and 
conditions contained in each example.
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that landlord absenteeism will not reduce the employment 
level or wage rate of the working classes.
(g) Foreign Imports
Another proposition that Senior [1831, pp46-47] considers 
is that wages can be reduced by foreign imports. He argues 
that this is analogous in its effect to the introduction of a 
new machine and again the argument employs the wages fund 
doctrine. If the import is something which is not consumed by 
workers, French silk say, fewer labourers would produce 
domestic silk but more would be employed in producing the 
manufactured exports needed to pay for the imports. 
Alternatively if the imports took the form of cheaper 
subsistence goods such as sugar or corn then given a fixed 
money wages fund the real wage fund would increase. Thus 
applying the wages fund doctrine. Senior concludes that 
Imports will not reduce domestic employment. This conclusion 
then can be regarded as novel fact (g) produced from the 
wages fund theory.
(h) Brisk demand and wages
Mill also considered the argument that wages will be 
higher and labour demand greater when the demand for 
commodities is 'brisk' although there is no change in the 
amount of capital employed and vice versa. Mill counters this 
by first admitting that the argument is true but is only a 
complication which obscures the general principle. If demand 
is slack capital may lay idle but, this will be 'the same 
thing to the labourers, for the time being, as if it did not 
exist' [1848, CW, II, p338]. Wages may fall but this is 
consistent with the wages fund doctrine because for all 
intents and purposes the wages fund has been decreased.
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Conversely, if demand is brisk the capitalist may borrow 
additional capital, and Mill argues;
"At such times wages in particular occupations rise. If we suppose, what 
in strictness is not absolutely impossible, that one of these fits of 
briskness or of stagnation should affect all occupations at the same 
time, wages altogether might undergo a rise or a fall. These, however, 
are but temporary fluctuations; the capital now lying idle will next year 
be in active employment, that which is this year unable to keep up with 
the demand will in its turn be locked up in crowded warehouses; and wages 
in these several departments will ebb and flow accordingly: but nothing 
can permanently alter general wages, except an increase or a diminution 
of capital itself (always meaning by the term, the funds of all sorts 
devoted to the payment of labour) compared with the quantity of labour 
offering itself to be hired"[1848, CW, II, p339].
Mill here then uses the wages fund doctrine to generate 
prediction (h) - the general level of wages cannot be
permanently altered by changes in demand.
(i) High Prices and Wages
In another example he considers the argument that high 
prices enable employers to pay more to workers. Mill argues 
that this can indeed happen if the higher prices came from 
increased overseas demand and did lead to producers saving 
more. Thus the wages fund would be increased and wages could 
rise. Once again there is a break between what is happening 
in commodity markets and what happens in the labour market, 
and that break centres around the capitalist's decision to 
invest, or in this case increase his investment. Prediction
(il) then is that higher prices as a result of higher 
overseas demand may lead to a higher average wage rate.
However if the high prices occur as a result of some 
"restrictive laws, or which is in some way or other to be 
paid by the remaining members of the community," [1848, CW, 
II, p339] then the people having to pay the higher prices 
will have smaller funds available for saving and purchasing 
labour. Wages may arise temporarily in those employments 
where prices have risen and fall elsewhere. However since it
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is likely that not all the increased revenue will be turned 
into capital in that employment some may be used in other 
employments which will tend to equalize wage rates. 
Prediction ( i2 ) then is that higher prices as a result of 
some restrictive practices will not raise the average wage 
rate.
(j) Minimum Wages
In chapter XII of the Principles Mill discusses some 
'popular remedies for low wages ' and here develops two 
predictions relating to the question of minimum wages - one 
relating to the short run and one to the long. In the short 
run a policy of a statutory minimum wage can benefit the 
working class and Mill makes interesting use of the wages 
fund doctrine in this context:
"Since, therefore, the rate of wages which results from competition 
distributes the whole existing wages—fund among the whole labouring 
population; if law or opinion succeeds in fixing wages above this rate, 
some labourers are kept out of employment; and as it is not the intention 
of the philanthropists that these should starve, they must be provided 
for by a forced increased of the wages-fund; by a compulsory 
saving"[1848, CW, II, p356].
Here the wages fund is being used to argue for government 
intervention; if the rich do not sufficiently refrain from 
consumption to employ all the poor at 'reasonable wages' 
then. Mill argues, the state must play a role:
"...it is supposed to be incumbent on the state to lay on taxes for the 
purpose, either by local rates or votes of public money. The proportion 
between labour and the wages-fund would thus be modified to the advantage 
of the labourers, not by restriction of population, but by an increase of 
capital"[1848, CW, II, pp356-357].
Here the wages fund is being applied in a very novel fashion. 
The wages fund is no longer a predetermined amount of wages 
goods or even money set aside and therefore wholly determined 
by the capitalists but an amount which can be augmented by 
local or central government funds by an act of public policy. 
This is an example of two period analysis and provides the
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prediction ( j ) that a minimum wage policy with government 
support can raise the average wage rate in the short run. 
Mill goes on to argue that this augmented fund would have his 
support 'if this claim on society could be limited to the 
existing generation; if nothing more were necessary than a 
compulsory accumulation, sufficient to provide permanent 
employment at ample wages for the existing numbers of the 
people'[1848, CW, II, p357]. However, he argues, this outcome 
is unlikely. The long run consequences of a minimum wage are 
then traced through and I will return to this in the next 
section.
This is the last example of a long and varied list of
short run predictions most of which were examples of two
period analysis. It will be useful at this stage to reproduce
this list by way of summary:
(a) Strike action to increase wages will not benefit 
the working class.
(bl) The introduction of machinery, the construction of 
which uses labour previously employed in the wage goods 
sector, will reduce the general wage rate.
(b2) The introduction of 'animated machines', or fixed 
capital in the form of horses and working cattle which 
consume the same goods as workers will reduce the 
general wage rate.
(b3) The introduction of machinery, with the exception 
of the two cases above, will either increase or leave 
unaltered the general wage rate.
(c) The demand for commodities is not the demand for 
labour.
(d) All acts of investment by capitalists involving 
transfers of expenditure from unproductive consumption 
to the employment of workers will benefit either the 
income or employment levels of the workers.
(el) War loans raised at the expense of the wages fund 
will lead to lower wages in the short run if the loan is 
used to pay for foreign soldiers.
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(e2) War loans raised at the expense of the wages fund 
will not reduce the wage rate if the loan is spent on 
soldiers recruited from the domestic pool of productive 
labour.
(f) Landlord absenteeism will not reduce the employment 
level or wage rate of the working class.
(g) Imports will not reduce domestic employment.
(h) The general level of wages cannot be permanently 
altered by changes in demand.
(11) Higher prices as a result of higher overseas demand 
may lead to a higher average wage rate.
(12) Higher prices as a result of some restrictive 
practices will not raise the average wage rate.
( j ) Minimum wage policy with government support can 
raise the average wage rate in the short run.
I have argued, then, that there was a width and depth in 
the application of the wages fund doctrine not often 
indicated in the conventional accounts. Moreover these 
applications existed in the mainstream literature of 
Classical economics for over half a century - from the time 
of Ricardo's Principles through the work of Senior to Mill's 
final edition of his Principles in the 1871. All this is 
evidence of a very robust theory and one which was strongly 
supported and staunchly defended by its adherents. Far from 
the wages fund doctrine being an obscure side shoot from 
Classical theory, abandoned not before time by J S Mill, it 
was in fact a thriving theory at the centre of Classical 
analysis as it was applied to a number of very important 
theoretical and policy issues. The theory was flawed with 
regard to money and real funds, and serious criticism could 
be made of it with regard to a number of other aspects, as I 
shall show in the next two chapters. In spite of this, 
however, the doctrine survived. This may have been partly due 
to the poor quality of the criticisms made, and the failure
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to really address the major weakness, the 'monster' of money, 
until the 1860s, but a large part of its robustness and 
longevity must be due to the number of applications and 
predictions the doctrine produced. In Lakatosian terms the 
theory was theoretically progressive; it produced a large 
number of novel facts as defined by the Zahar-Worrall 
criterion.
There is a final and important point to consider with 
regard to the progress of the short run doctrine. While the 
theory made considerable theoretical progress, there is no 
evidence that any of these predictions were subject to the 
sort of empirical testing that might be demanded of modern 
theory. The Classical economists gave a very limited role to 
empirical verification, and did not regard contradictory 
empirical evidence as particularly significant for the 
viability of t h e o r i e s . T h u s  it cannot be said that this 
part of the research programme made any Lakatosian empirical 
progress (by which is meant the empirical corroboration of 
novel facts) . But as I argued in chapter two, this lack of 
empirical progress will not lead to the immediate abandonment 
of the research programme. As long as theoretical progress is 
being made, the research programme can flourish in the
The approach taken by the Classical economists can be seen in the 
work of three authors in particular - Nassau Senior, J s Mill and J E 
Cairnes. The general approach developed in the work of these writers 
stressed the a priori nature of economics which was seen as a science 
founded on simple premises derived from observation or introspection. In 
this view, economic analysis consists of tendency laws and if the 
evidence in a particular case contradicts a particular principle this is 
because the ceteris paribus conditions are not fulfilled. Verification 
then is used to test the applicability of the theory not its truth or 
otherwise. How then can theories be refuted? Cairnes makes it clear in 
the Character and Logical Method of Political Economv [1875] that 
economic laws 'can be refuted only by showing either that the principles 
and conditions assumed do not exist, or that the tendency which the law 
affirms does not follow as a necessary consequence from this 
assumption'[1965, pllO].
5: Theoretical Progress and Novel Facts 214 
absence of empirical support, and indeed may survive in the 
face of empirical counterevidence. It is only when 
theoretical progress stops that this, together with the lack 
of empirical progress, will lead the research programme to 
degenerate. In the degenerating phase the programme will be 
vulnerable to attack, with fatal consequences if there is a 
rival programme available which is itself theoretically 
progressive. The short run and two period forms of the wages 
fund research programme clearly went through a theoretically 
progressive period at the hands of Senior and Mill, building 
on the work of Ricardo. The analysis enabled economists to 
predict outcomes to a variety of problems ranging from the 
impact of strikes, through the effects of war loans to the 
consequences of restrictive practices.
However, by the mid-1860s there had been no significant 
additions to the range of theoretical predictions for almost 
two decades. Mill's Principles was written in 1848, and the 
examples in it, which I have highlighted as novel facts, 
remained essentially unchanged in all subsequent editions, 
including those which postdate the recantation. The Classical 
economists were unable to maintain the momentum that they had 
achieved in earlier years and the doctrine reached its 
degenerative phase. As a Lakatosian analysis would predict, 
when the doctrine came under attack in the 1860s it was very 
vulnerable, and, not surprisingly, the attacks by Longe 
Thornton and Mill resulted in its ultimate, although not 
immediate, abandonment.
2. The Long Run Theorv 
The task in this section is to explore the extent to which 
the long run wages fund doctrine produced novel facts and the
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discussion will inevitably involve a consideration of the
auxiliary population theory.
(a) The Poor Law 
The notion that Poor Relief will not improve the living 
standards of the working class was an idea that was returned 
to time and time again by Classical economists from the time 
of Malthus' Essay to the 1870s. Ricardo made the point very 
explicitly in the Principles;
"Like all other contracts, wages should be left to the fair and free
competition of the market, and should never be controlled by the
interference of the legislature.
The clear and direct tendency of the poor laws, is in direct 
opposition to these obvious principles : it is not, as the legislature 
benevolently intended, to amend the condition of the poor, but to
deteriorate the condition of both poor and rich" [1817, pl26].
McCulloch in his Principles emphasized that the effect worked
through the labour market and he made use of population
theory in discussing the system of making up low wages with
'allowances' from the rates. The consequences of this were
that the 'Poor Laws teach the labourer to consider it as
indifferent whether his wages will suffice for the support of
a family or not - that, if they are insufficient, the deficit
will be made up from the parish funds, and thus remove the
natural and most powerful check to over-population" [1825,
pl88]. McCulloch went on to argue that 'the only means for
the permanent improvement of the poor' would be 'the
establishment of a really useful system of public education'
so that they would become acquainted with the 'circumstances
that really determine their condition' [1825, pl89].
Nassau Senior was the Classical economist most intimately 
involved with the question of the Poor Laws at a practical 
level and was perhaps the most influential member of the Poor 
Law Commission set up in 1832 to enquire into the operation
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of the laws. Senior's views on the Poor Laws were complex and 
changed over time^^ and here I will present only a brief 
outline. I noted in chapter three^^ that Senior was among the 
first Classical economists to reject the Malthusian view of 
the relationship of the growth of population to the means or 
subsistence. What this meant was that while he was opposed to 
the poor laws as were the other Classicists his opposition 
was for different reasons. His fundamental objection can be 
seen in a letter to the Lord Chancellor Brougham in 1832^® 
reproduced in Levy [1970, pp247-262] in which he argued
against the practice which had developed of giving 
'allowances' to the able-bodied working poor and traced 
through the consequences:
"The present system gives the labourer low wages but at the same time 
easy work, it gives him also, strange as it may appear, what he values 
more, a sort of independence. He need not study to please his master, he 
need not bestir himself to seek work, he need not put any restraint on 
his temper, he need not ask relief as a favour, he need not fear that his 
idleness, or drunkenness, will injure his family; he has, in short, all a 
slave's security for subsistence without his liabilities to 
punishment"[Levy, 1970, p249].
The effects of these poor law allowances then on the 
workforce was to reduce their wages, morale and productivity, 
and Senior, later in the same letter, explained the
consequences of falling productivity in 'fund' terms
"...the fund for the payment both of wages and of rates is diminishing. 
That fund consists of commodities which must be periodically reproduced 
by the industry and skill of the labourers assisted by the farmer's
5^ See M. Bowley, Nassau Senior and Classical Economics part II, ch.2 
for a full discussion of this.
55 See above pp83-84.
55 Letter to Lord Chancellor Brougham on Poor Law Reform, 14th. 
September 1832, Nassau Senior Collection, National Library of Wales, 
Aberystwyth, reproduced in Levy [1970, pp247-262].
57 Letter to Brougham on Poor Law Reform, Levy[1970] p249. This is the 
basis of Levy's erroneous judgment that senior's 'conception of a wages 
fund had no reference to a rigidly-fixed and unalterable amount as the 
Iron Law of wages would imply'[1970 p328]. Clearly Levy has misunderstood 
the point that this analysis is long run and of course in the long run 
the wages fund can change. See above pp53-54.
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capital. All the evidence now before us shows that, in the pauperized 
districts, skill and industry and capital are all wasting away. The fund 
would soon become unequal to the demands on it even if these demands were 
stationary. But they are increasing every day"[Levy, 1970, p249].
This is not strictly a wages fund approach for the rates are
also included and it is in that respect similar to the J S
Mill's approach to minimum wages. The reason why the
demands on the funds were increasing was that people who
should have known better such as farmers, the clergy, and the
magistrates subscribed to the 'monstrous' doctrines that
wages were a matter of right and not contract and that the
amount for their payment and the payment of poor relief was
inexhaustible. Extravagant rates of wages and allowances had
been granted as a r e s u l t . T h u s  unlike the earlier writers
Malthus, Ricardo and McCulloch, Senior did not object to the
poor laws because they were likely to Increase the rate of
growth of population, but because they were likely to reduce
the rate of growth of the capital stock from which labour
could be supported. Here then are two entirely different
explanations of the consequences of having a system of poor
laws but both of them are consistent with the long run hard
core of wage theory and both lead to the same prediction from
it. This is prediction (a) that any system of poor relief
which maintains the working poor with payments from the
See above pp210-211.
This approach was supported by another member of the Commission - 
Henry Garler who also wrote to Chancellor Brougham in support of Senior's 
argument : "The labourers have been taught the doctrine that the first
incumbrance upon property is their claim to relief, that the land (such 
is their expression) must support them, that whatever may be the source 
or cause of their wants, the law not only authorizes but directs the 
magistrates to supply their demands. These doctrines have not only been 
countenanced by newspapers and by some periodical writers but have 
received the avowed sanction of those who interpret and administer the 
Poor Laws, both by their expressions and their practices." Letter from 
Henry Garler to Lord Chancellor Brougham, Nov 1st.,1832, Nassau Senior 
Collection, National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth.
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authorities will reduce the long run living standards of the 
working class.
It must be noted that Senior was not against poor relief 
in principle but he was opposed to the current arrangements. 
He supported relief for orphans, the blind and the disabled 
including medical treatment and hospitals and he was not even 
in favour of abolishing poor relief for the able bodied. What 
he did argue for was the notion of 'less eligibility' 
according to which the recipient of relief should be worse 
off than the employed. The Poor Law Reform Act of 1834 which 
resulted from the Report of the Royal Commission written by 
Nassau Senior and Edwin Chadwick embodied these ideas in the 
form of the workhouse system.
These views were endorsed by Mill in his Principles in 
1848 and were repeated in subsequent editions. For Mill the 
old allowance system could be analyzed in the same way as the 
case of minimum w a g e s , a n d  Mill made it quite clear that 
its impact had been to lower wages. However, he concluded 
approvingly, the system 'received a severe check from the 
Poor Law of 1834' [1848, CW, II, p362].
(b) Minimum Wages
I pointed out above^^ that J S Mill argued that in the 
short run a policy of minimum wages may benefit the working 
classes. However he drew a sharp distinction between the 
Malthusian short run and the long run in this respect and 
made it very clear that if the effects of such a policy could 
not be limited to the 'existing generation' the standards of
70 See Bowley [1937, pp282-335]
7^ See the discussion in the next section.
72 See above pp210-211.
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living of the whole population would be brought towards 
subsistence. Thus having laid out the potential benefits of 
the short run position Mill went on to argue that it is one 
thing to maintain existing workers through minimum wages, but 
quite another to give food and clothing 'to all whom these or 
their descendants may think fit to call into existence'[1848, 
CW, II, p357]. Any attempt to do so would start the 
population 'forward at its rapidest rate'[1848, p363]. Some 
attempt may be made. Mill conceded, to exact work in exchange 
for support, and the power of dismissal may be retained as an 
incentive. But even if this were to make labour more
efficient, the population would overtake output:
"..the increase of people going on in a constant ratio, while the 
increase of produce went on in a diminishing ratio, the surplus in time
would be wholly absorbed; taxation for the support of the poor would
engross the whole income of the country; the payers and the receivers 
would be melted down into one mass. The check to population, either by 
death or prudence, could not be staved off any longer, but must come into 
operation suddenly and at once; everything which places mankind above a 
nest of ants or a colony of beavers, having perished in the
interval"[1848, CW, II, p358].
There is here then a second long run prediction or novel fact 
(b) that a minimum wage policy will in the long run reduce 
wages to subsistence.
(c) Allotments
Mill also discussed the Allotment System whereby in order 
to make up for low wages labourers were enabled to rent a 
small piece of ground on which to grow vegetables for home 
consumption. Mill saw this as analogous to the system of 
allowances and regarded the likely outcome as the same, the 
only difference with allotments being that 'they make people 
grow their own poor rates'[1848, CW, II, p364]. There is then 
novel fact (c) that a system of allotments will lower the 
living standards of the working class. It may be noted that
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Mill disagreed with William Thornton on this question. Mill 
had argued against allotments in his review of Arthur Helps' 
Claims of Labour T18441 in the Edinburgh Review in 1845,73 
arguing that '[e]very shilling which it bestows as a 
supplement to wages, it subtracts from the wages themselves' 
[1845, CW, IV p388]. Thornton argued against this in Over­
population and its Remedv in 1846 claiming that an allotment 
'gives the labourer a feeling of independence and self- 
respect, and at the same time the strongest incentives to 
diligence'[1846, p347], and also may raise standards of the 
existing generation sufficiently for this to provide some 
restraint on future population growth as expectations changed 
[1846, pp367-370]. In the Principles Mill was sceptical,
arguing that the effect on a family was likely to be small. 
What may have an impact he conceded would be a policy of 
encouraging labourers to save and purchase the land but the 
effect here would not be through increased output but through 
encouraging 'forethought and frugality to the entire class, 
the effects of which might not cease with the occasion'[ 1848, 
CW, II, p366]. Here then Mill returns to his key theme in 
dealing with low wages that the only permanent remedy lies in 
changing the attitudes and habits of the working class.
It is interesting to note that in discussing allotments 
both Mill and Thornton made references to some empirical 
evidence. Thus Mill argued that he could name a parish where 
in the previous few years an allotment system had been 
introduced and where this had resulted in lower wages [1845,
73 "The Claims of Labour", Edinburgh Review, no. CLXIV, April 1845, 
pp428-525, in Essavs on Economics and Society, Vol IV of Collected Works, 
1967.
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CW, IV, pp388-389]. Thornton by contrast, pointed to evidence 
in some parishes, where as a result of abandoning the 
allotment system, poor rates^ were either introduced for the 
first time or increased [1846, pp344-345]. Thornton referred 
to evidence in an article by Edwards in the Quarterly 
Review^^ in 1829 relating to one parish where there were 
fifty-eight landholders, of whom twenty-two were cottagers. 
Initially the poor rates were 6d. in the pound; forty years 
later the cottagers had lost their land and their rates had 
risen to 4s in the pound.
(d) Food Prices and Wages
Finally I will consider Mill's argument that money wages 
are determined by the price of food. This he maintained is 
only really true of a permanent change in food prices and in 
that case the effect works through the 'law' of the 
dependence of wages on the proportion between capital and 
labour. There are two cases he argues:
"In the first place, if the labourers have, as is often the case, no more 
than enough to keep them in working condition, and enable them barely to 
support the ordinary number of children, it follows that if food grows 
permanently dearer without a rise of wages a greater number of the 
children will prematurely die; and thus wages will be ultimately higher, 
but only because the number of people will be smaller, than if food had 
remained cheap. But, secondly, even though wages were high enough to 
admit of food's becoming more costly without depriving the labourers and 
their families of necessaries; though they could bear physically 
speaking, to be worse off, perhaps they would not consent to be so. They 
might have habits of comfort which were to them as necessaries and sooner 
than forego which, they would put an additional restraint on their power 
of multiplication; so that wages would rise, not by increase of deaths 
but by diminution of births, in these cases, the, wages do adapt 
themselves to the price of food, though after an interval of almost a 
generation"[1848, CW, II, p340].
Here, then, is a classic application of the long run theory 
and once again Mill is distinguishing those situations where 
workers are well supplied with necessaries from those where
74 E Edwards, "Conditions of the English Peasantry", Quarterly Review, 
Vol. XLI, No. LXXXI.
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they are not. Either way a combination of wage theory and 
population theory is employed to generate novel fact (d) that 
wages will in the long run be detezmined by the price of 
food.
Applying the Lakatosian approach indicates then that there 
are several novel facts stemming from the long run theory. 
These long run predictions are much fewer in number than the 
short run ones and are very dependent on population theory. 
In this sense perhaps the long run theory was less 
progressive but, on the other hand, to the extent that its 
hard core was completely general and coherent, the long run 
theory was far more robust.
With regard to the question of empirical progress, the 
argument I put forward concerning the role of empirical 
evidence in the short run and two period analysis, also 
applies to the long run. There was undoubtedly discussion of 
piecemeal fragments of evidence relating to the Poor Laws and 
other policy predictions; we saw an example of such evidence 
being used by Thornton and Mill in the case of the prediction 
concerning allotments. The important point is, however, that 
the Classical economists did not themselves subject their 
predictions to systematic empirical testing of the modern 
kind. Thus it must be concluded that while the long run 
theory made some theoretical progress, it made no empirical 
progress as judged in Lakatosian terms.
IV Conclusions
Novel facts are the Lakatosian litmus test of the success 
of a research programme. For the programme to carry on into
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the future it must make novel predictions. These do not have 
to be empirically verified although this is desirable. 
Without such theoretical development, Lakatos argued, the 
theory will stagnate, while with them it can prosper even 
though there may be uncomfortable counterexamples. Both parts 
of Classical wage theory provide convincing although 
examples of this process.
The short run theory was progressive in theoretical terms 
providing many examples and applications to practical 
problems which had nothing to do with the original 
construction of the theory. This rich variety of theoretical 
developments and applications has generally been ignored by 
conventional accounts which have tended to focus on the 
weaknesses of the theory and its final replacement by 
neoclassical analysis after the recantation. By contrast a 
Lakatosian interpretation reveals a theory which, although 
seriously flawed, nevertheless produced an impressively wide 
range of novel facts, and which was therefore theoretically 
very progressive. Over a period of thirty years, from Ricardo 
to Mill, and in relation to topics as diverse as strikes, 
machinery, war loans and landlord absenteeism, the wages fund 
doctrine was applied to develop a rich portfolio of 
propositions, which in Lakatosian terms constituted the 
protective belt of the research programme. In this Lakatosian 
sense, the wages fund doctrine was highly successful. This 
period of progressive development at the hands of Ricardo, 
Senior and Mill, however, came to an end in the 1850s. Mill's 
Principles dominated the landscape, and while the wages fund 
applications were faithfully reproduced in successive 
editions of the work, no new applications were developed.
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CHAPTER SIX
THE WAGES FUND DEBATE I: LONGE, THORNTON AND MILL ON SUPPLY 
AND DEMAND 
I Introduction
In the last three chapters I have discussed the theoretical 
development and progress of Classical wage theory. I have 
argued that following the period of theoretical progress at 
the hands of Senior and Mill, the wages fund doctrine made no 
further progress in the 1850s. There then followed in the 
1860 s an intense period of criticism of the wages fund 
doctrine which had some secondary implications for the long 
run theory.^ The best known example of these critiques, J S 
Mill's recantation of the wages fund doctrine in 1869, has 
attracted much attention over the years and many attempts 
have been made to interpret its significance. My argument in 
the next two chapters will be that this particular piece of 
criticism must not be seen as an isolated event but as part 
of a period of criticism of wage theory consisting of three 
major pieces of work - Francis Longe's Refutation 1866, W T 
Thornton's On Labour 1869, as well as Mill's review of 
Thornton's On Labour, usually referred to as Mill's 
recantation.2 The debate fell into two main parts. First 
there was the debate concerning supply and demand theory with 
respect to both commodities and labour. Mill spent much time
 ^ In part I of the recantation article Mill argues that Thornton's work 
has no implications for 'the inseparable connection of the remuneration 
of labour with the proportion between population and the means of 
subsistence'[1869, p517]. This question is taken up in the next chapter 
(see also Vint[1981, pp71-88]) along with a discussion of the Malthusian 
references in part II of Mill's article (see West and Hafer [1981, pp603- 
619], and Ekelund and Kordsmeier [1981, pp531-541].
2 In addition to Mill's review, there were a number of other reviews of 
Thornton's work, in the Pall Mall Gazette, the British Quarterly, and the 
Edinburgh Review; and I will refer to these in the course of the 
discussion.
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on this in the recantation article and attempted to dispose 
of Thornton's arguments on commodity supply and demand. 
Secondly, there were the arguments about the wages fund 
doctrine itself put forward by Longe, Thornton and Mill.
Thus, there was a debate throughout the second half of the 
1860s in which a number of counterexamples and 'refutations' 
to the wages fund doctrine and supply and demand theory were 
jointly presented and debated. For the first time the wages 
fund research programme was faced with serious criticism and 
challenge. In this and the following chapter I will be 
examining the nature of these criticisms, and their impact on 
supply and demand theory and the wages fund research
programme.
In this chapter the focus will be on supply and demand, 
and I will argue that powerful counterexamples were put 
forward by Thornton against the Classical supply and demand 
research programme, and that Mill defended this very 
carefully employing some of the strategies outlined by 
Lakatos in Proofs and Refutations. I shall also examine the 
treatments by Longe, Thornton and Mill of supply and demand 
in the labour market in relation to the goods market 
analysis. At the hands of Mill especially, this had very
important consequences for his later wages fund discussion.
In chapter seven, on the wages fund debate, I will outline
and analyze Longe's 'refutation' of the wages fund doctrine,
Thornton's critique of labour market economics, and Mill's 
recantation in terms of the Lakatosian framework I have been 
applying. Having defended supply and demand theory applied to 
goods markets. Mill turned to the attack with regard to the 
wages fund doctrine. Mill accepted and expanded upon the
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criticisms of Thornton, and the critique which he produced 
raised enough serious questions about the fundamental basis 
of the theory, that he felt justified in arguing that it 
should be abandoned. Having said this. Mill was, in fact, 
very reluctant to abandon the theory completely given the 
absence of a superior alternative and this is very much in 
line with a Lakatosian view.
In the course of the two chapters I will also develop two 
lines of argument with regard to the timing of this debate. 
The first point goes directly to the heart of Lakatos' 
approach. I will argue that these criticisms followed a 
period during which wage theory made no theoretical progress. 
As I argued in chapter five, the wage fund doctrine was used 
to generate a number of novel facts in the 1830s and 1840s, 
but by the mid-1860s no further new additions had been made 
to the range of predictions derived from the wages fund 
theory by Senior in the 1830s, and by Mill in the first 
edition of the Principles in 1848. Mill's subsequent editions 
of the Principles simply reproduced these earlier 
predictions. The wages fund doctrine was then vulnerable to 
attack due to its lack of further theoretical progress, and 
the public political and economic focus on the role of the 
trades unions in the 1860s produced a climate in which these 
criticisms could take root.
The second point concerning timing relates to the role of 
external history. In chapter two I pointed out that Lakatos 
took a particular view of internal history related to the 
MSRP.3 This approach consigned a larger part of history to
2 See above pp31-35.
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external history, and yet, at the same time, external history 
was given a relatively unimportant role, and Lakatos argued 
that it should be consigned to the footnotes wherever 
possible.4 Although I agree with Lakatos' approach to 
rational reconstruction, I will argue for a more significant 
role for external history, which, in the case of the wages 
fund doctrine, was important in influencing the timing of the 
theoretical discussion. In the next section of this chapter, 
I will argue that a number of factors conditioned the context 
in which the refutation and recantation debate took place. 
This debate took place during a decade in which trades union 
issues and events were at the forefront of public interest 
and concern. The nature and role of the trades unions came 
under intense public scrutiny in the 1860s culminating in the 
appointment of a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the trades 
unions in 1867. It is not surprising under these 
circumstances that some attention should be paid to the 
teaching of the political economists with regard to trades 
unions and their activities. I have argued in chapters four 
and five^ that while the major political economists, with the 
exception of Mill, did not use the wages fund doctrine to 
argue against trades unions or strikes, other commentators 
and popularizers did. Significantly, in the recantation Mill 
makes some remarks which appear to run counter to this. In 
referring to the doctrine 'which denied it to be possible 
that trade combinations can raise wages' he says that the 
doctrine had been 'hitherto taught by all or most economists
4 See Lakatos [1971a, pl07].
 ^ See above ppl23-124, and ppl70-186.
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(including myself)'[1869, p517].^ Mill's statement is of
course literally correct. The doctrine which he argues most 
economists had taught was simply the wages fund doctrine and 
no-one denies that this was indeed taught by most classical 
writers. It seems likely that the reference to the use of the 
doctrine against unions is an implicit recognition of decades 
of such usage by popular writers, lesser known economists, 
journalists and other commentators, as well as a recognition 
of his own earlier position. All three major critics of the 
1860s - Longe, Thornton and Mill were sympathetic to trades 
unions,7 and all would have been aware of the ways in which 
the wages fund doctrine had been used.
It was against this background then that the three
critical pieces of work were undertaken, but we must keep the 
role of events in proportion. While interest in the trades 
unions was a factor, the criticisms were of a theoretical 
nature and related back to a fundamental weakness with the 
doctrine which I noted in chapter four.
Also while it is clear that there was a period of 
criticism involving a number of people, commentators have not 
been entirely wrong to pay most attention to Mill's
recantation. Mill was by far and away the best economist, and 
the most well known and influential figure of the three. His
 ^ West and Hafer [1978, p615] in discussing this point, asked why Mill 
felt he had to recant when, as they argued, most of the classical writers 
did not use the wages fund doctrine against the unions? Their explanation 
was that Mill 'sensed' that the wages fund doctrine had anti-union 
implications. According to my argument, instead of Mill having to 'sense' 
such implications he was simply implicitly referring to decades of the 
use of the wages fund against trade unions by more popular writers and 
other commentators, as well as acknowledging his own earlier views.
7 As Breit[1967, p513, nl4] points out Longe was not an economist but a 
lawyer who became assistant commissioner of the Children's Employment 
Commission. This employment gave him opportunities to meet employers of 
large numbers of workers and to gain insights into the opinion of 
businessmen with regard to wages.
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recantation was a very important development which influenced 
contemporary thinking and stood as a point of reference for 
future writers. Also, considerable acknowledgement has been 
paid to Thornton's role although his critique is not as good 
as Longe's, who in one or two key aspects, pre-dated Mill's 
recantation and outshone Thornton. On the other hand it was 
Thornton, and not Longe, who drew Mill into the debate 
because Thornton was sufficiently well known in his own right 
to merit a review by someone of the stature of Mill whereas 
Longe was not, and of course Mill was a personal friend and
colleague.G
II Fawcett, Mill and Trade Union Developments in the 1860s 
In chapter five I argued that the reaction of the trades 
unions to the wages fund doctrine was a mixture of the 
negative and the pragmatic, accepting some parts of Classical 
economic reasoning if it suited them, but by and large 
rejecting it. Thus the strikes that the popularizers claimed 
were futile, nevertheless persisted. However, despite this 
and despite the fact that the wages fund doctrine made no 
theoretical progress from the 1850s onwards, there had been 
no major attack on the wage fund theory. All of this was to
® while it is not possible to definitely establish that Longe's work 
influenced either Thornton or Mill, there is some evidence that Mill, at 
least, received a copy of Longe's Refutation in 1866. On the publication 
of Mill's recantation Longe immediately had the unsold copies of his
Refutation reissued with a new title page bearing the new date of 1869 
and including a preface referring to Mill's recantation arguing that 
Mill's account coincided entirely with his own. Longe did not here
acquaint the reader with the knowledge that he had sent Mill in 1866 a
copy of his Refutation but he made this clear some years later when
writing to Jacob Hollander. In this letter he expanded on his
relationship with Mill and Thornton, and his treatment by the economics 
establishment after the appearance of Mill's recantation. Longe claimed 
that he had sent Mill, Fawcett and others copies of his 1866 pamphlet,
and that in 1869, after Mill's article was published the importance of
his contribution was recognized when he was invited to dinner at the
Political Economy Club (see letter of Longe to Hollander cited in the 
Introduction to J Hollander[1903], A Reprint of Economic Tracts, John 
Hopkins Press, Baltimore).
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change in the 1860s which was a decade of both turbulence and 
progress for the trades union movement. Public attention and 
debate was focused on the piroper role and place for trades 
unions in society and this produced a climate of opinion in 
which friends of the movement could produce major theoretical 
attacks on the wages fund doctrine.
In the late 1850s the trade union movement began to mount 
a campaign against the Master and Servant Law which 
discriminated against workers by making breach of contract on 
their part a criminal offence, whereas it was deemed to be 
only a civil offence if carried out by an employer. The lead 
was taken by Alexander McDonald, the Scottish Miners' leader. 
In May 1864 these leaders organized a national conference of 
trade union delegates to discuss the issue and this was well 
attended by members of unions and trades councils. A 
political campaign followed which led to the Master and
Servant Act 1867 which remedied some of the defects of the 
current legislation but still left the unions vulnerable to 
criminal action in 'aggravated cases'. Continued pressure by 
the unions led to the establishment of Courts of Conciliation 
and Arbitration also in 1867.
This rather steady progress of pressure and reform became 
enveloped in a crisis which blew up from 1866 onwards. Bad 
trade in 1866-7 gave scope for opponents of unions and
commentators of various kinds to blame unions for undermining
the competitive position of British goods. On top of this
there was the culmination of "the Sheffield Outrages",* which
 ^ There had been a long history of violence against non-union workers in 
Sheffield and this came to a head in October 1866 with the blowing up of 
a workman's house. There was an immediate public outcry which attributed 
much of the blame to trade unionism. Cf P H Rathbone "The Moral of the
6: On Supply and Demand 232 
led to the appointment of a Royal Commission of Inquiry into 
trade unions in February 1867. In addition, in the January of 
that year, there was the famous decision in the case of 
Hornby v Close which deprived the unions of much of their 
assumed legal status under the Friendly Societies Act.
In the midst of this turmoil the union leaders attempted 
to retain a united front and put a case to the Royal 
Commission. A group of five men - the 'Junta' - formed the 
'Conference of Amalgamated Trades'. This group - William 
Allan, Robert Applegarth, Edwin Coulson, George Odger and 
Daniel Guile began meeting frequently and secretly in London. 
They managed to persuade the Royal Commission that they 
should nominate a member and they chose Frederic Harrison 
while Robert Applegarth was to act as expert trade union 
witness in attendance. In the end, due to a great extent to 
the efforts and skills of Harrison and Applegarth, the Royal 
Commission's Report was relatively favourable to the unions 
and recommended legal status, with some qualifications.
Perhaps not surprisingly in this atmosphere, attention 
began to be paid to the theory of wages which underpinned 
current thinking about unions and wages. An article on trades 
unions and strikes had been produced by Henry Fawcett in the 
Westminster Review in 1860 and this was important not only 
for the arguments he put forward but also for the influence
Sheffield outrages". Transactions of the National Association for the 
Promotion of Social Science. [1867, pp692-693].
In this case the Boilermakers Society sued the treasurer of its 
Bradford branch for some money which they claimed he owed the Society. 
The Boilermakers, like many other unions, had deposited a copy of their 
rules with the Registrar of Friendly Societies in the belief that the 
Friendly societies Act 1855 would provide them with a means of redress 
against defaulting officers and members. However, the judgment of the 
court was that trade unions lay outside the scope of the Act.
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he had on M i l l . I t  will be useful to outline the links with 
Mill before examining Fawcett and Mill's arguments in more 
detail. As a result of Fawcett's article Mill made important 
additions to the 5th. edition of the Principles in 1862, and 
the importance to Mill of Fawcett's contribution is further 
highlighted when four years later he wrote to Fawcett
congratulating him on including the Westminster Review ideas 
in the chapter on cooperation in his new book The Economic 
Position of the British Labourerr i 8 6 5 1 I n  the same letter 
he expressed doubts about Fawcett's chapter on wages, 
proclaiming that he thought he 'could show that an increase 
of wages at the expense of profits would not be an 
impracticability on the true principles of political 
economy '. It has been argued that this letter to Fawcett
expressing disagreement with him over wages marks the
beginning of Mill's change of mind, which was to come to full 
fruition in the recantation.^^ It seems more likely, however, 
that the seeds of change are to be found in Mill's positive 
reaction to Fawcett's earlier 1860 contribution, for this 
prompted Mill to make significants changes in the Principles, 
outlining a positive role for unions within an explicitly 
Smithian bargaining model of the labour market, and this
argument reappears in the recantation.
^  Many of the arguments in this article were first outlined by Fawcett 
in a paper presented to the National Association for the Promotion of 
Social Science in 1858, see H Fawcett, "The Theory and Tendencies of 
Strikes", Transactions of the National Association for the Promotion of 
Social Science. [1858, pp635-640].
Letter to Henry Fawcett, Jan.1st, 1866, in Mill, "The later letters". 
Collected Works, vol. XVII, [1972, pll30].
Letter to Fawcett, Collected Works. XVII, pi130.
^4 See for example Schwartz[1968, p94]
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Early in the 1860 article Fawcett presents a very clear
statement of the wages fund doctrine:
"The capital of a country is that portion of its past produce which has
been saved to aid future production, and the wage fund of a country is
the portion of this capital which is applied directly to remunerate 
labour. This wage fund is distributed amongst the whole labouring 
population, and therefore wages depend directly upon the amount of this 
fund, and inversely upon the number of the labouring population. If this 
wage fund is estimated in money, the above simple proportion determines 
the average money wages of the country. But the quantity of commodities 
which these money wages represent indicates the real remuneration of the 
labourer. The aggregate wages paid to the labourer are thus determined; 
wages, therefore, cannot be permanently raised without either increasing 
the wage fund or diminishing the number of IcÜDOurers" [1860, p5].
This discussion seems likely to have been the forerunner of
an almost identical statement in Fawcett's 1865 book, which
in fact was used by Thornton as the basis upon which he
launched his attack on the wages fund. But Fawcett here is
not critical. In fact he uses the wages fund doctrine in its
two period form to argue that any reduction of hours of work
by the workforce as a whole, while not reducing wages
immediately, will have such a consequence in the next
production period. Thus in the current production period 'the
wage fund which exists would not, perhaps, be immediately
diminished, and for a time it is quite possible that the
labourers will receive the same wages'[1860, p5]. However,
the reduced efforts of the workforce will result in reduced
output and thus in the next period the 'wage fund would be
necessarily diminished, and consequently it is quite
impossible, in the absence of any counteracting
circumstances, for the labourer to receive the same wages for
less work'[1860, p5]. This is nothing other than a quite
meticulous application of the logic of the two period wages
fund doctrine.
See below p283.
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From this orthodox initial position concerning the general 
average wage rate, Fawcett goes on to consider the question 
of strikes in relation to economic theory, and here his focus 
becomes the variation of wages in different employments. He 
argues 'the law of the apportionment of the wages fund 
amongst the different sections of the labouring population is 
complicated, but there are general tendencies which can be 
stated" [1860, p6]. First, there is the tendency that wages 
everywhere will be equalized; and secondly, 'there is the 
tendency that wages of different employments must constantly 
tend to be such as will enable the ordinary rate of profit to 
be returned to the capital employed'[1860, p6]. The latter 
tendency is 'more immediate, although ultimately it must be 
absorbed into the first'[I860, p6], and the two together tend 
to push wages to their 'natural rate'[1860, p6]. Fawcett was 
very concerned to stress that these tendencies take time to 
work and that there are causes which act to disturb wages 
from their natural rate. Many who unequivocally argue against 
strikes seem to ignore these properties of political economy:
"If it is supposed that the laws of demand and supply operate 
instantaneously, if all the affairs of commercial life were also 
regulated instantaneously by competition, and if, in a word, it is not 
remembered that political economy treats of tendencies which require 
time to produce their influence, strikes may be denounced in one general 
sentence, and the sweeping conclusion be asserted which is so constantly 
reiterated, that strikes must inevitably cause loss to the 
labourers"[1860, p6].
If markets operated instantly, then, strikes could do no good 
for the working classes, but, Fawcett argues, since 
disturbing causes are important, the question of strikes must 
be reconsidered. He then examines two cases. The first is 
where some cause operates to produce different wages in 
different industries, and here strikes could force employers 
to pay more exerting a 'tendency to equalize the wages of
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different employments'[1860, p7]. Employers would be unable 
to resist by bringing in fresh labour because wages elsewhere 
would be higher. The second case is where some 'temporary 
cause has temporarily raised the profits of a particular 
business above the ordinary rate'[1860, p8]. Here again a 
strike will force the employers to pay more, and 'the workman 
is forced upon his employer as a partner'[1860, pl7]. Fawcett 
went on to look forward to the day when workers and employers 
could form voluntary partnerships in which to share the 
fruits of their work [1860, pl7].
In the first of two new paragraphs added to the fifth 
edition of 1862 Mill discusses the argument that the labour 
market does not work perfectly and that consequently the 
market rate is not fixed for the worker 'by some self-acting 
instrument, but is the result of bargaining between human 
beings - of what Adam Smith calls 'the higgling of the 
market''[1862, p932]. This would appear to owe something to 
Fawcett although Fawcett did not refer to Smith in his 1860 
article. The other source that Mill quotes here is a pamphlet 
entitled Trades Unions and Strikes, their Philosophv and 
Intention written in 1860 by T J Dunning, secretary to the 
London Society of Bookbinders. As Schwartz[1968, p89] points 
out, Dunning cited Smith in support of his argument that 
workmen must combine in order to redress the balance between 
them and their employers.Perhaps inspired by Dunning, Mill
Mill refers to Dunning in a footnote introduced in the 1862 edition 
and placed at the end of the section on combinations. Dunning argued that 
capital had the advantage over labour because the employers could hold 
out longer, and "as he who can stand out longest in the bargain will be 
sure to command his own terms, the workmen combine to put themselves on 
something like an equality in the bargain for the sale of their Icdjour 
with their employers. This is the rationale of Trade Societies which is 
very clearly indicated by Adam Smith in his 'Wealth of Nations'"[1860, 
p7].
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explicitly links his comment about the 'higgling of the 
market' with the question of trade unions, a linkage which 
was not made i n  Smith's original d i s c u s s i o n : 7^
"...those who do not 'higgle' will long continue to pay even over a 
counter, more than the market price for their purchases, still more might 
poor labourers who have to do with rich employers, remain long without 
the amount of wages which the demand for their labour would justify, 
unless, in vernacular phrase, they stood out for it: and how can they 
stand out for it without organized concert? What chance would any 
labourer have, who struck singly for an advance of wages? How could he 
even know whether the state of the market admitted of a rise, except by 
consultation with his fellows, naturally leading to concerted action?" 
[1862, p932].
Here then Smith's argument about the need for countervailing 
power in the labour market is clear enough, and to it Mill 
adds the extra point that workmen on their own would suffer 
from lack of information concerning the relationship of the 
actual rate of wages to the market level. Now, while still 
retaining the passages I referred to earlier which questioned 
the likely efficacy of strikes for general and partial 
w a g e s , M i l l  argues that combination by workers is necessary 
for the market system to work effectively:
"I do not hesitate to say that associations of labourers, of a nature 
similar to trades unions, far from being a hindrance to a free market for 
labour, are the necessary instrumentality of that free market" [1862, 
p932].
Even here, however, one can detect a note of caution, perhaps 
related to Mill's concern about the behaviour of unions, in 
the reference to 'associations...of a nature similar to 
trades unions'. Nevertheless even with this qualification
7^ Smith's original reference appeared in Book I chapter five of The 
Wealth of Nations when discussing the point that different types of 
labour are not all equally disagreeable. When the different products of 
different sorts of labour are exchanged for each other some allowance is 
made, he argues, for the differing degrees of both hardship and ingenuity
not by any accurate measure but by the 'higgling and bargaining' of 
the market place [1776, p49]. Curiously, as Blaug[[1985, p50] notes.
Smith does not refer the reader to the rather longer analysis in Book I 
chapter 10 where he discusses five non-pecuniary factors which offset 
variations in pecuniary gains from employment.
See above ppl28-130.
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this new argument of Mill's in 1862 represents a major change 
compared with earlier editions.
In the second of the two new paragraphs Mill explicitly 
accepts the second of Fawcett's arguments, referring to him 
by name as the authority on which he was drawing. Mill argued 
that workers were now able to know when firms were prospering 
and when they were not, and that they tended to strike for 
higher wages when profits rose. This was now seen as part of 
the process by which workers would share in the increased 
profitability of their labour and for a second time Mill 
takes a remarkably positive view of strikes;
"Strikes, therefore, and the trade societies which render strikes 
possible, are for these various reasons not a mischievous, but on the 
contrary, a valuable part of the existing machinery of society" [1862, 
p933].
In case the reader had not grasped the point. Mill emphasises 
once again the point that strikes and unions are to be 
welcomed as an integral part of the market system.
The 1862 passage concerning unions remained substantially 
unchanged in the 6th. edition of 1865, and with regard to 
those passages where the wages fund doctrine is reaffirmed, 
these must taken as the position from which Mill was 
recanting in 1869. However, at the same time the 1862 edition 
reveals considerable progress by Mill towards the position 
taken eventually in 1869. Within a few pages, then. Mill 
outlined quite a complex approach to the labour market which 
included arguments both critical of and supportive of trades 
unions. The original 1848 analysis of the inability of 
unions to generally or partially raise wages above market
Biagini [1987, pp815-819] has argued that the trades unions were 
substantially encouraged by this 'new view' of Fawcett and Mill which 
appeared to offer some justification for industrial action.
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levels without adverse consequences is preserved, as is 
Mill's critical opinion of unions' attitudes to piece work 
first outlined in 1852. In 1862 however, there is the 
additional more positive view of combinations as a necessary 
part of the market system, required because of information 
problems and the inferior bargaining position of workers. The 
analysis is very Smithian in general approach, but Mill is 
closer to McCulloch of 1824 than Smith in spelling out the 
circumstances under which unions can have a useful role. I 
will argue in chapter seven that this line of argument, 
together with others, was to have an important role in Mill's 
recantation.
Another contributor to the debate was Charles Neate, 
professor of political economy at O x f o r d . I n  1861 he gave 
two lectures on trades unions in which he argued that there 
was 'no certain law' which determined the distribution of 
income between wages and p r o f i t s . H e  went on to defend many 
of the activities of unions and to urge political economists 
to incorporate trade unions within their doctrines. Neate's 
central point was that trades unions were now a reality and 
like it or not employers and political economists must come 
to terms with them.
Frederic Harrison regarded political economy as 
dehumanizing and incomplete. In his "Limits to Political 
Economy", in the Fortniahtlv Review of August 1865 he argued 
that political economy was not science because economists 
assumed away important moral and social forces. Their
20 See Frazer [1974, pl75]
C Neate, Two Lectures on Trades Unions, delivered in the University 
of Oxford, in the vear 1861. Oxford and London.
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theories were always constructed, he argued, on the basis of 
unrealistic assumptions which took insufficient account of 
man's wider motivations and influences. This was the case in 
the labour market where the distribution of income may depend 
on the interplay of moral and political forces which are left 
out of account in the economist's mechanical and rather arid 
analysis.
From the mid 1860s the attack on the wages fund doctrine 
became stronger and better focused, and major theoretical 
objections were developed by Longe, Thornton and Mill in 
order to attempt to refute the doctrine. All of them were 
connected with or owed some intellectual or political 
allegiance to the trades union movement. It seems extremely 
likely that the momentous events which had engulfed the 
trades unions in the 1860s and which had engaged much public 
attention were also responsible for directing the attention 
of these writers to a review and an evaluation of Classical 
wage theory. In the next section of this chapter I will 
examine Thornton's attack on the theory of supply and demand 
of commodities, and Mill's responses to this. Section IV 
presents an examination of the work of Longe, Thornton and 
Mill on the supply and demand of labour. In the following 
chapter I will analyze the criticisms and refutations of
Harrison argues as follows: "When, therefore, the economists lays
down a law respecting wages, for instance, based on modern civilization 
and competition, or on anything but laws of human character and Society, 
what he does comes to this: He states a proposition about human action 
which can only apply to states of society with habits and institutions 
exactly like that before him, and which would be true of that particular 
state of society if mankind acted upon certain special motives, which 
they never exclusively do.... All that he can give us is the following :- 
The actual rate of wages now and formerly, some of the causes on which 
they depend (value unknown), and what wages would tend to be if something 
happened which never happens" [1865, pp367-368].
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Longe, Thornton and Mill with regard to the wages fund
doctrine.
Ill Thornton and Mill on the Supply and Demand of
Commodities^^
While Thornton's book On Labour^^  has naturally been seen 
by most commentators as prompting Mill's apparent change of 
view concerning the wages fund doctrine, relatively little 
attention has been paid, until recently, to those passages in 
On Labour regarding the supply and demand for commodities 
which Mill also dealt with at length in the Fortniahtlv
Review. Thornton replied in some detail to Mill in the second 
edition of On Labour in 1870, and these exchanges therefore 
form a significant debate on supply and demand theory. It is 
not surprising that Mill paid so much attention to this 
aspect of Thornton's work. First, Thornton's analysis of 
supply and demand constituted a direct and powerful attack on 
the contemporary state of orthodox price theory, and noone 
had done more in the preceding twenty years both to advance
and consolidate this approach than Mill.^^ Here then were
23 The arguments of this section are based on J Vint, "Thornton and Mill 
on the Supply and Demand of Commodities ; A Lakatosian View", in The 
International Journal of New Ideas, vol. I, forthcoming.
^4 Thornton outlined much of the argument of On Labour in earlier 
articles in the Fortnightly Review. The discussion of supply and demand 
of commodities was discussed in "New Theory of Supply and Demand", 
Fortnightly Review No. XXXIV, October 1st [1866,pp420-434], and supply 
and demand in relation to the labour market in "What Determines the Price 
of Labour or the Rate of Wages", Fortnightly Review. Vol. 1, No. 5, May 
1st [1867, pp551-566]. Other major elements of Thornton's book, relating 
to the labour market and trades unions, were developed in articles in the 
Fortnightly Review in October, November and December, 1867.
See G J stigler, "The Nature and Role of Originality in Scientific 
Progress", Economica. Vol. XXII, Nov. 1955, reprinted in G J Stigler, 
Essavs in the History of Economics. University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago,[1965 ppl-15]. Stigler argues that Mill introduced the concept of 
demand as a schedule into English economics and was thus able to state 
the laws of supply and demand with 'substantial accuracy'[ 1965, p9]. For 
a recent discussion of Mill on demand see Bradley [1989, pp43-56].
Bradley argues that Mill's approach shows more analytical originality 
than he is generally given credit for [1989, p55].
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potential counterexamples to that theory and Mill needed to
deal with them. Secondly, Thornton linked his critique of 
supply and demand to the analysis of the wages fund doctrine, 
and Mill in turn partly accepted and repeated this link.
The approach of this chapter focuses on the processes of 
theoretical discussion and debate between Thornton and 
Mill. 7^ The important feature of the debate was that 
Thornton's arguments, while not unproblematic, formed an 
important series of potential counterexamples amounting to a 
fundamental challenge to price theory as it was currently 
constituted. Seen in these terms the debate was a rational 
one in two senses. First, both authors were arguing about the 
same, limited supply and demand research programme. In 
Lakatosian terms both spelt out the hard core of this 
programme in identical terms, one in order to attack and the
other to defend. Secondly, the debate was carried on by
argument and counterargument, with some points being conceded
2® Interest in the Thornton-Mill debate has been revived recently as a 
result of the exchanges in History of Political Economv between Negishi 
[1986] and Ekelund and Thommesen [1989]. Negishi argued that Thornton 
made a powerful attack on supply and demand theory based upon the 
possibility of trade being carried out in disequilibrium, and that this 
was not understood by Mill. He also claimed that Mill's recantation was 
based on a wrong interpretation of one of Thornton's examples, that of 
the fish auction, a mistake which Mill implicitly acknowledged in 1871. 
Ekelund and Thommesen replied claiming that Thornton demonstrated little 
or no knowledge of supply and demand theory, and that Negishi's claims 
that Thornton was a disequilibrium theorist were farfetched in terms of 
modern theory. While these interpretations vary in their assessment of 
the impact of Thornton's work on Mill and Mill's response, a common theme 
is the assessment of the Thornton-Mill debate from a neoclassical 
perspective. A key disadvantage with this 'transverse approach', as 
Fisher[1986, p57] has noted, is that it focuses almost exclusively on 
what is 'correct' or 'mistaken' in terms of current orthodoxy and sheds 
little or no light on the development of ideas in their historical 
context.
27 A Lakatosian approach supersedes, in my view, analyses based on 
neoclassical retrospection. Thus from the Lakatosian point of view it is 
not important whether Thornton was putting forward arguments which, with 
hindsight, can be seen as 'totally off the mark' as Ekelund and Thommesen 
[1989, p582] have suggested or 'absurd' as Stigler has claimed [1955, 
p9].
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and some defended. It is clear that Mill took Thornton's 
arguments seriously and was right to do so; hence his 
detailed review. Indeed the picture which emerges of Mill is 
that of a man who, in dealing with these counterexamples, 
behaved as many other scientists would - attempting to rebut 
where possible, accepting that some modifications may be 
necessary, and arguing that some cases are merely 
'exceptions'. All of this is consistent with Lakatos' view of 
scientific change and represents a more satisfactory basis 
for examining the events than those which seek out and focus 
upon errors and inconsistencies as perceived with hindsight.
In part (a) of this section I will briefly outline the 
Lakatosian framework within which the Thornton-Mill debate 
can be analysed, and I will spell out the key elements of 
supply and demand theory which both writers agreed 
represented the contemporary Classical position. These 
elements I will argue constitute the hard core of the 
Classical supply and demand research programme as constituted 
in the mid-18 6 Os, In part (b) using the Lakatosian 
perspective, I will examine Thornton's potential 
counterexample of the fish auction (where supply and demand 
schedules may be coincidental), and Mill's response to this. 
I will argue that Mill accepted the possibility of 
coincidental schedules and argued for a content-increasing 
strategy to deal with this. In part (c) I will again use the 
Lakatosian analysis to examine Thornton's other potential 
'horse and glove' counterexamples, I will argue that Mill's 
reactions to these examples were varied. Some examples were 
regarded as 'extreme cases' and here Mill appeared to be 
engaging in 'exception-barring', and was criticized for doing
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so by Thornton. With regard to other examples Mill used the 
strategy of 'monster-adjustment ', reinterpreting these 
examples as being consistent with the research programme. 
Finally in part (d) of this section I will briefly examine 
the debate between Negishi[1986] and Ekelund and
Thommesen[1989] on Thornton's status as a disequilibrium 
theorist. I will argue that the wide disparity of
interpretation between the two sides reflects the 
difficulties associated with applying the transverse
approach.
(a) The Thornton - Mill Debate
In setting up his attack on supply and demand theory
Thornton lays out the current doctrine as defined by Mill:
"The prevailing doctrine on this subject is variously expressed.
Sometimes the statement is simply that supply and demand determine price; 
sometimes, a little less loosely, that price depends on the proportion or 
relation between supply and demand. Always it is assumed that price rises 
when demand exceeds supply, and falls when supply exceeds demand. These
are the popular ways of putting the case, and in none of them is there
anything inconsistent with the more scientific language used by Mr. Mill, 
who, however, besides systematising previous notions on the subject, has 
made some material additions to the stock. With arguments which appeared 
to me to be irresistible, until I caught myself half unconsciously 
resisting them, he maintains that price depends on the equation of supply
and demand; propounding, as the law of value or price, that the price
resulting from competition will be the one at which demand and supply - 
the quantity supplied and the quantity demanded - will be 
equalised"[1869, p46].
Thornton asserts that proponents of these arguments always 
make their claims conditional on three further assumptions - 
that competition is 'perfectly free and unrestricted', that 
goods are 'offered unreservedly for sale', and that the 
customers are at least two in number[1869, p47]. Thornton
argues that supply and demand do not determine price even 
where these assumptions are met. He proposes to show this by 
bringing forward examples where although demand exceeds 
supply, price does not rise, and where at the price resulting
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from competition supply and demand will not be equal [1869, 
p47]. Thornton's underlying falsificationist methodological 
position is made clear a few pages later when he argues that 
although any particular example may be dismissed as an 
exception this would not impair its importance:
"...for a scientific law admits of no exceptions whatever; one single 
exception suffices to deprive it of all legal character. If one single 
instance could be found or conceived in which water failed to seek its 
own level, that water seeks its own level would cease to be a law" [1869, 
p50].
These are very rigid requirements to place on any theory; one 
single valid counterexample whether of a hypothetical or 
empirical nature will falsify a theory without, it seems, any 
further qualification.^® In contrast to this dogmatic 
falsificationist position Mill, I shall argue, took a much 
more sophisticated view and one which is best described 
within a suitably modified Lakatosian framework.
Accepting both the Fulton and Fisher modifications to 
Lakatoses it is possible to outline a hard core for a 
Classical price theory research programme. Such a hard core 
is precisely spelt out by Mill in the recantation where he 
argues that if demand exceeds supply price will be driven up 
and where supply exceeds demand price will fall [1869, p508]. 
Mill concludes:
"The law, therefore, of values, as affected by demand and supply, is that 
they adjust themselves so as always to bring about an equation between 
demand and supply, by the increase of the one or the diminution of the 
other; the movement of price being only arrested when the quantity asked
28 Thornton's position was also challenged by his Pall Mall Gazette 
reviewer who argued that the proposition that water always finds its own 
level is a theoretical one, while in practice water varies in density and 
never finds its own level. Similarly it is argued the laws of political 
economy never operate in practice in the way that the theory may suggest 
[anon. 1869, pl2]. To this Thornton replied in the second edition of on 
Labour, that while he did not wish to follow his reviewer into the 
'profundities of mathematico-aquatics.... [e]vidently he is of the opinion 
that, although according to him, water never finds its own level, still, 
that water does find its own level is a scientific law' [1870, p67n].
29 See above ppl7-18, pp46-49.
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for at the current price and the quantity offered at the current price, 
are equal. This point of exact equilibrium may be as momentary, but is 
nevertheless as real, as the level of the sea"[1869, p508].
Thornton, as I pointed out earlier, had outlined a similar
view in On Labour referring to Mill as having propounded:
"... as the law of value or price, that the price resulting from
competition will be the one at which supply and demand - the quantity
supplied and the quantity demanded - will be equalised"[1869, p46].
Both Thornton and Mill then appear to have subscribed to the
following set of hard core arguments: (a) price will rise if
demand exceeds supply (b) price will fall if supply exceeds
demand (c) a unique equilibrium price will result from the
interaction of given supply and demand schedules (d) at this
price the quantity supplied will equal the quantity demanded.
This can be written in the usual way as:
2 = f(p)
where z is an excess demand function representing the 
difference between demand and supply at every price.®®
Given this, Thornton's various cases and arguments do 
represent powerful potential counterexamples to Classical 
price theory. Supply and demand analysis as constituted above 
and prior to Thornton's critique could deal with 
inelasticity in either the demand or supply schedule but not 
in both, as this would invalidate (c) above. Moreover no 
attention been given to the difficult problem of 
disequilibrium trading. Thornton's arguments were challenging 
and had to be dealt with.
30 The same hard core is present in Mill's Principles see Mill collected 
Works, vol. II, [1848, pp466-468]. In writing the section in the
Principles on supply and demand. Mill still had in his mind his earlier 
review of De Quincey's Logic of Political Economyr18441 as his references 
to De Quincey's book signify. It is interesting to note that Mill's 
earlier review of De Quincey is in some ways similar to his later 
discussion of Thornton's critique of supply and demand. After endorsing 
De Quincey's analysis of utility and 'difficulty of attainment' as 
factors influencing value. Mill went on to rebut De Quincey's claim that 
price was not determined by supply and demand [Mill, 1845, pp398-401].
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(b) The Fish Auction I Example; Coincidental Schedules and 
Implications for Mill's Recantation.
The first example which Thornton brings forward relates 
to a fishing boat which discharges fish at Hastings or Dover. 
This fish is then sold by means of a Dutch auction where 
Thornton assumes that the weight of the lot to be a
hundredweight, and the final price to be 20s. Thornton argues 
that if instead of being sold by Dutch auction, the fish were 
sold by the usual English auction method, the price may rise 
until a price of 18s. might be reached, which no one other 
than the successful bidder is prepared to pay. Thus in the 
same market, with the same number of customers, the same
quantity of fish might fetch two different prices, and this
would contradict element (c) of the hard core. However, 
Thornton goes on to say that this is not an example of the 
existence of two different prices with supply and demand 
conditions the same, because supply was not the same at 18s. 
and 20s. Thus, sticking to the definition of supply which he 
has just put freshly into print, in one case supply was a 
hundredweight of fish at 18s• and in the other it was a 
hundredweight of fish at 20s. In fact, Thornton argues, it 
does not seem to be possible that price can vary with supply 
and demand the same as long as there is competition.
In his review of Thornton's book Mill goes carefully 
through these examples and, referring to this Dutch auction 
case, he argues that Thornton's analysis does not disprove 
the theory of supply and demand but merely shows it to be 
indeterminate in some respects, - 'a certain limited extent 
of variation is possible within these bounds of the law'[1869
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p509].®l What is required is a 'supplementary law, which 
determines the effect, between the limits within which the 
principal law leaves it free' [1869, p509]. Thornton, he
claims, has provided this in his example by discussing a case 
which is an 'exception to the rule that demand increases with 
cheapness':
"If there is a part of the scale through which the price may vary without 
increasing or diminishing the demand, the whole of that portion of the 
scale may fulfil the condition of equality between supply and 
demand"[1869, p509].
Thornton then had provided the 'supplementary law' in the 
form of the assumption of a perfectly inelastic demand curve 
between the prices of 18s. and 20s., which is coincidental 
with the supply curve over that range of prices.®® While of 
course neither Thornton or Mill use this sort of language, 
modern commentators have tended to put the analysis in these 
terms.®® Mill denies that Thornton has undermined supply and 
demand theory, arguing that even had he not provided the 
'supplementary law' (demand and supply inelasticities, and 
coincidental schedules) he would not have undermined supply 
and demand theory. As I have already noted. Mill regarded 
this case as an exception and he then went on to question 
whether such a case is likely to be very common. He argues 
that where one is considering a few potential customers for
In 1870 Fleeming Jenkin produced the first diagrammatic analysis of 
supply and demand schedules (see Jenkin [1870, pp76-93]). Part of the 
analysis was devoted to representing Thornton's examples diagrammatically 
[1870, PP82-86].
22 Fleeming Jenkin interpreted this example correctly in 1870, producing 
a diagram with a perfectly inelastic supply curve and a downward sloping 
demand curve which coincided with the supply curve for the relevant 
portion [1870, p84].
22 Both Breit[1967] and Negishi[1986] argue that this was what Thornton 
was in effect doing, and that Mill interpreted it in this way, although, 
as I shall argue, Negishi goes on to argue that Mill was wrong to do so. 
(see below p258). In his analysis Negishi makes it clear that the demand 
and supply schedules are vertical and coincidental over the relevant 
range [1986, pp569-570].
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fish on a beach it is a possibility, but where buyers can be 
numbered in thousands 'it is the next thing to impossible 
that more of the commodity should not be asked for at every 
reduction of price' [1869, p509]. However, it is very
important to note that later on in the recantation Mill made 
it clear that he thought that the labour market did fall
within Thornton's excepted case i.e. 'the case which the law
of equality between supply and demand does not provide for, 
because several prices all agree in satisfying that
law'[1869, p514].
In the second edition of On Labour Thornton replied to
Mill's point, although in doing so he shifted his ground:
" ...Mr. Mill, in reply, contends that what I have really shown is, not 
that no price would equalise supply and demand, but that two or more 
prices might equalise them. It seems to me, however, that in this 
particular case it would not be possible for supply and demand to be 
equal at two different prices. For the case is one in which demand would 
increase with cheapness. A hawker who was ready to pay 8s. for a hundred 
herrings, would want more than a hundred if he could get a hundred for 
6s. There being then but a given quantity in the market, if that quantity 
were just sufficient to satisfy all the customers ready to buy at 8S., it 
follows that it would not have sufficed to satisfy them if the price had 
been 6s. If supply and demand were equal at the former price, they would 
be unequal at the latter"[1870, p57n].
This case is unambiguously different from the first. In the 
1869 case there is no suggestion that demand will increase at 
the lower price, and Mill's response is predicated upon this 
initial argument; in responding to Mill in the way that he 
does Thornton makes it appear as if he is simply rewording 
his initial case, when, in fact, he is changing it entirely. 
Thornton's intention in doing this seems simply to attempt to 
rebut Mill's accusation that the case is an 'exception to the 
rule that demand increases with cheapness'[1869, p509].
24 Thornton changed the numerical basis of his example from the first to 
the second edition. In the former he referred to a hundredweight of fish 
being sold at 18s. or 20s.; in the latter a hundred fish are sold at 6s 
and 8s.
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In terms of Lakatos' approach, the fish auction example is 
a global counterexample to the supply and demand research 
programme. Lakatos argues that we must seek the local lemma 
to which this is a counterexample and in this case this can 
be identified as the assumption that no portions of the 
demand and supply schedules are coincidental. Incorporation 
of this lemma would yield the improved but reduced theorem 
that 'a unique equilibrium price will result from the 
interaction of given supply and demand schedules which are in 
no part coincidental', otherwise the equilibrium price may 
not be unique. An exception-barring strategy would be to 
reduce the theorem further to 'a unique equilibrium price 
will result from the interaction of a supply schedule which 
is continuous and upward-sloping and a demand schedule that 
is continuous and downward-sloping'. This however will 
unnecessarily bar those examples where there is inelasticity 
in one or both of the schedules but where there is still a 
unique equilibrium price. It would also bar those Giffen 
cases where there are upward sloping demand curves and where 
there will a single equilibrium price but where this price 
may or may not be stable. The theorem would thus be reduced 
too far. Lemma incorporation then can improve the theorem but 
it will reduce its content, although not as much as an 
exception-barring strategy. If the objective is to increase 
content then what is required is lemma replacement or other 
theoretical adjustments which will allow the observation that 
produced the initial counterexample to become a corroboration 
of the theorem. This has been accomplished in modern theory 
where coincidental schedules can be allowed for and would not 
be seen as problematic. Thus one would no longer wish to
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constrain the model always to produce a single equilibrium 
price. Mill's own objective seems fairly clear; he was 
anxious to find a 'supplementary law' that would deal with 
the problem, and in suggesting that Thornton had provided it, 
argued that 'whoever can teach us this supplementary law, 
makes a valuable addition to the scientific theory of the 
subject'[ 1869, p509].®^ So here he seems to be arguing in 
favour of a content-increasing strategy. It is true that he 
regards the case as likely to be a rare exception, but there 
is no suggestion that this exception must be barred or 
excluded from the theory in any way. The theory, according to 
Mill, must be expanded to include cases of coincidental 
schedules where more than one price can equate supply and 
demand.
(c ) The Fish Auction II, Horse and Glove Examples; the 
Critique of Equilibrium and Mill's Defence 
Having discussed the fish auction example which in its 
1869 form was not intended as a critique of orthodox theory, 
Thornton then goes on to present a number of cases which were 
designed to invalidate Mill's approach. Mill's view of supply
and demand is once again outlined by Thornton as follows:
"Now his theory is that price is always tending to a point at which 
supply and demand will be equal; that price will keep falling towards 
this point as long as supply exceeds demand, and rising towards it as 
long as demand exceeds supply"[1869, p52].
The specific aims of the examples were to show (i) that where 
there is excess demand price may not adjust to equilibrium, 
(ii) that where there is excess supply price will fall but 
not necessarily to equilibrium, and (iii) that, even if as a 
result of competition, price is at a level, after adjustment,
22 My emphasis.
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which equates supply and demand nevertheless only a fraction 
of the supply will have been sold at the equilibrium price. 
In this part of section III I will examine these examples and 
the varying ways in which Mill dealt with them.
(i) Excess demand with no price adjustment
Thornton refers to two other examples (as well as an 
amended version of the fish auction I example, which I shall 
refer to as the fish auction II example) in his critique of 
supply and demand theory. Whereas the fish auction I case was 
designed to show that more than one price may equate supply 
with demand, these later examples were designed to show that 
no one price would equate supply with demand. The first 
example concerns the sale of a horse:
"Suppose two persons at different times, or indeed in different places, 
to have each a horse to sell valued by the owner at 50l. ; and that in the 
one case there are two, and in the other three persons, of whom every one 
is ready to pay 50l. for the horse, though no one of them can afford to 
pay more, in both cases supply is the same, viz., one horse at 50l.; but 
demand is different, being in one case two, and in the other three, 
horses at 50l. Yet the price at which the horses will be sold will be the 
same in both cases, viz., 50l"[1869, p49].
The other two examples illustrate the same point.®® Thornton 
puts forward these three cases, then, as examples of excess 
demand not leading to a rise in price towards equilibrium 
[1869, pp52-52], and Negishi [1984, pp573-574] argues that 
here Thornton is making important points about the nature of 
equilibrium. I will argue in section IV that these examples
®® This is immediately followed by the fish auction II case. Here 
Thornton amends the earlier fish example by assuming that in addition to 
the original customer buying at 18s. there are two others: "The total 
demand would then have been three hundredweight at IBs., yet the 
resulting price would still have been only 18s. the same as it was when 
the demand was only one hundredweight, the supply remaining the seime" 
[1869, pp49-50]. A few pages later he produces the similar glove example 
where a glover who is assumed to have a dozen pair of gloves on the eve 
of a ball, faces a dozen customers who will pay no more than ten 
shillings per pair. If now a second dozen enter the shop who are equally 
prepared to pay ten shillings but no more, demand will have doubled but 
price will not have risen [1869, pp51-52].
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are not clearly or fully specified enough for this conclusion
to be drawn.
Mill himself accepted that the horse example created 
difficulties with orthodox theory but argued that this was
because the example was so extreme - 'at £50 there is demand
for twice or three times the supply; at £50. Os. %d. there is 
no demand at all'[1869, p510]. In fact, he argued, the horse 
example was 'the extreme case which proves the law'[1869, 
p510]:37
"The law is, that the price will be that which equalises the demand with 
supply; and the example proves that this only fails to be the case when 
there is no price that would fulfil the condition, and that even then, 
the same causes, still operating, keep the price at the point which will 
most nearly fulfil it. Is it possible to have any more complete 
confirmation of the law, than that in order to find a case in which the 
price does not conform to the law, it is necessary to find one in which 
there is no price that can conform to it"? [1869, pSlO].
Mill took a similar line when commenting on the glove
example,®® although he had nothing to say about the fish
auction II case.®® Mill clearly found it more difficult to
see how these cases could be incorporated into existing
Thornton's Edinburgh Reviewer also took issue with this example, 
arguing that Thornton was not allowing competition between sellers or 
buyers to take place, and that effective demand was the same whether 
there were two or three prospective buyers [anon. 1869, p394]. Thornton 
replied to this in the second edition of on Labour, repeating the point 
that demand was varying and yet price remained the same [1870, p59n].
®® Thus Mill argues : "The case is just possible in a very small market - 
practically impossible in the great market of the community. But, were it 
ever so frequent, it would not impugn the truth of the law, but only its 
all-comprehensiveness. It would show that the law is only fulfilled when 
its fulfilment is, in the nature of things, possible, and that there are 
cases in which it is impossible; but that even there the law takes 
effect, up to the limit of possibility "[1869, p511].
29 while Mill did not comment on the fish auction II case Thornton's 
reviewer in British Quarterly for October 1869 did. The reviewer argued 
first, that the fish would be wanted for re-sale and thus it was unlikely 
that price would not be bid up, and secondly that the science of 
political economy assumes that 'desire of any human beings for any given 
object... .varies by almost imperceptible degrees, and not by sudden leaps 
over wide intervals' [anon. 1869, p464]. Thornton in turn replied to this 
in the 1870 edition of On Labour, insisting that while there may be more 
people prepared to pay the lower price than can be satisfied by the 
quantity available, none of them, by assumption, would be prepared to pay 
a higher price[1870, p60n].
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theory because of the apparent absence of an equality between
supply and demand. This suggests that the notion that supply 
and demand are equated in equilibrium [element (d) in the 
hard core, (see above p246) was regarded as a more important
feature of the theory than the idea that this is produced by
a unique equilibrium price [element ( c ) of the hard core]. 
Thus the horse and glove examples, where demand was greater 
than supply, were not so easy to accept within the framework 
as the fish auction case had been. While Mill cannot quite 
bring himself to explicitly argue that these cases are 
exceptions to be barred from the theory, the reference to 
'the extreme case which proves the law', and the supporting 
analysis, suggests that he was engaging in 'exception- 
barring'. Certainly this was how Thornton interpreted Mill's 
comments.
Thornton was very unhappy with Mill's response to these 
excess demand examples and took issue with him in the second 
edition of On Labour. He refers to Mill pronouncing the horse 
and glove cases 'to be extreme cases, which, "instead of 
conflicting with the law , prove it," and "do not impugn its 
truth, but only its all-comprehensiveness" '[1870, p68]. But 
he continues:
"..surely the very essence of as scientific law is its all­
comprehensiveness. what every such law does is to declare that in certain 
given circumstances certain results will invariably and inevitably ensue. 
In a declaration like this surely all cases whatsoever are comprehended 
around which the supposed circumstances are present. To whatever extent, 
then, it can be shown that the supposed circumstances might occur without 
being attended by the supposed results, to that same extent the law is 
shown to be not simply defective but false, and, what is worse, 
deceiving. Purporting to apply to all, it applies only to part, without 
affording any hint that another part, or any clue as to what part, is 
excepted from its operation"[1870, p69].
It is clear from this that Thornton thought that Mill was 
engaging in exception barring and attempting to escape from
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the rigid falsificationist criteria which Thornton had laid 
out.
(ii) Excess supply, price adjustment and overshooting
Thornton's discussion of excess supply made some 
concessions to orthodoxy. He argued that if supply exceeded 
demand price would indeed fall. Referring to the examples 
already covered:
"In the circumstances supposed, a dealer must either lower his terms or 
part of his stock will be left on his hands. Three horses cannot possibly 
be sold at 50l. a piece, nor three pairs of gloves at 3s. a pair, if at 
those prices only one horse, or one hundredweight of fish, or one pair 
gloves be demanded. If a dealer wishes to sell more than is actually 
demanded, he must tempt customers to demand more by reducing his 
price"[1869, p52].
However Thornton went on to argue that while this may be 
'near enough to the truth for most practical purposes, it is 
not accurate enough to satisfy the rigid requirements of 
science'[1869, p53]. Because price falls as result of excess 
supply, this does not necessarily imply that it will stop 
falling precisely at equilibrium price:
"The only thing certain is that the point at which the fall will cease 
will be one at which supply will not be in excess of demand, but it may 
quite possibly proceed to some lower point, at which demand will be 
excess of supply"[1869, p53].
Thus price, Thornton argues, may overshoot the equilibrium
point and Thornton illustrates with reference back to the
horse example:
"Because a horse offered for sale at 60l. finds no purchaser, and cannot 
be sold until its price be reduced to 50l., it does not follow that only 
one person would give 50l. for the horse, or that he himself would not 
willingly give 50l. a piece for two or three such horses"[1869, p53].
Price having fallen to below equilibrium it would not rise
again according to Thornton's analysis, although this is not
stated. Mill makes no comments on these arguments in his
review despite the fact that they are an integral part of
Thornton's critique.
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(iii) Disequilibrium trading
Having attacked the arguments concerning excess supply and 
excess demand, Thornton then proceeds to argue that even if 
the price that ultimately resulted from adjustments due to 
competition were the equilibrium price, only a small 
proportion of the goods offered for sale would have been sold 
at the final equilibrium price. He returns to the glove 
example to illustrate the point, but this example appears to 
refer to a case of discriminating monopoly and it was dropped 
in the 1870 e d i t i o n . 4® Immediately following this example 
however, Thornton presents an attack on orthodox theory which 
is made stronger by Thornton's acceptance of the premises of 
orthodoxy at the outset:
"Suppose it to be true, which it is, that where there is unrestricted 
competition, prices must fall as long as supply exceeds demand; and 
suppose it to be also true , which it is not, that in the same situation 
price must rise as long as demand exceeds supply - still, even then none 
but the extreme prices finally reached would be determined by the 
relations between supply and demand. None of the prices intermediate 
between the original set-up price and the final price would be so 
determined. But it is not at the finally resulting price that goods would 
be chiefly sold, but rather at the original set-up price, or at prices 
intermediate between it and the final price"[1869, pp54-55].
Negishi [1986, pp567, pp573-575] focused on this and earlier
examples to argue that Thornton can be seen as a pioneer of
modern post-Walrasian disequilibrium economics. I will argue
in the next section that this particular passage can indeed
be seen as a forceful critique of the notion of equilibrium
in the supply and demand research programme, but that the
40 Here Thornton appears to be putting forwcurd a case discriminating 
monopoly where the seller seeks to maximize revenue by moving either up 
or down the demand curve in response to the rapidity or otherwise of 
sales, but that at all times the quantity which is sold at the price 
which finally disposes of the stock is one at which only a fraction of 
the output will have been sold. It is only in this context that one can 
make sense of the argument that the rest of the output is sold, whether 
price is rising or falling, where supply exceeds demand [1869, p54].
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argument that all of Thornton's other examples can be 
likewise interpreted is problematic.
Mill rebutted Thornton's argument by arguing that this is 
merely the same as saying that the law in question produces 
its effects not suddenly, but gradually:
"A law which determines that the price of the commodity shall fall, and 
fixes the exact point which the fall will reach, is not justly described 
as 'a truth of small significance' merely because the dealers, not being 
dead matter, but voluntary agents, may resist for a time the force to 
which they at last succumb. Limitations such as these affect all 
economical laws, but are never considered to destroy their value" [1869, 
p511].
Thus Thornton's views on disequilibrium are rejected on the 
grounds that what Thornton is describing is simply the 
process of adjustment towards equilibrium. Mill's approach 
here then is a straightforward example of 'monster
adjustment'. The monster in this case is the possibility of
trade taking place at disequilibrium prices and this is 
simply reinterpreted as an example which is completely in
line with the theory. Disequilibrium trading is regarded as a 
process of adjustment which is an integral part of the theory 
and thus corroborates it.
(d) Thornton as a Disequilibrium Theorist
Negishi[1986, p567, pp573-575] has argued that Thornton's 
analysis of supply and demand in On Labour represented an 
important contribution to the development of a disequilibrium 
model of markets. It is clear in the case which I have just 
examined that Thornton put forward a powerful argument, and 
Negishi is right to see it as a pioneering effort in the
analysis of disequilibrium at the market level. However there 
are a number of weaknesses with Negishi's overall argument. 
First, Ekelund and Thommesen[1989, pp574-575] are quite right 
to warn of the dangers of elevating Thornton to the status of
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a disequilibrium theorist in the post-Walrasian tradition. 
Thornton was writing well before Walras and was discussing 
particular markets and not general equilibrium or 
disequilibrium. Secondly, a key difficulty associated with a 
transverse reading of the kind which Negishi presents is that 
once having established some link between the past and the 
present there is a temptation to interpret all the historical 
arguments as examples of the piece of contemporary theory 
which they are supposed to have predated. Thus Negishi, as I 
have noted, argued that the fish auction case was in fact an 
example of disequilibrium analysis which Mill misunderstood, 
whereas I have argued that the 1869 version was the 
significant one for Mill's recantation, and that this was not 
an example of disequilibrium analysis but an argument 
concerning coincidental schedules.Again Negishi interprets 
the fish auction II, and horse and glove examples as cases of 
disequilibrium. The difficulty with this as Ekelund and 
Thommesen [1989, p581] note is that the models at the back of
Moreover Negishi's readiness to retrospectively read all of Thornton's 
cases as examples of disequilibrium analysis led him to an interpretation 
of the 1869 example from which further misleading historical inferences 
were drawn. Thus Mill argued that vertical coincidence of schedules was 
an' exception to the rule that demand increases with cheapness'[1869, 
p509] and later, (as I argued above p249) he argued that the labour 
market may fall into this excepted category. The recantation therefore, 
Negishi argued, was based upon a false reading of the fish auction 
example. I have argued that, on the contrary, it was Thornton who shifted 
his ground between the 1869 and 1870 editions. Moreover in the 1870 
edition Thornton agreed with Mill's argument relating to the nature of 
capitalists' demand for labour; "The quantity of labour which an employer 
needs, depends upon the work he wants to have done. If there are certain 
jobs which it is essential to him to get finished within a certain time, 
he will, if labour be dear, consent to pay pretty high for the quantity 
needed to complete the jobs within the time. But he will not, merely 
because labour happens to be cheap instead of dear, hire more than that 
quantity... .Whenever, as in the case of labour, demand does not increase 
with cheapness, demand, as Mr. Mill has further pointed out, may be 
perfectly equalised with supply at many different prices" [1870, p87]. 
Given this, then, Negishi's claim that Mill's recantation was based on an 
interpretation of Thornton which was wrong, is in itself erroneous. Mill 
made a clear distinction between the commodity and labour markets, and 
undertook a clear analysis of the latter, separate from the auction 
example, an analysis which was accepted by Thornton himself.
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Thornton's examples are not very clearly specified. Most of 
the examples are at the level of the individual seller or 
firm, and the underlying market structures are not spelt out. 
Thus the fish auction II and glove examples could be cases of 
local monopoly while the horse example seems to be one of 
duopoly. If so, Thornton's analysis would be inconsistent 
with his objective which is to show that supply and demand do 
not determine price even where the competitive assumptions 
hold. On the other hand in these examples, demand appears to 
be perfectly elastic at a particular price and this is not 
inconsistent with an analysis of competition at the level of 
the individual firm. Excess demand at the local level for the 
product of a perfectly competitive firm will not lead to the 
price rising for that firm. On this reading Thornton may have 
been pointing to some very important issues relating to the 
relationship between the equilibrium of the firm and the 
equilibrium of the market which were only resolved in later 
decades. In neither of these interpretations, however, would 
these particular examples have any significance for the 
question of market disequilibrium.
The lack of clarity in Thornton's underlying models have 
led Ekelund and Thommesen [1989, pp569-573] to argue that 
Thornton did not really understand the supply and demand 
analysis he was attacking. In my view this argument cannot be 
supported and in any case misses the point. As I argued 
above, Thornton laid out the basis of the supply and demand 
research programme in the same terms as Mill, and in this 
sense he clearly understood the analysis. It is possible that 
subsequently he was inconsistent in his argument as I noted. 
On the other hand it also possible that he was making some
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important points about the relationship of the firm to the
market. Moreover, it must also not be forgotten that the
general argument that Thornton put forward concerning trading 
at disequilibrium prices was put at the level of the market 
and was on the basis of the competitive assumptions. 
Thornton's arguments then were at the least potentially
powerful counterexamples to the supply and demand research 
programme. Significantly, Mill himself regarded all of these 
counterexamples as falling within the framework of the 
competitive supply and demand model which both he and 
Thornton had outlined at the outset, although he seems to 
have engaged in exception-barring at one stage. The point, 
then, is not that Thornton's analysis may have been erroneous 
in terms of the later analyses of Edgeworth or Vickrey, as 
Ekelund and Thommesen show [1989, pp578-585], but that Mill 
took these potential counterexamples seriously, responded to 
them in a number of ways consistent with a Lakatosian view of 
the progress of science, and that his response in relation to 
the fish auction had important consequences for the history 
of the wages fund doctrine.
IV Longe, Thornton and Mill on Labour Supply and Demand and
the Wages Fund Doctrine
I have already noted the link between the Dutch auction 
case and the labour market."^® Longe, Thornton and Mill went 
on to further discuss the relationship of supply and demand 
to the wages fund doctrine, and it is to these treatments 
that I now turn. Longe was content to point to 
inconsistencies in Mill's treatment of supply and demand in
42 See above p249.
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the labour and goods markets, but Thornton went further, 
arguing that, as with commodities, supply and demand did not 
determine the wage rate. In contrast to his reaction to the 
commodity supply and demand arguments. Mill in this case 
accepted Thornton's point.
Longe posed a counterexample to the wages fund research 
programme in the form of an anomaly which he argued existed 
in the treatment by both Mill and Fawcett of the supply and 
demand for labour and the supply and demand for commodities. 
They attempted to make use of an analogy which, he argued, is 
both confusing and misused. He refers to passages from both 
authors to show that they make reference to the operation of 
supply and demand in commodity markets when attempting to 
explain the use of supply and demand with regard to labour. 
Longe quotes a passage from Mill's Principles where Mill 
draws an analogy between the effects of competition in goods 
markets and labour markets:
"Goods can only be lowered in price by competition to the point which 
calls forth buyers sufficient to take them off; and wages can only be 
lowered by competition until room is made to admit all the labourers to a 
share in the distribution of the wage-fund. If they fell below this 
point, a portion of capital would remain unemployed for want of 
labourers, a counter-competition would commence on the side of the 
capitalists, and wages would rise" [1848, CW, II, p356] .
Longe points out that while Mill is drawing an analogy here
he stops short of referring to a 'purchase fund' for goods
similar to the wages fund for l a b o u r . Longe then went on to
argue that the idea that a fixed fund must be spent on a
43 Quoted by Longe[1866] on page 23.
44 A few pages later Longe reinforces this argument pointing to the 
absurdity of the notion that a fixed fund may have to be spent on goods ; 
"Mr. Mill's theory would require the lucky purchasers who got their goods 
too cheap to give the money thus saved to the other consumers, and that 
then their demand for or want of the remaining supply would be such as to 
induce them to pay the whole of the increased funds thus at their 
disposal in the purchase of that remaining part;-a supposition which is 
simply absurd"[1866, pp26-27].
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particular commodity would imply that a particular variation 
in supply would produce a proportional change in price. 
Longe went on to show that Mill argued explicitly against 
this in the Principles, thereby revealing that Mill's 
analysis of supply and demand when applied to commodities 
differed from the analysis of the supply and demand of 
labour.
Longe followed this up by discussing another difference 
between the labour and commodity markets which Mill had 
glossed over. He pointed out that Mill insisted that one 
should not talk in terms of the ratio of supply and demand 
with regard to commodities but should instead refer to the 
relationship between the quantity supplied and the quantity 
demanded. However, Longe argued. Mill omitted to do this 
himself when discussing lab o u r / * ?
He indicated that Mill at one stage argued in these terms in the 
pages of the Times (February 15th 1866) when discussing the Cattle Plague 
Bill. In discussing compensation for dead cattle Mill argued that 'in 
whatever proportion the supply of cattle was diminished, in that 
proportion the price would be enhanced' (see Longe [1866, p27]>. However, 
as Longe points out. Mill withdrew this argument in another letter to the 
Times two days later (see Longe[1866, p27]).
42 In the example Longe refers to from the Principles. Mill discusses 
the consequences of a deficiency in supply : "Let us suppose that the
demand at some particular time exceeds the supply, that is, there are 
persons ready to buy at the market value a greater quantity than is
offered for sale. Competition takes place on the side of the buyers, and 
the value rises; but how much? In the ratio, some may suppose, of the 
deficiency. If the demand exceeds the supply one-third, the value rises 
one-third. By no means ; for when the value has risen one-third, the
demand may still exceed the supply; there may even at that higher value 
be a greater quantity wanted than is to be had, and the competition of 
buyers may still continue. If the article is a necessary of life, which 
rather than resign, people are prepared to pay for at any price, a 
deficiency of one-third may raise the price to double, triple, or
quadruple. Or, on the contrary, competition may cease before the value
has risen in even the proportion of the deficiency, A rise short of one- 
third may place the article beyond the means or beyond the inclinations 
of purchasers to the full amount ' [1848, CW, II, p466-467]. The emphasis 
is Longe's, see Longe [1866, p29].
47 The full passage is: "The demand for a commodity, then, is not the 
quantity of money wherewith it is to be purchased, but the quantity of 
the commodity itself wanted by purchasers. But what is Mr Mill's law of 
wages? "Wages then depend upon the demand and supply of labour, or as it 
is often expressed, upon the proportion between population and capital '.
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Longe concluded that the wages fund doctrine was not 
originally based on the notion of supply and demand but 
simply developed from the proposition that at any one time 
the wages of labourers are limited by the quantity of 
circulating capital allocated to labour. But, Longe argues, 
this will only set a limit to what the workers could get and 
will not determine what they actually will get, a point that 
will be taken up in the next chapter.
Three-quarters of the way through the chapter on supply 
and demand, Thornton turned his attention to an analysis of 
the applicability of supply and demand ideas to the labour 
market.*® Thornton argued that there is an important 
difference between the labour market and the market for 
commodities. Thus while in goods markets the factor which 
determines price is competition among sellers, in the labour 
market competition among buyers also affects price and in 
most cases is the dominant factor. This is because labour is 
almost always offered for sale without 'reservation of
with an unaccountable forgetfulness of having previously used the demand 
for the 'commodity labour' in the very same way which he had just 
condemned, Mr Mill thus refers to his law of wages in the end of the 
chapter from which the above passage is quoted: 'Finally, there are
commodities of which, though capable of being increased or diminished to 
a great and even to an unlimited extent, the value never depends upon 
anything but demand and supply. This is the case in particular with the 
commodity labour, of the value of which we have treated copiously in the 
preceding book'. Mr Mill leaves it to his readers to reconcile, if 
possible, the two uses of the term 'demand', and to extricate him from a 
difficulty, the solution of which would have discovered the error of his 
theory of wages, and the unreality of the entire system on which that
theory was based" [1866, pp31-32].
42 Thornton began by stating very clearly that the price of labour in 
the absence of combinations on either side of the market will depend, as 
in the goods market, on competition and not on supply and demand. He 
provided a labour market example to show that with supply and demand 
remaining the same and consisting of three farmers and twelve labourers,
the wage rate will depend on whether the farmers or the labourers are
more urgently in need of work [1869, pp66-69 ]. The more urgent the need 
on either side of the market, the greater the degree of competition on 
either side, and it was the degree of competition either by the workers 
or the employers which would determine where the wage rate would 
eventually settle.
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price'[1869, p69] unlike other commodities, and this due to 
two factors. First, labour will not keep - labour not done 
today is not available tomorrow;*® and secondly, labourers 
usually have nothing other than their labour to live on and 
therefore cannot hold out for higher wages.®® Thus for these 
two reasons together labour is usually sold without 
reservation of price [1869, p74-75].®^ To make matters more 
difficult still for the workers, Thornton argued, labourers 
are usually faced with the additional handicap of combination 
by employers. The ability of employers to combine stems from 
the fundamental reality that while '[i]n every other 
department of trade the customers greatly outnumber the 
dealers....in the labour market, on the contrary, the dealers
Thornton argues as follows: "All other commodities may be stored up 
for a longer or shorter time, without loss either in quantity or quality. 
But labour will not keep; it cannot be left unused for one moment without 
partially wasting away. Unless it be sold immediately, some portion of it 
can never be sold at all. To-day's labour cannot be sold after to-day, 
for to-morrow it will have ceased to exist. A labourer cannot for 
however short a time, postpone the sale of his labour, without losing the 
whole price of the labour which he might have exercised during the period 
of the postponement"[1869, p70].
®® Thornton argues that: "Labourers who live by the sale of their labour
have, for the most part, nothing but their labour to live upon the
well-being of these depends mainly on the bargain they can make for their 
labour, and extreme poverty virtually disables them from bargaining. It 
forbids their standing out as all other sellers are accustomed to do, for 
their price"[1869, pp70-71].
21 Thornton points out in a footnote [1869, p74n] that Cairnes had
expressed some disagreement with the manuscript on the importance of the 
second of these two points. Cairnes argued that poverty was the sole 
cause of the labourers' weak bargaining position. The loss that a 
labourer suffers by not working is offset by the comfort or enjoyment he 
gains as a result, and thus what is being sacrificed is a net amount 
analogous to the profit lost on a product that remains unsold. In this 
sense then labour is no different, cairnes had argued, to other goods. 
Thornton disputed this, arguing that the labour lost to-day will be lost 
forever. For him the analogy was with a farmer who having decided not to 
sell corn to-day in hopes of a higher price to-morrow, finds that the 
ricks have burnt down and the entire product has been lost, not just the 
profit, while Cairnes had made a useful point, as Thornton conceded, 
Thornton's argument is in the end more compelling in terms of the 
strategic position in which it leaves the labourer.
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usually greatly outnumber the customers'[1869, p76-77].®®
Thornton appears to be not very consistent in his discussion 
of employers' combinations. In one place he argued that 
employers will invariably combine to lower wages or keep them 
below what they would have been except when labour is 
scarce.®® Later on he maintained that when labour is very 
scarce employers 'generally agree among themselves not to pay 
so much for it as competition would have compelled them to 
do'[1869, p83]. A key to the disparity of these two
statements is the argument sandwiched between them that 
employers' combinations determine the wage rate 'and 
determine it arbitrarily - not indeed absolutely without 
regard to the relations between supply and demand, but 
without any uniformity of correspondence of those 
relations'[1869, p83]. Indeed, he went on to say that
sometimes when labour is abundant masters may pay more for it 
than they have toi [1869, p83]. He concluded by making the 
point that while masters probably never exercise all the 
power they possess with regard to the workers, nevertheless 
'the combined masters really posses whether they choose to 
exert it or not, almost absolute power of control over the 
wages of uncombined workmen ' [1869, pp83-84]. Thornton's
vision of the labour market then was one where the wage rate 
is determined most of the time by the employers who regularly 
combine together and who only rarely compete. The final 
outcome will depend on the relative bargaining strength of
®® The Spectator reviewer picked up on this point and Thornton changed 
the wording slightly in the second edition; see Thornton[1870, plOOn].
22 Thornton refers to Smith's argument here that masters are always 
combining to prevent wages rising above their actual rates, and in this 
discussion Thornton points out that where labour is scarce such 
combinations may break down [1869, pp78-79].
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employers and their actual behaviour in the market, and will 
thus bear no systematic relationship to the supply and demand 
for labour. Thornton went on in the rest of the book to argue 
that trades unions have an important role in redressing the 
balance in the labour market, and are under certain 
circumstances, able to achieve increased living standards for 
their members.®*
Mill picked up on Thornton's arguments in two ways. First, 
he accepted that labour may indeed be one of the exceptions 
that Thornton discussed when analyzing supply and demand - 
one where several prices may equate supply and demand.®® 
Secondly, given that there is no unique wage rate that must 
be arrived at, the actual wage rate will be determined 'by 
causes which operate strongly against the labourer, and in 
favour of the employer'[1869, p514]. Here he agreed with
Thornton that the employers will have the upper hand in the 
bargaining process,®® although he focused on the fact that 
they can take advantage of the labourers ' inability to hold 
out rather than on the simple fact that employers are fewer 
in number.®? This, Mill argued, may enable employers to 'keep
®* I will discuss Thornton's analysis of the consequences of and the 
limits to trades union action in chapter seven, see below pp301-304.
®® See above p249.
®® Mill argued this point as follows: "For as the author observes, there 
is this difference between the labour market and the market for tangible 
commodities, that in commodities it is the seller, but in labour it is 
the buyer, who has the initiative in fixing the price. It is the 
employer, the purchaser of labour, who makes the offer of wages; the 
dealer, who is in this case the labourer, accepts or refuses. Whatever 
advantage can be derived from the initiative is, therefore, on the side 
of the employer"[1869, p515].
®? It is the ability to hold out that Mill concentrates on: "And in that 
contest of endurance between buyer and seller, by which alone, in the 
excepted case, the price so fixed can be modified, it is almost needless 
to say that nothing but a close combination among the employed can give 
them even a chance of successfully contending against the 
employers"[ 1869, p515]. At the end of the recantation article. Mill makes
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wages lower than there is any natural necessity for'[1869, 
p518]. It is implicit in this that the power of the employers 
may suppress the wage rate below the level that a more equal 
competition would produce, and Mill concludes the recantation 
article by arguing that trades unions have a role in 
redressing the balance. ®®
Both Thornton and Mill then criticized the wages fund 
doctrine on the grounds that it was a version of supply and 
demand analysis. Their interpretations differed quite 
significantly, however, in ways which related back to their 
perceptions of the validity of supply and demand analysis as 
it applied to commodities. Thus Thornton argued that it was
the degree of competition among dealers that would be 'the
immediate arbiter of price'[1869, p64] with supply and demand 
having only a very limited role to play, and he applied these 
same arguments to the labour market. Mill on the other hand 
had not rejected the analysis of supply and demand as applied 
to commodities, but was prepared to concede ground with 
regard to the labour market, and accept that this may be a
special case where demand and supply analysis will not
provide a solution to the determination of the wage rate 
which will instead be determined by the relative bargaining 
strength of workers and employers. Perhaps it was because 
Mill was anxious to make it clear that he was discussing a 
special case, that he was a little more careful than Thornton
this point again : "... it is necessary for us to contemplate, not as an 
impossibility but as a possibility, that employers, by taking advantage 
of the inability of labourers to hold out, may keep wages lower than 
there is any natural necessity for"[1869, p518].
22 Mill argues "... if work-people can by combination be enabled to hold 
out so long as to cause an inconvenience to the employers greater than 
that of a rise of wages, a rise may be obtained which, but for the 
combination, not only would not have happened so soon, but possibly might 
not have happened at all"[1869, p518].
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was in establishing the inelastic nature of labour demand. 
Thornton had been arguing a very general case that 
'competition' should replace 'supply and demand' throughout 
political economy. By contrast. Mill was seeking to show that 
the labour market was a special case within political economy 
where the wage rate would be determined by relative 
bargaining strengths and not only by supply and demand. The 
argument that labour demand was inelastic was central to this 
'special case' approach taken by Mill, and, significantly, he 
nowhere refers to the broader notion of competition employed 
by Thornton. In arguing as he did. Mill made a clear 
separation between the supply and demand research programme 
on the one hand, and the wages fund research programme on the 
other. This was an important distinction to maintain at this 
stage in the development of Classical economics. Mill's 
strategy of vigorously defending the supply and demand 
research programme from potential counterexamples while 
accepting important criticisms of the wage fund programme had 
crucial implications for the future. Thus while the wages 
fund research programme was recanted and ultimately 
abandoned, the supply and demand research programme continued 
to develop.
V Conclusions
The analysis of the Thornton-Mill debate on supply and 
demand using a Lakatosian approach presents a different 
picture of Mill in the Fortniqhtlv Review from those often 
portrayed in conventional accounts where he has sometimes 
been seen as error prone or as being unduly or unnecessarily
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influenced by Thornton. 9^ in my analysis, however. Mill is 
revealed as a scientist who behaved as many other scientists 
would when faced with powerful attacks - potential 
counterexamples - to a well-accepted theory. He responded in 
a variety of ways - attempting to rebut the arguments, 
suggesting the possibility of a content-increasing response 
by expanding supply and demand analysis to include the case 
of coincidental schedules, engaging in exception-barring and 
monster-adjustment, and in places conceding ground. In all of 
this Mill appears as a normal fairly cautious scientist 
attempting to uphold and defend the theories to which he 
subscribes. I have also shown that while there may have been 
some problems with Thornton's arguments, they were 
nevertheless powerful potential counterexamples to supply and 
demand theory in its contemporary state. Many of the features 
of the Thornton-Mill debate on the supply and demand of 
commodities provide powerful support for a Lakatosian view of 
scientific progress.
A fundamental difference between Thornton and Mill relates 
to their underlying methodology. Thornton took what I 
described in chapter two as a 'dogmatic falsificationist' 
position whereby one counterexample would suffice to reject a 
whole theory. Mill, by contrast, took a 'sophisticated 
falsificationist' position. For Mill, there may be a number 
of reasons why a particular example may appear to contradict 
a theory, and there were a number of ways of dealing with 
these, as I have pointed out, without rejecting the theory.
59 Thus Negishi has argued that Mill falsely recanted on the basis of an 
error in interpreting Thornton. Ekelund[1976] argued that Mill failed to 
realise that increased money payments to workers would simply be offset 
by rising prices. Breit[1967] simply alleges that Mill may never have 
understood the wages fund doctrine in the first place.
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The exchange between Thornton and Mill then provides useful 
evidence for the sophisticated falsificationist view of 
scientific progress put forward by Lakatos.
I have also considered in this chapter the very important 
discussion by Longe, Thornton and Mill of the links between 
and differences in supply and demand theory as applied to 
commodities on the one hand, and to the labour market on the 
other. Of particular significance is Mill's treatment of 
Thornton's Dutch auction case. In considering this in the 
context of commodities. Mill is content to regard this as an 
exception which is potentially capable of being brought 
within the framework of supply and demand theory, which 
thereby will remain intact with increased content. When he 
turns to consider wage theory, however, this same 
'exceptional case' becomes the initial basis on which to 
recant from the wages fund doctrine. Having established this 
link in the chain of logic. Mill then went on to develop 
other arguments against the wages fund doctrine, relating to 
the notions of wages from capital, the elasticity of labour 
demand and the flexibility of money funds, and it is to these 
arguments that I will turn in the next chapter.
In this chapter I have produced a rational reconstruction 
of the Thornton-Mill debate on supply and demand. The largely 
internal history which has resulted from this has been 
presented in terms of the MSRP and provides a comprehensive 
account of the debate. I have, however, also argued for a 
significant role for external history. The events surrounding 
the trades union movement during the 1860s raised the profile 
of the trades union question and provided an environment in 
which Fawcett, Longe, Thornton and, most importantly. Mill
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himself reconsidered key aspects of supply and demand
analysis and its relationship the wages fund doctrine. The
political events of the 1860s did not influence the nature of 
the discussion of the wages fund doctrine for, as I shall 
show in the next chapter, this was largely a theoretical
debate, but they undoubtedly determined the timing.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
THE WAGES FUND DEBATE II; REFUTATION AND RECANTATION 
I Introduction
In the last chapter I discussed the debate between 
Thornton and Mill on the supply and demand of commodities 
which was an important preliminary to the discussion of the 
wages fund doctrine. In this chapter I will turn my attention 
to that discussion, to the attacks on the wages fund doctrine 
by Longe, Thornton and Mill. This debate differed from that 
on supply and demand in that Mill was no longer the champion 
of the status quo defending the research programme from 
attack, but was himself a leading critic. The task of 
defending the doctrine was taken up later by Cairnes.
In chapter three I outlined a Lakatosian hard core for the 
short run wages fund doctrine with the following elements:
The Short Run Analysis
1 Production of goods (both wage goods and luxuries) is 
carried out using discrete (point-input - point-output) 
production processes undertaken during discontinuous 
production periods.^
2 Wages are advances of goods or money from capital.
3 A predetermined fund of goods is destined for the 
payment of wages, and is set aside by the capitalists at 
the beginning of the production period.
4 The supply of labour in the short run is fixed.
5 The real wage rate in the short run is determined by 
dividing the pre-determined wage fund by the labour 
supply.
 ^ See Ekelund [1976, p68].
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The Two Period Analysis
1 The size of the wages fund may be altered between 
production periods.
2 In the short run the labour supply is fixed.
3 The change in the short run real wage rate will be 
determined by dividing the change in the wages fund by 
the labour supply.
In the rational reconstruction of the wages fund doctrine in 
chapter four I argued that the difficulties concerning the 
'monster' of money led McCulloch to attempt to pin down a 
more rigid version. Thus the assumption of zero crossovers in 
consumption between workers and capitalists would imply that 
an increase in money wages for the workers would simply be 
offset by higher prices.
In this chapter I will explore the counterarguments to 
this hard core put forward by Longe, Thornton and Mill. I 
will argue that the second element in the hard core - the 
argument that wages were payments by capitalists to workers 
from capital - was criticized effectively by both Longe and 
Mill although Thornton paid no attention to it. The important 
counterargument to the research programme which was put 
forward by all three writers related to the third and very 
important element in the hard core - the notion that a 
predetermined fund of wage goods or money 'destined' for the 
payment of wages is set aside at the beginning of the 
production period. In the discussion of the 1860s there were 
two powerful attacks on this notion of a 'destined' fund. 
First, it was denied by Longe, Thornton and Mill that an 
amount of capital set aside to pay wages must be so used. 
Secondly, Mill argued that there was a certain flexibility in
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the money funds available in the hands of capitalists with 
which to pay wages, and thus workers may be able to bargain 
for increased real wages at the expense of profits, up to a 
certain limit • The notion of the wages fund as a limit on 
what can be obtained is important in the work of both 
Thornton and Mill. These powerful counterarguments were 
accepted by Mill who argued that the wages fund doctrine 'is 
deprived of its scientific foundation, and must be thrown 
aside' [1869, p517]. What was being counterargued and
rejected then was the idea of a destined, or predetermined 
fund set aside for wage payments which divided by the labour 
supply would determine the wage rate (elements 2,3,4 and 5 of 
the hard core).
In chapter four I argued that McCulloch, faced with the 
'monster' of money, amended the theory by the strategy of 
lemma incorporation. In the last chapter I argued that Mill 
dealt with Thornton's criticisms using a number of 
strategies. In the case of the recantation of the wages fund 
doctrine the situation was more complex for two reasons. 
First, Mill's critique, building on that of Thornton (and 
possibly Longe's), struck at the very centre of the hard core 
(elements 2,3,4 and 5). Secondly, because it did strike at 
the hard core Mill concluded that the theory must be 
abandoned. What was being broached in the recantation was not 
a programme-saving theoretical amendment to an otherwise 
sound and progressive theory, but an analysis of several 
fundamental weaknesses with the hard core of the short run 
Classical wage theory research programme. One of the 
weaknesses of the theory - the flexibility of money funds - 
could have been resolved by the adoption of McCulloch's
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strategy of lemma incorporation but, as I argued in chapter
four, evidence from the Principles indicated that Mill would 
not be prepared to adopt this approach, and he chose not to 
argue in this way in the recantation.
And yet, in spite of all of this. Mill still behaved, as
he did with regard to the supply and demand issue, in the
sort of cautious and careful way that Lakatos would expect of 
a scientist faced with powerful counterarguments to a well 
established theory. I will show that in the recantation, 
where he was advocating rejection of the doctrine, he still 
felt that theoretical modification might still be possible, 
and as I noted in the last chapter, in the 1871 edition of 
the Principles he made it quite clear that the criticisms 
relating to the wages fund doctrine were not ready for 
incorporation into a general work. This reluctance to abandon 
a flawed theory in the absence of an alternative is very much 
in line with a Lakatosian interpretation. An anomaly or a 
counterexample to a research programme will not immediately 
lead to its abandonment, for subscribers to the programme 
will seek to make some amendment or change to the theory 
which will explain the counterargument.
The discussion by Longe, Thornton and Mill centred around 
three sets of issues, and I will deal with these in turn. In 
section II I will explore the extent to which the three 
writers accepted the second element in the research programme 
- the notion that wages are paid from capital. In section III 
I will consider the approaches taken by these writers to the 
question of labour demand, and the consequent critiques 
offered against the third element of the hard core - that 
funds destined for the payment of wages are set aside by
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capitalists at the beginning of the production period. In 
section IV I will follow this up and examine Mill's arguments 
concerning the flexibility of money funds and the 
implications of this for the notion of 'destined funds', and 
trades union action. Section VI presents a summary of the 
main conclusions - that the debate of the 1860s represents a 
good example of a rational debate.in Lakatosian terms, with 
powerful potential counterarguments being cautiously and 
carefully dealt with by a range of strategies, as a result of 
which some counterarguments were rebutted while others were 
not. The wages fund doctrine was refuted but not abandoned, 
because there was no alternative at that time.
II Wages From Capital
The twin notions that production is carried out in 
discrete time periods and that capitalists 'advance' workers 
their wages during these time periods from capital, are 
absolutely fundamental to Classical economics, and mark it 
off from later neoclassical analysis. These ideas form the 
first two elements of the wages fund hard core, of course, 
but they also give expression to deeper underlying 
convictions relating to the natural harmony of interests 
between capital and labour. The notion that production is 
carried out in discrete time periods (the so-called point 
input-point output production function) did not feature 
explicitly in the later debate over the wages fund,^ but the 
idea that wages are paid from capital was strongly and 
effectively attacked by Francis Longe. Although Thornton paid
2 I showed in chapter four that Hodgskin attacked this element of the 
hard core in 1825 although his criticism had no impact on the further 
development of the doctrine. See also A C Pigou[1949] reprinted in 
Rima[1970] for a cogent critique of the notion of production as 'annual 
jets'[1970, PP106-107].
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no attention to this aspect of the issue. Mill produced 
important arguments which were strikingly similar to one 
aspect of Longe's critique, and the arguments of Longe and 
Mill together constituted a major counterargument to the 
wages fund research programme.
Longe's analysis is contained in his discussion of the 
first of his three objections to the wages fund doctrine that 
'the capital or wealth applicable to the payment of the wages 
of labour in a country, at any time or during any period, 
does not consist of a definite fund distinct from its general
wealth, nor of a fund which is 'destined' for the purchase of
labour'[1866, p22]. The last point concerning the destined 
nature of the funds I will consider in section IV below and 
for the moment I will examine the first part of Longe ' s
argument that the wages fund is not separate from the general
wealth of the country. Longe's approach to this question is 
shaped by his interpretation of Mill's approach to capital. 
He argued that Mill falsely distinguished capital from non­
capital by reference to the intentions of the capitalist. 
Mill had argued as follows in the Principles ;
"The distinction, then, between capital and non-capital does not lie in 
the kind of commodities, but in the mind of the capitalist, in his will 
to employ them for one purpose rather than another; and all property, 
however ill-adapted in itself for the use of labourers, is a part of 
capital so soon as it, or the values to be received from it, is set apart 
for productive employment"[1848, CW, II, p57].
This notion that the definition of capital rests on the will 
of the capitalist is false. Longe argued, and ignores the 
'very cause which in real life governs both the quantity of 
wealth, which is from time to time used as capital, and the
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particular mode o[f]^ production in which it is used' [1866, 
p43]. This cause, he argued, can be summarized in the 
following expression - 'both capital and labour are servants 
of the consumer'[1866, p43]. Longe then proceeded to produce 
an analysis of the demand for labour as derived demand. The 
level of consumption demand for a commodity, he argued, is 
crucial in determining the amount of wealth used in 
production:
"Consumption is not production; but the existence, or prospective 
existence of a purchaser, is a condition precedent to the employment of 
wealth as capital; and the quantity of the products of labour and capital 
required, and the quantity of money or wealth for which they will be 
exchangeable, - in other words, the demand and its money-measure, govern 
the quantity of wealth used from time to time in production, - whatever 
may be the quantity of wealth applicable to (or even 'destined' or 'set 
aside' for) such a purpose, the quantity of labour seeking employment, 
and the quantity of suitable raw material available to the 
producer"[1866, p44].
Longe went on to assert that the link between demand and 
production was the 'mind of the producer'[ 1866, p44].
Producers make estimates of demand and this governs the 
'quantity of wealth or capital (using the terms as 
synonymous) which is from time to time employed in productive 
operations'[1866, p44]. Longe then directly attacked Mill's 
notion that 'the demand for commodities is not the demand for 
labour'. He argued that the producer is not buying labour 
itself when hiring people, but the work of labourers and it 
is this that the consumer also wants. The demand for 
commodities Longe concluded 'does determine the quantity of 
labour employed, and the quantity of wealth spent in the 
wages of labour' [1866, p46].
It was claimed in chapter five that Mill's analysis of the 
demand for commodities cannot be taken at face value as a
 ^ In the original text the word 'or' is used here which is clearly a 
typographical error.
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denial of the notion of derived demand, but represents a
particular argument concerning the relative impact on labour 
demand from changes on the pattern of demand between labour 
services and goods. This, I argued, was analyzed strictly in 
accordance with the wages fund doctrine and Say's Law. 
However while Mill may not have denied that the employment of
labour is derived from the demand for commodities,
nevertheless his main point was that the capitalist (and not 
the consumer) was at the centre of the decision process and 
it is this point that Longe is attacking. For Longe, while 
the producer must still make the decision, that decision is 
determined by the consumer.
Having argued against Mill's fourth proposition on 
capital. Longe then went on to criticize the view that 
labourers are maintained by the wages fund throughout their 
period of work. Agricultural labourers have part of their 
wages paid from the funds which the purchaser pays for the 
farmer's stock or corn, and in manufacturing trades, workers 
are paid regularly on a weekly, fortnightly, or monthly 
basis. Producers are in receipt of 'purchase money' for the 
goods equally regularly, and often receive this "within a 
short time after, if not before, they have paid the wages of 
the workmen by whose hands the goods were produced" [1866, 
p53]. In the coal industry coal is often bought while still 
in the ground and the owner gets paid as soon as the coal is 
brought to the surface. In the case of journeyman carpenters, 
bricklayers, millers, butchers, tailors and others, their 
masters are typically in receipt of money from customers 
prior to paying out wages. He also notes that here the 
'purchase money' is not capital in any sense of the word it
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is 'the personal expenditure of private consumers, who intend 
to eat the flour, and wear the boots and clothes, etc.' 
[1866, p53]. At the same time he notes that wages in
manufacturing are often paid from receipts from merchants and 
middlemen, and although these funds are in fact capital they 
are left out of the capital, which forms the wages fund as 
far as Mill is concerned.
In the recantation Mill took a line that is very similar 
to that of Longe. Referring to the distinction made in 
orthodox theory between capital and labour he argued:
"In the common theo^, the order of ideas is this. The capitalist's 
pecuniary means consist of two parts — his capital, and his profits or 
income. His capital is what he starts with at the beginning of the year, 
or when he commences some round of business operations; his income he 
does not receive until the end of the year, or until the round of 
operations is completed. His capital, except such part as is fixed in 
buildings and machinery, or laid out in materials, is what he has got to 
pay wages with. He cannot pay them out of income, for he has not yet 
received it. when he does receive it, he may lay by a portion to add to 
his capital, and as such it will become part of next year's wages-fund, 
but has nothing to do with this year's" [1869, p516].
The important features in this passage are the clarity and 
care with which Mill separates out capital from income in 
describing the orthodox analysis, and the way in which at the 
end of the passage he emphasizes the point that this year's 
income cannot become part of this year's wages fund. Mill 
then went on to make a major break with this orthodox view in 
a relatively neglected but very important passage in the 
recantation:
"He starts at the commencement with the whole of his accumulated means, 
all of which is potentially capital; and out of this he advances his 
personal and family expenses, exactly as he advances the wages of his 
labourers. He of course intends to pay back the advance out of his 
profits when he receives them; and he does pay it back day by day, as he 
does all the rest of his advances ; for it needs scarcely be observed that 
his profit is made as his transactions go on, and not at Christmas or 
l^dsummer when he balances his books. His own income, then, so far as it 
is used and expended, is advanced from his capital and replaced from the 
returns, pari passu with the wages he pays" [1869, pp516-517].
Here then Mill made two important and novel points in this
critique. First, he argued against the notion of a wages fund
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rigidly separated from other forms of capital and income, and 
secondly he denied that this wages fund could not be 
augmented from income. In arguing that wage payments may be 
made from revenues Mill is not necessarily denying the 
existence of the point input - point output production 
function. Output could still be produced in discrete 'jets' 
or 'bursts', even though revenue from sales and payments to 
workers from such revenues were more c o n t i n u o u s . ^
III The Nature of Labour Demand
The third element in the hard core of the wages fund 
doctrine was the proposition that a fund of wage goods or 
money destined for the payment of wages is set aside by the 
capitalists at the beginning of the production period. All 
three writers presented a powerful counterexample to this 
proposition. They all argued that the demand for labour was 
perfectly inelastic in the short run. If this is so, and if 
the wage rate is determined by bargaining between labour and 
employers, as Thornton and Mill had argued, then the wages 
bill is determined ex-post as a result of the bargaining 
process^ and can no longer be seen as 'predetermined'. Every
 ^ Schwartz [1972, pp90-101] took a different view, arguing Mill's 
approach in this passage marked a significant break with previous 
thinking, and that Mill's recantation rests essentially on this rejection 
of the Classical discontinuous production function. Ekelund [1976] argued 
that Schwartz was wrong for two reasons. First, he quite correctly argued 
the abandonment of the 'annual harvest' assumption did not imply that 
production and consumption flows were perfectly synchronized as Schwartz 
appeared to. However Ekelund went on to argue an extreme case that even 
in a continuous flow model a real wages fund would exist if there were 
any lag at all between production and consumption [1976, p79]. This 
argument is very unconvincing however, and would appear to define as a 
wages fund any stock of goods which happens to exist at any time. 
Secondly, Ekelund argued that Mill was talking in terms of money funds in 
this passage, and that the continuity of money transactions had nothing 
to do with a real stock of goods at any given time period [1976, p80]. I 
will argue below that Ekelund erroneously attempted to isolate a fixed 
real wages fund from the effects of variable money allocations.
 ^ Another writer who argued that wages were determined as a result of 
bargaining between workers was Fleeming Jenkin [1868, p26]. Jenkin argued 
that a major weakness with the wages fund doctrine was that it did not
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employer would have a limit to how much could be conceded to 
workers but as Mill put it in the recantation 'the real limit 
is the practical consideration, how much would ruin him, or 
drive him to abandon the business : not the inexorable limits 
of the wages-fund'[1869, p517].
Longe's argument that the demand for labour is inelastic 
was developed when he discussed his second objection that the 
labourers do not constitute a body among whom the wages fund 
can be distributed by competition. One obstacle is the 
existence of different skills, he argued. How could 'the 
shoemakers compete with the tailors, or the blacksmiths with 
the glass-blowers'?[1866, p55]. It is tempting to dismiss
this on the grounds that the wages fund doctrine related to 
the whole work force and that an excess supply of labour may 
be uniformly distributed across trades causing the average 
wage rate to fall. But Longe takes the point further than 
this and raises the issue of how an increase in labour supply 
would drag wages down, and here he makes two other points. 
For additional workers to be absorbed, either the wages fund 
must be distributed in exchange for a greater quantity of 
work than there is a demand for, or they are employed on the 
grounds that the increased number do no more work, both of 
which propositions are absurd. Longe maintains. In the short
run the demand for labour may be perfectly inelastic:
"The number of labourers whom any class of employers engaged in trade, as 
for instance, the Dorsetshire farmers can employ (unless their capital is 
to be distributed as the Lancashire relief fund was applied , viz. 
without any view to its producing any profit or increase of wealth), is 
determined by the quantity of work they require to be done. If ten 
thousand labourers did all the work they wanted to have done, eg. all the 
ploughing, the harrowing, and reaping, &c, there might be any number of 
surplus labourers in the country, and their competition might reduce
explain how the wages fund itself was determined [1868, ppl3-14]. cliffe 
Leslie [1868, pp360-362] picked up on Jenkin's argument and put a similar 
case in Frazer's Magazine in July 1868.
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wages to sixpence a day, but the fanners would not employ more labour 
than they wanted, however cheap it was" [1866, p55].
Competition then will not succeed in allocating an increased 
labour supply via the wages fund mechanism. The demand for 
labour depends on a prior estimate of the work to be done 
i.e. on the demand for the products or services of labour. 
Once this estimate has been made the demand for labour is 
inelastic in the short run. Thus Longe is clearly arguing 
that the demand for labour is both a derived demand and that 
it is inelastic.
In the chapter on supply and demand in On Labour. Thornton 
added a long footnote referring to Henry Fawcett where for 
the first time he attacked the wages fund doctrine directly®. 
Thornton referred to the 'imaginary wage fund' discussed in 
Fawcett's book The Economic Position of the British Labourer 
[1865]. Fawcett had argued that average money wages were 
determined by dividing the amount of capital by the labouring 
population.^ This implied, Thornton argued, that 'there is a 
certain national fund, the whole of which must necessarily be 
applied ('destined' was Macculloch's favourite word) to the 
payment of wages'[1869, p84]. Thornton, like Longe, then
questioned whether any such predestined fund exists. Such a 
fund, he argues must be an aggregate of individual funds but 
'[i]s there any specific portion of any single individual's 
capital which the owner must necessarily expend on
® He had, as I have noted, criticized the supply and demand basis of 
wage theory already.
 ^ The full passage is: "The circulating capital of a country is its 
wages fund. Hence, if we desire to calculate the average money wages 
received by each labourer, we have simply to divide the amount of capital 
by the number of the labouring population. It is therefore evident that 
the average money wages cannot be increased unless either the circulating 
capital is increased or the number of the labouring population is 
diminished"[1865, pl20].
7; Refutation and Recantation 284
labour'?[1869, p84]. Thornton elaborates this point and
suggests that the labour demand curve may well be inelastic:
"Of course there is a certain amount which every effectual employer can 
afford to spend on labour, as also there is in every instance a certain 
limit to that amount which cannot possibly be exceeded. But must the 
amount, so limited, which is thus applicable to the purchase of labour, 
be necessarily so applied? Does any farmer, or manufacturer or contractor 
ever say to himself,'! can afford to pay so much for labour : therefore, 
for the labour I hire, whatever the quantity be, I will pay so much'? 
Does he not rather say, 'So much labour I require, so much is the utmost I 
can afford to, pay for it, but I will see for how much less than the 
utmost I can afford to pay, I can get all the labour I require'"[1869, 
pp84-85n]?
Thornton here then is arguing that labour demand is 
inelastic and it is important to note that the analysis of 
inelasticity is at the level of the individual employer. The 
wages fund doctrine had usually been taken to apply to the 
labour force as a whole but here for the first time was a 
major criticism of the theory being developed at the level of 
the single employer.® Individual capitalists decide the level 
of labour demand at any one time and attempt to get this 
labour at the lowest cost. Here, of course, the wages fund is 
not predetermined, but is the outcome of labour market 
processes. Although it is clear from this that the demand for 
labour is perfectly inelastic in the short run, Thornton does 
not attempt to spell out the factors determining the level of 
labour demand. I have maintained that Longe argued along 
similar lines, but in Longe's work it is clear that the level 
of labour demand is determined by consumer demand working 
through the 'mind of the producer'[1866, p44]. In this
respect Longe's discussion was both fuller and stronger.
® As I have already noted Longe also referred to the single 'employer' 
or to the 'mind of the employer'[ 1866, p41], but he does not focus his 
analysis at that level, nor does he make the point that Thornton makes, 
that the aggregate fund is the sum of individual funds.
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Having attacked the idea of a predetermined fund at the 
level of the individual employer, Thornton generalized from 
this to the whole economy:
"But if there thus be no wage fund, which any single employer is bound to 
distribute among labourers, evidently, therefore, there can be no 
national wage fund, division of which by the whole number of labourers 
seeking employment will show the average rate of wages they will 
obtain"[1869, pp84-85n].
Thornton's willingness to attack the wages fund doctrine at 
the individual level and then apply the results to the 
aggregate level is very significant. The criticism at the 
individual level was quite convincing; Mill was clearly 
persuaded and consequently also argued at the level of the 
individual employer. Moreover, because he approached the 
question at this level. Mill made some other important points 
about the flexibility of the money funds in the hands of 
Individual capitalists. I will return to this in the next 
section.
I argued in the last chapter that much of the early part 
of Mill's recantation was taken up with an analysis of 
Thornton's critique of the supply and demand of commodities. 
In turning his attention to the wages fund doctrine itself. 
Mill first of all made it clear that he accepted that labour 
may be one of Thornton's exceptions where several prices may 
equate supply with demand. He then went on to outline the 
orthodox wages fund doctrine and it is worth spelling out 
Mill's description of it in full because it is probably, and 
perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the clearest statements of the
short run hard core to be found in the literature:
"There is supposed to be, at any given instant, a sum of wealth, which is 
unconditionally devoted to the payment of wages of labour. This sum is 
not regarded as unalterable, for it is augmented by saving, and increases 
with the progress of wealth; but it is reasoned upon as at any given 
moment a predetermined amount. More than that amount it is assumed that 
the wages-receiving class cannot possibly divide among them; that amount, 
and no less, they cannot but obtain. So that, the sum to be divided being
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fixed, the wages of each depend solely on the divisor, the number of 
participants. In this doctrine it is by implication affirmed, that the 
demand for labour not only increases with cheapness, but increases in 
exact proportion to it, the same aggregate sum being paid for labour 
whatever its price may be" [1869, p515].
It is important to note how precise Mill was here in spelling
out some key features of the orthodox doctrine. He made it 
absolutely clear that the wages fund could be altered but 
that in the short run it was predetermined. Also he pointed 
out very firmly that not only will the demand for labour 
increase with the cheapness but will do so 'in exact
proportion', the wages bill being fixed. After reviewing the 
orthodox theory Mill went on, like Longe and Thornton before 
him, to develop the counterargument that the demand for
labour was perfectly inelastic in the short run:
"But is this a true representation of the matter of fact? Does the 
employer require more labour, or do fresh employers of labour make their 
appearance merely because it can be bought cheaper? Assuredly, no. 
Consumers desire more of an article, or fresh consumers are called fort , 
when the price has fallen; but the employer does not buy labour for the 
pleasure of consuming it; he buys it that he may profit by its productive 
powers, and he buys as much labour and no more as suffices to produce the 
quantity of his goods which he thinks he can sell to advantage. A fall of 
wages does not necessarily make him expect a larger sale for his 
commodity, nor, therefore, does it necessarily increase his demand for 
labour" [1869, pp515-6].
The significant feature of this passage is the importance 
attached to the sale of commodities in the employer's
decision making. Like Longe, Mill was here quite clearly 
arguing that the demand for labour was a derived demand.*
9 Hollander [1968] argued that this passage in the recantation indicated 
that Mill thought that the demand for labour was of zero elasticity due 
to the existence of fixed technical coefficients in production. Thus once 
a capitalist had made a decision concerning the amount of fixed capital 
to employ, the existence of a fixed capital-labour ratio would imply that 
the demand for labour was given in the short run. This argument is quite 
persuasive to the extent that it is the case that in the short run the 
fixed capital stock is given and this must set some limits to the 
quantity of labour required. There are, however, a number of weaknesses 
with it. First, as Hollander [1968, p333] himself acknowledges, there are 
no explicit references in Mill's recantation to the question of fixed 
technical coefficients. E G West and R W Hafer [1978] argued that if Mill 
were concerned with fixed technical coefficients he would not have said 
that a 'fall of wages does not necessarily make him expect a larger sale 
for his commodity' but 'something like the following: "A fall of wages
does not in the short run allow the employer to use more labour because 
in the short period there is complete absence of the necessary additional
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From the argument so far, it is clear that Mill in the 
recantation regarded the short run labour demand curve as a 
derived demand which in the short run was of zero elasticity. 
Moreover, this was enough to satisfy Mill that labour was 
indeed one of Thornton's 'excepted cases - the case which the 
law of equality between supply and demand does not provide 
for, because several prices all agree in satisfying that law' 
[1869, p514]. Under these circumstances then how will the 
price of labour be determined? Mill was quite clear that this 
would be as a result of bargaining between employers and the 
employed, and that there was a need for strong trades unions 
in these circumstances. Referring back to Thornton he argued 
as follows :
"[W]e are already able to see that the question between one of those 
prices and another will be determined by causes which operate strongly 
against the labourer, and in favour of the employer. For, as the author 
observes, there is this difference between the labour market and the 
market for tangible commodities, that in commodities it is the seller, 
but in labour it is the buyer, who has the initiative in fixing the 
price. It is the employer, the purchaser of labour, who makes the offer 
of wages; the dealer, who is in this case the labourer, accepts or 
refuses. Whatever advantage can be derived ; from the initiative is 
therefore on the side of the employer. And in that contest of endurance 
between buyer and seller, by which alone, in the excepted case, the price 
so fixed can be modified, it is almost needless to say that nothing but a 
close combination among the employed can give them even a chance of 
successfully contending against the employers"[1869, p515].
Thus Mill argued quite explicitly that the labour market was
one of Thornton's exceptions where the wage rate will be
determined by bargaining between employers and workers.^®
Here Mill was very clearly building upon the 1862 edition of
co-operant factors" [1978, p607]. Secondly, Hollander argued that
evidence from other work by Mill, Torrens and Cairnes shows that the 
assumption of fixed technical coefficients was commonly adopted by 
Classical writers. I have discussed Hollander's interpretation of Mill's 
Principles in chapter five and I argued that no firm conclusions could be 
derived concerning the shape of the labour demand curve because in the 
examples to which Hollander referred demand was changing while supply 
remained constant. See above pl23. Hollander later revised his view and 
argued that Mill's recantation was based upon Mill's view of the demand 
for labour as derived demand [1984, pp96-97].
Mill developed this argument in part II of the recantation, see below 
pp301-304.
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the Principles where, as was pointed out in chapter six, he 
outlined a bargaining approach to the labour market along 
Smithian lines. This was further developed in part II of the 
recantation, as I shall show, and there Mill referred to
Smith explicitly. Trades unions then, according to Mill, were 
necessary to counter the power of the employers and under 
these circumstances the wages fund was not fixed but depended 
on the outcome of the bargaining process. The argument posed 
by Longe, Thornton and Mill, that the demand for labour was 
perfectly inelastic was a powerful counterexample to the 
wages fund doctrine, and was a central argument of Mill's 
recantation.
Mill's argument that labour is one of Thornton's 
exceptions does pose one major problem for interpreting
Mill's recantation. I argued in the last chapter that 
Thornton's Dutch auction example centred on the existence, at 
least over a range, of supply and demand schedules which were 
both vertical and coincidental. This appeared to be accepted 
by Mill as a valid exception to orthodox analysis as far as 
goods markets were concerned. The question then arises as to 
whether Mill regarded the labour market as an exception 
because there also supply and demand schedules were vertical 
and coincidental. I have noted that he, like Longe and 
Thornton, regarded labour demand as perfectly inelastic. But 
was the supply of labour schedule vertical and coincidental 
with the labour demand curve, at least over a range? The 
question is highlighted by Mill's references at the end of 
part I of the recantation, and again in part II, to the
Malthusian doctrine. Mill's arguments here that an increase
in the supply of labour will lower the wage rate have led
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Hollander[1968], and West and Hafer[1978] to argue that a 
competitive solution was still at the back of Mill's mind. A 
competitive solution of course requires some elasticity in 
either the supply or the demand curve or both. Hollander, and 
West and Hafer, argued that, given Mill's Malthusian 
references, the demand curve could not after all be vertical. 
I will argue that these interpretations are erroneous, and 
derive from misplaced attempts to reconcile within a short 
run supply and demand framework Mill's quite complex and 
evolving views of the labour market in which there were 
unionised and non-unionised sectors, and both short run and 
long run perspectives.
In part I of the recantation Mill argued as follows :
"On. the side of supply, the law laid down by economists remains intact. 
The more numerous the competitors for employment, the lower, ceteris 
paribus, will wages be. It would be a complete misunderstanding of Mr. 
Thornton to suppose that he raises any questions about this, or that he 
has receded from opinions enforced in his former writings respecting the 
inseparable connection of the remuneration of labour with the proportion 
between population and the means of subsistence"[1869, p517].
This argument concerning the continued relevance of the
supply side led Hollander [ 1968] to argue that Mill was
writing 'as if the competitive equilibrium was somehow still
meaningful'[1968, p337] amd moreover that a competitive
outcome would require a negatively sloped demand curve
(assuming a vertical supply c u r v e ) . W e s t  and Hafer[1978]
Hollander argued that it is therefore necessary to allow for 
hypothetical variations in the quantity of fixed capital. Where there is 
excess demand for labour employers behave as if they will allocate to the 
support of labour the required fixed capital, but this fixed capital is 
never built because as employers compete for labour services the wage 
rate is forced up to a new equilibrium. The problem with Hollander's 
argument is that he is trying to reconcile a statement about long run 
wage theory with Mill's critique of the short run, within a framework of 
supply and demand schedules. The fact that in such a framework the 
schedules must cross to give a competitive solution led Hollander into 
the contradictory argument that employers will make plans to employ more 
workers and build, in the short run, plant that can only be in fact built 
in the long run, as a result of which plans, the wage rate will rise, no 
extra labour will be employed and no extra capital will therefore be 
required after allI There is no doubt that this was not what Mill had in
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also maintain that Mill's later argument that 'there is no 
keeping up wages without limiting the numbers of competitors 
for employment'[1869, p695] reveals 'Mill's belief that the 
demand curve for labour normally does have a less than 
vertical slope'[1978, p611] . I will argue that Mill's
comments on the supply side are not inconsistent with his 
analysis of demand inelasticity.
In order to understand Mill's approach it is necessary to 
discuss further his bargaining model elements of which I 
outlined a b o v e . T h e r e  I pointed out that Mill argued that 
in the labour market the short run wage rate will be 
determined by bargaining between workers and employers. This 
approach was further developed and made clearer in part II of 
the recantation, where the Smithian ideas developed under the 
influence of Fawcett in 1862 came once more into play. Mill 
argued that there will be an upper limit to the wage rate 
which would be where the employer receives too little profit 
'to compensate him for the anxieties and risks of trade', and 
a lower limit where wages may be so low as 'to diminish the 
numbers or impair the working powers of the labourers' [1869, 
p690]. Between these limits. Mill argued, the wage rate will 
be determined by what Adam Smith called 'the higgling of the 
market'[ 1869, p690]. So what Mill presented then was analysis 
based not on competitive supply and demand, where there would
mind. There is no textual support for this view; nowhere does Mill even 
hint at the notion that employers attempt to add to the fixed capital 
stock in the short run. Hollander's case stems solely from the need to 
reconcile Mill's remarks about the supply side with the existence of a 
perfectly inelastic demand schedule.
No further evidence is provided for this conclusion which appears to 
rest simply on the argument that a negatively sloped demand was necessary 
to explain a fall in wages as a result of an increase in the supply of 
labour.
See above pp236-239.
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be a unique equilibrium solution but a bargaining model where 
the outcome depended upon the relative bargaining strength of 
the parties concerned. At this stage Mill does not take the 
discussion of what influences the relative bargaining 
positions much further. He makes only one comment and this 
relates to the weaker position of unorganised labourers and 
the potential strength that unionisation could bring.
Later in part II he returns to the Malthusian issue and 
here it is quite clear that the number of labourers is an 
important factor in their relative bargaining position. 
Given the potential for conflict between trades union 
practices and individual freedom. Mill asked if trades 
unionism could be justified and here he made another 
reference to the supply side question:
"For (as Mr. Thornton recognizes) there is no keeping up wages without 
limiting the numbers of competitors for employment. And all such 
limitation inflicts distinct evil upon those whom it excludes - upon that 
great mass of labouring population which is outside the Unions; an evil 
not trifling, for if the system were rigorously enforced it would prevent 
unskilled labourers or their children from ever rising to the condition 
of the skilled"[1869, p695].
There were two answers to the question, he argued. First, an 
'upright and publicly-spirited man' may justify his 
membership of a union on the grounds that it was a mere step 
on the way to universal unionism, a state which when reached
Mill argued as follows: "In this higgling, the labourer in an
isolated condition, unable to hold out even against a single employer, 
much more against the tacit combination of employers, will, as a rule, 
find his wages kept down at the lower limit. Labourers sufficiently 
organised in Unions may, under favourable circumstances, attain to the 
higher"[1869, p690].
The background to Mill's discussion is some strong criticism by both 
him and Thornton of trades union practices. Both writers were concerned 
about some of the methods unions used in gaining pay rises. The 
establishment of rules forbidding the employment of non-unionists or 
limiting the number of apprenticeships, restrictions on the use of 
machinery and rules concerning demarcation practices all conflicted with 
the views of both Thornton and Mill concerning individual liberty and 
economic efficiency, see Thornton [1869, pp300-338], and Mill [1869,
pp695-699].
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would by definition mean the end of unfair practices with 
regard to non-unionists[1869, p696]. Secondly, Mill argued, a 
unionist might invoke a Malthusian justification for 
membership. Exclusion of the more ignorant workers who would 
always tend to have large families, would keep up the wage 
rate in that trade.
The total supply of labour was an important factor then 
because it did influence the bargaining process. In the short 
run what influenced the outcome in what Mill called the 
'contest of endurance' was how long either side could hold 
out. In the longer run a crucial factor affecting workers' 
bargaining ability was the number of workers and hence the 
attempts to restrict entry into certain trades. An increased 
number of workers in the longer run may lower the wage rate 
in two ways. First, if there are no restrictions on entry 
into trades unions the increased numbers will undermine the 
ability of workers to bargain effectively with employers. 
Secondly, if there are restrictions then the increased 
numbers will only swell what Mill referred to as that 'great 
mass of labouring population which is outside the 
Unions'[1869, p695]. Such workers Mill had argued were
isolated and would be unable to hold out against employers.
Mill argued as follows;" The ignorant and untrained part of the 
poorer classes (such Unionists may say) will people up to the point which 
will keep their wages at that miserable rate which the low scale of their 
ideas and habits makes endurable to them. As long as their minds remain 
in their present state, our preventing them from competing with us for 
employment does them no real injury; it only saves ourselves from being 
brought down to their level. Those whom we exclude are a morally inferior 
class of labourers to us; their labour is worth less, and their want of 
prudence and self-restraint makes them much more active in adding to the 
population. We do them no wrong by entrenching ourselves behind a 
barrier, to exclude those whose competition would bring down our wages, 
without more than momentarily raising theirs, but only adding to the 
total numbers in existences. This is the practical justification, as 
things now are, of some of the exclusive regulations of Trades' 
unions"[1869, p697].
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and as a result their wages would usually be brought down to 
the lower of his two limits. Increased numbers of non­
unionised labourers would thus lower the average wage rate.
There is another somewhat more conjectural argument which 
is relevant to this discussion of the impact of a long run 
increase in labour supply, and which also may help clarify 
the issue of coincidental schedules. This argument relates to 
the question of the existence of two sectors in the economy. 
The Classical economists often thought in terms of two
sectors - a productive sector where labourers produced
tangible goods for sale at a profit, and a service sector 
where workers, typically domestic servants, were employed in 
order to consume the benefits of that labour. While the 
demand curves of firms in the productive sector may be
vertical due to the derived demand argument, there is no such 
constraint in the service sector. Here employers could employ 
more workers if the wage rate fell and consequently the 
demand for labour as a whole would be responsive to wage rate 
changes even if the demand in the productive sector was not. 
Inclusion of a service sector would provide another way of 
reconciling Mill's desire to preserve the supply side 
argument with inelasticity in labour demand (in the
productive sector). This possibility was first suggested by 
Hollander[1964, pl79-180, and 1968, p336] and more formally 
developed in Vint[1981, pp84-87]. As Hollander pointed out. 
Mill included a service sector in his account of the orthodox 
doctrine -'the demand for labour consists of the whole of the 
circulating capital of the country, including what is paid in
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wages for unproductive labour'[1869, p515].^^ Hollander did 
not pursue this line of reasoning, however, because he 
claimed that Mill went on to limit his recantation arguments 
to the productive sector only [1968, p334]. Thus Mill argued 
that 'the employer does not buy labour for the pleasure of 
consuming it; he buys it that he may profit from its 
productive powers'[1869, p334]. In our view this is a
misinterpretation of Mill's approach. He quite clearly did 
include a service sector in his initial outline of received 
doctrine, and the fact that he paid no further attention to 
the service sector thereafter is simply due to the fact that 
he focused on the nature of labour demand in the productive 
sector because it was here that there was union activity. 
There is no reason to suppose that service labour was not 
assumed by Mill to be part of total labour demand; it quite 
clearly was. Thus when he turned his attention to the longer 
run question of the impact of an increase in total labour 
supply there is equally no reason to assume that this impact 
would not work its way through both productive and 
unproductive sectors of the economy.
In the light of these arguments, what is now to be made of 
Mill's claim that the labour market fell within one of 
Thornton's excepted cases - where several prices satisfy the 
'law of equality between supply and demand' [1869, p514],
i.e. where the supply and demand schedules are coincidental? 
This is not an easy matter to resolve but three points may 
help to clarify the issues. First, as I have argued, total 
labour demand consisted of the demand for productive workers.
See Hollander, [1964, pl80] and [1968, p334].
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which Mill had argued was inelastic, plus the demand for 
unproductive workers to which such arguments could not apply. 
Total labour demand then was not perfectly inelastic and the 
question therefore of whether the schedules were coincidental 
at the aggregate level does not arise. Secondly, within the 
productive sector and with regard to the unionized labour 
force. Mill was discussing the question at the level of 
individual employers bargaining with particular groups of 
workers. Mill's analysis can be interpreted as follows. An 
individual employer estimates the demand for his product and 
on the basis of this seeks to employ a certain fixed quantity 
of labour. The employer then bargains with the union (or 
unions) over the rate for supplying this fixed quantity. Thus 
supply and demand are in this sense fixed before the 
commencement of the 'contest of endurance', and a variety of 
wages rates are consistent with supply and demand being 
equated. Thirdly, in the non-unionized productive sector the 
workers who exist in an 'isolated condition' may find their 
wages 'kept down' to subsistence.^® Here the wage rate is 
imposed on the workers by the employers, usually acting in 
combination.An individual employer would be able to employ
® Referring to the higgling in the market place Mill argued: "In this 
higgling, the labourer in an isolated condition, unable to hold out even 
against a single employer, much more against the tacit combination of 
employers, will, as a rule, find his wages kept down at the lower limit. 
Labourers sufficiently organised in Unions may, under favourable 
circumstances, attain to the higher"[1869, p690].
Mill is absolutely clear that at least at the outset of the bargaining 
process it is the employer who initially fixes the wage rate:"[W]e are 
already able to see that the question between one of those prices and 
another will be determined by causes which operate strongly against the 
labourer, and in favour of the employer. For, as the author observes, 
there is this difference between the labour market and the market for 
tangible commodities, that in commodities it is the seller, but in labour 
it is the buyer, who has the initiative in fixing the price. It is the 
employer, the purchaser of labour, who makes the offer of wages; the 
dealer, who is in this case the labourer, accepts or refuses. Whatever 
advantage can be derived from the initiative is therefore on the side of
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whatever quantity of labour he required at the going 
subsistence wage rate.
Thus Mill's view of the labour market was a complex one, 
undertaken. in a framework where there were two sectors - 
productive and unproductive, where there was both unionized 
and non-unionized labour, and in which he dealt with both the 
short run and the long run perspectives. The argument about 
productive workers was clear and persuasive. Demand 
inelasticity and the flexibility of money funds gave unions 
some power to raise wages in real terms via bargains between 
individual employers and groups of workers. All of this is 
consistent with Thornton's exceptional coincidental schedules 
case. This is not to say that the whole of the labour market 
should be seen in this way. No argument was put forward for 
seeing the service sector in these terms, and the Malthusian 
arguments just discussed indicate that this was also the case 
for the non-unionized productive sector. The difficulties 
that Hollander [ 1968 ] and West and Hafer[1976] have with 
Mill's recantation stem from trying to interpret it as a 
simplistic single argument concerning the shape of supply and 
demand curves in the aggregate labour market.^® Our argument 
has been that Mill was developing a much more complex view, a 
task which was begun in 1862 with the incorporation of 
Fawcett's 'Smithian' ideas concerning bargaining. This 
evolving view was not fully developed or fully explained in
the employer. And in that contest of endurance between buyer and seller, 
by which alone, in the excepted case, the price so fixed can be modified, 
it is almost needless to say that nothing but a close combination among 
the employed can give them even a chance of successfully contending 
against the employers"[1869, p515]. Where trades unions are not present 
then, workers will have to simply accept the wage rate fixed by the 
employers.
20 See above pp289-290.
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the recantation which after all was a review of someone 
else's work and not a treatise on a new approach.
IV The Money Fund, The Real Fund and Price Effects
The argument that the demand for labour is perfectly 
inelastic raises another but equally important question. If 
the wages bill is not fixed but is a variable, determined ex 
post as a result of bargaining, what are the implications of 
this flexibility in the money wages fund for the level of 
real wages? In chapter four I argued that McCulloch attempted 
to solve the problem raised by the 'monster' of money by 
implicitly adopting the lemma that workers only consume wage 
goods and never consume luxuries. The notion of the 
inelasticity of labour demand in the recantation reopened the 
question of the flexibility of money wages and Mill spent 
some time discussing this. He did not refer explicitly to the 
relationship between money and real wages, nor did he 
directly discuss workers' consumption patterns, but it is 
clear from his analysis and from his earlier work in the 
Principles # that the McCulloch strategy was not acceptable to 
him and that he thought that workers' real living standards 
could be increased by bargaining.
Mill begins the discussion of the flexibility of money 
funds by questioning the fundamental distinction between 
capital and income made in 'the common theory'[1869, p516]. I 
dealt in some detail with this point in section I I , but a 
brief resume of the key issues may be useful at this stage. 
According to the orthodoxy, capital is what a capitalist 
starts with at the beginning of the year, or 'when he
See above pp280-281.
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commences some round of business operations'[1869, p516],
while income is what he receives at the end of the year, or 
when 'the round of operations is completed'[1869, p516]. Part 
of his capital is tied up in buildings and machinery, or has 
been laid out in materials; the rest is what he has to pay 
wages with. Wages cannot be paid out of income, for he does 
not receive his income until the end of the production period 
or round of operations. At that stage some of his income 
could be added to the capital stock and become part of next 
year's wages fund but it clearly could not be used to add to 
this year's fund [1869, p516]. Mill went on argue that this 
distinction 'between the relation of the capitalist to his 
capital, and his relation to his income, is wholly 
imaginary'[1869, p516] and argued strongly that capitalists' 
resources were far more flexible than the orthodox theory 
allowed. Mill argued that all the income of a capitalist is 
potentially capital, and that the pattern of expenditures and 
receipts is a continuous one and does not occur in discrete 
time periods as the 'common theory' would indicate. 2^
Mill continued to elaborate on the flexibility of the 
money funds in the hands of a capitalist:
"If we choose to call the whole of what he possesses applicable to the 
payment of wages, the wages fund, that fund is co-extensive with the 
whole proceeds of his business, after keeping up his machinery, buildings 
and materials and feeding his family; and it is expended jointly upon 
himself and his labourers. The less he expends on the one, the more may 
be expended on the other and vice versa. The price of labour, instead of
22 As I noted on p280 above Mill argued as follows; "He starts at the 
commencement with the whole of his accumulated means, all of which is 
potentially capital: and out of this he advances his personal and family 
expenses, exactly as he advances the wages of his labourers. He of course 
intends to pay back the advance out of his profits when he receives them; 
and he does pay it back day by day, as he does all the rest of his 
advances; for it needs scarcely be observed that his profit is made as 
his transactions go on, and not at Christmas or Midsummer when he 
balances his books. His own income, then, so far as it is used and 
expended, is advanced from his capital and replaced from the returns, 
pari passu with the wages he pays"[1869, pp516-517].
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being determined by.the division of the proceeds between the employer and 
the labourers, determine it. If he gets his labour cheaper he can afford 
to spend more on himself. If he has to pay more for labour, the 
additional payment comes out of his own income; perhaps from the part 
which he would have saved and added to capital, thus anticipating his 
voluntary economy with a compulsory one; perhaps from what he would have 
expended on his private wants or pleasures. There is no law of nature 
making it inherently impossible for wages to rise to the point of 
absorbing not only the funds which he had intended to devote to carrying 
on his business, but the whole of what he allows for his private 
expenses, beyond the necessaries of life. The real limit to the rise is 
the practical consideration, how much would ruin him, or drive him to 
abandon the business, not the inexorable limits of the wages fund" [1869, 
p517].
In this passage the point is made several times that the 
funds in the hands of a capitalist at any one time are money 
funds available for expenditure on himself and his family, or 
on wages for his workers, and that these forms of expenditure 
are potentially interchangeable. Mill reemphasizes the point 
in summing up:
"In short, there is abstractedly available for the payment of wages, 
before an absolute limit is reached, not only the employer's capital, but 
the whole of what can possibly be retrenched from his personal 
expenditure; and the law of wages, on the side of demand, amounts only to 
the obvious proposition, that the employers cannot pay away in wages what 
they have not got" [1869, p517].
In repeatedly referring to the flexibility of money funds 
Mill reopened the crucial question of the relationship 
between money and real fund conceptions of the wages fund 
doctrine. In chapter four I discussed the strategy of lemma 
incorporation employed by Malthus and McCulloch and which 
produced a more limited but more robust doctrine. In the 
resultant rigid version of the doctrine any increased 
allocations of money to the workers would simply be offset by 
rising goods prices leaving the real wage bill constant. Also 
in chapter four I showed that Mill followed McCulloch's 
approach where workers were assumed to be not fully supplied 
with necessaries. In chapter four I also showed that where 
workers were fully supplied with necessaries Mill was 
prepared to argue that they could become better off as a 
result of increased money allocations and would be able to
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consume luxuries.^® In other words the McCulloch approach was 
abandoned. Mill appears to imagine a hierarchy of goods, and 
while consumption of the higher level luxuries by workers is 
allowed for, it is only when their more basic needs are being 
met. Mill, it seems, believed that workers' consumption of 
luxury goods depended upon their level of real income and did 
not assume a rigid separation of workers' and capitalists' 
consumption. Further support for this approach is found in 
book IV chapter II where Mill outlines his long run wage 
analysis. Improved technology may lower prices and when 
prices fell:
" ... of those goods which labourers generally do not consume ... all who 
consume them, whether landlords, capitalists, or skilled and privileged 
labourers, obtain increased means of enjoyment ... The landlords and the 
privileged classes of labourers, if they are consumers of the same 
commodities, share the same benefit" [1871, pp715-6].
The passage above reinforces Mill's general approach 
suggesting that some better off sections of the workforce - 
who are presumably well fed or sufficiently supplied with 
necessaries - can and do consume luxuries.
It is quite clear that in the recantation Mill was not 
prepared to adopt the McCulloch approach. He referred 
repeatedly to the question of the flexibility of the 
financial resources in the hands of individual capitalists 
with the clear implication that trades unions could bargain 
for an increased share of these. Moreover, at the end of the 
recantation he states quite clearly that the trades unions 
could use their power to obtain an increase in the level of
23 See above ppl22-123. As I noted above Pigou was the first to outline 
the importance of this weakness in the wages fund doctrine. As a result 
of reducing their own consumption capitalists could increase the size of 
the wages fund. (See Pigou in Rima[1970, ppl05-106]).
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real output consumed by the working classes:
"The power of Trades Unions may therefore be so exercised as to obtain 
for the labouring classes collectively, both a larger share and a larger 
positive amount of the produce of labour" [1869, p518].
There is no hint here of the argument that all of the gains
that unions could achieve would be offset by rising goods
prices.
Ekelund [1976] argued that Mill should have realised 
that increasing the money funds paid to labour could have no 
effect on the real wage, because these increased money 
allocations would be offset by price increases. This argument 
amounts to no more than a restatement of the McCulloch 
approach, and I have shown that Mill did not subscribe to 
this in the Principles where workers were fully supplied with 
necessaries, nor did he do so in the recantation where it was 
his clear intention to argue that workers could achieve 
increased real living standards as a result of trades union
action.24
In part II of the recantation Mill went on to discuss the 
consequences of trades union action, and here again he 
commented on Thornton's argument in On Labour. Thornton's 
discussion and Mill's commentary focused on two broad issues. 
The first was the extent to which unions could secure a 
general increase in wages. Both writers argued that this 
could only come about if the workers organized themselves 
into a national union.25 Secondly, both writers discussed the
24 Ekelund conceded that 'the assumption that capitalists and workers do 
not have some overlapping consumption is, of course, overdrawn'[1976, 
p76n], but went on to argue that the extent of consumption cross-overs 
were likely to be minimal. I have shown that both Ricardo (see pp71-73) 
and Mill (see ppl21-123) argued quite explicitly for such cross-overs. 
See Hollander [1979, pp326-332] on this point (especially note 74, p332). 
see also Negishi [1985, ppl48-151], and Ekelund [1985, ppl52-153].
25 Mill argued that there will be an upper limit to wages where wages are 
so high as to leave either no profit to the capitalist, or profits which
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extent to which unions could successfully bargain for partial 
increases in wages. Here both Thornton^^ and Mill^? then were 
careful to spell out the limits to and constraints upon union 
action. In the short run unions could bargain for higher 
wages and get them at the expense of profits, but in 
subsequent periods this might adversely affect consumers via
are insufficient reward for the 'anxieties and risks of trade'[1869, 
p690]. The lower limit to wages will be set by that level of wages which 
might 'diminish the numbers or impair the working powers of the 
labourers'[1869, p690]. Mill went on to argue that between the two limits 
just described wages will be determined by what Adam Smith had called 
'the higgling of the market'. Any labourer in an isolated condition would 
not be able to hold out against a single employer, let alone a 
combination of employers. However if workers could be sufficiently 
organized in unions they may be able to attain wages at the higher limit. 
This would however require 'an organisation including all classes of 
labourers, manufacturing and agricultural, unskilled as well as 
skilled'[1869, p690]. Where there was only a partial union, there would 
be a lower upper limit in wages - 'that which would destroy, or drive 
elsewhere, the particular branch of industry in which the rise takes 
place'[1869, p690]. Thornton also argued for a national league of unions, 
in his case connected by offensive and defensive alliances with similar 
leagues in other countries. This may achieve higher wages everywhere 
without employers being able to shift capital from trade to trade, or 
from country to country[1869, p300]. Thornton made it clear that while 
higher wages everywhere may be achievable workers must be aware that 
there was a danger that they may push their demands too far. Thus if the 
workers encroached too much on profits they may end up 'killing the gold- 
laying geese...for the sake of their eggs.'[1869, pp278-280]. Mill was 
obviously impressed by this point and repeated it almost verbatim:" What 
is true is, that wages might be so high as to leave no profit to the 
capitalist, or not enough to compensate him for the anxieties and risks 
of trade; and in that case labourers would be killing the goose to get at 
the eggs"[1869, p690].
25 In considering partial unions Thornton argued that either prices must 
rise or profits fall, and if profits fall capital usually will be 
transferred out of that trade, leading to a fall in labour demand and 
lower wages. [1869, pp261-262]. Having said this Thornton then went on to 
outline a number of circumstances in which a partial rise of wages may 
take place without such adverse consequences for the workers. This may 
happen where there is a local monopoly or comparative advantage which 
would allow prices to rise to compensate the employers [1869, pp264-273], 
where economic growth is bringing increased demand [1869, pp274-277],
where productivity is rising due to the introduction of 
machinery[1869,p299] and where the scale of operations is so large that a 
capitalist may prefer a reduced rate of profit on a large capital to a 
higher one on a smaller capital [1869, p303].
2^ Mill generally endorsed Thornton's arguments concerning the impact of 
union action although he did not go into as much detail. Although it may 
be partly because his analysis is far more condensed. Mill's remarks on 
this aspect appear to be a little more critical of union action as can be 
seen from the tone of his conclusion: "Still, the rise of wages in any 
department is necessarily at the expense of either wages in other 
departments or of profits, and in general both will contribute to it. So 
long at least, as there are any classes of labourers who are not 
unionised, the success of the Unions will generally be a cause of loss to 
the labourers in the non-unionist occupations"[1869, p695].
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higher prices, and workers through reduced labour demand 
leading to unemployment or lower w a g e s . 28
It is important to note that none of these arguments 
invalidates the criticism of the wages fund doctrine put 
forward by Mill in the recantation. The orthodox wages fund 
doctrine had asserted that the wages fund available at any 
one time was fixed. The implication of this was that if a 
particular group of workers could bargain for a higher wage 
at a particular time, at that same time either the average 
wage rate for the rest of the workers would have to go down 
or some other workers would have to become unemployed. The 
arguments put forward by Thornton and Mill on the 
consequences of union action relate to the effects in 
subsequent time periods as employers either withdraw their 
capital as a result of falling profits, or raise their prices 
to attempt to recoup their losses. Partial union action was 
fraught with difficulties as a result of these effects, and
28 Following up on the point that a general rise in wages cannot be 
attained by a general price rise. Mill went on to argue that it therefore 
follows that a partial rise in wages which falls on the consumer via an 
increased price' is generally a gain made, wholly or in part, at the 
expense of the remainder of the labouring classes'[1869, p694]. Mill
argued that where price has risen to accommodate a wage settlement, two 
possibilities will follow. Either the public will reduce its consumption 
of the article in question or they will spend less on other things: "In 
the former case, if the consumption falls off in full proportion to the 
rise of price, there is no more money than before expended in the 
article, and no more, therefore, to be divided between the labourers and 
their employers; but the labourers may possibly retain their improved 
wages, at the expense of profits, until the employers, weary of having 
less profit than other people, withdraw part of their capital. But if the 
consumption does not fall off, or falls off in a less degree, so that 
more is really spent on the articles after than before the rise, the 
prices of some other things will fall from diminished demand; the 
producers of those other things will have less to divide, and either 
wages or profits must suffer. It will usually be wages ; for as there will 
not be employment in those departments for so man labourers as before, 
some labourers will be thrown out of work. As Mr Thornton remarks, the 
general increase of the incomes of the community through the progress of 
wealth may make up to the other branches of the productive classes for 
what they thus lose, and convert it from an absolute loss, to the loss of 
a gain - the gain which as a body they would have derived from the 
general increase of wealth, but of which the whole, or more than the fair 
share, has been drawn off by a single branch" [1969, pp694-695].
7; Refutation and Recantation 304 
Thornton and Mill were quite clear and open about these 
difficulties, but they in no way undermine the theoretical 
critique relating to the inelasticity of demand and the 
flexibility of money funds.
V Restatement and Rebuttal
In his book Some Leading Principles of Political Economy 
1874, Cairnes not only attempted to defend the wages fund 
doctrine from the attacks of Longe and Thornton, but he also 
put forward his own statement of the doctrine. Cairnes' 
starting point was an examination of the factors which
influenced the capitalist's investment decision. This he said 
would depend on his total means, his preference between 
consumption today and profit in the future, and on the profit 
opportunities open to him. It was important, Cairnes argued, 
to discover what determined the distribution of capital 
between wages and the other elements of capital, these other 
elements being capital and raw materials. An important 
factor to be considered here was the proportion of capital to 
labour required in a particular industry, or what Cairnes 
called the 'nature' of the industry.29 Thus the capital-
labour ratio was an important factor for the individual 
capitalist and while this varied between industries it was, 
in aggregate, given at any one time. Cairnes went on from 
there to point out with the aid of a numerical example that 
while the capital-labour ratio may be fixed for a particular
industry, the ratio of wages to total capital will vary
29 Thus in cotton for example a large proportion of the capital required 
will be in the form of fixed capital, while in agriculture the bulk of 
capital would be needed for wages. Thus the capital-labour ratio was an 
important factor for the individual capitalist, and the 'nature' of the 
national industries as a whole determined 'the proportion in which labour 
shall be combined with other instruments of production' [Cairnes, 1874,
p200].
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according to the wage rate.®® Cairnes was quick to point out 
here that he was not arguing that the wage rate was a 
determinant of the wage fund. The reason that the wage rate 
would fall, as in his example, would be due to an increase in 
the supply of labour. An increase in the supply of labour 
reduces the wage rate and this frees some of the wages fund 
to be reallocated between capital and wages. Here then, 
Cairnes seems to be arguing a long run case which asserts 
that, other things being equal, the size of the wages fund 
will be affected by the supply of labour 'wherever those 
labourers are employed in conjunction with fixed capital and 
raw material'[1874, p203]. Cairnes goes on to make this more 
explicit and argues that the change in labour supply has a 
more than proportional impact on the wage rate.®^ This is an 
interesting argument by Cairnes on the role of technical 
coefficients in determining labour demand but it is important 
to remember that first, it is a long run argument, and that 
secondly, the question of the total quantity of capital to be 
allocated to productive uses is still left as a subjective
58 Thus Cairnes imagines a capitalist with £10,000 who spends £5,000 on 
fixed capital and raw materials with which to employ 100 men at a wage of
£50 per year. The wage bill or wages-fund would be £5,000 or 50% of the
total capital employed. If in a later period the wage falls to £40 the 
capitalist could now employ the men for £4,000 thereby freeing £1,000 of 
his capital. If this is invested in the same business assuming the same 
capital-labour ratio the £1,000 would be allocated (in round numbers) 
between fixed capital and raw materials - £550, and wages - £450. The
wages bill of £4,450 would now be 44% of the total.
51 Cairnes argues as follows: "But the rate of wages, other things being 
the same, varying inversely with the supply of labour, this is equivalent 
to saying that the Wages-fund expands as the supply of labour contracts, 
and contracts as the supply of labour expands. An unexpected consequence, 
not, so far as I know, before adverted to, results from this play of 
economic forces, namely, that an increase or diminution in the supply of 
labour, where it is of a kind to be employed in conjunction with fixed 
capital and raw material, acts upon the rate of wages with a force more 
than proportional to the increase or diminution in the supply; for it 
tells at the same time upon both the factors on which the result depends, 
modifying them in opposite directions, - the fund undergoing diminution 
as the number to share it is increased; or, on the other hand, expanding 
as the sharers become fewer"[1874, p204].
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matter dependent on the capitalist's taste for indulgence and
an assessment by him of likely profitability. These points 
are of considerable relevance when considering the use made
of this analysis by Cairnes in attempting to rebut Thornton's
argument that the wages fund is not predetermined.
In considering Thornton's case Cairnes quoted from the 
second edition of On Labour where, influenced no doubt by 
Mill's recantation, Thornton dwelt on the flexibility of 
money funds available to the capitalist:
"Is there any specific portion of any individual's capital which the 
owner must necessarily expend upon labour? Of course every employer 
possesses a certain amount of money, whether his own or borrowed, out of 
which all his expenses must be met, if met at all. With so much of this 
amount as remains after deduction of what he takes for family and 
personal expenses, he carries on his business, - with one portion of that 
balance providing or keeping in repair buildings and machinery, with a 
second portion procuring materials, with a third hiring labour. But is 
there any law fixing the amount of his domestic expenditure, and thereby 
fixing likewise the balance available for his industrial operations? May 
he not spend more or less on his family and himself, according to his 
fancy - in the one case having more, in the other less, left for the 
conduct of his business"? [1870, p84].
Thornton then went on to argue that if there were no rigidity 
with regard to individual funds there could be no 
'fixity'[1870, p85] in the aggregate fund. Cairnes attacked 
this position arguing that the predetermination of the wages 
fund referred to the notion that given a certain level of 
national wealth 'the character of Englishmen being what it 
is, a certain prospect of profit will "determine” a certain 
proportion of this wealth to productive investment' [1874, 
p217]. This clearly begs the question that Thornton had 
raised concerning the subjective nature of the primary 
decision about how much to invest. Cairnes goes on from here 
invoking the fixed technical coefficients argument to assert 
that given a certain allocation of funds to productive 
investment, the 'nature' of the industry concerned will 
ensure that a certain proportion of this must go to fixed
7; Refutation and Recantation 307 
capital and a certain proportion to labour. Thus he 
maintained that despite Thornton's argument that capitalists 
will try to get their labour as cheaply as possible 'a 
certain proportion of the sums so invested must go to the 
payment of wages [1874, p218]. If the wage rate was forced 
down by capitalists, he argued, to below the point at which 
with a given supply of labour the wages fund would be fully 
allocated, capitalists would have surplus funds which would 
either remain uninvested or be invested in wages, fixed 
capital or raw materials [1874, p219]. Cairnes then outlined 
the implications for this using the fixed factor proportions 
argument:
"But by hypothesis the fixed capital and raw materials were already in 
due proportion to the labour force, and they would consequently now be in 
excess of it"[1874, p219].
The consequences of this would be an increased demand for 
labour which would drive the wage rate back up again.®® The 
problem for Cairnes ' arguments follows from this - if the 
additions are not hypothetical, how can they be made in the 
short run? It seems likely that Cairnes, in his enthusiasm to 
rebut Thornton, attempted to apply his interesting long run 
argument to the short run, without carefully thinking through 
the implications.
Cairnes ' comments on and restatement of the wages fund 
doctrine were interesting in that they highlighted the role
®2 It was this argument which prompted Hollander[ 1968] to argue that in 
the Torrens-Mill-Cairnes 'ex post' version of the wages fund, capitalists 
when faced with a fall in the wage rate, attempt to make hypothetical 
additions to the capital stock, increase their demand for labour, and 
thereby drive the wage rate up again. The problem with Hollander's 
interpretation is that Cairnes' additions to the fixed capital stock do 
not appear to be 'hypothetical' as the above passage suggests. For if the 
proportion of fixed capital and raw materials to labour now exceeds its 
'due proportion', this implies that the fixed capital has been 
constructed. The example is a long run example which Cairnes is 
attempting to apply to the short run.
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of factor proportions in determining the demand for labour. 
But ultimately Cairnes' defence was unsound. He did not 
adequately deal with the argument concerning the flexibility 
of money funds available to capitalists, nor were his 
attempts to rebut Longe and Thornton very convincing. His 
attempt to defend and recast the theory by opening up the 
question of factor proportions failed to provide a defence 
and simply left more to be explained.
The year after Cairnes ' restatement F A Walker produced 
the first comprehensive review of the wages fund debate, 
examining the contributions of Longe  ^ Thornton, Mill and 
Cairnes among others.®® After briefly reviewing their work. 
Walker attacked head on two key elements (elements 2 and 3) 
of the wages fund hard core - that wages are paid from 
capital and that the wages fund is predetermined. He argued 
that the history of America showed that wages were paid 
'mainly out of the product of current industry'[1875, 
pl04].®4 Wages, then, are not advanced from capital. Given 
this, the third element in the hard core, - the notion that 
the wage rate is given by dividing a predetermined fund by 
the number of workers - cannot be sustained either. A 
reduction in the number of workers, far from raising the wage 
rate, as the wages fund doctrine would predict, would reduce 
the amount of output and the wage rate may remain the same or
53 f a  Walker, "The Wage-Fund Theory", The North American Review. [1875, 
pp84-119].
34 Walker argued that 'in the pure principle'[ 1875, pl07] wages are 
never paid out of capital, although in practice some employers made 
advances in cash or commodities to workers. However, Walker claims, in 
farming areas where such advances were made they rarely exceeded one half 
of the stipulated wages and in general amounted to no more than a third 
[1875, pl05]. The fundamental point. Walker argued, was that 'the workmen 
trusted their employers with their labour and waited to get their wages 
out of the product'[1875, pl06]. In conditions of capital scarcity, this 
was the only basis in which employment could be provided.
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even fall [1975, ppl09-110]. Walker also dismissed Cairnes' 
claim that the wage fund expands as the supply of labour 
diminishes and vice versa. For Cairnes this result was 
achieved because a decrease in the supply of labour would 
increase the wage rate. While this may be possible in one 
industry, Walker argues, because producers could pass on 
increased wages in increased prices, it could not happen in 
aggregate for 'the result of diminished product cannot fail 
to be reduced wages' [1975, pll5]. Walker went in to develop 
these arguemnts further in The Wages Question published in
1876.35
Thornton also criticized Cairnes' argument in a delayed 
review of Cairnes' Leading Principles published in The 
Nineteenth Centurv in 1879. The main point of Thornton's 
review is to argue that Cairnes' numerical example, which 
showed that the ratio of the wages fund to total capital 
varies according to the wage rate, was not a defence of the 
wages fund doctrine but conclusive proof that 'the proportion 
of capital expended upon labour is not a predetermined and 
unalterable sum, but a sum which may vary materially with 
circumstances'[1879, p307].®®
35 See Walker [1876, especially ppl28-151]. In a later chapter Walker 
argues, contra the wages fund doctrine, that strikes may benefit both 
employees and employers via the effect that higher wages may have on 
labour productivity [1876, p387].
35 One reviewer who gave general support to Cairnes was V H Stanton in 
the Fortnightly Review, December 1874, although on one aspect he 
differed. Stanton focused on the question of whether capitalists will
make judgments on the minimum acceptable level of profits in terms of a
minimum rate of profit or a minimum real value of profits, Cairnes 
emphasized the rate of profit, Stanton argued, while he himself felt that
the real value of profits may be influential at times. If so the workers
could go on benefiting from the progress of invention, as capitalists 
competed for labour, even though a minimum rate of profit had been 
reached [1874, pp668-669].
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In the same year as Thornton's article, Sidgwick also 
reviewed the wages fund controversy in the Fortnightly 
Review. After agreeing that 'Professor Walker's argument 
gives a coup de grâce to the old wages-fund theory ', Sidgwick 
threw out a challenge to Walker and other economists to put 
something in its place [1879, p411]. It was this challenge 
and the response of Walker and others to it which generated 
what Gordon referred to as the 'second round debate' [1973, 
pp23-31], and which resulted in the eventual development of 
marginal productivity t h e o r y . w i t h  hindsight, Sidgwick's 
article was a watershed. Until his contribution, the point of 
reference for the discussion of wage theory was the debate 
which began in the 1860s. Sidgwick himself reviewed this 
literature, but therafter subsequent writers made fewer 
references to the earlier controversy and the discussion now 
involved American as well as British writers.®® There 
continued to be defences of the doctrine, but often the focal 
point was Walker's work, and none of these efforts succeeded 
in undoing the damage done to the hard core in the earlier 
debate.
Terry defended the wages fund doctrine on the grounds that 
wages were paid from capital, but at the same time argued 
against the 'mistaken idea that by a wages fund is meant a 
fund ^ accumulated and set apart to pay wages before the
37 See Gordon [1973, pp31-33] on the links between the wages fund debate 
and the development of marginal productivity theory.
38 Gordon [1973, pp24-26] argues that there were three factors which 
helped to sustain the second round debate. First, Sidgwick's contribution 
brought Walker's work to the attention of English economists, as well as 
laying down a challenge to Walker himself, secondly, the quantity and 
quality of American economists had by then achieved a 'critical mass for 
intellectual productivity'. Finally, the creation of the first English 
language economic journal - The Quarterly Journal of Economics - at 
Harvard in 1886, provided the necessary forum for the discussion of the 
issues at a professional level.
7; Refutation and Recantation 311 
process of production has begun, or even a permanent fund' 
[1886, pp511-513]. For Terry the wages fund was 'mere
expression for a certain proportion of the average product if 
labour, and of course depends directly upon its 
productiveness' [1886, p515]. Similarly Macvane reasserted
the view that wages were paid from capital but conceded that 
these were 'a portion of the commodities that are continually 
emerging from production' [1887, p36].®® Bonar argued that
the wages fund doctrine was 'not a falsehood but a truism' 
but only if it was conceded that the fund was not rigidly 
fixed and only if the argument were undertaken 'in the more 
general terms of the older economists (Adam Smith and 
Ricardo)' [1891, pl50].48 Sumner attempted to defend the old 
theory from attacks by 'wild and untrained writers on 
political economy' and went on to argue that the wages were
not paid out of output but were determined by supply and
demand [1882, p258]. However he conceded that although supply 
and demand determined wages this was not 'a simple case of a 
ratio, so much capital to so many men' [1882, p259].
The history of wage theory after the recantation supports 
a Lakatosian reading. There was no ready made theory to which 
to turn, and the next twenty years saw the emergence and
development of a new hard core built on marginal productivity 
theory. The criticisms of the 1860s had been very effective 
and Cairnes' defence was a failure. Significantly Walker's
39 See also the review of Walker's Wages Question in the North American 
Review [1887, pp306-309]. This review is anonymous but, as Gordon argues 
[1973, p27], it reads like the work of MacVane.
48 I argued in chapter four that Bonar regarded the rigid wages fund 
doctrine as having been developed by McCulloch (see above plOl). In the 
passage quoted above Bonar is clearly referring back to looser pre- 
McCulloch formulations in which, as I argued in chapter three, the fund 
was not specified as being predetermined.
7; Refutation and Recantation 312 
final coup de grâce also addressed the hard core statements. 
The hard core was exposed as a weak and unconvincing base on 
which to maintain a research programme. Although the later 
defences of the wages fund doctrine failed to address the 
central issues, the fact that these writers continued to 
refer back to the old doctrine is powerful evidence in 
support of a Lakatosian view. Indeed, the very 
halfheartedness and compromising character of some of these 
arguments underlines this point. None of these later writers 
made a serious attempt to undo the arguments of the 1860s but 
they were very reluctant to abandon the doctrine in the 
absence of a fully developed alternative.
VI Conclusions
Over the last two chapters I have examined in considerable 
detail the wide range of criticisms, anomalies, and 
counterexamples put forward against the theory of supply and 
demand, and the wages fund doctrine in the second half of the 
1860s. I have argued that this wave of criticism took place 
during a period when there was heightened public interest in 
the question of the role of the trades unions, and it was 
precisely in the context of the role of the trades unions 
that the critical work of Longe, Thornton and Mill was set. 
Having said this however, it is clear from the discussion of 
the last two chapters that the arguments and counterarguments 
were concerned with fundamental issues of economic theory. 
Thus while the events of the 1860s may have prompted the 
writers to reexamine the question of wages, the attacks on 
the two research programmes were made in terms of their
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internal logic and coherence, and the extent to which they 
could explain potential a n o m a l i e s .
In the last chapter I analysed the attacks on supply and 
demand theory by Thornton, and Mill's strong and robust 
defence. Here I argued that the arguments put forward by 
Thornton constituted powerful potential counterexamples to 
the Classical supply and demand research programme, and that 
Mill defended the programme rationally and carefully, 
employing the sort of strategies outlined by Lakatos in 
Proofs and Refutations. This debate was important for the 
later discussion of the wages fund doctrine because Mill 
asserted that the labour market was one of Thornton's 
excepted cases.
In this chapter I reviewed the work of Longe, Thornton, 
and Mill on the wages fund doctrine. I argued that the 
critics put up counterexamples to the key elements of the 
short run wages fund doctrine and that these were powerful
41 By contrast Forget [1990] has recently attempted to explain the 
recantation itself in terms of external history. Mill, she claims, 
recanted the doctrine in order to 'soften middle class opinion towards 
the position of the labour elite' [1990, p33], with the objective of 
building a consensus between the middle classes and labour intellectuals. 
Moreover, she argues, in order to be able to use political economy more 
effectively for social reform. Mill first had to wrest the wages fund 
doctrine from 'the hands of those who had long put half-under stood 
doctrines to ideological use' [1990, p35]. There are a number of
weaknesses with this account. First, a determination on Mill's part to 
change the attitudes of the middle classes does not account for the long 
and detailed theoretical critiques by Longe, Thornton and Mill. As
Biagini [1987, pp815-819] has pointed out, the trades unions were quite 
comfortable with the view of the wages fund doctrine expounded by Fawcett 
and Mill between 1860 and 1862. This view supported a legitimate role for 
trades unions in facilitating the operation of the labour market. Why did 
Mill simply not explain this revised view more carefully to a middle 
class audience? Secondly, Forget argues, unconvincingly, that Mill's 
motivation in recanting was not to criticize his own earlier views, but
to attack the vulgarization of the doctrine at the hands of those with
ideological aims. I agree that Mill may well have been reacting to 
earlier popularizations, but in recanting 'doctrine taught by all or most 
economists (including myself)' [Mill, 1869, p517]. Mill was also
referring to his own discussion of the short run wages fund which 
appeared in every edition of the Principles from 1848 until 1871, when it 
underwent minor modifications as a result of the recantation. What 
Thornton's critique prompted Mill to do was to address the fundamental 
theoretical weaknesses of the short run doctrine.
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enough to convince Mill that the doctrine was unsound and 
that in its current form had to be discarded. Against element 
(2) of the orthodox doctrine. Longe argued that wages were 
not entirely paid from capital and Mill agreed that 
capitalists income was a source of wages which unionists 
could bargain for. Mill, however, still maintained that wages 
were in the main paid out of capital and went on, as Thornton 
had done, to follow through the consequences for subsequent 
capital allocations to wages arising from reduced profits. 
Against element (3) of the orthodox doctrine. Longe, Thornton 
and Mill all argued that the demand for labour was perfectly 
inelastic with both Longe and Mill basing this on the notion 
of labour demand as derived demand. In addition. Mill exposed 
the flexibility of the money funds in the hands of 
capitalists which, given an inelastic demand curve for 
labour, could be bargained for by unionists with some 
prospects of increasing their real wages.
I have noted that these recantation arguments concerning 
the inelasticity of demand and the flexibility of money funds 
were focused on the short run i.e. within one production 
period. However where Thornton and Mill turned their 
attention to the argument that capital allocations to wages 
may be reduced in subsequent periods if profits are lowered 
as a result of union action, both were using a two period 
analysis. I have argued that none of their two period 
arguments cast doubt on or reduce in any way the force of the 
short run critiques. In addition to the short run and two 
period analyses Mill also examined the long run Malthusian 
aspects of the issue, and I argued there that Mill's approach
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did not undermine his earlier arguments and was consistent 
with them.
I have argued that Mill's recantation rested on two main 
counterarguments to the rigid wages fund doctrine. The first 
was that the elasticity of demand for labour in the 
productive sector was equal to zero and not unity as the 
wages fund doctrine implied.42 Secondly, the money funds in 
the hands of capitalists were flexible and could be bargained 
for by trades unionists up to a certain limit. Any increased 
money wages obtained by unionists would in the short run lead 
to increased real wages since prices would not be bid up in 
the way that McCulloch (and later Ekelund) suggested. These 
were powerful arguments which struck at the very hard core of 
the orthodox doctrine, and not surprisingly, given this. Mill 
was prepared to say that the wages fund doctrine must be 
abandoned. These developments were very much in line with a 
Lakatosian view of scientific change. Mill had behaved with 
the utmost care and caution in dealing with Thornton's 
attacks on supply and demand, and he defended that research 
programme rationally and carefully. The wages fund research 
programme could however no longer be defended. The argument 
about inelasticity relating to derived demand was persuasive 
and Mill was not prepared, for the reasons I have discussed, 
to employ the McCulloch 'defence' with regard to the 
dichotomy between money and real funds.
In addition to this there were some other Lakatosian 
elements in Mill's recantation. Thus while Mill said that the
42 Alfred Marshall in an early essay, written some time after 1870, was 
probably the first person to point out that the orthodox wages fund 
doctrine implied that the labour demand curve was a rectangular hyperbole 
- see J K Whitaker [1975, pl87]. In the same essay Marshall agreed that 
Mill had proved the falsity of the wages fund doctrine [1975, pl87].
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wages fund doctrine must be abandoned he was at the same time 
suggesting that it may be amended. Having just outlined the 
wages fund doctrine he confessed;
"I must plead guilty to having, along with the world in general, accepted 
the theory without the qualifications and limitations necessary to make 
it admissible"[1869, p515].
So although later he suggests that the theory must be thrown 
aside, here Mill is arguing that theory is potentially 
satisfactory or 'admissible' if only it could be augmented 
with certain extra arguments in the form of certain 
qualifications and limitations. This is very reminiscent of 
the approach that Mill took when dealing with Thornton's 
attack on supply and demand, the difference being that in the 
case of supply and demand he was able to counterattack and 
produce some of the qualifications and limitations which 
could keep it 'admissible', whereas in the case of the wages 
fund he was unable to do this. Nevertheless it reveals the 
reluctance on the part of Mill to completely abandon the 
theory in the absence of an alternative. Indeed the wording 
of this argument suggests the possibility of finding some 
theoretical amendment to the theory which, like the McCulloch 
strategy, would leave it intact but with a smaller content. 
Mill however did not take this any further and in the preface 
to the 1871 edition reported that the 'additional light' 
which had been thrown on the question of the influence of 
strikes on wages was 'not yet ripe for incorporation in a 
general treatise on political economy'[1871, CW, II, p.xciv]. 
A footnote to Thornton's work and to Mill's own review of 
this make it clear that it was the recantation debate that 
was being referred to here.
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Mill's views had begun to change in the early 1860s and 
the recantation was the culmination of this change. In 1869, 
unlike 1862, he was prepared to attack the wages fund 
doctrine itself, but he still felt unable to incorporate the 
critique into the last edition of the Principles. A small but 
very significant change was made to the text of the 1871 
edition, however, and it is worth comparing it with its 
predecessors in order to see just how far Mill had moved. In 
all the earlier editions Mill had written of attempts by 
workers to raise the general rate of wages:
"But if they aimed at obtaining actually higher wages than the rate fixed 
by demand and supply - the rate which distributes the whole circulating 
capital of the country among the entire working population - this could 
only be accomplished by keeping a part of their number permanently out of 
employment"[1848,49,52,57,62,65, CW, II, p930].
This was a straightforward application of the wages fund 
doctrine. After the recantation debate this passage was
changed to take account of Mill's central conclusion:
"They would also have a limited power of obtaining by combination, an 
increase of general wages at the expense of profits. But the limits of 
this power are narrow; and were they to strain it beyond those limits, 
this could only be accomplished by keeping a part of their number 
unemployed"[1871, CW, II, p930].
This altered passage stands as the only change Mill made to 
the Principles as a result of the debate, but in it is 
encapsulated the essence of the controversy. Gone is the 
mechanistic reference to the rate set by demand and supply 
which cannot be exceeded without unemployment; now the reader 
is told that combinations can raise wages at the expense of 
profits. The key theoretical point has been made - the wages 
fund was not rigid in the short run. But Mill, ever cautious, 
maintains that the power to do this is limited, and that if 
the limits are exceeded this will lead to unemployment. The 
limits are not set out, and perhaps the reference to limits
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is simply inserted to soften the impact of the changed
passage. Allied to this, the retention in the 1871 passage of 
the last part of the passage in more or less its original 
form, with its reference to unemployment, appears at first 
sight to maintain a rather strained continuity with the wages 
fund doctrine. But another interpretation is possible. In the 
recantation Mill spelt out how far profits can be reduced to 
make way for rising wages:
"The real limit to the rise is the practical consideration, how much 
would ruin him, or drive him to abandon the business, not the inexorable 
limits of the wages fund"[1869, p517].
If Mill's reference to limits in the Principles is an
implicit reference to this notion of a limit, then the 
continuity with the past is further weakened. Now the
reference to unemployment in the retained second half 
sentence has a different meaning. It now relates not to the 
unemployment caused in the current production period as a 
result of higher wages and a fixed wages fund, but to
unemployment caused in subsequent periods as firms were 
driven out of business.
Having said all of this, it is likely that Mill was
attempting to soften his position in the Principles relative
to the recantation. As Schwartz[1968, pl03] points out,
nowhere in the recantation does Mill refer to the limits of 
union action being 'narrow'. Also while a key theoretical 
point was made in the section on combinations. Mill did not 
see the need to amend his discussion of the wages fund 
doctrine in the formal analysis of wages in Book II of the 
P r i n c i p l e s . 4 3  M i l l  then, while recanting from orthodoxy.
43 In Book II chapter xi. Mill maintained throughout all editions that 
"Wages (meaning, of course, the general rate) cannot rise, but by an 
increase of the aggregate funds employed in hiring labourers, or a
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could not bring himself to abandon the theory completely and 
this is line with a Lakatosian interpretation.*4 Mill was a 
rational scientist who had dealt most cautiously and 
carefully with the criticisms of both supply and demand 
theory and the wages fund doctrine.45 He found the latter to 
be theoretically weak and thereby 'deprived of its scientific 
foundation' [1869, p517], but there was no alternative theory 
to which to turn. The bargaining model provided a useful 
explanation of wage determination at the level of the firm 
and the industry in situations where the competitive market 
mechanism was not working effectively. But the bargaining 
model could not, by definition, provide an improved 
explanation of the competitive determination of the wage 
rate. The attempts by Cairnes and others to resurrect the 
doctrine in the 1870s and 1880s failed, and Walker's work 
provided the stimulus for the search for new explanations. A 
content increasing theoretical change with regard to a
diminution in the number of competitors for hire; nor fall, except either 
by a diminution of the funds devoted to paying labour, or by an increase 
in the number of labourers to be paid"[1848, CW, II, p338].
44 In "Comte, Mill and Cairnes: The Posivitist-Empiricist Interlude in 
Late Classical Economics", Journal of Economic Issues, 1973, Ekelund and 
Olsen argued that, with regard to the labour market. Mill was locked in a 
'mental dichotomy'[ 1973, p395]. On the one hand he maintained a
theoretical position based on the wages fund doctrine, and on the other 
an empirical approach to labour issues influenced by Comte. The 
recantation is then seen as a temporary lapse from this dichotomy, with 
Mill returning to it in 1871 as the sentence quoted in the text 
shows[1973, pp395-396]. There are two difficulties with this
interpretation. First, Ekelund and Olsen provide no explanation for the 
timing of this lapse. Mill had apparently taken a Comtian view of the 
labour market for 'at least twenty-one years'[1973, p395] and thus his 
apparent change of mind with regard to Classical theory must have been 
conditioned by events in the late 1860s. Secondly, while Mill could not 
bring himself to abandon the wages fund doctrine completely, this is not 
to say that he withdrew the recantation, as my account has shown. The 
recantation therefore cannot be described as a 'temporary aberration' 
[1973, p395]. I have argued that a Lakatosian approach deals adequately 
with both these points.
43 This view contrasts with that of Stigler, who accused Mill of 
'scientific irresponsibility'[1968, plOO] in capitulating to a debating 
point 'without providing any coherent theory to replace the abandoned 
portion'[1968, plOO].
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competitive explanation of wage rate determination was only 
provided as a result of the subsequent development of 
marginal productivity theory.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS 
I Introduction
There is a fundamental question relating to the wages fund 
doctrine: was it rational for the Classical economists to
develop it and adhere to it? Viewed from the perspective of 
twentieth century economics the answer to this question 
should be no; the wages fund . doctrine judged from a 
neoclassical perspective was an erroneous and false theory. 
The overriding conclusion of this thesis is to argue the 
opposite; in Lakatosian terms the Classical economists did 
act rationally. The doctrine made theoretical progress in the 
absence of rivals and this provides a rational explanation 
for its success and longevity despite its weaknesses. It was 
also rational for Mill to refute the doctrine in the way that 
he did and for the reasons that he gave. The doctrine had 
stopped producing additional novel facts, and was vulnerable 
to the powerful attacks upon it by Longe, Thornton and Mill. 
Again it was equally rational that, having been refuted, it 
was not immediately abandoned, for there was no alternative. 
In short the wages fund doctrine was rationally developed and 
rationally criticized.
In coming to this overall conclusion I have examined the 
wages fund doctrine in some detail, and in the rest of this 
chapter I wish to draw together some of the key strands of 
the Lakatosian appraisal I have undertaken. I argued at the 
outset that there were two essential aspects of Lakatos' 
work. One was the rational reconstruction of history using 
the concepts and tools of the MSRP. The other was the role 
that completed rational reconstructions could play in 
assessing Lakatos' meta-methodology - MHRP. I intend to
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construct my review of the results of the Lakatosian history 
of the wages fund doctrine around these two related aspects 
of the Lakatosian project. In section one I will briefly 
review the more detailed arguments concerning the rational 
reconstruction of the wages fund doctrine developed in the 
thesis. I will argue that there is strong evidence of
Lakatosian processes at work. External history is important, 
however, and in section two I will review its role and the 
extent of its impact. Finally, in section three, I will
address the question of the significance of the rationally 
reconstructed history of the wages fund doctrine for Lakatos' 
methodology of historiographical research programmes.
II The History of the Wages Fund Doctrine Rationallv 
Reconstructed
The purpose of rational reconstruction is to reconstruct 
an internal history which provides a rational account of the 
growth of knowledge. Each methodology or theory of scientific 
rationality will have its own way of demarcating what is 
rational or internal from what is external. For the
methodology of scientific research programmes, rational
reconstruction or internal history emphasizes 'long—extended 
theoretical and empirical rivalry of major research
programmes, progressive and degenerating problemshifts, and 
the slowly emerging victory of one programme over the
other"[1971, pl05]. In previous chapters I have used various 
aspects of MSRP to rationally reconstruct the history of the
wages fund doctrine. In the remainder of this section I will
review the results which the analysis has achieved.
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(a) The Development of the Hard Core
In chapter three I developed a hypothetical hard core of 
the wages fund research programme which both reflected the 
views of the wages fund doctrine typically characterized in 
the history of economic thought and which also acted as the 
rationally reconstructed hard core of the programme. Armed 
with this reconstruction I was then able to assess the extent 
to which an actual hard core emerged which resembled this.
I argued that some elements of the short run hard core 
appeared in the work of Smith, Ricardo, and James Mill and 
that the short run hard core fully appeared in the work of 
Malthus. All the early writers did assume a point input - 
point output production function and also argued that wages 
were advanced from capital; what was missing in the work of 
Smith, Ricardo and James Mill was a clear statement that 
there was a predetermined wages fund and that the average 
wage rate could be found by dividing the amount of this fund 
by the number of workers. This element was present in 
Malthus' Essav in 1798, but the articulation of the hard core 
is less full and clear in Malthus' later Principles of 
Political Economy in 1820. Thus, during the period of the
early writers discussed in chapter three, the hard core had
not fully developed in the sense that a clear set of hard
core elements was subscribed to by the all the major 
Classical economists. Also during this period there is some 
evidence in Ricardo's work of an approach which ran counter 
to the wages fund doctrine. I argued in chapter four that the 
hard core became fully developed in the 1820s as a result of 
the work of Marcet and McCulloch, and from then on the major 
writers subscribed to the research programme.
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As far as the long run hard core was concerned, I argued 
that this was developed much earlier, and was present in the 
work of Smith, Malthus and Ricardo. This hard core which 
related the real wage rate in the long run to the 
relationship between the rate of capital accumulation and the 
rate of population growth was perfectly general and was 
consistent with a wide range of possible trends of real 
wages, capital accumulation and population growth. The early 
writers such as Malthus and Ricardo, I argued, adopted the 
auxiliary hypothesis that population will outstrip capital 
accumulation, and the version of wage theory which resulted 
from this was known as the ' Iron Law of Wages '. The auxiliary 
hypothesis, which existed in the protective belt of wage 
theory, was confronted with some theoretical and empirical 
evidence in the 1830's. As a result of this the later writers 
such as Senior and Mill adopted the alternative and opposite 
auxiliary hypothesis that capital will tend to outstrip 
population. This debate took place in the protective belt of 
wage theory and this accounts for the longevity of Classical 
economics in the face of empirical evidence against the 
Malthusian population argument. Quite simply, in Lakatosian 
terms, the long run hard core of the wage theory research 
programme remained untouched.
(b) The Rigid Wages Fund Doctrine: A Content-Decreasing
Response to a Counterexample 
In Proofs and Refutationsr19761. Lakatos outlined a number 
of responses a scientist may make when faced with a 
counterexample to a theorem. Chapter four presented a very 
clear example of a content decreasing strategy - that of 
lemma replacement. Confronted with the potential
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counterexample or 'monster' of money, Malthus and McCulloch 
argued that any increase in money wages would not alter real 
wages but merely lead to rising prices. What was missing 
explicitly from this but was nevertheless implicit was the 
assumption of zero cross-overs in consumption between workers 
and capitalists. This assumption was logically part of the 
now more rigid version of the wages fund doctrine which 
stated that the average wage rate for workers who are assumed 
to consume no luxuries is determined by dividing the 
predetermined wage fund by the labouring population. This 
assumption then, while not explicit, is nevertheless 
logically part of the rigid wages fund doctrine, and this 
accords with Lakatos' argument that if elements which 
rationally belong to a programme are missing, they should be 
included by the historian. Thus following Lakatos, I have not 
only selected the rational elements in the history of the 
wages fund doctrine but I have also provided a 'radically 
improved v e r s i o n . T h e  rationally reconstructed and 
radically improved short run wages fund doctrine was . from 
1825 onwards more rigid and robust, but also more limited in
scope. It was this rigid version of the wages fund doctrine 
that logically underpinned the case against trades union 
action. The rigid theory unambiguously predicted that strike 
action could not succeed in raising wages.
The major Classical economists, however, did not 
consistently adhere to the rigid version. I showed in chapter 
three that Ricardo allowed for luxury consumption by workers, 
thereby implicitly eschewing the lemma required by McCulloch. 
Mill's approach was a little more sophisticated as I argued
 ^ see above p33 and pllO.
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in chapter five. If workers were not fully supplied with wage 
goods the McCulloch effect would come into operation; if they 
already had enough wages goods, increased money wages could 
be spent on luxuries. The challenge posed by the 'monster' of 
money was thus not fully or consistently resolved, and the 
dichotomy in the hard core of the research programme 
remained.
(c) Theoretical Progress and Decline
According to MSRP, scientists will be behaving rationally 
as long as they adhere only to those theories which are 
making theoretical progress. Empirical confirmation is 
desirable, but not necessary as long as the theoretical 
progress is maintained. Thus if empirical confirmation is 
absent or even if there are occasional falsifications based 
on empirical evidence, these will not matter in the presence 
of continued theoretical progress.
The key indicator of theoretical progress is the 
production of novel facts, and in chapter five I analysed the 
extent to which the wages fund doctrine was progressive. I 
accepted and employed the Zahar-Worrall definition of a novel 
fact as a statement or prediction which was not used in the 
construction of the theory. Given this definition I showed 
that the wages fund generated a number of these at the hands 
of Senior and Mill in the 1830s and 1840s. This wide range of 
applications and predictions constitutes powerful evidence of 
theoretical progress, and indicates that the political 
economists were being rational in sticking to the wages fund 
research programme even though there were potential problems 
with the hard core. It is also important to note that many of 
these predictions were produced as a result of addressing
8: Conclusions 327
arguments against the wages fund doctrine; thus some of the 
novel facts were produced in response to counterexamples. 
Here again it is possible to see the important links between 
Lakatos' earlier work on responses to counterexamples and his 
later work on theoretical progress.
The success of the wages fund research programme as judged 
by the production of novel facts also helps to explain the 
lack of impact of the early criticisms of the 1820s. There 
are three points here. First, most of the early criticisms 
were not persuasive as I noted in chapter four. Secondly, 
there was one argument, that of Thomas Hodgskin which did 
represent a powerful potential critique. Hodgskin argued very 
convincingly against the point input-point output production 
function upon which the wages fund doctrine rested. However, 
this criticism was directed at the hard core and one would 
therefore expect it to be ignored by adherents of the 
programme. Finally, and most importantly, rational 
reconstruction of the wages fund doctrine provides evidence 
of the tremendous potential that the research programme 
offered despite the problem with the hard core posed by the 
'monster of money'. An important prediction (postdiction) of 
the MSRP is that no rational scientist will abandon such a 
promising programme in its early stages, as a result of an 
attack on the hard core which according to the negative 
heuristic should be ignored anyway.^  The wages fund research
Hands [1990, p77] has recently criticized Blaug [1990a, plOl] for 
suggesting a connection between positive appraisal and psychological 
acceptance of the theory by the scientists of the day. But as Blaug 
[1990, ppl02-13] points out in reply to Hands [1990, p77], Lakatos did 
argue that the MSRP can be defended in terms of the history of science. 
Thus the behaviour of scientists is to be assessed in terms of the 
rational reconstructions of past theories. Thus Lakatos argued;"But the 
methodology of research programmes draws a demarcation between internal 
and external history which is markedly different from that drawn by other 
rationality theories. For instance, what for the falsificationist looks
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programme exhibited much promise in the 1820s and went on to 
fulfil this promise by producing a wide range of novel facts. 
Under these circumstances it was entirely rational that the 
dichotomy between real and money was ignored.
(d) The Recantation Debate Rationallv Reconstructed
I have argued that the recantation debate rationally 
reconstructed fell into two parts. On the one hand there was 
the attack by Thornton on the theory of supply and demand; on 
the other hand there were the critiques of the wages fund 
doctrine developed by Longe, Thornton and Mill.
In chapter six I showed that Thornton's criticisms of 
supply and demand analysis could be analyzed using the 
concepts developed by Lakatos in Proofs and Refutations. 
Thornton's various examples were dealt with by Mill in a 
number of ways including 'exception-barring' and 'monster— 
adjustment'. Mill rejected all of Thornton's criticisms of 
supply and demand with the exception of the argument relating 
to coincidental schedules, and this one was fundamental to 
Mill's later critique of the wages fund doctrine. Mill's 
behaviour here provides more evidence for the Lakatosian 
view. Thornton's arguments were potential counterexamples and 
Mill took them seriously, employing a number of strategies to 
rebut them. The emphasis throughout was on theoretical 
argument and counterargument and the debate was carried on 
rationally and cautiously.
The wages fund debate itself also provides powerful 
evidence for a Lakatosian interpretation of the development 
of science. Longe, Thornton and Mill all disobeyed the
like the (regrettably frequent) phenomenon of irrational adherence to a 
'refuted' or to an inconsistent theory and which he therefore relegates 
to external history, may well be explained in terms of my methodology 
internally as a rational defence of a promising research programme" 
[1978, plOl].
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negative heuristic and presented counterexamples to the hard 
core of the research programme. Thus both Longe and Mill 
disputed the core argument that wages are paid from capital, 
and Longe, Thornton and Mill all argued against the notion 
that the wages fund was predetermined. In addition to this 
the 'monster' of money reappeared. Mill argued that all of a 
capitalist's income was potentially available to be bargained 
for and in this context he did not employ the McCulloch 
argument. These arguments exposed fundamental weaknesses with 
the hard core, but despite this and despite the fact that the 
hard core had been attacked and the negative heuristic 
disobeyed. Mill did not abandon the short run theory 
altogether. There was no alternative theory available to take 
its place and Mill seemed to hope that some amendment could 
be made to the wages fund doctrine which would deal with the 
anomalies which he had outlined. However, the fact that 
Longe, Thornton and Mill had made convincing attacks on the 
hard core itself made the prospect of any content increasing 
theoretical change unlikely, and indeed no such changes were 
ever made to the wages fund research programme. In the end, 
of course, the wages fund research programme was abandoned in 
favour of a new research programme based on marginal 
productivity theory.^ Again all of this provides convincing 
evidence in favour of a Lakatosian interpretation; scientists 
do not immediately abandon refuted theories in the absence of 
any viable alternative.
3 The debate initiated by Walker, to which I referred in chapter seven 
(see above p308), led eventually to the development of marginal 
productivity theory by J B Clarke and others in the late 1880s and 1890s. 
See Gordon[1973, pp31-33] on the links between the wages fund debate and 
the development of marginal productivity theory.
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III The Role of External History
I argued that a rigid version of the wages fund doctrine 
was available after 1825 although the political economists 
themselves did not consistently adhere to it. It was this 
version, however, which underlay the arguments against 
strikes and union action put forward by the popularizers of 
political economy in newspapers, novels, novelizations and at 
lectures and talks to the workers. The anti-union message was 
put confidently and robustly, and rested on the logic of the 
rigid doctrine, but the underlying theory was not usually 
spelt out. One exception to this was found in the work of 
Harriet Martineau which, as I showed in chapter five, 
explicitly dealt with the wages fund doctrine and the 
McCulloch case.4 The wages fund doctrine then had an 
important external existence at the hands of the popularizers 
of political economy.5
External history was also important in determining the 
timing of the recantation debate. Events and developments 
relating to the trades unions in the 1860s undoubtedly 
stimulated Longe, Thornton and Mill to pay attention to the 
union issue, although the arguments they put forward were 
theoretical. Thus, while according to my argument, the 
history of the theoretical debate concerning the wages fund
As I pointed out in chapter four, the Classical economists themselves 
did not in the main use the wages fund doctrine against the unions. Both 
McCulloch and Torrens argued that unions had a useful role and could 
bargain for higher wages if profits were above their natural rate. See 
above ppl23-136.
3 See Biagini [1987] for an interesting discussion of of the impact of 
the wages fund recantation on trades' union attitudes after 1870. Biagini 
argues that the trades unions had accepted the old wages fund doctrine, 
as amended by Fawcett and Mill in the 1860s, because this doctrine 
justified many of their attitudes to bargaining. So imbued with the old 
doctrine had they become, Biagini argues, that at first the trades 
unionists were reluctant to adopt the new 'recantation' approach for fear 
of provoking a reaction from Liberals and Conservatives [1987, p815].
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doctrine must be accounted for in terms of internal history, 
the crucial and final wave of criticism and counterargument 
were prompted by external events.
IV The Wages Fund Doctrine as a Historical Novel Fact
In claiming rationality for the Classical economists I am 
not making any claims for the absolute truth or falsity of 
the wages fund doctrine. Rationality here is being judged 
from within a particular methodology - the MSRP. The wages 
fund doctrine is false if assessed from the perspective of 
neoclassical economics, and the significance of the wages 
fund for Lakatos ' MHRP is reinforced by this fundamental 
point. I have shown that the Classical economists were 
rational in developing and adhering to a theory which by 
modern standards is erroneous. The rational reconstruction I 
have undertaken constitutes, in Lakatosian terms, an 
historical novel fact which lends support for the MHRP. I 
would wish to argue that this is a particularly strong, rich 
and fruitful example. This particular case study embraces the 
development of the research programme, its theoretical 
progress and decline, and its very controversial and explicit 
recantation. Few, if any, other episodes in the history of 
economics contain all these elements, all of which are 
explained by and are in turn provide evidence for the 
Lakatosian framework I have applied.
As I pointed out in chapter two the methodology of 
historiographical research programmes seeks to provide a 
framework in which rival theories of rationality can be 
compared. One methodology will be judged to be more 
progressive than another if it can rationally reconstruct 
more novel 'historical' facts, thereby paralleling at the
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meta-level the criterion of novel facts pertaining at the 
lower level. On this basis, Lakatos argued [1971a, pll7], 
MSRP will be judged more progressive than falsificationism. 
Central to this issue is the question of the relationship 
between internal and external history. Thus the reason why 
MHRP reconstructs more historical novel facts is that it 
interprets more of the history of science as internal 
history. This is very much the case with the wages fund 
research programme. A falsificationist would find it 
i^^s-tional that economists continued to support the wages 
fund doctrine after the early attack by the Ricardian 
Socialists, and in face of the inconsistency created by the 
monster of money'. In a Lakatosian framework these are 
explained by internal history as we have seen. Again, a 
falsificationist would seek external explanations — old age, 
a feeling' that he had gone too far — for Mill's failure to 
make more than minor changes to the 1871 edition of the 
Principles. Again I have argued that this is capable of 
in terms of internal history. More of the history 
wages fund doctrine has been reconstructed as rational 
internal, and this in turn provides more support for MHRP 
itself.
Lakatos argued that a general definition of science 'must 
reconstruct the acknowledgedly best gambits as "scientific": 
if it fails to do so, it has to be rejected" [1971a, pl24]. 
•Although expunged from current theory, the wages fund 
doctrine was one of economics' best gambits in the nineteenth 
century, holding sway, when fully formed, for over fifty 
years. I have reconstructed it as scientific, and in doing so
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have shown that the methodology of historiographical research 
programmes continues to make theoretical progress.
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